

GAZETTEER  
OF THE  
PERSIAN GULF,  
'OMĀN,  
AND  
CENTRAL ARABIA

BY  
J. G. LORIMER, C.I.E.  
INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

VOL. I  
HISTORICAL.

PART II



CALCUTTA  
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA  
1915

CENTRE FOR ARAB GULF STUDIES  
UNIVERSITY OF EXETER

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Reprinted from an original  
in the India Office Library

ISBN

Complete set 0 576 03451 7 and 0 7165 0993 8  
This volume 0 576 03454 1 and 0 7165 1323 4

Republished in 1970 by Gregg International Publishers Limited  
Westmead, Farnborough, Hants., England  
and  
Irish University Press, Shannon, Ireland

Reprinted 1983 by Demand Reprints,  
P.O. Box 123, Amersham, England.  
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## INTRODUCTION.

THE Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Omān and Central Arabia consists of two volumes, the first volume being a history of the Persian Gulf Region and its surrounding countries, the second a geographical dictionary covering the same area.

The second volume was published in 1908. The first volume had been all but completed for the Press by the late Mr. Lorimer at the time of his death in the beginning of 1914, the only portions in fact of the work then remaining to be written being the "Introduction and the Table of contents." These have been prepared and the volume completed for the Press by the undersigned.

The explanation of the "system of transliteration" referred to in the last paragraph of the introduction to the second volume, has for convenience of binding been formed into a separate note and will be found as Appendix S at page 2737 of Part II of this volume.

A full explanation as to the division and contents of the second volume has been given by Mr. Lorimer in the introduction to that work and it only remains therefore to give a similar explanation in regard to Volume I.

Volume I has been divided into twelve chapters geographically: Chapter 1 deals with the Persian Gulf region as a whole and the remaining chapters with each of the main political divisions in turn into which that region is divided, commencing with 'Oman, continuing with the States on the Western shores of the Gulf, Central Arabia, Turkish Iraq, the Persian districts on the eastern shores of the Gulf and ending with the chapter on Makrân.

Each of the above chapters has been sub-divided into certain definite "periods" covering in some cases the reign of a Shâh or Sultân, the rule of a Shaikh, the regime of a Viceroy, and in others arbitrary divisions of time based on outstanding land-marks in the history of the State concerned.

Each of these "periods" follows similar though not identical lines, referring in turn to the topics most prominent during the particular "period" under review.

Under such a system it follows necessarily that a topic of considerable prominence during one period may have no sequel in the period immediately following though it may possibly be, and often is, continued in a later one.

In order therefore to enable the reader to follow up the thread of any one particular subject a "detailed table of contents" has been prepared on the following lines.

The various "periods" in each chapter have been given a number. Each period has again been sub-divided into "subject headings" each of which has been lettered.

When any particular subject is continued in a later period an entry to that effect in italics immediately below the "subject heading" concerned has been made, giving the number of the "period" and the letter of the "subject heading" in which the continuation will be found.

It should be noted however that though the above system has been found capable of application in the majority of chapters and periods, instances occur throughout the volume in which special subjects (especially British policy and relations) are so inextricably woven into the general history of the State under review that no definite sub-division of its "periods" into "subject headings" is possible and in such cases the sequel to a particular subject can only be traced by a careful perusal of the general text.

In addition to the twelve chapters referred to above Volume I includes a number of Appendices, also written by the late Mr. Lorimer dealing separately with subjects of special importance or interest in the Persian Gulf Region, and also a series of genealogical trees of the ruling families of States in the same area.

A table of chapters, annexures, appendices and genealogical trees will be found at page 5 and the "detailed table of contents" at page 9.

For convenience of binding Volume I has been divided into three parts.

Part I consists of the first nine chapters, *i.e.*, the General History of the Persian Gulf Region, the Histories of 'Oman, of the Arab States on the western shores of the Persian Gulf, of Central Arabia and of Turkish 'Iraq, in fact of what may conveniently be termed the "Arabian" portion of the Volume.

Part II consists of the remaining three chapters, *i.e.*, of the Histories of 'Arabistan, of the Persian Coast and Islands, and of Makran, in other words of the "Persian" section of the work and of the Appendices.

For facility of reference, the "Introduction," the "Table of chapters" and the "detailed table of contents" have been prefixed to both Parts I and II.

Part III consists of a portfolio containing genealogical trees, maps, etc.

L. BIRDWOOD.

SIMLA;

10th October 1914.

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## PART I.

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AND  
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I  
HISTORICAL  
Part 1 B

## CHAPTER IV.

## HISTORY OF QATAR.\*

**Qatar the head-quarters of the Āl Khalifah section of the 'Utūb, 1766-1782.**

The modern history of Qatar opens with the settlement at Zubārah, upon the western shore of the promontory, of immigrants from Kuwait—the whole Āl Khalifah division, namely, of the 'Utūb. It is stated that, at the arrival of the 'Utūb in Qatar in 1766, Huwailah, inhabited by Āl Musallam of the Bani Khālid stock, was the largest place on the coast; but Fuwairat and Dōhah also existed, the former being occupied by Ma'ādhid and other Āl Bin-'Alī, and the latter by Sūdān refugees from the Pirate Coast. The Āl Khalifah were followed to Zubārah at a short interval by their kinsmen the Jalāhimah, another division of the tribe, whom they at first hospitably received; but dissensions shortly broke out, resulting in the secession of the Jalāhimah to the neighbouring village of Ruwais, where they addicted themselves to piracy and were afterwards all but exterminated by the Āl Khalifah and by others whom the Āl Khalifah called in to their assistance. After this event the remnant of the Jalāhimah appear to have transferred themselves from Ruwais to the adjacent port of Khor Hassān.

The growth of Zubārah was greatly stimulated by the Persian occupation of Basrah between 1776 and 1779, during which a number of Basrah merchants together with fugitives from Kuwait resided temporarily at Zubārah and the pearl trade and the general trade of Eastern Arabia with

Settlement  
of the 'Utūb  
at Zubārah,  
1766.

Injury to  
Persian in-  
terests from  
the growth  
of Zubārah.

\* Apart from the records of the Government of India there are few sources of information regarding the history of Qatar, and such works as do exist are compilations from those records. The principal authorities for earlier times are *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; and a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906: those for a more recent period are a *Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1804-1904*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1904; a *Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Qatar Affairs, 1873-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1866, throws some light on the condition of Qatar in 1863; and Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, gives some details of British naval operations not to be found elsewhere. The single Agreement relating to Qatar will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*.

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Republished in 1970 by Gregg International Publishers Limited  
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Printed in Holland

India to a considerable extent centred there; and in 1779 the Imām of 'Omān sent a ship to Zubārah upon some friendly errand. In these circumstances the reduction of Zubārah became an object of importance to the Persian Government; and under their instructions several attempts, commencing in 1777, were made upon the place by the Shaikh of Būshehr, but without success. In 1780, possibly in the same connection, but more probably in consequence of piracies committed by the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān, that tribe were at war with the 'Utūb, both of Zubārah and of Kuwait. At length in 1782, emboldened perhaps by the increasing difficulties of the Zand rulers of Shirāz, the 'Utūb of Zubārah ventured to retaliate by an incursion into the island of Bahrain, where much damage was done by them to the town of Manāmāh, and whence they carried off a Būshehr vessel that had come to fetch the annual tribute paid by the islands to Persia. The military danger from the existence of Zubārah to the Persian position in Bahrain was thus made fully apparent.

'Alī Murād Khān, the ruler of Shirāz, immediately ordered Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr to organise, with the help of the petty rulers of Rīg, Ganāveh, Dashtistān and other places on the coast, a strong expedition against Zubārah; and a force of 2,000 men was accordingly embarked for this service under the command of Muhammad, a nephew of Shaikh Nāsir. The Persian fleet at first blockaded Zubārah, and negotiations ensued in which the rôle of mediator was assumed by Rāshid-bin-Matar, the retired Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; but the utmost that the 'Utūb would concede was the return of the plunder which they had taken in Bahrain. This offer having been declined, the Persian troops were disembarked and proceeded to attack the Zubārah fort; but, being met on shore by a force much larger than they had expected, they were routed and driven to their ships with heavy loss. Shaikh Muhammad, who commanded, as well as a nephew of Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Matar and some notables of Hormūz, who had accompanied the expedition, were among the slain in this disaster. Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr and Shaikh Rāshid met after this at 'Asalu on the Persian coast, where they endeavoured, but without success, to equip a second expedition.

A month or two later, the Persian garrison of Bahrain having succumbed to the 'Utūb of Zubārah, to whose assistance their brethren of Kuwait had in the meantime arrived, the islands passed under the sway of the 'Utūb and became, instead of Zubārah, the principal seat of their Shaikhs. Ahmad-bin-Khalifah was the first of the 'Atbi chiefs that ruled over Bahrain.

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### Affairs during the ascendancy of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Qatar, 1783-1816.

The Jalāhimah, under the sons of a Shaikh named Jābir, had taken their part with the other 'Utūh in the conquest of Bahrain; but after the victory, conceiving themselves to have been slighted or insufficiently rewarded, they appear to have sojourned for a time on Khārag Island and at Būshehr. Subsequently they returned to Qatar, where they settled at Khor Hassān; and at that place a contest for the chief power in the section took place between 'Abdullah, an elder son, and Rahmah, a younger son, of Shaikh Jābir. The dispute was eventually decided in favour of Rahmah; and 'Abdullah at some time before 1810 fled to Masqat, where he died, to seek the assistance of Saiyid Sa'id against his brother. The power of Rahmah in Qatar was, however, at no time universal, and it did not at first extend even to Zubārah, which was in the immediate vicinity of his own headquarters. In 1805 an 'Atbi Shaikh of Zubārah, evidently not Rahmah, joined with the 'Atbi Shaikh of Kuwait in seeking British aid against the Wahhābis.

Settlement  
of Rahmah  
at Khor  
Hassān, 1783  
or later.

Zubārah was at this time a larger and more important place than Qatif; and in 1790 foreign merchants enjoyed complete protection there, and there were no customs duties. The share of the Arahs of Qatar in the pearl fisheries was at this time small.

The name of Rahmah-bin-Jābir soon became notorious as that of a daring and successful freebooter, by whose depredations the Persians and the 'Utūh other than the Jalāhimah were the chief sufferers. In 1809, shortly before the despatch of the first British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, reprisals against Khor Hassān were attempted by a Persian fleet from Būshehr; but Rahmah, reinforced by his sympathisers the Qawāsīm, defeated the expedition and even captured some of the enemy's vessels. Towards the end of 1809 he was reported to have taken 20 Batils owned by the 'Utūb while at sea on their way from Kuwait to Masqat; and in this affair a son of 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, was killed in charge of the convoy. In revenge for the death of the latter a naval attack on Khor Hassān was threatened by the 'Utūb of Kuwait, but was not, apparently, made. The exploits of Rahmah, though in some cases piratical, were performed as a rule under pretext of lawful warfare; and towards the subjects and officials of the British Government, even at a period when

Naval depredations by  
Rahmah,  
1783-1809.

no respect was shown for them by the Qawāsīm, his conduct was scrupulously correct. On one occasion he was stated to have shown "remarkable . . . forbearance towards the *Augusta* Cruizer, when in the power of his fleet."

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By 1809 Rahmah had entered into close relations with the Wāhhābī power and controlled, in conjunction with their emissaries, even the town of Zubārah; the latter circumstance would seem to mark a recent growth of his power, for in 1800-02 some of the 'Atbi chiefs expelled from Bahrain by Saiyid Sultān of Masqat had been able, in spite of their enmity with Rahmah, to take refuge at Zubārah and engage there in negotiations for assistance by the Wāhhābīs in recovering Bahrain. In consequence partly of the intimacy of Rahmah with the Wāhhābīs, a collision with whom the British Government were anxious to avoid, and partly of his irreproachable attitude towards British interests, it was decided, in connection with the Rās-al-Khaimah expedition of 1809, to abstain if possible from direct action against him. At one time indeed it was intended to require, from whichever of the two Jalāhimah brothers might be found in possession of Khor Hassān, a written undertaking to desist at least from giving "employment or active support" to the Qawāsīm, who were said to have resorted there from Rās-al-Khaimah, and in event of refusal "Khor Hassān and its maritime and piratical equipments" were to be destroyed; but in the end even these conditions were apparently waived in deference to the opinion of the naval and military commanders of the British expedition and of General Malcolm, then British Envoy to Persia. Mr. N. H. Smith, Political Resident at Būshehr, who had not perhaps been informed of the decision, would have sent a force to Khor Hassān for the purpose of destroying Rahmah's vessels; but the movement was disallowed and action prevented by the Government of Bombay with the concurrence of the Government of India.

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In 1809, as already indicated, the Wāhhābīs with the support of Rahmah brought Qatar strictly under their own rule; Bahrain soon succumbed to the powerful Wāhhābī influences which were then directed on it from Zubārah and Qatif; and in 1810 a Wāhhābī governorship of Qatif, Qatar and Bahrain, with headquarters in Bahrain, was instituted and conferred upon one 'Abdullah-bin-'Ufaisān. Under the aegis of the Wāhhābī power, Rahmah assisted by boats from the Pirate Coast proceeded, soon after the conclusion of the British operations at Rās-al-Khaimah, to atrocities of increasing gravity; he captured 18 loaded vessels belonging to the 'Utūb of Zubārah and Bahrain; he took a ship and several smaller vessels belonging to Masqat, Kangūn, Būshehr and other ports of

which, with a very few exceptions, he put the crews to death: in short, he created a reign of terror in the Gulf. In May 1811 Rahmah made a piratical cruise of some importance, on which he was accompanied by a fleet from the town of 'Ajmān; but the star of his Wāhhābī patrons was now temporarily declining, and events soon occurred which obliged him to become more circumspect.

In 1811, the power of the Wāhhābīs in Eastern Arabia having been greatly weakened by events upon the western frontier of their empire, Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat attacked them in Qatar by means of a naval expedition, expelled their garrisons from Zubārah and Khor Hassān, and destroyed the former of those two places by fire. The result appears to have been the evacuation by the Wāhhābīs not of Qatar only but also of Bahrain, where their governor of Hasa, Qatar and Qatif was taken prisoner, and the restoration of the sovereignty of the Āl Khalifah. Rahmah, who represented the Wāhhābī power at sea in this part of the Gulf, fought a desperate action with the fleet of the 'Utūb and sustained a decided reverse; and about this time, or soon after, he seems to have transferred his headquarters from Qatar to Dammām on the coast of Hasa.

In 1813 Rahmah, whose respect for the British name was as inalterable as his hatred for the 'Utūb of Bahrain, unwittingly committed a piracy on a Baghlah from Basrah freighted with horses belonging to the East India Company; but, on discovering the mistake, he made arrangements for forwarding the animals to Bombay, where they all eventually arrived in safety.

#### Removal of Rahmah-bin-Jābir from Qatar and his proceedings until the second British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1816-20.

In 1816, or possibly earlier, Rahmah somewhat suddenly disassociated himself from the Wāhhābī cause and joined the ruler of Masqat. This change of sides appears to have been due not to inconstancy on his part, but rather to the implacability of his resentment against the 'Utūb of Bahrain, between whom and Saiyid Sa'id, formerly allies, enmity had now arisen; and Saiyid Sa'id appears to have intended, had he been successful in his attack on Bahrain in 1816, to set Rahmah-bin-Jābir in the place of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs. The Wāhhābīs and the Qawāsīm, as friends of the Āl Khalifah, now became the enemies and the victims of Rahmah; while the Wāhhābī Amir, annoyed at Rahmah's desertion

Expulsion of  
the Wāhhābīs  
from Qatar,  
1811.

Migration  
of Rahmah  
from Dam-  
mām to  
Būshehr.  
1816.

of his case, persecuted him by every available means. In July 1816 a fort which Rahmah had constructed at Dammām on the coast of Hasa was blown up by the Wahhābis; not without difficulty he rescued his family and effects at Khor Hassān, the removal of which to Dara'iyah had been directed by the Amir; and at length, in October 1816, he arrived at Būshehr as a fugitive and an exile, accompanied by about 500 families and bringing with him, besides smaller boats, two very large Baghlahs, a great Batil and several Baqarāhs. To the present day the western and northern coasts of Qatar are dotted with the remains of forts attributed to Rahmah.

Rahmah's relations with Masqat and war with the Qawāsim, 1817.

The proceedings of this restless individual during the next two years form properly no part of the history of Qatar; but still less do they enter into that of any other district. At Būshehr Rahmah was well received by Shaikh Muhammad, the Governor, who assigned a quarter for his residence and that of his dependents; nor did he delay to visit the British Resident, to whom he professed friendship for the British Government and readiness to be employed in fighting the Qawāsim, whose day of reckoning was now at hand.

Saiyid Sa'id was anxious that Rahmah should become a subject of Masqat and settle in some part of 'Omān; but the pirate, who regarded his patron as disgraced by the failure of the expedition against Bahrain in 1816, declined the proposal. In 1817, however, Rahmah visited Masqat with the object of inducing Sa'id to renew his attempts on Bahrain; but he found the Saiyid occupied with various internal difficulties.

In 1817 Rahmah made a highly successful cruise against the Qawāsim and captured twelve of their boats while engaged in carrying supplies from Bahrain to Rās-al-Khaimah; four of these he brought back with him to Būshehr, and eight he sank or destroyed, for want of crews to man them, after removing part of the cargoes.

In 1818 Rahmah removed again from Būshehr to Dammām; and thenceforward he may be regarded as connected with the province of Hasa rather than with Qatar.

It was expected in 1819 that Rahmah, either on his own account or under the auspices of Masqat, would join the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, and it was resolved to accept his services should they be offered; but Rahmah, who never lost sight of his main object—the humiliation of the 'Utūb of Bahrain—and with whom the punishment of the Qawāsim was a merely secondary matter, did not come forward. Instead, in February 1820, when the Prince Governor of Fārs was endeavouring to organise an expedition against Bahrain in

Migration of Rahmah from Būshehr to Dammām, 1819.

British dealings with Rahmah in connection with the Rās-al-Khaimah expedition of 1819-20.

order to anticipate the designs of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in that quarter, Rahmah crossed the Gulf to Būshehr and placed himself with three vessels at the disposal of the Persians. On the 10th of February he sailed from Būshehr for Tāhiri to join the Prince Governor; but on the way his largest Baghlah was wrecked upon a shoal near Bardistān, Rahmah and his companions barely escaping with their lives,—an accident which seems to have put an end to the enterprise in so far as he was concerned. During these proceedings an order for the destruction of Rahmah's vessels had been issued by General Sir W. Grant Keir, the commander of the British expedition; but, as Rahmah was found to be at the time in the employment of the Shirāz Government, it was decided to postpone action. On the 13th of April 1820 Rahmah was again at Būshehr, where he was invited by the Resident to become a party to the General Treaty of Peace. He declined, pleading that he was now a servant of the Governor-General of Shirāz; and this excuse, on its being corroborated by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who also undertook to be answerable for Rahmah's future conduct, was accepted as sufficient by the British authorities.

### British Relations, 1821-23.

In 1821 in consequence of piracies committed by the inhabitants, the town of Bida' (now Dōhah) was destroyed by the East India Company's cruiser "Vestal," and three or four hundred of the people migrated temporarily to the islands between Qatar and the Pirate Coast.

Punishment of piracy, 1821.

In January 1823, in the course of his voyage of discovery along the Arabian coast which is more fully described \* in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Lieutenant McLeod, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, paid a visit to Dōhah (then Bida') on the eastern side of Qatar; he found the place, which was admittedly a dependency of Bahrain and therefore subject to the provisions of the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, under the administration of a Shaikh of the Āl Bū Āinain. Dōhah was at this time the only port in Qatar which possessed any trading vessels; but the requirements of the Treaty in regard to flags and the registry of vessels were not observed by the inhabitants, who appeared to be ignorant of its terms. Lieutenant McLeod, however, obtained a list of the shipping; and, on his arrival in Bahrain a few days later, he made representations to the Shaikh which, it was thought, would secure a proper observance of the

Visit of the Resident to Qatar, 1823.

\* Vide page 677 ante.



Treaty in Qatar.\* A British marine survey of the Qatar coast and of the waters to the east of it was at this time in progress, and the operations were assisted by the Shaikhs of the littoral to the best of their ability.

### General history of Qatar from the Resident's visit in 1823 to the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840.

Between the Resident's visit in 1823 and the close of the Egyptian occupation of Hasa in 1840 the affairs of Qatar attracted little attention. Such matters as came to notice related either to the sovereignty of the Bahrain Shaikh over the promontory or to attacks committed by the inhabitants, or by piratical refugees, upon boats belonging to other parts of the Gulf.

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Although the authority of the Shaikh of Bahrain in Qatar was not at this period questioned, and although the Shaikh was generally able to expel those who resisted it, his writ cannot be said to have run freely.

1828. An inhabitant of Bahrain having been stabbed by Muhammad-bin-Khamis, the headman of the Āl Bū 'Ainain of Dōhah, the Shaikh of Bahrain caused the offender to be placed in confinement; his tribe revolted; and in May 1828 Shaikh 'Abdullah, after destroying the fort of the Āl Bū 'Ainain at Dōhah, removed them to the villages of Ruwais and Fuwairat, where they came more directly under his control.

1833. In 1833, and perhaps for some time previously, Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir, resided on the coast of Qatar for the purpose of watching the proceedings of the Wahhābis, a rupture with whom he was meditating.

1835. In 1835, as related in the history of Bahrain, the people of Huwailah rebelled against the authority of the ruler of Bahrain, opened a correspondence with the Wahhābis, and were abetted in their revolt by Almad and by another undutiful son of Shaikh Abdullah. By the mediation of Saiyid Hilāl, a son of Saiyid Sa'īd of Masqat, a settlement was arranged between the Shaikh and his rebellious subjects: the conditions were that

\* The registration of ships, as observed in the history of Trucial 'Omān, ultimately proved to be impracticable and was abandoned; but, in view of the indefinite status, replete with political difficulties into which the Qatar promontory has now lapsed, it is much to be regretted that our officers did not continue to insist, as they did in Trucial 'Omān, on the use of the Trucial flag. In this there could have been no real difficulty so long as Qatar remained under the Shaikha of Bahrain; and the maintenance of the flag might have stereotyped the dependence of Qatar on Bahrain, and with it the principle of British control over Qatar.

each party should retain the advantages acquired during the war, but that Huwailah should be evacuated and demolished, and that the inhabitants should remove to Bahrain and settle there under a guarantee by the Saiyid of Masqat for their personal safety. The agreement was almost immediately violated by Shaikh 'Abdullah's nephews and other partisans, who incited some members of the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe to make a raid on Huwailah; and this affair, in which a boat was sunk and a dependent of 'Isa-bin-Tarif, a leading man among the people of Huwailah, was killed, and for which Shaikh 'Abdullah refused to make reparation, led to the secession of 'Isa-bin-Tarif, accompanied by a number of the Āl Bin Ali and Āl Bū 'Ainain, to Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Oman. The British Resident in the Gulf, however, forbade the seceders to use Abu Dhabi as a base for operations against Bahrain, except on the condition that the Shaikh of that place consented to make common cause with them and to declare war against the Shaikh of Bahrain,—a condition which was not fulfilled; and the subsequent proceedings of the emigrants, described in the history of the Bahrain Shaikhdōm, did not affect the promontory of Qatar.

In 1836 and 1837, as mentioned in the history of Bahrain, Shaikh 1836-37. 'Abdullah seems to have entertained an idea of retiring from the midst of the family conflicts by which he was surrounded in Bahrain to a safer and more peaceful abode at Khor Hassān in Qatar, and he even made preparations for the move; but he does not appear to have carried his purpose into effect until some time afterwards.

In 1839, in consequence of relations lately formed by the Shaikh of 1839-40. Bahrain with the Egyptian Military Commander in Hasa, the inhabitants of Qatar became exposed to fresh exactions; and their discontent reached such a pitch that the Āl Bū Kuwārah, whose principal settlement was Fuwairat, applied for leave to remove from the country and to settle elsewhere under the protection of the British Government. At the end of 1839 or beginning of 1840, on some of the Na'im of Qatar refusing to pay Zakāt which had been demanded of them by the Egyptians through the Shaikh of Bahrain, Muhammad Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Hasa, despatched a party of regular troops, assisted by Bedouins of the Makhadhhabah division of the Bani Hājir, to lay waste their country; but the assassination of the Governor in the neighbourhood of Hofuf obliged the expedition to return prematurely without effecting anything.

During the first part of the period now in question, some insecurity was created at sea by Bani Yās refugees from Abu Dhabi who had settled temporarily in Qatar. The first of these to arrive was Muhammad-bin-Shakhbūt, who had himself been deposed in 1818 from the Abu Dhabi

Maritime  
irregularities  
committed  
by residents  
of Qatar.

Shaikhship; and he was followed by Suwaidān-bin-Za'al, a discontented member of the Mahāribah section of the Bani Yās, who quitted Abu Dhabi in 1822 but did not apparently settle in Qatar until some time later. In January 1823 Suwaidān, who was then supposed to be living at Yās Island, was said to have at command about 1,000 armed supporters and to possess a fine Batil and 50 smaller boats. Among his followers were Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tikhān) and 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn, whose names were before long to be associated with piratical outrages.

1-24. Towards the end of 1823 Muḥamad-bin-Shakhbūt, then domiciled at Dōhah in Qatar, made an unsuccessful attempt to recover his position at Abu Dhabi, in the history of which Shaikhdom his expedition is described; and, on his return to Qatar, he appears to have shifted his headquarters from Dōhah to Huwailah. Early in 1824, a piracy by Muḥammad-bin-Shakhbūt on a vessel of Dibai—a place then in alliance with Abu Dhabi—having been reported, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf somewhat hastily required Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, as ruler of Qatar, to take action against Muḥammad, and even offered him the assistance of a British squadron; but the supposed piracy was in the end shown not to have occurred.

16-28. In 1826 a number of piratical offences, noticed in the history of Trucial Omān, were committed from Dōhah in Qatar by 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn and Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tikhān), the followers of Suwaidān-bin-Za'al; they carried their plunder at first to Dōhah, but soon afterwards they decamped from that place. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was, with some difficulty, restrained by British influence from declaring war on account of these incidents against the Shaikh of Bahrain, and it does not appear that any corrective action was taken by the British political authorities; but in 1828, on the return of Suwaidān and his followers to Abu Dhabi, the depredations of the gang came to an end.

Meanwhile, however, in May 1827, a heinous piracy had been committed by one 'Obaid (or 'Abdullah)-bin-Mahanna, a tribesman of the Manāsir, who had recently settled at Dōhah in Qatar. With some companions, among whom was a certain Husain-bin-Jāsim of Bahrain, he attacked a Būshehr Batil off Ganāveh, on her way to Dilam; a number of the occupants were put to death, and the remainder, after being completely stripped, were landed on the coast near Burdakhān. A small portion of the property plundered was recovered in Bahrain; but to the demand of the British Resident for the surrender of 'Obaid and Husain the Shaikh replied that they had fled beyond his jurisdiction, which appeared to be the case. Enquiries, however, continued; and in April

1828 the Resident had an interview with Shaikh 'Abdullah, at which he impressed on him the necessity of doing his utmost to arrest the offenders. At length in September 1828 'Obaid-bin-Mahanna, issuing from some unknown haunt with a number of Manāsir associates, resumed his piratical practices in the neighbourhood of Būshehr; but, having landed at Ziyārat on the Persian coast and aroused suspicion there by his enquiries as to the destination of a small Baghlah which was there at anchor, he was taken prisoner by the inhabitants after a desperate resistance. From Ziyārat 'Obaid was brought to the British Resident at Būshehr, who, after his identity had been satisfactorily established, handed him over to Shaikh 'Abdūr Rasūl to answer for his depredations on Būshehr boats and murders of Būshehr subjects; but 'Obaid cheated the gallows by escaping from custody during the storm of Būshehr by Timūr Mirza in November 1828. On their return from Ziyārat to the Arabian coast, the crew of 'Obaid's boat, as mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, plundered four vessels belonging to 'Asalu.

In 1831, apparently so near to Būshehr as Halileh, a piracy of an 1831-32. ordinary character was committed on a Kangūn fishing boat by an individual named Hasūm, whose home was at Fuwairat in Qatar; the criminal was not traced, however, until the following year. It was afterwards ascertained that, on leaving Halileh, Hasūm had crossed the Gulf to 'Oqair, where he attempted to surprise a boat belonging to Bahrain; but the crew were on their guard and took him prisoner along with eight of his companions. After having been detained for some days at 'Oqair the prisoners had managed to escape to Huwailah in Qatar, and here the boat taken by them at Halileh was subsequently recovered.

After the punishment of the Bani Yās for piracy in 1835, a number 1836. of the tribe emigrated\* westwards to Khor-al-'Odaid, partly to escape paying their share of the fines imposed by the British Government, and partly in order that they might be able to continue their piratical mode of life. They were countenanced by the inhabitants of the eastern coast of Qatar, who not only made no effort to restrain their depredations, but even supplied them with water and other necessities; and it was consequently resolved to send a naval force to demonstrate the accessibility of those waters to British vessels and to remind the people of Qatar of their responsibilities. The cruise, which was made by two sloops of war and a schooner, was a complete success: it resulted in an undertaking, imposed on the headmen of Dōhah, Wakrah and 'Odaid, to seize the boats of the pirates or otherwise to pay a fine; in the capture of some of the dependants of Jāsim-bin-Jābir, Raqraqi, the chief

\* See also page 766 ante.

among the pirates ; and in the burning upon the beach, in presence of the Resident, of one of the piratical Baghlahs. In September 1836 the headman of Dōhah, who was suspected of maintaining close relations with the Raqraqi, was personally warned by the Resident not again to harbour him.

Qatar, as a dependency of Bahrain at the time, came under the operation of the Maritime Truce of 1835 ; and in 1836 the Restrictive Line was prolonged from Sir Bū Na'air Island, by way of Hālūl, so as to pass ten miles north of the extremity of the Qatar promontory.

#### General history of Qatar from the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840 to the attack by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi on Qatar in 1867.

The misdeeds of Jāsim-hin-Jābir, however, continued ; and in February 1841, in consequence of a Rās-al-Khaimah vessel having been seized and plundered by him, a squadron consisting of the steam frigate "Sesostris," the "Coote," 18-gun sloop of war, and the "Tigris," 10-gun brig, was sent under Commodore Brucks, I.N., to require from the headman of Dōhah the surrender of the pirate's vessel and the payment of a fine of \$300, besides compensation for property plundered. After a short bombardment of the place by the 8-inch guns of the "Sesostris" the vessel of Jāsim, who was actually present in Dōhah at the arrival of the squadron but lost no time in making his escape to the interior, was handed over and publicly burnt ; and some other property which he had left behind was confiscated. The ships then proceeded on a similar errand to Dibai.

In the early summer of 1841 a Lingeh boat, carrying dates and matting from Qatif to Bahrain, grounded on the western coast of Qatar, and, while in this helpless state, was relieved of cargo to the value of 240 Muhammad Shāhi rupees by five Baqārah which put off from the coast. A complaint made by the sufferers to Nāsir, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was disregarded ; and eventually, at the request of the Shaikh of Lingeh, the case was taken up by the British Resident at Būshehr, and it was decided that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be held responsible. The Qataris, however, pleaded that the property claimed had been voluntarily paid them as salvage by the master of

the distressed vessel ; and, as in the end they substantiated this story by an oath of divorce taken in the presence of a Qādhi, the compensation money, which had been recovered from them, was returned.

Soon after this the promontory of Qatar began to figure, as a scene of operations, in the struggle between Abdullah-bin-Ahmad and Muhammad-bin-Kbalifah, the rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, of which the general course is described in the history of that principality. On the first occurrence of a breach between the chiefs in 1840, Shaikh Muhammad, the junior of the two, retired to Qatar and established an influence which was for a time superior to his grand-uncle's in that part of the Bahrain Shaikhdom. In 1842, however, when Khālīd, the ex-Amir of the Wahhābis, visited Shaikh 'Abdullah from Dammām, he was received at Khor Hassān in Qatar where the old chief was then residing, Shaikh Muhammad having in the meanwhile returned to Bahrain ; and a little later on actual hostilities breaking out between the relatives, the first act of Shaikh 'Abdullah was to recross the straits and land in Bahrain, whence in the month of June he succeeded in expelling Shaikh Muhammad. The people of Khor Hassān in Qatar must apparently have sided with Shaikh Muhammad, for the victor immediately gave up that village to partial plunder ; and it was perhaps for the purpose of combating the influence of Shaikh Muhammad, which seems to have been generally strong upon the mainland, that Shaikh 'Abdullah soon after made arrangements to re-occupy the deserted site of Zubārah. Shaikh Muhammad, however, who had landed in Qatar on his expulsion from Bahrain in 1842, anticipated his grand-uncle by seizing the fort of Murair near Zubārah ; and not long afterwards he obtained possession of Fuwairat, and assumed the offensive by launching from that place an expedition, ultimately successful, against the Bahrain islands. In April 1843, immediately after the capture of Muharraq, a Qatari contingent by whom Shaikh Muhammad was assisted were suddenly recalled to Qatar by an attack of the Manāsir upon their homes ; but their departure caused no inconvenience to Shaikh Muhammad, whose position in Bahrain was by that time firmly established.

In the autumn of 1843 'Isa-hin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-Āli ally of Shaikh Muhammad, transferred his abode from Qais Island to Dōbah in Qatar ; the change was welcome to the British authorities both because it brought that warlike character to the side of the Restrictive Line on which, in certain circumstances, he could be permitted to indulge his tastes, and because at the same time it took Dōbah out of the hands of a headman of the Sūdān tribe who was more addicted to piracy than to regular war.

Affairs in Qatar during the civil war in Bahrain, 1840-43.

Affairs in Qatar during the continuance of the struggle between the Shaikh and the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, 1843-46.

In 1844 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, sailing from Nāband on the coast of Persia, sought to surprise 'Isa-bin-Tarif at Dōhah; but the attempt failed, and he sought another field of operations. In 1847 the contest for the Bahrain Shaikhship was practically ended by a decisive battle on land, fought near Fuwairat in Qatar; in this engagement 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who had meanwhile changed sides and become the mainstay of 'Abdullah's party, lost his life, and the hopes of the ex-Shaikh perished with him.

Visit of the  
Wahhābis  
Amir to  
Qatar, 1851.

Early in 1851 Faisal-bin-Turki, the Amir of the Wahhābis, in the course of a tour through his dominions, arrived within two stages of Dōhah in Qatar; and the people of that place, as well as of Wakrah and Fuwairat, immediately evinced an inclination to throw off their allegiance to the Shaikh of Bahrain and to become subjects of the Wahhābi empire. A timely peace, however, arranged in July 1851, removed the risk to which the Āl Khalifah were exposed of losing their possessions in Qatar as they had already lost Dammām in Hāsa.

Political  
position of  
Qatar, 1866-7.

In 1866 it was reported by Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, and in 1867 the view was accepted by the Government of India, that the Shaikh of Bahrain probably owed fealty to the Wahhābi Government on account of his possessions in Qatar, but that, in regard to the Bahrain islands, he was altogether independent of the Wahhābis; and the tribute of \$4,000 a year which the Bahrain Shaikh now rendered to the Wahhābi Amir was regarded as a payment made to secure his subjects in Qatar from aggression by other tribes of the mainland. At one time between 1852 and 1866 the Amir appears to have had a representative of his own at Dōhah; but it is probable that this agent was only the local Shaikh.

#### Attack on Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and its consequences, 1867-68.

Cause and  
circumstances  
of the attack,  
1867.

A remarkably treacherous and destructive attack was made in October 1867 on Dōhah and Wakrah, the principal places upon the eastern coast of Qatar, by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi acting together; the motive, on the part of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was a desire to punish the inhabitants for some restiveness against his authority which they had lately exhibited. The proceedings of the allies are fully described in the history of Bahrain, to which they properly belong, and

need not therefore be mentioned in this place; suffice it to say that the towns of Dōhah and Wakrah were, at the end of 1867, temporarily blotted out of existence, the houses being dismantled and the inhabitants deported, and that the damage inflicted was estimated to amount to over \$2,00,000. In June 1868, after an unsuccessful appeal for redress to the Wahhābi Amir, the Qatar tribes which had suffered embarked on a retaliatory expedition against Bahrain; but they did not obtain any decided success.

The intervention of the British political authorities in the Gulf, though considerably delayed by circumstances over which they had no control, in the end produced a strong effect, as is related in the history of Bahrain. The results were most conspicuous in Bahrain, where one Shaikh was deposed and another installed; but they extended also to Qatar, which Colonel Pelly, leaving Bahrain early in September 1868, immediately visited with H.M.S. "Vigilant," the gunboat "Hugh Rose" and the steamer "Sind." At Wakrah the principal Shaikhs of Qatar had an interview with the Resident on board ship and were informed that they had incurred the severe displeasure of Government by their expedition against Bahrain; their plea that the expedition was merely retaliatory was accepted, however, in partial extenuation of the irregularity committed; and, as related elsewhere,\* a considerable amount of redress was ultimately obtained for them from the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.

British inter-  
vention  
and proceed-  
ings at Wak-  
rah, 1868.

An Agreement, dated the 12th of September 1868, was then obtained from Muhammad-bin-Thāni of the Āl Thāni, the most influential man in the whole promontory, whereby he undertook to return to Dōhah, which he had forsaken, and to reside peaceably there; never to put to sea with hostile intent, but instead to refer all his disputes with his neighbours for settlement by the British Resident; not to assist the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, but on the contrary to hand him over to the Resident, should he fall into his power; and, lastly, to maintain with the new Shaikh of Bahrain the same relations as had existed between himself and the former Shaikhs of those islands, submitting for decision by the Resident any differences of opinion that might arise in regard to matters such as tribute. The tribute mentioned may have been the sum which was payable by the Shaikh of Bahrain on account of Qatar to the Wahhābi Amir.

Agreement  
by the Āl  
Thāni Shaikh  
of Qatar,  
12th Septem-  
ber 1868.

\* Vide page 891 post.

Nothing is known of the manner in which the Āl Thāni had attained by 1868, to predominant influence in Qatar; they were Ma'adhid and therefore of the Āl Bin-'Alī, the tribe of 'Isa-bin-Tarif.\*

reement  
respect of  
ute to  
main.

A further agreement was furnished by Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Thāni and the chief Shaikhs of the Qatar Bedouins according to which the tribute, if any, payable by them to Bahrain should be determined before the British Resident, and paid in future through the Residency; and Colonel Pelly then addressed a letter to "all the Chiefs of Qatar," informing them of the settlement reached, and warning them of the consequences of any future breach of the maritime peace.

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Before leaving Wakrah the Resident adverted to a robbery, which had taken place there, of property belonging to certain British Indian subjects resident in Bahrain; and he demanded of the assembled Shaikhs the payment of 18,000 Qrāns as compensation. The amount was immediately produced, one-third in cash and two-thirds in the shape of a bill on a wealthy pearl merchant of Liugeh, the bill being secured by a sealed bag of pearls which was handed over to Colonel Pelly to be delivered to the merchant on receipt of payment. The sum actually realised in this case amounted to 18,699 Qrāns; and out of this 16,200 Qrāns were paid away to two complainants who were able to give proof of their losses.

#### History of Qatar from the attack by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi to the occupation of Dōhah by the Turks, 1867-71.

During the four years following the great raid made on Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi no event of importance occurred in the promontory, and the political situation there remained unchanged.

#### General history of Qatar from the Turkish occupation of Dōhah to a rebellion against Turkish authority, 1871-93.

cupation  
Dōhah by  
Turks,  
71-72.

In July 1871, a little more than a month after the occupation of Qatif by the Turks, a deputation, headed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, was sent by the commander of the Turkish troops to Dōhah in Qatar and succeeded in persuading Jāsim, the son of Muhammad-bin-Thāni, Shaikh of Dōhah and the most influential man in Qatar, to accept the Turkish flag; the senior Shaikh, now old and infirm, did not approve of the step, and continued for a time to fly the Arab flag over his own house. On news of this event reaching Būshehr, Colonel Pelly, the Resident in

\* Vide pages 795 and 799 ante.

the Persian Gulf, despatched his assistant, Major Grant, in H.M.S. "Magpie" to Dōhah, where the state of matters was found to be as described; the Shaikh assigned as a reason for his submission to the Turks that he lived on the mainland and that the Turks were a land power, also that the British Government had failed to do his subjects justice in a certain case of piracy. Meanwhile Colonel Pelly, with a view to ascertaining whether the Turkish proceedings at Dōhah had been authorised by the Turkish Government, telegraphed to Colonel Herbert, the British Resident at Baghdād, and was informed in reply that the Wāli of Baghdād professed not to know whether Turkish flags had been sent to Qatar or not, but claimed that Qatar was not covered by a previous Turkish assurance that there should be no interference with Bahrain. In August, the Turks having meanwhile taken possession of the Hasa Oasis, Qatar became a base for hordes of Bedouins who began to harass the Ottoman troops from the southward, and two or three months later Sa'ūd the Wahhābi himself retired to Qatar with a large Bedouin following who insisted that the settled inhabitants, on pain of having their property raided, should furnish them with supplies; during this crisis a warning was sent by the Political Resident to British Indian subjects in Qatar, probably to the effect that, if they remained, it must be at their own risk. In January 1872 a Turkish Commodore, accompanied by 'Abdullah-bin-Subah, Shaikh of Kuwait, visited Dōhah with the "Assur" and another Turkish steamer, from which, much to the disgust of the Shaikh and the inhabitants, a detachment of 100 Turkish troops and a field gun were landed; this garrison having established themselves in a fort of the Āl Musallam, the Turkish occupation of Dōhah was complete. The measures described seem to have been taken under the orders of Mid-hat Pāsha,—who himself visited Hasa at the end of 1871, in response to a request from the Shaikh of Dōhah for protection against Sa'ūd's Bedouins.

In 1873 the regular troops originally stationed by the Turks at Dōhah appear to have been withdrawn, a detachment of 30 Dhābitiyahs or gendarmes being substituted.

Removal of  
Turkish  
regular  
troops, 1878.

Except in the internal affairs of Qatar, especially the administration of the chief town and its immediate environs, little or no change was produced by the presence of a Turkish post at Dōhah; tribal relations generally continued on the same footing as formerly, and the Āl Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah were still the principal factor in politics.

Internal  
affairs, 1874.

In 1874 fighting occurred near Zubārah between the Na'im and the Bani Hājir, in which the latter were worsted; and in the same year

Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah held the Bani Hājir to account for a piracy committed near Khor Shaqīq, on a boat belonging to 'Abdul Karīm of Bahrain, in which more than \$2,000 in cash, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim himself, was taken, besides goods belonging to British Indian subjects. The Turkish gunboat "Iskanderia" made a cruise along the coast to enquire into the misbehaviour of the Bani Hājir, and the result was apparently to show that Shaikh Jāsim himself was partly to blame for the disorder that prevailed.

75. Lieutenant Fraser, Assistant Resident, who visited Dōhah in 1875 in connection with a British claim, found that the Āl Thāni Shaikhs, who had at first welcomed the Turkish occupation as a means of shaking off British control in maritime matters, were now heartily tired of it; but, for fear of being deported to Constantinople, they concealed their dissatisfaction. The Turkish representative, Jāsim Āgha, who was also Qādhi, notwithstanding the smallness of the force of only 50 gendarmes at his disposal, insisted on being consulted by the Shaikhs in every matter and recovered considerable sums of money from the inhabitants of Dōhah.

76. In the autumn of 1876, in the discharge at Dōhah of an errand relating to piracy, Captain Guthrie, commanding the B.M.S. "May Frere," obtained information that the town now paid from 9,000 to 10,000 Qrans per annum as revenue to the Turkish Government, but that this amount was insufficient to cover the expenses of the small Turkish detachment, whose duties were of a police and not of a military nature. The worst of the Qatar piracies in this year was one committed in the Dōhah harbour, close to the house of Shaikh Jāsim himself, by a party of seven Bani Hājir who attacked an Abu Dhabi vessel at night while the crew were asleep, killing two men and carrying off a slave and a quantity of other property; the total compensation due was assessed at \$2,679, but it was not apparently obtained, though a reference on the subject was made by the British Government to the Porte. In this year Shaikh Jāsim was appointed by the Turks to be Qaim-Maqām or Deputy-Governor of Qatar, and thereafter his father Muhammad-bin-Thāni, who seems to have been better disposed to the British than to the Turks, and who died two years later in 1878, had no more voice in public affairs.

1879-81. In May 1879 the Mutasarraf of Hasa came to Dōhah in the "Iskanderia" and had interviews with various prominent individuals, including Shaikh Jāsim, whom he formally appointed to be governor over Dōhah town. In November there took place an exodus to Fuwairat of some of the Āl Bū Kuwārah inhabitants of Dōhah; it was traced to

jealousy of Shaikh Jāsim's new position and was said to have been instigated by the Shaikh of Bahrain; and a British and a Turkish gunboat both visited the coast to enquire into the incident. In 1880 the Bani Hājir pirate Zaid-bin-Muhammad relieved a boat of some pearls belonging to Shaikh Jāsim and captured a vessel belonging to Wakrah; and raids were committed near Dōhah by Manāsir and 'Awāmīr. In 1881 the Āl Bū Kuwārah were joined at Fuwairat by some of the Na'im; and the 'Ajmān tribe carried off 450 camels from Qatar. In December 1881 Ahmad, a brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain, landed on the west coast of Qatar with about 200 followers for purposes of sport, and Shaikh Jāsim sent a deputation from Dōhah to welcome him and invite him to an entertainment in the interior; but Ahmad insisted that Jāsim should come in person to greet him where he was, and his wishes were obeyed, after which he accompanied the Dōhah Shaikh to a camp. The strength of the Turkish detachment at Dōhah at this time, whether regular troops or gendarmes, was about 130 men.

In April 1884 a raid was made by Bani Hājir Bedouins upon the coast of Qatar, and a son of the Shaikh of Wakrah was killed. In the following month Shaikh Jāsim began preparations for an expedition by sea against the Bani Hājir in Dhahrān, representing to the British officials that he had obtained the sanction of the Turks and desired the leave of the British Government also; but his request was refused, and he abandoned his bellicose intentions. In July the 'Ajmān, who by threats of attacking Dōhah had made it impossible for the inhabitants to proceed as usual to the pearl fisheries, encountered a force of their enemies the Manāsir at the wells of Banaiyān in the Jāfūrah desert and were defeated with much loss,—a result that gave great satisfaction to Shaikh Jāsim. In this engagement the Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir tribes were divided, some of each fighting upon either side.

In April 1885 a boat belonging to Wakrah was wrecked off Fuwairat and plundered by the people of that village. In October about 100 persons belonging to Wakrah emigrated with 10 boats to Ghāriyah in consequence of a quarrel with Shaikh Jāsim, who in December made an attack on Ghāriyah, killing four of the inhabitants. The Turkish gunboat "Mirrikh" toured upon the coast for some time during the year.

In the following year a competitor with Shaikh Jāsim for influence in Qatar appeared in the person of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, a Turkish subject but son of the Wazīr of Bahrain, who assumed the headship of the Ghāriyah settlement and who, from his intrigues with the Turks, seemed to aim at supplanting Jāsim in the Qaim-Maqāmship of Qatar. A suggestion by the officer in charge of the Turkish gunboat, that the people of Ghāriyah should be allowed to live in peace under

1884.

1885.

Rivalry  
between  
Shaikh Jāsim  
and Muham-  
mad-bin-  
'Abdul  
Wahhāb,  
1886-87.

Muhammad-bin-'Ahdul Wahhāb, so irritated Jāsim that he again attacked the place, but this time without success. Muhammad, after urging the establishment of a regular Turkish customs house at Dōhah, went away to Hasa; but he returned in May with 50 Dhābitiyahs, of whom 20, it was said, would be posted at Ghāriyah. By these proceedings Jāsim was greatly incensed and at first threatened to withdraw from Dōhah and commence hostilities against Muhammad; but in July a reconciliation was arranged. In the winter of 1886-87, Muhammad, who all the time kept up an active correspondence with the Turkish authorities in Hasa and 'Irāq, visited Bahrain; he was met there by the inhabitants of Ghāriyah, whom, apparently with the approval of the Turks, he then settled at Dārīn on Tārūt Island, Ghāriyah being thus almost depopulated.

Disturbances, 87. The next year was of one considerable unrest in Qatar. Shaikh Jāsim, who greatly feared the establishment of a customs house in Qatar and was generally upon bad terms with the Turks, considered that the best means of frustrating Ottoman designs would be to destroy the importance of Dōhah, a task which he now set himself to accomplish; retiring to Dha'ain, he announced that he had severed his connection with Dōhah and was no longer responsible for the affairs of Qatar, which would in future be "first referred to God and then to the Turkish Government." Disturbances in Dōhah and its neighbourhood, probably instigated by Shaikh Jāsim, followed; and in June or July the bazaar was plundered by Bani Hājir Bedouins, the principal sufferers on this occasion being some Persian traders who had incurred Jāsim's displeasure. In August the mischief extended to British subjects, and piracy at sea began, with the result that the British Political Resident was obliged to take action in the manner described in a later paragraph. By the middle of October all was quiet again.

The year 1888 opened with a visit to Dōhah by Nafiz Pāsha, Wālī of Basrah, who had an interview with Shaikh Jāsim and promised him a title and decoration; a coal depôt was established; and, a little later, a military garrison of one infantry battalion or 250 men was stationed at Dōhah and a steam launch placed there. These arrangements may have been due to the remonstrances of the British Government regarding piracies in Turkish waters or to the disorders at Dōhah in the previous year, but they were suspected by the British authorities to be preparations for a Turkish advance in the direction of 'Omān,—the more so that the predominance acquired in Najd by the Amir of Hail over the Wahhābi ruler of Riyādh was supposed to favour a forward policy in Arabia on the part of the Turks.

In July 1889, in connection with a scheme, possibly his own, of establishing direct Turkish administration in Qatar, 'Akif Bey, the Mutasarrif of Hasa, paid a visit to Dōhah. His first interview with Shaikh Jāsim took place at the house of Muhammad-bin-'Ahdul Wahhāb and cannot have been free from danger; for, while the Mutasarrif was accompanied by his personal attendants only, the Shaikh appeared with a retinue of about 600 armed footmen and 60 or 70 horsemen and camel-riders, many of whom carried loaded Martini rifles. A second and more private meeting afterwards took place, at which the Mutasarrif suggested the institution of a regular administration and a customs house; but the project was strongly opposed by Jāsim, who tendered his resignation of the Qāim-Maqāmship in writing.

In the following year the proposals of 'Akif Bey for the better government of Hasa became known in some detail. He had recommended that Jāsim, on account of his frequent absences, should be provided with an Assistant in the Qāim-Maqāmship; that Government buildings should be erected at Dōhah; that cavalry as well as infantry should be stationed there; that taxes should be levied on pearl dealers and other merchants; and that a harbour-master should be appointed at Dōhah to collect dues from native vessels. Posts should be established at Zubārah and 'Odaid; two steamers should be run between Dōhah, 'Oqair and Qatif; and at 'Oqair a mosque should be built. In the autumn of 1890 Mudirs intended for Zubārah and 'Odaid arrived in Bahrain from Basrah, but they did not proceed to their posts; the hitch was apparently due to the departure of 'Akif Bey from Hasa, upon sick leave, at the beginning of 1891.

Meanwhile, in 1890, Shaikh Jāsim caused it to be proclaimed that the administration of Qatar had been transferred from himself to the Turkish officials; but his resignation was not accepted by the Wālī of Basrah, who early in 1891 exhorted him instead to discharge his customary duties with zeal.

In 1889 a piracy, attended by loss of life, was committed by Bani Hājir on a Bahrain vessel off the coast of Qatar; Shaikh Jāsim recovered the stolen property, but failed to arrest the offenders. In 1890 the Āl Morrah, at the instance of Mutasarrif of Hasa, were prohibited from entering Dōhah. At the beginning of 1891 a fight occurred between the 'Ajmān on the one side and the Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir and Manāsir on the other; and, during the pearling season, some Bani Hājir seized a vessel at Wakrah and carried off six boats of the Qubaisāt Bani Yās from an island in the neighbourhood,—an outrage for which Shaikh Jāsim professed himself unable to afford any redress. In 1892 there was a

Attempt by the Turks to establish close control over Qatar, 1889-91.

Piracies and miscellaneous occurrences, 1889-1892.

Visit of the Wālī of Basrah to Dōhah and replacement of the Turkish military garrison, 88.



serious crop of maritime outrages. A boat was seized near Wakrah, taken away, and abandoned near Zubārah; another boat, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim, was boarded near Dha'ain and carried off, with the pearls she contained, after two of the crew had been killed and one wounded; again a Persian boat from Jazeh in Shibkūh was attacked near Wakrah, 10 of the crew being killed and 13 wounded, and a quantity of pearls taken; and finally a Shārjah pearl boat was seized and removed to Khor Shaqīq, but was recovered by Jāsim,—Jāsim, however, at the intercession of elders, released some prisoners whom he had taken. In 1872, from August to November, 'Ahdur-Rahmān, the expelled Wahhābi Amīr of Najd, resided at Dōhah under the protection of Jāsim.

#### British relations with Qatar during the same period, 1872-1893.

A piracy has already been mentioned above, which was committed by Bani Hājir in the summer of 1874, near Khor Shaqīq, on a Bahrain vessel owned by a certain 'Abdul Karīm, and in which some British Indian traders were sufferers jointly with Shaikh Jāsim himself. Shaikh Jāsim promptly took measures for reconquing his own losses; but a year passed without any redress being afforded to the British subjects affected; in 1875, however, compensation was obtained by Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, who despatched his Second Assistant, Captain Fraser, to settle the matter with Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Thāni.

Meanwhile a petition was received from the British Indian traders at Dōhah, who complained of exactions by the Shaikh and expressed a wish to leave the place; but, as it appeared that the dues complained of were ordinary taxes taken for the purpose of providing protection against Bedouins, the petitioners were informed by the Resident, under the orders of the Government of India, that it was for themselves to decide whether they should leave Dōhah or not, and that, if they remained, they must conform to the local laws and system of taxation.

Captain Guthrie, commanding the B.M.S. "May Frere," experienced some discourtesy at a visit to Dōhah in 1876 from the officers in charge of the Turkish post, who, as he was returning from the shore to his ship, shouted after him that Dōhah was Turkish territory and that he must leave the port before sunset. As a number of Arabs had witnessed the scene Captain Guthrie was careful to remain at Dōhah for another 24 hours.

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civility of  
, Turks to  
British  
island, 1867.

In 1876 Shaikh Jāsim, who had then recently been appointed by the Turkish Government to be Qaim-Maqām of Qatar, took advantage of his new powers to vent his spite against Chela and Rama, two of the British Indian subjects for whom compensation had been obtained by Captain Fraser in the previous year; this he did by causing them to be summoned to the distant provincial capital of Hofūf on the frivolous ground that their depositions were required.

In 1879 a fresh case occurred, in which a Hindu was beaten and otherwise ill-treated by the Turkish officer at Dōhah for having exported dates,—an act not known to be prohibited. Notwithstanding a recommendation by the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government that compensation should be claimed on behalf of the Hindus Chela and Rama, no satisfaction had as yet been obtained in the case of 1876; and Colonel Ross was inclined to recommend that, in view of the unfortunate effect of such incidents as these upon British prestige in the Gulf, steps should be taken to withdraw all British subjects from Dōhah. The Government of India, however, thought it better to press for the removal from Dōhah of the offending Turkish officer, by name Muhammad Āgha; and this, in the end, was obtained.

In 1879 a warning by the Political Resident against connecting themselves with the Bani Hājir pirates, who at this time were giving much trouble along the Arabian coast, was conveyed to the Shaikhs of Qatar by Captain Woodroffe, accompanied by the Residency Agent in Bahrain. This was done in connection with a case in which the Bani Hājir buccaneer Zaid-bin Muhammad, having seized two vessels belonging to the Mahāndah of Khor Shaqīq, used them to plunder a fishing vessel anchored off Ras Laffān to the amount of 2,000 Qrāns, one of the crew also being killed.

It should be noted that in March 1881 Shaikh Jāsim represented to the British Resident that his authority did not extend to the whole Qatar coast and that he was only responsible for Dōhah and Wakrah under the Agreement of 1868; he requested therefore that the people of other ports, such as Fuwairat and Ruwais, should be compelled to remove and settle in his territory, after which he would answer for their behaviour.

A discussion with the Porte, relative to piracies off the Arabian coast generally, took place between 1879 and 1881 and is fully related in the history of Hasa.

In 1881, in consequence first of threats of an invasion of Bahrain by Nāsir-bin-Mubarak with the assistance of Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, and

ill-treatment  
of Indian  
traders, 1876-  
1879.

Warning ad-  
dressed to  
the Shaikhs  
of Qatar and  
discussions  
with Turkey,  
1879-1881.

Question of  
dealings and



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na with  
Shaikh of  
bah, 1881.

later of projects on the part of Jāsim himself to proceed by sea against the 'Ajmān tribe near Qatif and the Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās, a question arose as to the degree of interference which might still with propriety be exercised by the British Government in such matters in Qatar; in each of the cases mentioned, it should be added, Shaikh Jāsim had been advised by the British authorities in the Gulf to refrain from action and had complied with their advice. The Government of India, recognising that the agreement made in 1868 with Shaikh Jāsim's father, by which Shaikh Muhammad undertook not to make war by sea, could hardly, on account of its personal character and the subsequent assumption by the Turks of authority at Dōhah, be regarded as binding on Shaikh Jāsim, referred the point to Her Majesty's Government, whose orders, issued early in 1882, were to the effect that the Shaikh, though he had accepted the position of an Ottoman dependent on land, should be encouraged to maintain close and direct relations with the officers of the Government of India and to defer to them, as he appeared inclined to do, in all matters affecting the peace of the seas. As regards the course to be followed in event of the Shaikh of Dōhah or any other Shaikh similarly situated putting to sea with hostile intentions, either without reference to or in disregard of the warnings of the British Resident, Her Majesty's Government were unable to give the Government of India any precise instructions; they held that it was for the Government of India to decide, upon general considerations of expediency, whether coercion should be employed in any individual case. It had been intimated to the Porte in July 1881, at the conclusion of the discussions mentioned in the last paragraph, that, as they declined to agree to a joint police of the seas, Her Majesty's Government were obliged to undertake that duty single-handed "without reference to the claims of the Sultān to territorial jurisdiction in those waters." The commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf were accordingly empowered to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbances of the peace at sea, avoiding, however, the raising of needless questions with Turkish authorities, where such might exist, and unnecessary encroachment upon the jurisdiction of the Sultān, wherever the same might be effectually established on the coast to the north of 'Odaid.

romise by  
Shaikh Jāsim  
to adhere to  
the Agree-  
ment of  
1868.

About the same time Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident, proposed that Shaikh Jāsim, whose character and conduct were as unsatisfactory as ever, should be compelled to acknowledge in writing the continued validity of the Agreement signed by his father in 1868; but the Government of India, being of opinion that proceedings to this end

might bring about a difficulty with the Turks, ordered that a verbal assurance only should be obtained. This was done; and the renewal of his treaty obligations to abstain from war at sea and to refer his disputes with his neighbours to the British Resident appeared for a time to have a restraining effect upon the unruly Shaikh.

In October 1881 Shaikh Jāsim began to harass the British Indian traders at Dōhah, whose operations in pearls interfered with his own, and whose position he was therefore determined to render untenable; but a visit of H.M.S. "Woodlark" to the port resulted in a temporary settlement of the difficulty. Eventually, however, in 1882, Jāsim forcibly closed the shops of the Indians and expelled them from the place, giving false reasons for his action. In May 1882 a Residency Agent was sent to him with a letter to warn him that he would be held responsible for loss caused to British subjects; but he was obdurate. In November 1882 a confidential Agent of the Residency visited Dōhah in H.M.S. "Woodlark" to require compensation for the traders; and again the demand was disregarded. At length, in December 1882, authority having been first obtained from Her Majesty's Government, Colonel Ross, the Resident, proceeded in person to Dōhah with H.M.S. "Woodlark" and H.M.S. "Arab" and insisted, on pain of instant hostilities, that the Shaikh should apologise to the British Government, pay compensation to the Indian traders, and grant the latter permission to return to Dōhah. With these conditions Jāsim found himself obliged to comply; and the indemnity recovered, amounting to Rs. 8,000, was paid over to the Indians, who had meanwhile taken refuge in Bahrain.

No sooner did the Porte become aware of the direct recovery of damages from their so-called Qāim-Maqām by means of a British naval demonstration at Dōhah than they protested to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and the question was referred to Her Majesty's Government; Shaikh Jāsim, it appeared, had represented the affair in strong colours to the Turkish authorities, and had threatened to resign the Qāim-Maqāmship unless the Rs. 8,000 recovered from him were refunded. The British Ambassador was at first directed to avoid, if possible, discussion of the subject; but, if it were not possible, he was to state distinctly that the British Government could not admit that Turkey possessed any sovereign rights on the Qatar coast. Eventually, the matter still being pressed, Lord Granville on the 7th of May 1883 informed the Turkish Ambassador in London, in writing, "that the claims of the Porte to rights of sovereignty over the Qatar coast had never been admitted by Her Majesty's Government." Exception

Expulsion of  
British In-  
dian traders  
from Dōhah  
and action of  
the British  
Government,  
1881-83.

Protest by  
the Porte  
against the  
British pro-  
ceedings,  
1883.

having been taken to this reply, the Turkish Ambassador was further told in unequivocal terms, on the 22nd of September 1883, that the British Government were unable to accept the views of the Porte, and that they were not prepared to waive the rights which they had exercised at intervals, during a long period of years, of dealing directly with the Arab chiefs of the Qatar coast, when necessary, in order to preserve the peace of the seas or to obtain redress for outrages on British subjects or persons entitled to British protection.

Further ill-  
treatment of  
Indian tra-  
ders by  
Shaikh Jāsim  
and pirates,  
1883-86.

After the settlement in 1882 five of the Indian traders who had been expelled returned to Dōhah; but their position there was still disagreeable on account of the hostility of the Shaikh. In 1886, after taking precautions to disavow his responsibility for anything that might happen to the British traders in his absence, Shaikh Jāsim temporarily quitted Dōhah for 'Odaid; and immediately the Indians were attacked by Bani Hājir Bedouins and two of their number were wounded, but not seriously. The Assistant Resident, Khān Bahādur 'Abdur Rahmān Hakīm, who was sent to the spot to investigate, found reason to believe that the affair had been deliberately arranged by Shaikh Jāsim with his son, whom he left in charge at Dōhah, and that the object was to intimidate the Hindus into withdrawing from Dōhah and so to put an end to their rivalry in trade. Later, however, the Resident reported that Jāsim had emphatically denied his complicity in the matter and had apologised for the occurrence; and under orders from the Government of India the denial and apology were accepted.

In the autumn of 1886, several petty cases of piracy having been committed by Bani Hājir off the coast of Qatar, the Residency confidential Agent was sent in H.M.S. "Sphinx" to interview the headmen of the coast, and was successful in obtaining from them assurances of co-operation with the British Government, some of which were given in writing.

Wanton at-  
tack on Bri-  
sh Indian  
traders at  
Dōhah and  
action of the  
British au-  
thorities,  
1887.

In 1887, on the withdrawal of Shaikh Jāsim from Dōhah on account of differences between himself and the Turks, there was an outbreak of lawlessness in the town, most probably instigated by the Shaikh himself from his place of retirement. At the beginning of the troubles the Indian traders were protected by the Shaikh's relatives in Dōhah; but early in August two Indian British subjects were wantonly attacked and wounded by Arabs. Piracies also began along the coast, half a dozen being reported within a short time. The Shaikh of Bahrain, some of whose subjects were among the victims of these outrages, now requested permission to take forcible action on his own account; but the British

Resident instead directed that specie and pearls to the value of Rs. 20,000, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim in Bahrain whither the Resident had himself proceeded, should be impounded; and this was immediately done. Meanwhile all the British subjects at Dōhah had been removed by the Assistant Resident, who was sent there for the purpose and to remind Shaikh Jāsim of his responsibilities; H.M.S. "Osprey" had arrived in Bahrain; and the Turkish military commandant in Hasa had gone with a guard to Dōhah, and was engaged in consultation there with Jāsim and the other Shaikhs. The result of Colonel Ross's pacific expedient was eminently satisfactory, for Shaikh Jāsim presently sent an Agent to Bahrain to negotiate; and the case was settled by payment of Rs. 6,390 as compensation to the injured British Indian and Bahrain subjects out of the property attached.

Shaikh Jāsim, while through force of circumstances he was obliged to submit to the British demands, neglected no means of upsetting what had been arranged and appealed to the Walis of Basrah and Baghdād, representing that he had been despoiled of "all" his property in Bahrain on account of his connection with the Turkish Government. The immediate result of his complaints was a threatening letter, probably unauthorised by higher authority, in which the Mutasarrif of Hasa demanded from the Shaikh of Bahrain the restoration of Jāsim's property; and later the inevitable protest was addressed by the Porte to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. With reference to the protest the British Ambassador was referred by Her Majesty's Government to the views which they had expressed in 1883, and to which, he was informed, they still adhered.

Protest by the  
Porte, 1888.

In connection with the losses sustained by Persian subjects at Dōhah, the Shāh enquired whether the British authorities could assist his Government in obtaining the reparation to which the former were entitled, estimated at 30,000 Tūmāns; and a hope appears to have been held out of compliance with the request as soon as the claims of British subjects should have been adjusted. Early in 1888, however, the Persian Government seem to have had recourse instead to the good offices of the Porte, but whether they obtained any satisfaction by this means is uncertain. As mentioned in the history of Bahrain, it appears that a Persian Minister about the same time actually gave countenance to the idea of a raid to be made by Shaikh Jāsim upon Bahrain in the interests of Persia.

Assistance of  
the British  
authorities  
requested by  
Persia, but  
not utilised,  
1887-88.

In October 1888 Colonel Ross visited Dōhah and had an interview with Shaikh Jāsim, who came to meet him with a following of about

Visit of the  
Resident to  
Dōhah, 1888.

700 mounted Bedouins. The Shaikh complained of the injustice of the treatment which he had received.

Further correspondence between the British and Turkish Governments regarding the situation of the Porte in 1889.

The energetic proceedings of Nāfiz Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, in Qatīf and Qatar occasioned, in 1888, some disquiet to Her Majesty's Government; but, as the steps taken were ostensibly due to British strictures on the prevalence of piracy, and as a discussion of boundaries was not desired, it was apparently resolved not to object to them. At the time it was believed that the Shammar Amir of Hail contemplated operations against 'Omān, and that it might be the intention of the Turks to assist him with troops from Hasa and Qatar. In 1889, however, with the plain object of asserting Turkish sovereignty over Qatar, the Turkish Foreign Office informed the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the garrison in Qatar would be reinforced from the Baghdad Army Corps; but Her Majesty's Government deemed it sufficient to remind the Porte, with reference to the state of war which then prevailed between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and by which the Turks might have been tempted to seek an extension of influence in the direction of Abu Dhabi, that Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference any attempt on the part of the Turkish authorities at interference or aggression in 'Omān.

#### Relations of Qatar with Bahrain, and affairs at Zubārah, 1872-92.

Qatar was the theatre, during this period, of various movements, dangerous, or at least interesting, to the Bahrain principality; but these are noted in the history of Bahrain, and here we shall confine ourselves to some remarks on the claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to Qatar and on affairs at Zubārah.

Claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to Zubārah, 1873.

The sovereignty of the Shaikh of Bahrain over Qatar, unquestioned before, was brought into discussion by the Turkish conquest of Hasa; and in 1871 Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, was desired by the Government of Bombay to report on the subject, but obtained leave to defer doing so on the ground that there was a probability of the Turks withdrawing from Hasa. The question then slumbered until the summer of 1873, when a Turkish officer was reported to have gone to Zubārah in Qatar for the purpose of persuading the inhabitants to acknowledge Turkish authority; by this occurrence the Shaikh of Bahrain was moved to formulate a claim to Zubārah on the ground that the Na'im of

Zubārah were his subjects and had acknowledged the fact in the presence of Colonel Pelly, the late Resident. Colonel Ross, after receiving a report on the subject from his Assistant in Bahrain, Major Grant, informed Government that the sovereignty of Qatar was indeterminate, though the whole of the coast had lately fallen under Turkish influence; and, the rights claimed by the Shaikh of Bahrain being uncertain and beyond the power of the possessor to enforce, he at the same time asked Major Grant to dissuade the Shaikh, as had been done in the past, from entangling himself in the affairs of the mainland. Colonel Pelly, the ex-Resident, to whom the papers were referred for opinion, considered that the question of territorial sovereignty should still, so far as possible, be avoided; and he thought that the Shaikh of Bahrain, while he was acknowledged to possess certain rights of pasturage, etc., on the Qatar coast, should not therefore be held to be empowered to put to sea for the purpose of coercing any port in Qatar. Meanwhile, in September 1873, the Shaikh of Bahrain had again asserted his claim to Zubārah and the obedience of the Na'im tribe and asked whether he must relinquish it; and at length, towards the end of the year, the Government of India expressed their general concurrence in the view that the Shaikh of Bahrain had no clear or important rights in Qatar and that he should be restrained, so far as possible, from raising complications on the mainland.

In September 1874, after attempts on their part to cross over from Qatar into Bahrain had been foiled by movements of vessels of the Bombay Marine, the Bani Hājir turned their attention to the Na'im village of Zubārah; and, but for the appearance of the "Hugh Rose" gunboat there, they would probably, notwithstanding a brave resistance by the small summer garrison, have taken the place and obtained possession of boats with which they might have invaded Bahrain. The delay gave the Na'im time to return in strength from Bahrain and the pearl banks to Zubārah, where they shortly inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Bani Hājir. Before the end of the year Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, a Bahrain refugee, appeared upon the coast of Qatar, and the prospect of Zubārah falling into his hands caused great alarm to the Shaikh of Bahrain, who asked permission of Colonel Ross, the Resident, to reinforce Zubārah, on the ground, first, that Zubārah was a dependency and invaluable outwork of Bahrain, and again that, if he failed to help his allies the Na'im in their extremity, he would forfeit their support for the future. Colonel Ross was moved by these arguments to agree to the reinforcement of Zubārah as a purely defensive measure; but his action was not altogether approved by the Government of India, who considered that, in view of

Zubārah attacked, and reinforced by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1874.

the decision reached in the previous year, the Shaikh should have been dissuaded from sending men to Zubārah and should have been encouraged to depend altogether upon the British Government for the defence of his islands. It subsequently transpired that an absurdly inaccurate account of the whole affair had been telegraphed to the Porte by their Wālī at Baghdād, representing the Na'im of Zubārah as a tribe in rebellion against the rightful authority of the Turkish Government whom the Bani Hājir had been employed to coerce, but who had escaped punishment through improper interference by the Shaikh of Bahrain. The dangers which threatened Bahrain from the side of Qatar were shown by the Resident to be chiefly due to the uncertainty whether the coast, on the side towards Bahrain, was or was not under the authority of the Porte.

The Shaikh of Bahrain, though he had intimated his readiness to be guided by the advice of the British Government, once more in April 1875 put forth a claim to sovereignty over the whole of Qatar, which he asserted to be subject and tributary to Bahrain. On the fact being reported to them, the Government of India observed with regret the continued disposition of the Shaikh to entangle himself in the affairs of the continent and ordered that he should be made to understand that, if he persisted in a course opposed to their advice and thereby became involved in complications upon the mainland, the consequences would be upon himself, and they would hold themselves free to take such measures with respect to him as they might think necessary. The purport of this letter was communicated to Shaikh 'Isa by Lieutenant Fraser, the Assistant Resident, in person; and the Shaikh, while denying that his rights in Qatar had become invalid or extinct, stated that he bowed to the orders of Government.

The Shaikh afterwards made a request through his brother that he might be allowed to postpone the withdrawal of his men from Zubārah until the end of the pearl season; but it was not granted. In the neighbourhood of Zubārah, except for a few raids and counter-raids by the Bani Hājir and Na'im upon each other's cattle, matters remained fairly quiet; but in the pearl season some of the Beni Hājir put to sea to commit piracy,—a proceeding which led, as mentioned in the history of Bahrain, to excessive action by the Shaikh in very distant waters.

In 1876 the Bani Hājir tribe was temporarily split into two factions, one of which connected itself with Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain outlaw, and the other with the Na'im of Zubārah. The precaution was taken of again warning the Shaikh of Bahrain to refrain from

Claim of  
the Shaikh  
of Bahrain  
to sovereignty  
in Qatar  
is allowed by  
the Govern-  
ment of  
India, 1875.

Evacuation  
of Zubārah  
by the Shaikh  
of Bahrain,  
1876.

Matters at  
Zubārah,  
1876-77.

interference on the mainland; but it was not apparently necessary, for no visible results followed from the new combination. In 1877 there were complaints, as described in the history of Bahrain, that Shaikh 'Isa still maintained undesirably close relations with Zubārah; but enquiry showed that he was not, in fact, doing more than was required to keep the Na'im upon his side and to prevent their joining the Bani Hājir.

In September 1878, as related in the history of Hasa, a heinous Piracy, accompanied by the murder of four persons, was committed by the inhabitants of Zubārah upon a passing boat; and Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was directed by the Government of India to demand of the Turkish authorities that the place should be punished, and to offer British naval assistance for the purpose. These instructions he executed by starting on the 22nd of October in person for Basrah, where he had a not unsatisfactory meeting with the Wālī, 'Abdullah Pasha. In the meantime, or immediately afterwards, Zubārah, of which the inhabitants had made themselves obnoxious to all their neighbours by raids and piracies, was attacked by a large force under Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak. Colonel Ross, on becoming aware of this new complication, at once proceeded from Būsbahr to Bahrain, where he arrived on the 17th of November in H.M.S. "Teazer," H.M.S. "Arab" being already anchored there. Shaikh 'Isa came on board and earnestly besought that some action should be taken in favour of the Na'im; but the Resident's reply was a refusal, at which he appeared greatly dissatisfied. On the 18th of November Colonel Ross landed at Zubārah from the "Teazer" and visited the camp of Shaikh Jāsim, pitched about half a mile from the square fort of Murair, in which the Na'im, to the number of about 500 souls, were besieged; the village of Zubārah proper was already completely in ruins, and it was said that some boats had been burnt. The force with Shaikh Jāsim appeared to number about 2,000 armed men; and, in consequence of the disparity in numbers between the attackers and the attacked, there had been no actual fighting. On his return to Bahrain Colonel Ross found a telegram from his acquaintance, the Wālī of Basrah, to the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif, in which the latter was directed to send the gunboat "Iskanderia" immediately to Zubārah in order to prevent any attempt by the besieging force to invade Bahrain; and this order he at once forwarded to its destination. The Na'im besieged in Murair surrendered, on unfavourable terms, not long after Colonel Ross's departure, and Zubārah as a populated place ceased to exist; the inhabitants,

Destruction,  
of Zubārah.  
1878.

between whom and Shaikh Jāsim a peace seems to have been arranged by the commander of the "Iskanderia," were in the first instance mostly removed to Dōhah. It was considered at this time, both by the British Resident and by the Shaikh of Bahrain, that the best solution of the Zubārah difficulty, in so far as the security of Bahrain was concerned, would be the permanent occupation of the place by the Turks.

Rumours of  
a Turkish  
occupation of  
Zubārah,  
1888-91.

In 1888 it was reported that the Turks intended to rebuild Zubārah; and, as it was feared that the agent selected would be the Bahrain outlaw Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the British Resident was instructed by the Government of India to inform that individual and Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, who was his father-in-law, that a settlement at Zubārah would not be permitted. No actual attempt to re-occupy the place was observed. In 1890 and 1891 there were rumours of the appointment of a Turkish Mudir to Zubārah, and the post was at first offered to Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārīn, who declined it; but the project, after a Mudir designate had arrived in Bahrain, was apparently abandoned.

#### Relations of Qatar with Abu Dhabi and affairs at 'Odaid, 1872-93.

The history of a colony of Bani Yās seceders at Khor-al-'Odaid, maintained from 1869 to 1878, will be found included in that of the Abu Dhabi principality,\* within the territorial limits of which 'Odaid is situated; but the bearing of certain events there upon the history of Qatar, which the inlet closely adjoins, should be noted.

Relations of  
the Turks  
with 'Odaid,  
1871-76.

In 1871, soon after the arrival of the Turks in Hasa, it appeared that the Turkish flag had been offered to the Bani Yās colonists at 'Odaid; but the latter, who professed themselves independent of all authority, were said not to have accepted it, though there was also a contradictory rumour that it was hoisted on Fridays. In 1873 four Turks visited 'Odaid and arranged that a sum of \$40 or 50 should be paid annually by the settlers through Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, after which they went away, having been deterred by the inferior character of the water supply from establishing a post. In 1874 Shaikh Zāid of Abu Dhabi stated that local Turkish officials had written to him asserting 'Odaid to be under their protection, and calling on him to abstain from interference there; he was unable, however, to produce their letters when called upon to do so. In

\* Vide page 763 ante.

1875 it was ascertained that the headman of 'Odaid had both a Trucial and a Turkish flag and that he used one or the other as occasion required. On the 18th of October 1876, when Captain Guthrie visited 'Odaid in the "May Frere," he found the Trucial flag flying but learned that tribute was still paid to Turkey.

In 1876 and 1877 a number of piracies were committed by the Āl Morrah, a Bedouin tribe nominally dependent on Turkey, from boat harbours under 'Odaid; these proceedings the headman of 'Odaid was unable to prevent, and representations to the Turkish Government became necessary. Her Majesty's Government, while avoiding specific mention of 'Odaid, reference to which might have raised an inconvenient territorial question, drew the attention of the Porte to the increase of piracy along the Qatar coast which had resulted from the extension of Turkish sovereignty in that direction, and intimated their own resolve not to allow the peace of the Persian Gulf to be disturbed by marauders, whether proceeding from places like Dōhah actually in Turkish possession, or belonging to tribes that admitted Turkish supremacy and sailing from the ports of independent chiefs too weak to prevent the abuse of their territory. The Turkish Government in reply denied all knowledge of piratical outrages on the Qatar coast and asked for particulars.

Correspondence with the Porte regarding piracies committed from 'Odaid, 1877.

In 1878 the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs complained of action by the British authorities at 'Odaid a few months previously, which, as related in the history of Abu Dhabi, had resulted in the abandonment of the place by the Bani Yās colonists; and in the Turkish communication 'Odaid was stated to be a dependency of the Turkish district of Qatar. It does not appear from the records of the Government of India what reply was made to this complaint; but, from the correspondence which shortly after took place in regard to piracies off the coast of Hasa and Qatar, it seems clear that the British Government were resolved not to admit Turkish pretensions to jurisdiction at 'Odaid or at any place further to the eastward.

Complaint by the Porte of British action at 'Odaid, 1878.

From 1876 onwards, as a result of the presence of Bani Yās rebels at 'Odaid, hostile relations prevailed between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; and in 1880, by the return of the Qubaisāt to Abu Dhabi, the enmity between the Shaikhs was much embittered. During the sojourn of the Qubaisāt at 'Odaid that place had fallen largely under the influence of Shaikh Jāsim, to whom, by their removal, it was again lost; and his indignation was expressed in pecuniary claims which he now brought against their headman, Buti-bin-Khadim.

Protracted war between the Shaikhs of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi.

1881. In 1881 Jāsim intimated to the Resident an intention on his part of occupying 'Odaid and seizing the person of Buti-bin-Khādim; but Colonel Ross was able to prevent him from attempting either enterprise. In December 1881 a raid was committed by Bani Hājir and other Bedouins from Qatar in the neighbourhood of Abu Dhabi and a number of camels were carried off and sold at Dōhah, whereupon the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi immediately prepared to retaliate and Shaikh Jāsim made dispositions for defence; but eventually, by the intervention of Muḥammad-bin-'Abdal Wahhāb, the matter was settled without fighting.

1885. In 1885, after an interval of peace, Shaikh Jāsim re-opened his feud with Abu Dhabi, alleging that a debt due from Buti-bin-Khādim, for which Shaikh Zāid had become surety, had not been discharged; that the Manāsir, who were protected by Shaikh Zāid, had plundered some natives of Qatar on Dalmah Island and had raided Qatar territory; and that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was interfering with 'Odaid, which belonged of right to Shaikh Jāsim and which he intended to occupy. The complaint in regard to the Manāsir probably referred to the carrying off from Na'ajjah near Dōhah, by the Āl Bū Sha'ar section of that tribe, of some cattle and three female slaves belonging to Jāsim's dependents,—an act for which reprisals were at once made at Jāsim's instance by the Bani Hājir and the Āl Morrah. These tribes made a foray on the Bani Yās country, carrying off six camels which found a market at Dōhah, and recriminations between the two Shaikhs followed; but matters were once more temporarily adjusted by the agency of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain refugee. Meanwhile the Political Resident, in reply to a communication from Shaikh Jāsim, had desired him to relinquish his intention of occupying 'Odaid and to send particulars of his claims against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi with a view to a settlement; but with the latter invitation Shaikh Jāsim did not see fit to comply.

1886. In the summer of 1886 Shaikh Jāsim informed Shaikh Zāid that he had been directed by the Turkish authorities to rebuild 'Odaid, and he enclosed, as evidence of his statement, a letter from the commander of the Turkish vessel "Zuhaf." This correspondence was forwarded by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to the Political Resident, but in the meantime, apparently, Shaikh Jāsim made a movement from Dōhah in the direction of 'Odaid. The Resident, however, again warned him to desist from his proceedings and held a vessel of war in readiness to proceed to the spot, while a protest made to the Turkish authorities resulted in the disavowal and censure by the Wālī of Basrah, in writing, of the action of the commander of the "Zuhaf"; and accordingly no attempt to occupy 'Odaid was made by Shaikh Jāsim.

In 1887 a piratical Baqārāh from Wakrah attacked a boat of the Qubaisāt Bani Yās on the pearl banks, and one of the crew of the latter was so severely wounded that he died. 1887.

In 1888 the protracted war between the Shaikhs of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi suddenly reached a crisis. In February of that year, the Wālī of Basrah being then actually present in Dōhah, a raid was committed at Na'ajjah in the immediate vicinity by Manāsir camel riders, chiefly of the Āl Bū Sha'ar section, who carried away 40 male and female slaves; and some of the Manāsir, advancing yet nearer, abducted two or three slaves from the very outskirts of Dōhah. Pursuit was attempted, but was unsuccessful. In March Jāsim made a retaliatory raid into the district of Liwah in Dhafrah and carried off some 400 camels, which he divided amongst his followers; he also recovered, on this occasion, two of the slaves raided from Dōhah; and he caused 20 Liwah villagers to be soundly thrashed. In May the tables were again turned by a raiding party of 250 Bedouins whom Shaikh Zāid despatched against Dōhah under his son Khalifah; on their arrival before the place, Shaikh Jāsim himself being then at Dha'āin, the townspeople turned out against them in scattered detachments, were drawn by a simulated flight into an ambush, and lost 34 men killed, among whom was 'Alī, a son of Jāsim.

Between rage and grief Shaikh Jāsim was all but distraught; he incited the Turks to invade Trucial 'Omān, he applied for help to Ibn-Rashid, he opened a correspondence with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān other than Shaikh Zāid, and he subsidised freely a number of the Bedouin tribes. On Ibn-Rashid making a favourable response to his overtures disturbances on a serious scale, and even an attack by Jāsim and his allies upon Abu Dhabi, began to be apprehended by the British political authorities.

The Turks, however, possibly on account of a warning against interference which the Government of India asked might be conveyed to the Porte, did not move; Ibn-Rashid also remained inactive; and Shaikh Jāsim's reprisals eventually took the shape of incursions into Liwah, in January and February 1889, in which date plantations were cut down and men, women, and children barbarously murdered. Shaikh Jāsim also prohibited the subjects of the Shaikh of Dibai, who had now thrown in his lot with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, from landing in Qatar for trade or for any other purpose. In April the Bani Yās in their turn retaliated by an expedition to the distant region of Barr-al-Qāwah, from which they carried away a large number of camels belonging to the Bedouin tribes that supported the Shaikh of Dōhah. In June a counter-

Death of a son of Jāsim in the war, 1888.

Prospect of Turkish and Central Arabian interference in the war, 1888.

1888.

raid was made by Jāsim's people in the direction of Abu Dhabi, from which they returned with camels taken from the Darā' and Āl Bū Shāmis Na'im. In August a number of the Āl Morrah transferred themselves to the side of Shaikh Zaid and promised to act with him against raiders from Qatar. In his eagerness to strike, Shaikh Jāsim ventured upon one occasion to despatch armed men and ammunition by boat to Sila', a place on the coast considerably to the eastward of Khor-al-'Odaid and therefore under Abu Dhabi; but for this act he was severely reprimanded by the Resident under the orders of the Government of India, an intimation being added that repetition of the offence would entail serious consequences.

Turkish support of the Shaikh of Dohah in the war, 1889.

During the continuance of the war the Turkish garrison at Dohah received orders to assist Shaikh Jāsim in defending the town, if attacked; but they were prohibited from operating at a greater distance than 4 hours' march from Dohah. At the end of 1889 the Wālī of Basrah tried to arrange a reconciliation and wrote a letter to Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi, in which he exhorted him to submit to Turkish arbitration with a view to the avoidance of strife and bloodshed, and for the sake of the Muhammadan religion, common to the disputants, and of the "latent" sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey over both, which other powers were seeking to deny. To this communication the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, advised by the British Political Resident, replied that it was his own wish and intention, so long as the Shaikh of Dohah abstained from aggressive movements, to confine himself to the government and protection of his own territories.

1890-91.

In 1890 raids and counter-raids continued, the advantage on the whole resting with the Shaikh of Dohah; and in 1891 a raiding party from Qatar actually reached a point beyond Abu Dhabi town and succeeded in evading pursuit.

Rumoured design of the Turks to occupy 'Odaid, 1890-1.

In 1890-91, as already mentioned, there were rumours of an intention on the part of the Turks to post a Mudir at 'Odaid; but, though a Mudir designate actually arrived in Bahrain from Basrah at the end of 1890, they came to nothing.

### Rising in Qatar against Turkish authority, 1893.

Relations between the Turks and the Shaikh of Dohah, their nominal representative in Qatar, had for some time been growing more and more

strained, for Shaikh Jāsim had successfully obstructed the Turkish scheme of establishing a custom house at Dohah, and the Turks believed him to be responsible for much of the tribal disorder and insecurity which prevailed in the country and along the coast. Matters were now brought to a crisis by a visit which the Wālī of Basrah paid to Qatar in the course of a tour to Hasa, doubtless with the object of setting matters right.

His Excellency arrived by land from Hofuf towards the end of February 1893, accompanied by 300 cavalry, who had marched from Basrah *via* Kuwait, and by a regiment of infantry. He summoned Shaikh Jāsim to his presence at Dohah; but Jāsim, who feared arrest notwithstanding a promise of safety, refused to visit him; and the Wālī, suspecting treachery or unwilling to compromise his own dignity, declined a suggestion by Jāsim that they should meet with small escorts in the desert. The negotiations continued for nearly a month, Ahmad, a brother of Jāsim, being employed on a safe-conduct as intermediary; but Jāsim refused to come in from Wajbah, 12 miles west of Dohah, where he had taken up his position, and the Wālī at length resolved on forcible action.

Negotiations between the Wālī and Shaikh Jāsim, February-March 1893.

On the night of the 25th March, having first placed Ahmad and twelve of the principal men of Dohah in confinement, the Wālī moved out with the Turkish troops and tried to surprise Shaikh Jāsim at Wajbah; but in this he failed, and the Arabs, collecting, attacked and defeated the components of the Turkish column, which were somewhat scattered. Most of the fighting appears to have taken place at Misaimir about 7 miles south of Dohah from which it would seem that the Turks had attempted a circuitous approach on Wajbah, or that they found a convenient line of retreat by Misaimir. The troops, losing considerably as they went, eventually made their way back to the Dohah fort; their retirement was covered towards the end by the guns of the Turkish vessel "Mirrikh," which afterwards opened on the town; and the Wālī took up his quarters on board the "Mirrikh." The total loss of the Turks on this day was estimated at 100 men, and of the Arabs at 400 souls—men, women, and children. By seizing the wells in the neighbourhood of Dohah the Arabs compelled the Wālī to liberate Ahmad and the other leading men whom he held as hostages, and the Wālī had also to make terms for the return by land to Hofuf of the cavalry that he had brought with him from Hasa. After these events Dohah was deserted by its inhabitants, who scattered to other places; Shaikh Jāsim continued to live quietly at Wajbah; and the "Mirrikh," with the Wālī on board, remained at anchor in the Dohah harbour.

Defeat of a Turkish force, 26th March 1893.



Attempted  
British inter-  
vention, May  
1898.

A few days before the collision, Shaikh Jāsim, who evidently felt that his position was growing difficult, had written to the British Political Resident imploring his protection; and he had also applied to the Shaikh of Bahrain for leave to settle, under his jurisdiction, in the northern part of Qatar. On the Misaimir affair coming to be known in London and at Constantinople, Lord Rosebery, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, requested that the British Political Resident or another officer should be sent to the spot to mediate between the Turks and Shaikh Jāsim; and Colonel Talbot, at the end of April, accordingly proceeded from Büshehr to Dōhah. The Wāli, however, declined to discuss matters with him unless by order of the Porte, and in the meantime news of his dismissal arrived; so Colonel Talbot, leaving the Wāli behind, moved to Wakrah, where he had an interview with Jāsim. Ahmad, having been appointed by his brother as plenipotentiary, agreed to accept any decision by the British Resident and asked to be provided with a place of refuge on the Qatar coast, where he might renew the Agreement of 1868 or undertake the same obligations as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Here, however, the British proceedings ended.

Final settle-  
ment, June  
1898.

In June 1898 a settlement between the Turkish Government and the Shaikh was effected by the Naqib of Basrah, who arranged that, on condition of the arms captured from the Turks being surrendered, Shaikh Jāsim should be allowed to resign the Qāim Maqāmship in favour of his brother Ahmad, and should receive a free pardon.

### General and internal history of Qatar since the rising against the Turks, 1893-1907.

Turkish  
Assistant  
Qāim-Maqām  
posted at  
Dōhah, 1893.

Notwithstanding this settlement and his own apparent unwillingness to serve them, Shaikh Jāsim continued to be treated by the Turks as Qāim-Maqām of Qatar; but a regular Turkish official was also posted to Dōhah as Assistant Qāim-Maqām. The refusal of the Turks to accept Jāsim's resignation was probably due to the consideration that he was less dangerous as an official than he might be as an irresponsible free-lance. The Turkish garrison at Dōhah was maintained, after 1893, at a considerable strength.

1894.

In 1894 the Assistant Qāim-Maqām of Dōhah and his wife were murdered by two Turkish soldiers, who at first escaped to Wakrah, but were in the end arrested and brought back.

In July 1896 the Bani Hājir carried off some 3,000 sheep and a number of camels belonging to the Na'im of Qatar; Ibn-Rashid, however, intervened, and in November he demanded that reparation should be made by Shaikh Jāsim to the Na'im, which was immediately done.

In 1897 Shaikh Jāsim, acting on behalf of the people of Qatar, appears to have informed the Mutasarraf that they could not afford to contribute to a war fund opened by the Turks in connection with their war against Greece.

In 1898, during a temporary absence of the Turkish gun vessel usually kept at Dōhah, a small rising took place in which several Turks and Arabs were killed. The reason of it appeared to be that the Arabs considered a successful raid made by the Shaikh of Kuwait in April 1898 upon the Bani Hājir, who were under the protection of Shaikh Jāsim, to have been instigated by the Turkish authorities. After this affair the garrison of Dōhah was again strengthened.

In 1902 both Jāsim and his brother Ahmad declined an invitation to visit Hasa.

In September 1905 a Muhammadan Turkish subject was murdered at Dōhah by Shaikh Ahmad, the brother of Jāsim, in mistake for a Jew, the partner of the deceased, against whom Ahmad had a grievance; and difficulties with the Turkish authorities at Basrah were at first apprehended on account of this incident. Ahmad, however, on becoming aware of his mistake, at once apologised to the Turks and tendered Rs. 800 as blood-money to the relatives of the murdered man; but the latter refused to accept compensation.

In 1906 it was reported that the Turkish garrison at Dōhah was nominally 200 men, but that it generally stood, on account of desertions, at about half that strength.

In November 1905, through a visit by Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, much light was cast upon the administrative position in Qatar. It appeared that Shaikh Jāsim, though for five or six years he had been living in retirement at Lūsail and had nominally abdicated both the Qāim-Maqāmship and the chiefship, was still in reality ruler of Dōhah and all its dependencies, and that nothing of importance was done in Qatar without his being consulted. At the same time his brother Ahmad, who discharged the active duties of the Qāim-Maqāmship and who was accordingly the medium in all dealings with the Turks, had succeeded in acquiring a certain position of his own, and some jealousy prevailed between him and Jāsim. Semi-independent charge of Wakrah was held by Shaikh Jāsim's third son, 'Abdur Rahman. In

Administra-  
tive position  
in Qatar,  
1905.



spite of his great age, probably well over 80 years, Shaikh Jāsim was found in excellent health and full possession of his faculties; he appeared to be keenly interested in all matters of business.

assassination  
of Shaikh  
Ahmad and  
his son, Dec-  
ember 1905.

In December 1905, shortly after Captain Prideaux's visit, Shaikh Ahmad was murdered by one of his own servants, a Bani Hājir, on account of a private grudge; it was generally suspected that Khalifah, the eldest son of Shaikh Jāsim, had also been privy to the crime. The old Shaikh proved himself quite capable of dealing with the emergency, for he obliged the elders of the Bani Hājir to resort in a submissive manner to his camp, where they gave an undertaking to hunt down and execute the murderer. At the close of one of his discussions with them an untoward incident occurred in the shape of a sudden and murderous attack on Sālim-bin-Shāfi', chief Shaikh of the Makhadhdhabah division of the Bani Hājir, by a slave of the deceased; but, connection with the deed having been emphatically repudiated by the Āl Thāni, the progress of the negotiations was not disturbed. A few weeks later the murderer of Shaikh Ahmad was shot dead in Dhahrān by Bashīr, a nephew of Sālim-bin-Shāfi', and the feud arising from the death of Ahmad was declared closed. One result of the murder of Ahmad was to leave 'Abdullah, the fourth son of Jāsim, in charge of Dōhah, whereby he was considered to have obtained an advantage over his eldest brother Khalifah in respect of the ultimate succession to Shaikh Jāsim. It was noticeable that the Turks abstained very carefully from meddling in the nomination of the new Shaikh of Dōhah, and that they left the matter entirely to Shaikh Jāsim; but, notwithstanding their respect for his independence in tribal matters, his foreign relations continued to be controlled by the Turkish military commandant of the Dōhah fort. In November 1906 an attempt was made on the life of Shaikh 'Abdullah by a negro slave, who was not shot down until he had killed two persons.

Tribal  
matters,  
1905-06.

In April 1905 Shaikh Ahmad of Dōhah headed a raid by Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir of the Makhadhdhabah division on 'Ajmān, Bani Khālid of the 'Amāir section and Bani Hājir of the Āl Muhammad division, who were then encamped in the Jāfurah desert; some spoil in the shape of flocks was obtained, but the raiders lost five men killed. In May 1906 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Dōhah undertook a small punitive expedition against the predatory Bani Hājir and Manāsir tribes; and in July he again forayed the Bedouins, proceeding himself as far as Dōhat-as-Salwa and sending a party, by whom twelve Bedouins were killed, through Barr-al-Qarah almost as far

as 'Oqair. In August 1906 the Shaikh of the Āl Morrah, who had suffered heavy punishment at the hands of the 'Ajmān and become a fugitive, visited Shaikh 'Abdullah; in September the 'Ajmān composed a long-standing feud with the people of Dōhah by surrendering 100 camels and entering into engagements; and in November the head of the Makhadhdhabah Bani Hājir came to an arrangement with Shaikh Jāsim, which made it possible for the Makhadhdhabah to camp again with safety in Qatar.

#### British relations with Qatar during the same period, 1893-1907.

The relations of the British authorities with Qatar continued after 1893 on the same unsatisfactory footing as before, being still partly with the Turks and partly with the Shaikhs of the Āl Thāni family.

On the 15th of April 1893, in the course of discussions relating to late events at Dōhah, a note was handed to Lord Rosebery by the Turkish Ambassador in London in which reference was made to Qatar as "a Turkish sub-governorship" and "a dependency of Najd." Attention having been drawn to these expressions by the Government of India, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook, as the communications had been of an informal nature, to remind the Turkish representative privately that Her Majesty's Government dissented from the view implied in the note.

Question of  
the status of  
Qatar, 1893.

In 1893 the Turkish authorities at Dōhah protested against the presence of H.M.S. "Brisk" in the harbour, forbade the Commander to hold torpedo practice in the bay, and prevented the officers of the ship from visiting the shore. Instructions for future guidance were solicited by the naval authorities; and it was laid down by the Government of India, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, that, while Turkish rule should not be recognised at Dōhah and British naval officers might act there, as upon the coast of Hadda, in such manner as might be necessary to prevent or punish infractions of the maritime peace, it was desirable that no opportunity should be given to Turkish officials of asserting by overt action such nominal authority as the Porte might possess in the locality, and that, therefore, Her Majesty's ships should refrain from visiting the harbour of Dōhah except when special occasion for doing so should arise.

Question of  
British war  
vessels at  
Dōhah and  
British liberty  
of action  
in Qatar,  
1893.

About the same time it was observed by Her Majesty's Government, in correspondence with the Government of India, that, as the actual authority of the Turks appeared to be confined to the town of Dohah, there was no sufficient reason for allowing the pretensions of Turkey to interfere with British liberty of action in Qatar or prevent the Government of India from making such treaties with the chiefs of Qatar as might be considered advisable.

Insult to the British flag at Dohah, 1894.

In the spring of 1894 a vessel owned by a British Indian subject was boarded, on entering the port of Dohah, by a party of Turkish soldiers who at first hauled down and took possession of her British flag; on being satisfied, however, that the vessel was British and had a British certificate, they restored the flag. The Political Resident from Bushahr then visited Dohah in H.M.S. "Sphinx," but the local Turkish officials, on the ground that the Resident's direct request was irregular, refused to offer any explanation of the incident and referred him to the superior Turkish authorities. The Government of India instructed the Resident to take no further action in the matter inasmuch as the mistake had been rectified as soon as discovered, while to press for explanations would only be to elicit an assertion of the Porte's jurisdiction at Dohah, all occasion for which it was desired to avoid; but the Wali of Basrah, having been informed of the occurrence by the British representative there, denied the lowering of the flag and gave assurances of the friendship of Turkey for Britain.

Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Zubarah, 1895.

The history of an attempt to invade the Bahrain Islands, made by Shaikh Jāsim in 1895 with the countenance of the Turks, is given at length in the history of the Bahrain principality. As there related, the attempt was frustrated by the forcible action of British war vessels at Zubarah, and provided Her Majesty's Government with an opportunity of informing the Porte that they could not admit the part of the coast on which Zubarah was situated to lie within the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire.

Question of a Turkish sanitary post in Qatar, 1897.

In 1897 the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Qatar; but the project was defeated by the opposition of the British delegate, who explained that Her Majesty's Government did not recognise the existence of Turkish jurisdiction over Hasa.

Question of the renewal of treaty relations between Great Britain and the Al Thāni

The admission of Shaikh Jāsim in 1882 that the Agreement of 1868 was still valid and his willingness in 1893 to renew that Agreement or to contract engagements similar to those accepted by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān have already been mentioned. In 1898, at a private interview with Lieutenant Robinson of H.M.S. "Sphinx," Shaikh Ahmad, who then represented

his brother at Dohah, declared his readiness to enter into the same relations with the British Government as were maintained by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān; and in November 1899, at a meeting with Colonel Meade, the Political Resident, at Wakrah, Shaikh Ahmad expressed a desire to form a closer connection with the British power and asked for permission to occupy 'Odaid; but no action was taken on his requests as he failed to confirm them in writing.

Shaikhs, 1898-99.

After the posting of Mr. Gaskin to Bahrain as Assistant Political Agent at the beginning of 1900, Shaikh Ahmad made indirect overtures to him for an understanding with the British Government; his proposals resembled the suggestions that he had made to Colonel Meade in 1899, and he continued to repeat them at intervals. At length, in the spring of 1902, a definite message was received by Mr. Gaskin from Shaikh Ahmad, who offered, on condition of British protection being extended to himself and his followers, to take up his residence at any point on the coast which might be appointed,\* to hold himself responsible for the security of the adjoining waters, and to co-operate with the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain in such matters as might concern them on the mainland. The principal motives of the Shaikh's offer were undoubtedly fear of the Turks and a desire to strengthen his own position in the eyes of the people of Qatar; but, as the arrangement proposed might have satisfactory results, the offer was reported by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government. An investigation of Shaikh Ahmad's position was authorised, but it was directed that no obligations should be undertaken without further reference to the Secretary of State or without full consideration of the political and military aspects of the case. After enquiry it was reported that Ahmad was already virtual chief of Qatar; that his brother Jāsim, though still treated by the Turks as Qāim-Maqām of Qatar,—a title which he repudiated,—had retired in his favour; and that Ahmad was more likely to succeed his brother at his death than any of Jāsim's sons. Subsequent experience, as we have seen, showed this report to be partially erroneous, inasmuch as Jāsim's retirement from the chief power was, up to 1905, only ostensible; and the violent death of Ahmad in 1905 falsified the expectations current in 1902 regarding the succession to the chiefship.

\* This is what was reported at the time; but it was afterwards stated that the instructions of Shaikh Ahmad's agent, one 'Ahdur Rahmān, Wazzān, were to apply for leave to colonise 'Odaid. In reply to a query by Mr. Gaskin, however, the agent said that he thought Shaikh Ahmad would be equally well satisfied with a settlement at Zubarah or at some other place.

1903.

It was thought that on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to Bahrain, in November 1903, Shaikh Ahmad might present himself in person to urge his wish for British protection; and, in view of this contingency, the answer to be given him was discussed between the Indian and British Governments. It was decided by His Majesty's Government that the *status quo* in Qatar, which the Porte on its side had recognised by the withdrawal of Mudirs appointed to Wakrah and Zubarah,—a matter which will presently be mentioned,—ought not to be disturbed by the conclusion of any fresh Agreement between the Shaikhs of Qatar and the British Government; but that the Shaikh might be assured of the friendship of the British Government being continued, so long as he should abstain from entering into engagements with another power. Ahmad, however, did not appear in Bahrain; and the necessity of making any communication to him was thus obviated. It was generally admitted at this time that an Agreement with the Shaikhs of Qatar would be advantageous, inasmuch as it would invest the British Government with a special position in regard to the maintenance of maritime peace off the coasts of the promontory, and would increase the weight of British opinion in any international question that might arise concerning the use of the adjacent pearl banks; but it was held expedient to defer a final decision until the British position in the Persian Gulf should have been examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and until tension at the moment prevailing between Great Britain and Turkey in Arabia should have subsided. In September 1903 Shaikh Ahmad was eager to be informed by Mr. Gaskin, who came to Lūsail, whether a petition by him for British protection was likely to be favourably received; but in 1905, when Captain Prideaux visited Qatar, he seemed to have grown indifferent on the subject, though he still complained of the Turkish incubus at Dōhah.

Attempt by the Porte to establish posts and officials at Zubarah, Wakrah and 'Odaid, 1902-04.

While the proposals of Shaikh Ahmad for closer relations with the British Government, made in 1902, were under consideration, a step was taken by the Turkish Government which temporarily diverted attention from that subject and added to the complications with which it was already beset. On the 27th of November 1902 it was suddenly announced in the "Iqdām," a semi-official Turkish organ, that Turkish Mudirliks were to be created at 'Odaid, Wakrah, Zubarah and Jazirat-al-'Amāir \* on the Arabian coast. Confirmation of the news was soon forthcoming in Bahrain, the Mudir designate of Zubarah

\* The islands of Musallamiya and Jinnah are both known as Jazirat-al-'Amāir: either or both may have been intended.

arriving in Hasa in February of 1903, and the official intended for Wakrah in the month after. It was further ascertained that the Turkish scheme involved the erection of guard-houses to connect Zubarah with 'Oqair. Towards the end of March 1903 a Turkish gunboat left Basrah for Qatar to assist in the execution of the general design. Exactly three days later, on the 23rd of March, assurances were received by the British Ambassador at Constantinople from the Grand Vazir that no intention of posting officials to the places in question existed; but the proceedings of the Turks continued to be suspicious and were closely watched. H.M.S. "Sphinx" was sent to visit Zubarah and 'Odaid, and called at Wakrah, where the Turkish flag was found flying. Meanwhile Yūsuf Bey, the Mudir designate of Wakrah, had reached Bahrain on his way, as was suspected, to Wakrah. Under the authority of His Majesty's Government obstacles were placed in the way of his sailing for Qatar, but he succeeded in evading them; he left Bahrain on the 27th of April; and a few days later, after one unsuccessful attempt, was reported to have established himself at Wakrah. In the interim, on the 27th of April, an assurance had been obtained at Constantinople that the *status quo* in Qatar should not be in any way disturbed. After a short time Yūsuf Bey was called to Dōhah to act for the Assistant Qāim-Maqām of Qatar, and a peremptory demand for his recall from Wakrah having been addressed to the Porte by His Majesty's Government, it does not appear that he subsequently returned to the place. Soon, however, it was discovered that 'Abdur Rahmān, son of Shaikh Jāsim, had been officially appointed to Wakrah in place of Yūsuf Bey with the title of Mudir and a salary of \$52 a month. This elicited a fresh protest from the British Government, who refused to recognise the right of the Turks to appoint any administrative official whatsoever in Qatar, even from among the local Shaikhs; and at last, in October 1904, 'Abdur Rahmān was, by order of the Porte, deprived of the status of Mudir. It seems, however, that he was allowed to retain his salary,\* which the Turks represented to be a subsidy of old standing, as also the status which he enjoyed at Wakrah as local agent of the Turkish Government.

From 1893 to 1898 piracies were of rare occurrence upon the coast of Qatar. The only serious case, apparently, was one that occurred in 1895, in which a British Indian sailing vessel was plundered, one of the crew being killed and others wounded; and in 1896 'Ali, an Āl Bin-'Ali

Piracies on the coast of Qatar, 1893-1906.

\* In 1906, however, it was stated that 'Abdur Rahmān had never actually drawn this salary.

refugee from Bahrain settled at Ghāriyah, attacked a Bahrain boat and carried off Rs. 1,000 in pearls and money.

1899.

The year 1899, however, was signalised by a renewal of insecurity. In February 1899 a Persian vessel, the "Mubāraki," was plundered by Arabs at Abu Dhulūf, losing two-thirds of her cargo. On the 16th of August a Bahrain jolly-boat was attacked and carried off by Bani Hājir Bedouins near Dhakhirah, but recovery of the boat and part of the cargo was subsequently effected through the Shaikh of Dōhah. A few days after the piracy at Dhakhirah, two Dangis belonging to Hindu British subjects were captured, again by Bani Hājir pirates, near the Fasht-ad-Dibāl; one was pillaged and abandoned, the other was taken bodily to Rās-adh-Dhabaiyah, where she was beached and became a total wreck. The damage in these three cases amounted to over Rs. 16,000, of which amount only about one-fourth was made good by restitution. The remainder was still unrecovered when Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, visited Wakrah on the 25th of November 1899 and had an interview on shore with Ahmad, the brother of Shaikh Jāsim, principally with reference to the outrages.

1900.

On the 18th of August 1900 some Bedouins of Qatar, disguised as pearl-fishers, boarded a Bahrain vessel at the Qaraimah bank, a few miles north of Rās Rakan, and plundered her; in this case the property lost scarcely exceeded Rs. 300 in value, but the principal loser was a shell-purchaser in the employment of a British mercantile firm. This fresh case revived the question of reparation for the earlier piracies.

1902.

The proceedings, however, remained infructuous; and in February 1902 they were abandoned, chiefly on account of the time that had elapsed since the occurrences, and of the security which had since prevailed along the Qatar coast. The ability of the Shaikh of Dōhah to prevent piratical outrages was not entirely clear, and he asserted that the depredations were invariably committed by the Bani Hājir Bedouins, whom the presence of the Turks prevented him from chastising, and that some of the so-called piracies were committed by marauders who waded out from the coast and did not make use of boats belonging to villages. It was, however, decided by the Government of India that in future the Shaikh should continue to be held responsible for the behaviour of the Bedouins of Qatar, his property in Bahrain being if necessary placed under attachment until redress had been afforded, and that the inhabitants of coast villages should be treated as answerable for the use of their vessels by pirates.

After 1900 there were no further complaints of piracy on the Qatar coast until the 8th of January 1906, when the crew of a Persian boat belonging to Rig arrived in Bahrain and stated that in the previous month, after being driven by stress of weather to Abu Dhulūf in Qatar and compelled by the elements to jettison part of their cargo, they had been plundered and otherwise ill-treated by the inhabitants of the village. Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, proceeded in H.M.S. "Sphinx" to the scene of the accident, where he remained from the 28th to the 30th of January; but 'Isa-bin-Hamad, the headman of the place, though assured of good treatment, refused to come on board and professed himself a subject of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Captain Prideaux accordingly wrote to the headman requiring his presence before him in Bahrain and returned to his headquarters, but bad weather prevented the removal of two boats belonging to Abu Dhulūf which it had been intended to take away as security for the headman's appearance. 'Isa-bin-Hamad eventually arrived in Bahrain on the 1st of March and stated that nothing had been taken from the Persians except salvage which they voluntarily paid; but, in the meanwhile, his contumacy had been reported to the Government of India and orders requested. In June 1906 a protest was lodged by the Turkish Ambassador in London, to the effect that Captain Prideaux's action would have a disturbing effect on the tribes and might give rise to difficulties. The Persian complainants, though duly summoned, did not return to Bahrain to answer the objections of the headman; and the case, as one of piracy, was then necessarily dropped, the headman being merely cautioned as to his future behaviour.

Some points, however, had been raised by the incident in regard to which the Government of India considered it necessary to issue instructions for the future guidance of their officers. These instructions, after being approved by His Majesty's Government, were issued in February 1907: their substance was that, as action against piratical communities on the coast of Qatar, especially when the sufferers were persons not entitled to British protection, required careful consideration, all cases of piracy and maritime disturbance should be reported, as they occurred, to the Government of India. This form of procedure the Government of India considered to be preferable both to the grant of discretionary powers to local officers and to the laying down by themselves of any general rule, and they did not anticipate that the slight delay which it might involve would have any disadvantageous results in regard to the final settlement of cases. They added that it appeared unnecessary to make a rule, as had been

Orders of Government in regard to piracies, February 1907.

suggested by the Political Agent in Bahrain, that petty chiefs should be required to come off or send a boat, without having been specially asked to do so, to every British Government vessel arriving in their vicinity.

Maritime  
disturbance,  
900.

Of a non-piratical nature, but otherwise worthy of mention, was a collision which occurred off the coast of Qatar in 1900 between the Āl Bin-'Alī and the 'Amāmarah: these tribes, as related in the history of Bahrain, had a blood-feud with one another of several years standing. On the 16th of June 1900, five boats of 'Amāmarah and two of Dawāsir from Bahrain were driven by an adverse wind into the neighbourhood of Wakrah, where a fleet of Āl Bin-'Alī and other boats was engaged in pearling; and the Āl Bin-'Alī, who were in greater strength than the 'Amāmarah, finding their blood-enemies unexpectedly at hand, hoisted their flags, as in honour bound, and made sail as if to attack. The 'Amāmarah replied by a fusillade from their boats, and a serious encounter might have ensued but for the intervention of a nephew of Shaikh Jāsim, who persuaded the 'Amāmarah to surrender their arms to the Āl Bin-'Alī and enabled them to depart in safety. As it appeared, from investigations held by the Assistant Political Officer in Bahrain, that the Āl Bin-'Alī were the aggressors,\* they were in the first place fined Rs. 1,000 for breach of the maritime peace. Being required to deliver up the 'Amāmarah rifles, 20 in number, which had passed into their possession, they substituted some inferior weapons; and for this further offence an additional fine of Rs. 500 was imposed on them. The fines were paid with a promptitude which showed the effectiveness of the means of compulsion held in reserve by the British Government, — the sequestration, namely, of property owned by the Āl Bin-'Alī in Bahrain.

Visits of  
British  
officers to  
Qatar, 1899-  
1903.

In 1899, as already mentioned, the Resident, Colonel Meade, paid a visit to Wakrah; and in September 1903 Mr. Gaskin, the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, touched at Lūsail and at Wakrah and interviewed Shaikhs Jāsim and Ahmad separately.

1905.

In November 1905 Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, crossed over to Qatar in a native boat and went to see Shaikh Jāsim in his camp at Bū Hasa, about 10 miles inland from Lūsail: here he remained for three days, transacting business with the Shaikh, and had an interview with Nāsir-bin-Mubarak, the Bahrain refugee and claimant. On his return to the coast Captain Prideaux spent a day with Shaikh

\* It may be mentioned, however, that the Āl Bin-'Alī have never ceased to deny the justice of this decision; they allege that they got up sail to avoid the 'Amāmarah, not to attack them; and they claim credit for not having fired back when fired upon.

Ahmad at Dōhah. By this visit a great addition was made to what had before been known, geographically and politically, concerning Qatar.

In May 1906, Major Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf, accompanied by Captain Prideaux, made a tour by sea in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to Lūsail, Dōhah, Wakrah and Khor-al-'Odaid. At Lūsail a friendly interview with Shaikh Jāsim and Nāsir-bin-Mubarak, his son-in-law, took place; at Dōhah a call was made on the Turkish Commandant and business was discussed; at Wakrah, where no member of the Āl Thāni family happened to be present, the party visited the headman of the Āl Bū 'Ainain tribe and inspected the fort and wells; at 'Odaid the inlet was traversed for several miles in a steam-cutter, but not a single human being was described upon its shores. The visit to Dōhah was afterwards reported by the Turkish military authorities in Hasa to Constantinople, with a recommendation that efforts should be made to put down piracy in order to deprive the English of all excuse for interference on the Qatar coast.

#### Relations of Qatar with Najd, 1893-1907.

We have seen that before the crisis of 1893, and especially in 1888, friendly relations prevailed between Shaikh Jāsim and the Amīr of Jabal Shammar: nor were they discontinued, apparently, until the overthrow of Ibn-Rashīd's power in Najd. In 1894 Shaikh Jāsim sought an interview with Ibn-Rashīd, which was refused for fear of the Turks; and in 1896, as already mentioned, the Shaikh at the request of Ibn-Rashīd caused restitution of animals raided to be made by one tribe of Qatar to another.

Relations  
with Ibn-  
Rashīd,  
1893-1896.

When Hāil declined and Riyādh obtained the ascendancy in Central Arabia, Shaikh Jāsim, in his later years a convinced Wahhābi and during most of his life a bitter enemy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, had no difficulty in adapting himself to the change and began to send money and other gifts annually to Ibn-Sa'ūd; but his views in this respect were not shared by his brother Shaikh Ahmad. A visit paid by 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of the Wahhābi Amīr, in the summer of 1905 to districts adjoining Qatar brought out the divergence of opinion in the Āl Thāni family very clearly: for, while Shaikh Jāsim sent the Amīr a letter of welcome, with \$ 8,000 in cash and a present of rifles and rice, and himself visited him at the wells of 'Araiq, Shaikh Ahmad warned him that any attempt on his part to cross the border of Qatar would be opposed by the united forces of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi.

Relations  
with Ibn-  
Sa'ūd, 1905.

## CHAPTER V.

## HISTORY OF BAHRAIN.\*

## Early History, 1602-1783.

Expulsion  
of the  
Portuguese  
by the  
Persians,  
about 1602.

Persian  
occupation  
of uncertain  
duration.

Seizure of  
Bahrain by  
the Imām of  
'Omān, 1718.

In tracing the course of events in Bahrain it is unnecessary to go back beyond 1602, about which year the Portuguese were expelled from the islands by the † Persians; the ruined fort on the northern coast of the main island, known at the present day as Qal'at-al-'Aǧāj, is a relic of the Portuguese occupation.

After this the Persians appear to have retained possession for a considerable time; and in 1622 they must have had a military dépôt in Bahrain, for they brought thence a quantity of the gunpowder which they expended in the siege of Hormūz.

In or about 1718 a descent was made on Bahrain by the Arabs of Masqat, then governed by Sultān-bin-Saif II, an Imām of the Ya'arabi

\* The only authorities in regard to the recent history of Bahrain are the records of the Government of India and compilations based thereon, among which may be mentioned *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Bahrain Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. For Agreements, etc., relating to Bahrain the reader is referred to Aitchison's *Treaties*, and for details of British naval action and similar matters to Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877. Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, gives a view of the state of affairs in Bahrain in 1862-1863. The authorities for early events (1600-1800) are the same as those cited for the corresponding period in the footnote to the title of Chapter First.

† In this and in most other places where "Persians" are mentioned in connection with Bahrain affairs, the term must be understood to mean "subjects of the Persian Government." Persian subjects employed by their Government in matters at Bahrain have generally been Arabs of the Būshehr and Kangūn neighbourhoods.

dynasty; it is not clear whether the Bahrain islands were then derelict or whether a Persian garrison held them; but in either case the invaders seem to have had little difficulty in establishing their power. The 'Omāni occupation seems to have lasted for a short time only, and it is said to have been brought to an end by the voluntary removal from their homes of the indigenous population, who emigrated to other places in order to escape foreign oppression.

At the middle of the 18th century the Hūwalah Arabs, at the present day still strongly represented in the islands, were the chief resident tribe and controlled the politics of the archipelago; but in 1753 they were so much divided among themselves by feuds that the conquest of the islands appeared likely to prove an easy task for any foreign invader.

Apparently in that very year, invited by the local situation, Shaikh Nāsir, the ruler of Būshehr under the Persian Government, made a descent upon Bahrain and, with the assistance of Mir Nāsir, chief of Rīg, established his own authority there. In this manner the islands again became a dependency, at least in name, of Persia.

In 1755, partly because of his failure to pay 5,000 Tūmāns on account of the revenues of Bahrain during the three years that it had been in his possession, Shaikh Nāsir was imprisoned by the Vakil Karīm Khān at Shīrāz; and in 1767 the Vakil seems to have insisted that he should pay 4,000 Tūmāns a year on account of Būshehr and Bahrain together.

There is no information regarding the internal affairs of Bahrain during the Persian occupation established in 1753. In 1771 pirates of Khārag, having captured two ships under British colours—with several others—in the Gulf below Būshehr, carried their prizes to Bahrain and kept them there until they found an opportunity of removing them to Rīg. In 1779 a certain Shaikh Nāsir of Bahrain, who brought with him a vessel of his own, took part in the recovery of Būshehr, on behalf of Shaikh Nāsir of that town, from one Bāqir Khān into whose hands it had fallen. These affairs, which hardly concern Bahrain, are related in full in their proper places.

### English and other foreign views in regard to Bahrain, 1602-1783.

Bahrain was one of the first places in the Persian Gulf to attract the attention of the representatives of the English East India Company.

Predomi-  
nance and  
proceedings  
of the Hūwa-  
lah, about  
1751-53.

Annexion  
to Persia,  
about 1753.

Revenue on  
account of  
Bahrain  
claimed by  
the Vakil of  
Shīrāz, 1755.  
67.

Events  
Bahrain,  
1753-83.

Thomas Aldworth, appointed chief of the Sūrat Factory on its foundation at the beginning of 1613, was soon engaged in a search for new markets outside India, and reported upon Bahrain, during his first year of office, in the following terms: "I find there is a seaport town called "Bareyn, whereunto a ship of 2 or 3 hundred tons may come, and I "understand this country spends much cloth, for the Venetians bring it "overland and so carry with them again all sorts of Persian Silks, which "trade is, as it were, offered us, and surely I think in short time will be "able to vent as much cloth as Suratt."

1625. The Company soon after this selected Jāshk, and subsequently Bandar 'Abbās, as their port in the Persian Gulf; but occasional references to Bahrain continue to occur in their records, as for example in 1625, when some information regarding the pearl fishery with its headquarters in Bahrain was extracted from Portuguese deserters.

1700-01. In 1700-01, when, after a brief re-approchement, the relations of the Old East India Company with the Persian Government had again become unsatisfactory, it was suggested by Mr. Owen, the Company's Agent in Persia, "that, if in future it should become necessary for the Company to "employ force for the preservation of their privileges and trade in Persia, "it would be expedient to take possession of the Island of Barreïn near "Bassorah, a station which would not only afford a proportion of Persian "produce, but enable the Company's cruisers to overawe the trade."

In 1751, when an attack on Bandar 'Abbās was feared, the Company's representatives there asked that they might be authorised to remove elsewhere and pointed out that the present was "a fine opportunity ..... of seizing the Persian Fleet and settling at Bahreen;" but the Bombay Presidency in reply to these proposals, while they sanctioned a temporary transfer of the Factory to some other place, strictly forbade any interference with Persian vessels.

1752. In 1752, the project of a removal from Bandar 'Abbās being still under consideration, enquiries were made in regard to various possible new locations: and Mr. F. Wood, the Company's Agent, reported in these terms on Bahrain; "I can get no better intelligence relating to "the Island of Bahreen, than its being a place held in superstitious "veneration by the Hoolah Arabs, and that it is very fertile, abound- "ing with Springs and fresh water, but both the Air and Water are "extremely unwholesome according to the Account of several Persons "who have been formerly Inhabitants of that Place." Eventually, in 1763, Būshehr was chosen in preference to Bahrain as the base of the Company's operations in the Persian Gulf, just as Jāshk had been selected a century and a half before.

When the Dutch under Baron Kniphausen formed a settlement on Khārag at the end of 1753, it was strongly suspected that they meant to seize Bahrain, and the suspicion for some time continued to be entertained; but, if they harboured the design thus attributed to them, they took no steps to carry it into effect.

Dutch views  
1753-66.

### Conquest of Bahrain from the Persians by the Arabs, 1783.

The recent history of Bahrain may be said to date from 1783, in which year the Persians, then in possession, were expelled from the islands. The Arab horde which drove them out was led by the Shaikhs of the 'Utūb; but it included contingents from numerous tribes of the Arabian mainland.

The conflict in Bahrain may have been provoked by Persian aggression upon Zubārah, a flourishing settlement on the adjacent coast of Qatar which had been founded a few years previously by 'Atbi settlers from the port of Kuwait. This place Shaikh Nāsir, Governor of Būshehr and Bahrain under the Persians, was commissioned by Karīm Khān, Zand, to reduce; and as early as 1777, apparently, some attempt was made by him to carry out his instructions.

Invasion of  
Bahrain by  
the 'Utūb,  
1782.

After the death of Karīm Khān, the power of Persia as a Government being for the time paralysed, the Arabs of Zubārah retaliated, probably in 1782, by a descent on the Island of Bahrain; they defeated Shaikh Nāsir in the field, drove him to his fort, plundered and destroyed the town of Manāmah, and took possession of a Būshehr vessel with which they retired to Zubārah.

As related in the history of Qatar, a counter-attack was next made upon the 'Utūb of Zubārah by the Shaikh of Būshehr with the aid of supporters from Rās-al-Khaimah and Hormūz; but it was ignominiously repulsed. A message from Shaikh Nāsir informing his son, who had been left in charge of Bahrain, of the defeat of the Persians and urging him to hold out resolutely in Bahraïn, was meanwhile intercepted at sea by a fleet of six large vessels and a number of boats despatched by the 'Utūb of Kuwait to the relief of their kinsmen at Zubārah; and this expedition, having changed their destination, ran to Manāmah, seized and set fire to the town, and shut the Persian garrison up in the citadel. The northern 'Utūb were joined in Bahrain, as quickly as the available means of transport would admit, by the 'Utūb of Zubārah and Ruwais

Capture of  
Bahrain by  
the 'Utūb and  
other Arabs,  
1783.



and by contingents from various tribes of Qatar, among them Āl Musallam from Huwailah, Āl Bin'-'Alī from Fuwairat, Sūdān from Dōhah, Āl Bū 'Ainain from Wakrah, Kibisāh from Khor Hassān, Sulutah from Dōhah, Manāna'ah from Abu Dhalūf, Sādah from Ruwais, Āl Bū Kuwārah from Sumaismah, and Na'im Bedouins from the interior of the promontory. The Bahrain Islands were quickly occupied by the invaders; and the Persian garrison of the Manāmah fort, after a siege of about two months' duration, capitulated on the 28th of July 1783 and were allowed to return to Būshehr.

#### Events from the foundation of the Bahrain Shaikhdom to the first attack on Bahrain by the Saiyid of 'Omān 1783-1800.

Secession  
of the  
Jalāhimah,  
1783.

Bahrain was thus transformed from a Persian dependency into an Arab principality governed by Shaikhs of the Āl Khalifah section of the 'Utūb. The Jalāhimah section of the tribe, who had once before separated themselves from the rest of the 'Utūb in Qatar and who now considered themselves unfairly treated by the majority in Bahrain, shortly took their departure for the mainland, leaving the Āl Khalifah in undisputed possession of the new conquest. The disappointed Jalāhimah were at this time under the leadership of four brothers, sons of a deceased Shaikh named Jābir; and one of these, named Rahmah, was destined to achieve great notoriety and to become the scourge of the Āl Khalifah of Bahrain.

Abortive  
measures of  
the Persians  
for the  
recovery of  
Bahrain,  
1783-1785.

The Persian Government, or rather the Arab Shaikhs representing them in the Gulf, could not at once reconcile themselves to the loss of Bahrain. During the latter part of the year 1783 preparations were on foot for an expedition on a large scale by the Shaikhs of Būshehr and Hormūz, assisted by Persian troops and by the Shaikh of the Qawāsīm, against Zubārah and Kuwait; but no armament actually sailed. Again, in February 1785, the fleets of Būshehr and Rij rendezvoused at Kangūn, where a small land force had already arrived from Shirāz, to await the Shaikhs of Hormūz and Rās-al-Khaimah; but the death of 'Alī Murād Khān of Shirāz dispelled the danger which thus threatened the Āl Khalifah of Bahrain. During the next few years, while the Shirāz Government laboured under domestic difficulties, the Shaikhs of Bahrain remained unmolested; and in 1798 they were still able to lend effectual aid to the Shaikh of Būshehr in affairs upon the Persian coast.

The conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utub gave a great impulse to the trade of the islands, for the Arab immigrants soon acquired a mercantile fleet and became the principal carriers of goods between Masqat, at this time the chief local emporium, and Basrah and the places on the western coast of the Gulf. There were no import duties in Bahrain under the first 'Atbi Shaikhs, and the interests of merchants were carefully protected. The pearl trade of the Persian Gulf was at this period almost entirely controlled by the people of Bahrain; and their annual imports from India, valued at 10 lakhs of rupees, were paid for by means of pearls, chiefly through the market of Masqat.

Growth of  
trade, 1783-  
90.

#### First attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1799-1802.

Throughout a whole generation following this short era of peace, the independence of Bahrain was more than once in serious jeopardy; but the cause, at this later time, was less the assertion by Persia of claims to sovereignty than the ambition of Saiyid Sultān and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat to annex, without any shadow of right, the comparatively rich and valuable islands of Bahrain.

In 1799 Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, not without encouragement from the Persian governor of Shirāz, declared war against the 'Utūb of Bahrain; this he did ostensibly on the ground of their refusing to recognise a tax or duty which he claimed the right to levy on all vessels passing Masqat, but really with the object of conquering Bahrain. The marine of the Āl Khalifah seems to have consisted at this time of three large vessels only, all of which were captured at sea, while returning from India, by the navy of Masqat; but Saiyid Sultān did not as yet venture to land in Bahrain. The 'Utūb, alarmed by his proceedings, opened a correspondence with Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, who received their advances with alacrity and, on their offering to become tributary to Persia, proceeded privately to Bahrain and received from them an instalment of revenue on account of the past year. The 'Utūb seem to have stated to the Persians on this occasion that Bahrain had once belonged to the Turkish Government, out of whose possession it had passed about seventy years previously.\*

Outbreak of  
war with  
Masqat,  
1799.

In 1800 the ruler of Masqat invaded Bahrain, capturing 25 of the leading families, whom he deported to Masqat, and establishing an 'Omāni garrison in a fort at 'Arād on Muharraq Island. Some of the

Invasion and  
occupation of  
Bahrain by  
Saiyid  
Sultān, 1800-  
1801.

\* This was of course incorrect. The Turks temporarily established themselves in Bahrain in 1559, but they were again expelled by the Portuguese in the same year.



chiefs of the defeated 'Utūb took refuge on this occasion at Zubārah, and others at Kuwait, to which last place Saiyid Sultān apparently pursued them. At his departure the Saiyid left his youthful son Salīm, with whom he associated a reliable adviser, in charge of his interests in Bahrain; but the position of the 'Omānis there was precarious, and in 1801, not long after the sailing of the Saiyid's fleet, they were invested in 'Arād by the 'Utūb and compelled to surrender and to evacuate Bahrain.

Renewed  
invasion of  
Bahrain by  
Saiyid  
Sultān, 1802.

In the following year, having obtained some assistance from Būshehr by permission of the Persian ruler of Shirāz, Saiyid Sultān again landed in Bahrain and successfully engaged the 'Utūb; but the latter had now secured the support of the Wāhhābis, whose outposts by this time threatened the land frontiers of the 'Omān Sultanate; and in these circumstances the ruler of Masqat seems to have found it expedient to abandon his enterprise and return home.

#### Events from the first to the second attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1802-1816.

Extension of  
Wāhhābi  
influence over  
Bahrain,  
1803-1809.

After these events the 'Utūb of Bahrain succumbed for a time, but reluctantly, to the influence of the Wāhhābis. In 1803, at the bidding of the Wāhhābi Amir, they sent their subjects to cruise against the people of Masqat at a season when they should have been more profitably engaged in pearl-diving, and suffered a heavy defeat at sea; and in 1805, during a dynastic dispute in the 'Omān Sultanate, a fleet largely 'Atbi proceeded to Masqat, apparently to watch events there in the Wāhhābi interest. In 1805, however, the Shaikhs of Bahrain were inclined to join Saiyid Badar of Masqat in an attack on the Qawāsīm, of which the real object was to destroy the local influence of the Wāhhābis; and their disposition towards the Saiyid had become so favourable that they now paid him at Masqat the dues which they had formerly withheld. In the same year they proposed that the Bombay Government should, by promising the occasional assistance of one or two vessels of war in Bahrain, place them in a position to defy the Wāhhābis,—a request to which the British authorities, though it was recommended for acceptance by Captain Seton, the Political Resident at Masqat, and supported by the 'Atbi Shaikhs of Kuwait and Zubārah, were unable to agree; and in 1809 they ventured to disregard a summons by the Wāhhābi

Amir to join with the Qawāsīm in a naval attack upon Basrah and upon their own 'Atbi brethren at Kuwait.

In 1810 the Wāhhābi Government, who had lately strengthened their position in the Persian Gulf by entering into arrangements with Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the head of the dissident Jalāhimah section and the most influential personage at the time in Qatar, appointed an agent or Wakil to superintend on their behalf the administration of Bahrain, Hasa and Qatar; this individual was named 'Abdullah-bin-'Ufaisān, and his usual residence appears to have been in Bahrain. The authority of the 'Atbi Shaikhs in local matters was maintained; but they were obliged to pay tribute through the Wakil, and Wāhhābi teachers were stationed in the principality to convert the people to the reformed doctrines.

Bahrain  
under strict  
Wāhhābi  
control,  
1710-11.

In 1811, however, embarrassments having arisen upon his western frontier in consequence of the gradual advance of the Egyptians upon that side, the Wāhhābi Amir reduced his garrisons in Bahrain and Zubārah; and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat immediately profited by the opportunity to attack both places. Zubārah was burnt, and in Bahrain the Wāhhābi Wakil was taken prisoner and the 'Utūb were restored to power, but in subordination—so Saiyid Sa'id afterwards declared—to Masqat. In the same year a desperate action was fought at sea between the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Rahmah-bin-Jābir, of which the result was favourable to the Shaikhs of Bahrain.

Bahrain  
freed from  
the Wāhha-  
bis by the  
ruler of  
Masqat,  
1811.

In 1813 the 'Utūb of Bahrain, whose interests at this time coincided with those of the Saiyid of Masqat, volunteered to join the latter at Dibai with a fleet of 15 or 20 sail and a force of 2,000 men for an expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah; but they did not fulfil their undertaking. The unexpected failure of Saiyid Sa'id's attack in that year upon the Qāsimi stronghold may have been due, in part, to their defection.

Short-lived  
alliance  
between the  
'Utūb of  
Bahrain and  
the Saiyid of  
'Omān,  
1811-1813.

#### Second attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1816.

Towards the year 1816 some revulsions of feeling affected the powers interested in Bahrain, and new combinations were formed. The 'Utūb of the islands now sought the protection of the Wāhhābis and entered into a friendship with the Qawāsīm, while Rahmah-bin-Jābir ranged himself under the standard of Masqat.

Origin of the  
rupture.

Proceedings  
of the British  
Resident.

On the 19th of July 1816, news having been received of the sailing of an expedition from Masqat against Rās-al-Khaimah and Bahrain, Lieutenant Bruce, Political Resident at Būshehr, arrived in Bahrain, where he had an interview with 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, the Shaikh of the principality. The Shaikh, to whom the Saiyid had held out a threat that British ships of war would participate in the attack on Bahrain and that the ports of British India would be closed to the 'Utūb so long as they were at enmity with himself, complained to Lieutenant Bruce that the treaty between Masqat and Bahrain had been wantonly broken by Saiyid Sa'īd, who had treacherously seized 15 Bahraini vessels and their cargoes off Masqat. On being assured of the neutrality and even friendship of Britain—of which the Resident apparently undertook to convince him by the conclusion of an informal agreement not authorised by Government—'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad declared himself able to hold his own, at least with Wahhābi assistance, against any force which might be brought against him; and the event fully justified his opinion.

Saiyid Sa'īd, who was now approaching Bahrain, on his part professed, in a correspondence with the Resident, that he was compelled to act against the 'Utūb by their repudiation of his suzerainty, which they had admitted in 1811, by their alliance with the Wahhābis, and by their indulgence in piratical practices. He turned a deaf ear to the dissuasion of the British representative, and he even neglected to answer a letter in which British mediation was offered.

Repulse of  
the Masqat  
expedition  
July or  
August 1816.

The Masqat armament, to which three Būshehr vessels were added by order of the Persian Government of Shīrāz and which was strengthened by Arab contingents from the Persian ports of Kangūn and 'Asalu, arrived on the scene a few days after Lieutenant Bruce's departure from Bahrain. A landing was immediately effected by the 'Omānis on the Island of Muharraḡ; but, in an engagement which followed, the invaders were signally defeated with the loss of two near relations of Saiyid Sa'īd, one of whom was his younger brother Hamad.

Unsuccessful  
negotiations  
between  
Saiyid Sa'īd  
and the  
Persian  
Government  
of Shīrāz for  
a fresh  
attempt on  
Bahrain.

The Saiyid with his fleet then crossed the Gulf to Kangūn to take on board 1,000 musketeers and 400 irregular horse whom the Persian Governor-General of Fārs had undertaken to provide on an understanding that, should the troops be embarked and the expedition then fail or be abandoned, the ruler of Masqat would defray the expenses incurred and in future remit an annual Pishkash to Shīrāz, and that otherwise, in case of the islands, being taken, the Saiyid should pay 10,000 Tūmāns a year ever after to the Governor-General of Fārs. After some

time, however, Saiyid Sa'īd discovered that the Persians really intended to seize him by treachery and carry him a prisoner to Shīrāz, so he abandoned the idea of accepting their assistance and returned home. Soon afterwards a Persian emissary arrived in Bahrain, by name Sikandar Khān, who accepted presents from the Shaikhs of Bahrain for the Prince of Shīrāz and conferred on them in return Persian robes of honour. Some political understanding, also, was probably arranged at the same time; but it cannot have been one of any consequence.

In 1817 Rahmah-bin-Jābir visited Masqat and would fain have persuaded the Saiyid to equip another expedition against Bahrain; but he found Sa'īd's attention engrossed by domestic difficulties.

#### Close connection between the 'Utūb and the Qawāsim, 1817-1819.

The attitude of the Shaikh of Bahrain, whose plausible assurances in 1816, backed as they were by an invitation to open a direct trade between India and Bahrain, had convinced the Resident of his attachment to commerce and his aversion for piracy, now became extremely unsatisfactory; and he was shown to be assisting, with grain and every other kind of store, the piratical Qawāsim, "who hourly frequented the ports of the island," and with whom he had now formed an alliance. In 1817 Lieutenant Bruce was constrained to report that Bahrain, which had become the principal mart for property plundered by pirates and the main dépôt from which the Qawāsim drew their supplies of rice and dates, could itself hardly be regarded otherwise than as a piratical settlement, especially as numbers of the inhabitants were accustomed to proceed to Rās-al-Khaimah and there to enlist as temporary members of buccannering crews. At this time craft engaged in piracy generally landed their booty direct in Bahrain, whence a portion of it was carried over to Būshehr and other places on the Persian coast by vessels belonging to Kuwait. Nevertheless, on the appearance of the Egyptians in Hasa about the end of 1818, Shaikh 'Abdullah appears to have offered to provide them with sea transport for a force that they proposed to send against Rās-al-Khaimah and the other piratical ports.

Sale of  
plundered  
property in  
Bahrain.

In February 1819, a report having been received that several Indian women had been brought from Rās-al-Khaimah and sold in the Bahrain bazaar as slaves, H.M.S. "Eden," Captain Loeh, with H.M.S. "Conway" and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Benares," "Mercury"

Inoperative  
agreement  
by the  
Shaikh to  
prevent the

sale of  
plundered  
British  
property in  
Bahrain,  
1819.

Bani Yās  
mistaken for  
Qawāsim in  
Bahrain,  
1819.

and "Antelope," were despatched to Bahrain for an enquiry into the matter. The report was not substantiated, but Captain Loch succeeded in obtaining, by an exchange of prisoners through the Shaikh of Bahrain, the liberation of 17 Indian women who were held in captivity by the Qawāsim at Rās-al-Khaimah; and, before his departure from Bahrain, he persuaded the Shaikh to execute an agreement for preventing the sale of captured British property in his dominions,—an agreement which, unfortunately, the Shaikh afterwards treated as if it did not exist.

During his stay in Bahrain Captain Loch received information from the British Residency Agent, a native, that a squadron of Qāsimi vessels was lying in the "southern anchorage"—perhaps Khor-al-Qalā'ah; and immediately, without paying sufficient attention to the assertions of the Shaikh and his ministers that the crews were not Qawāsim but Bani Yās, or to the advice of the East India Company's officers, he sent a boat expedition under cover of the "Antelope" to take possession. The vessels, which were boarded and captured after a stout resistance, were wrecked in being brought out of the anchorage; the Shaikh of Bahrain professed great indignation at violation of the neutrality of his port; and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, to whom or to whose subjects the vessels were afterwards proved to belong, made a claim for reparation on the Bombay Government which, it is believed, was admitted and satisfied in respect both of property and of lives lost.

#### Bahrain affairs in connection with the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1819-1820.

British  
policy of  
neutrality in  
regard to  
Bahrain.

When in 1819 an expedition was despatched from Bombay against the piratical stronghold of Rās-al-Khaimah, the policy of the British Government in regard to Bahrain was defined as one of complete abstention from interference between rival claimants to possession; and it was resolved to inform the 'Atbi Shaikh that, so long as he restrained his subjects from piracy, he would reap the advantages of a friendly neutrality on the part of Britain, whereas, should a piratical spirit manifest itself in Bahrain, the same measures of coercion would be applied to the 'Utūb as to the Qawāsim. The conclusion with the Shaikh of "an engagement similar to that negotiated by Mr. Bruce in the year 1816," which would assure the 'Utūb of the benevolence of British intentions, was also contemplated by Government. From the general line of action thus marked out there seems to have been no deviation.

The idea of transferring Bahrain to Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, which had at first been entertained, was thus definitely set aside; but the Saiyid himself did not neglect to make use of his temporary close connection with the British at Rās-al-Khaimah for the purpose of advancing his interests in Bahrain. The crippling of their allies, the Qawāsim, was a severe blow to the 'Utūb of Bahrain, who moreover suspected that the ruler of Masqat was encouraged and supported in his designs by the British Government; and so impressed were the Persians with the probability of the Saiyid's success on this occasion that at the beginning of 1820 the Government of Fārs, who had recently rather hung back in the matter, began to beg him to convey their troops to Bahrain; and the Prince Governor of Shīrāz, when these applications failed, actually addressed himself to the commander of the British expedition and requested the loan of four or five transports, —a demand which, needless to say, was refused. An active share was taken in the Persian preparations by the 'Atbi freebooter Rahmah-bin-Jābir, formerly of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who was now domiciled at Dammām in Hasa.

When, early in January 1820, Saiyid Sa'id parted from Sir W. Grant Keir at Rās-al-Khaimah, it was believed that he would immediately attack Bahrain without depending on any except his own resources, and this he may have intended to do; but the Āl Khalifah, now thoroughly alarmed, anticipated action on his part by making full submission through an agent whom they sent to Masqat. The terms arranged were that the 'Utūb of Bahrain should pay an annual tribute of \$30,000 to His Highness, while he should release certain 'Atbi Shaikhs whom he had detained and restore some Bahraini vessels and other property which he had taken at sea on their way from India. Both parties appear to have stipulated for a guarantee of this arrangement by the British Government, but none was apparently, obtained; later, however, an instalment of \$12,000 seems to have been actually remitted by the 'Utūb to Masqat on account of the promised tribute; and as to the fact of the tribute having been promised, at least, there can be no doubt whatever.

Some ten Qāsimi craft which were liable to destruction by the British armament at Rās-al-Khaimah having taken refuge in Bahrain, Captain Loch was despatched from Rās-al-Khaimah with H.M.S. "Eden" and H.M.S. "Curlew" to demand their surrender. This on the 17th of January 1820 he obtained, as also an agreement by the Shaikh not to admit any more boats of the same character into his port until

Designs of  
Masqat and  
Persia on  
Bahrain,  
1820.

Submission  
of the 'Utūb  
of Bahrain to  
the Saiyid of  
Masqat,  
1820.

Direct  
British  
dealings with  
Bahrain,  
January  
1820.

authorised to do so by the British authorities. The agreement, it is obvious, was merely temporary, and it must have been meant to facilitate the destruction of piratical craft which was then proceeding upon the whole Pirate Coast.

Preliminary  
Treaty of  
Peace, 5th  
February  
1820.

On the 5th of February 1820 a Preliminary Treaty of Peace, binding Salmān-bin-Ahmad and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikhs of Bahrain, to prevent the sale of plundered goods, likewise the supply of necessities to pirates, at places in their dominions and to deliver up all Indian prisoners, was executed at Shārajah by Saiyid 'Abdal Jalil, a Wakil representing the Shaikhs.

General  
Treaty  
Peace, 23rd  
of February  
1820.

Finally, as guaranteed to them in this Preliminary Treaty, the Shaikhs were admitted to the benefits of the General Treaty of Peace. It was signed by their agent at Shārajah on the same day as the Preliminary Treaty, and by the Shaikhs themselves in Bahrain on the 23rd of February 1820.

#### Events from the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah to the third and last attack on Bahrain by the Saiyid of 'Omān, 1820-1828.

Treaty and  
other  
relations  
with  
Britain.

The engagements with the British Government into which the 'Atbi Shaikhs had entered were, upon the whole, satisfactorily observed; and it was not found necessary for cruisers to watch the ports of Bahrain, during the next few years, as those of the Pirate Coast were watched. Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, on his part, went so far as to claim that the General Treaty of Peace established relations of protection and dependence between the British Government and himself; but this impression Lieutenant McLeod, the Political Resident, was careful to remove, while on a visit to Bahrain in 1823. A British marine survey of the waters surrounding and lying to the east of Bahrain was in progress at this time, and was assisted by all the superior and inferior chiefs concerned to the best of their ability.

At the end of 1822 a boat belonging to Būshehr was seized by a Bahrain Batil on account of a claim which the owner of the latter entertained against the Shaikh of Būshehr; and, the case at first appearing to be one of piracy, the Batil and her crew were captured in the Shatt-al-'Arab by H.M.S. "Sophie" and conveyed to Bombay. In this case the Shaikh of Bahrain made no attempt to shield his

subjects, whom he admitted to have been guilty of an impropriety; but the charge of piracy was not established in the court of the Recorder of Bombay; and, the accused Bahrainis and their vessels having been released, a suitable explanation was made to the Shaikh.

In August 1825 a case occurred of petty aggression by a Bahrain Baghlah at Mokha upon a vessel belonging to that port; but a little later, on the arrival of the offending Baghlah at Masqat, the matter was easily settled by the intervention of the British authorities.

During this period not a single serious infringement of the maritime peace by Bahrain subjects was reported.

In the summer of 1821 the Bahrain islands were ravaged by Cholera. Four thousand persons, it was said, perished.

Cholera  
epidemic,  
1821.

An extraordinary and unauthorised agreement, relating to the affairs of Persia in the Persian Gulf generally and therefore more fully discussed in the history of the Persian Coast, was signed at Shīrāz on the 30th of August 1822 by Captain W. Bruce, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Britain, and by Mirza Zaki Khān, Minister to the Prince Governor of Shīrāz, on the part of Persia.

Agreement  
in regard to  
Bahrain  
between  
Captain  
Bruce,  
Political  
Resident,  
and the  
Government  
of Shīrāz,  
1822.

With regard to Bahrain the Agreement laid down that the islands had always been subordinate to the Government of Fārs, against whose authority the 'Atbi Shaikhs had lately become rebellious; that the flag assigned to the 'Utūb of Bahrain under the General Treaty of Peace with Britain in 1820 should accordingly, if already granted, be withdrawn; that no assistance should in future be rendered by Britain to the 'Utūb of Bahrain; and that, on the contrary, the British Government should, if requested, assist the Persians against Bahrain with "one or two" vessels of war. In other words the title of Persia to possession of Bahrain was explicitly admitted. Captain Bruce, in accepting these conditions, appears to have been actuated by a belief that a demonstration against Bahrain, which the Prince Governor of Shīrāz was believed to contemplate, would probably be successful; and he held that, in any case, "the Island of Bahrain reverting again under the authority of Persia" will tend more to the tranquillity of the Arabian side of the Gulf than "almost any other act, and will at once do away with the petty acts of aggression and retaliation existing between the different branches of the Beni Attabec Arabs."

The views of the Resident were not shared by the Government of Bombay, who at once, in clear and emphatic terms, disavowed to the Government of Fārs the action of their representative at Būshehr, and, as a further mark of their disapprobation, removed Captain Bruce from his

appointment and recalled him to India. With reference chiefly to the clause of the Agreement that affected Bahrain, the Bombay Government remarked: "It acknowledges the King of Persia's title of Bahrain. "of which there is not the least proof and which the British Government "cannot assert without injuring the pretensions of the Imaum and the "Attabees. It promises our aid against every power possessed of an "island in the Gulf, and expressly against the Attabees, to whom we are "bound by a treaty of friendship, and with whose conduct we have every "reason to be satisfied." According to a report by Major G. Willock, the British representative at Tabriz, the Shāh [also, "whilst refusing his "accordance to the stipulations, expressed his displeasure that the Prince "of Shiraz should have entered into any engagements with the British "Government without his knowledge and injunctions."

In the course of an important tour along the Arab coast, undertaken by special order of Government, Lieutenant McLeod, the successor of Captain Bruce, landed on the 27th of January 1823 at Manāmah, where he was hospitably entertained by the Shaikhs of Bahrain. The chief object of his visit was to reassure the Shaikhs in regard to Captain Bruce's unfortunate Agreement, by informing them that it was of no effect, and that no change of policy was contemplated by Government; but the case was also discussed of the Bahrain Batil which had been seized by H.M.S. "Sophie" and carried to Bombay on account of a technical piracy committed on a Būshehr vessel in the Shatt-at-'Arab. Shaikh 'Abdullah, the younger of the joint chiefs, who with a majority of the 'Utūb of the principality resided on Muharraq Island, was found to be in virtual charge of the state; his elder brother Salmān, who was now a very old man and was represented in most matters by his son Khalifah, had retired to spend the remainder of his days in Rifa'-ash-Sharqi on the main island, where the Resident had an interview with him also. Lieutenant McLeod reported that the authority of the Shaikhs of Bahrain in their own dominions did not appear to be so absolute as might have been expected, and that it was "borne with much reluctance by the inhabitants of the islands." Sons and servants already appeared to encroach upon the functions properly belonging to the Shaikhs alone.

The death of Shaikh Salmān occurred two years later, in 1825, when his son Khalifah succeeded to a half share of the net revenue of the principality; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, though the concurrence of his nephew in all acts of government was theoretically required, contrived to retain the entire executive power in his own hands.

The feud between Rahmah-bin-Jābir, chief of the dissident Jalāhimah 'Utūb, and the Shaikhs of Bahrain was, until its termination

Visit of  
Lieutenant  
McLeod,  
Political  
Resident, to  
Bahrain and  
the general  
position  
there,  
January  
1823.

1826.

Feud  
between  
Rahmah-

by the death of the former, a source of constant unrest. Indeed Captain Bruce appears to have been betrayed into his maladroit concessions to the Prince Governor of Shirāz partly by irritation at the petty warfare to which the enmity between the Āl Khalifah and the Jalāhimah gave rise.

At the beginning of 1822 both sides appealed to the British authorities to mediate,—a request which was at once granted on condition that the British Government should not be understood to guarantee the observance by either party of such terms as might be arranged. An interview took place between 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad and Rahmah-bin-Jābir at Bāsīdu in the presence of Colonel Kennett, the Acting Political Agent at that place; but the differences of the chiefs proved at this time to be irreconcilable. From the fruitless meeting at Bāsīdu Shaikh 'Abdullah returned to Bahrain, while Rahmah proceeded to Masqat to lay his grievances before his friend and ally, Saiyid Sa'id; the only result of this movement, however, was that a few months later the ruler of Masqat informed the British Resident that he considered Rahmah to be an altogether unreliable character and declined to accept a responsibility for the actions of that chief which the Government of India wished to fix upon him.

In 1823 earnest but still unsuccessful efforts were made by Lieutenant McLeod to bring the principal disputants into accord.

At length, on the 24th of February 1824, an agreement was signed in Bahrain before Colonel E. G. Stanms, Political Resident, by Shaikh 'Abdullah and Rahmah-bin-Jābir, by which they undertook to be at peace with one another for the future upon certain conditions, principally the withdrawal by Rahmah of his protection from the Āl Bū Samait tribe and the indemnification by him of Bahrain subjects for certain losses which he had inflicted on them. This peace, which seems to have been observed by both parties for nearly two years, ultimately broke down; in 1825 an attempt was made by the Resident, but without success, to effect an accommodation between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Āl Bū Samait; and in the war which was then renewed, the blind and aged Rahmah, as related in the history of Hasa, perished in an extraordinary and dramatic manner by his own act.

In 1820, as we have seen, the Shaikhs of Bahrain submitted to the ruler of Masqat and undertook to pay him an annual tribute, of which one instalment was actually discharged; but by 1822, if not earlier, they had ceased to observe their engagements. In August 1822, when a naval attack on Bahrain by Saiyid Sa'id appeared imminent

bin-Jābir  
and the  
Shaikhs of  
Bahrain,  
1822-1826.

Renewed  
designs of  
the Saiyid  
of Masqat  
upon  
Bahrain.

letters were addressed by the Governor of Bombay to him and to his opponent, Shaikh 'Abdullah, deprecating war and suggesting to both sides that the tribute claimed should be rendered by the 'Utūb if it were of ancient origin and had been regularly paid, and that otherwise the demand for it should be withdrawn by the 'Omāni sovereign. In the spring of 1823, when rumours of a combined attack to be made on Bahrain by the Persian Government, the ruler of Masqat, and the Qāsimi Shaikh were current, the Government of Bombay addressed Major Willock, the British representative at Tehrān, requesting him to dissuade the Persians from disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf; and in 1825, when, on the death of Shaikh Salmān of Bahrain, Saiyid Sa'id proceeded to champion the claim of his sons to supreme power as against their uncle Shaikh 'Abdullah, a strong personal remonstrance was addressed to His Highness of Masqat by the Governor of Bombay.

### Third and last attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān upon Bahrain, 1828.

Preparations  
at Masqat  
and in  
Bahrain,  
June—  
October  
1828.

About June 1828 a report became current that Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat was collecting ships and men for a fresh attack upon Bahrain; but it was immediately contradicted by the Saiyid himself, who even sent an envoy with presents and a reassuring letter to the 'Atbi Shaikhs. The duplicity of his conduct in this having become apparent, the 'Utūb presently sought the intervention of the British Government; but the Resident declined to interfere, unless by detaching the Bani Yās, whose junction with the Saiyid might, it was feared, induce the Qawāsim to make common cause with the 'Utūb. In August Saiyid Sa'id sent a written declaration of war to Shaikh 'Abdullah, bidding him expect his arrival after the expiration of one month; and early in September the Masqat armament, composed of a large number of European-built and native vessels, sailed for Qishm, where it arrived on the 17th of the month. After a few days' halt at Qishm the fleet crossed the Gulf to Abu Dhabi and was joined by Shaikh Tahnūn, whom the British Resident had not been able to restrain from interference, and by a contingent of the Bani Yās. On the 27th of October the Saiyid's fleet was scattered at sea by a storm; but it re-assembled, and on the last day of the month his ships cast anchor off Sitrah Island, near the entrance of Khor-al-Qalā'ah.

Meanwhile every disposition had been made by Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad for repelling the expected invasion. The larger craft belonging

to Bahrain had been massed in Khor Fasht, where they would be ready to meet any attack on Manāmah from the open sea; the vessels of medium and smaller size had been collected in the neighbourhood of Muharraq town, probably because that was a central position from which they could be quickly moved either to Manāmah harbour or to Khor-al-Qalā'ah; the entrance of Khor-al-Qalā'ah had been blocked by means of sunken boats filled with stones; all fortifications had been placed in a state of repair; and a large number of Arabs had been recruited from every direction for the defence of the islands. Meanwhile, too, efforts had been made by the 'Utūb to bribe the Abu Dhabi Shaikh to remain neutral, and from the event it may be inferred that they had not been altogether unsuccessful.

The shore opposite to the anchorage of the Masqat fleet was at first watched by a force under Khalifah-bin-Salmān, the junior Shaikh of Bahrain; but after three days, during which the 'Omānis were engaged in removing the artificial obstructions at the mouth of Khor-al-Qalā'ah, the defenders fell back upon Hūrah, an eastern suburb of Manāmah town.

Apparently on the 5th of November, the entrance of Khor-al-Qalā'ah having been cleared, two small vessels and eleven Baghlabs entered, and a summons to surrender was addressed to the 'Utūb, who received it with disdain. On the night of the 5th November a part of the Masqat force was landed, on Sitrah, and took possession of a fort; and the next day a bombardment of Manāmah town and of the fort on Hālat Abu Māhur was attempted, without success, by some vessels of the fleet. Nothing further happened until the 9th of November, when Saiyid Sa'id learned to his dismay that Shaikh Tahnūn and the Bani Yās had begun to disembark without orders between Rās-al-Jufair and Rās Umm-al-Hasam. He immediately hastened ashore, accompanied by a Nubian bodyguard and such other men as he could collect; but, before he reached the spot, the force on shore was hotly assailed by the 'Atbi troops covering Manāmah town, and was thrown into disorder by an unexpected charge of cavalry, from behind the date groves of Māhūz, upon its flank and rear. It was noted as a significant fact that the Bani Yās were the first to fly in this engagement; and it was subsequently alleged that they had turned their arms against their allies, had plundered them, and had even done their best to prevent fugitives from escaping in boats. Saiyid Sa'id himself, who was brought off the field by his Nuhians, had to swim some distance to safety and while in the water received a spear wound in the sole of his foot. The scene of this rout would appear to have been the south side of Khor-al-Qalā'ah, somewhere between the eastern entrance of that inlet and the



town of Manāmah. Meanwhile the fleet, seized by panic at the sight of what was passing on shore, instead of lending their assistance weighed anchor and ran out of Khor-al-Qalai'ah. In executing this manoeuvre a brig and a Baghlah grounded, and the latter was carried off by the 'Utūb; but the 'Omānis, under cover of night, succeeded in burning the other where she lay stranded, not however before she had been stripped by the enemy. The loss of the invading force was estimated at 500 men.

Depressed by this defeat, by the fear of further treachery, by his wound, by an outbreak of cholera on board his ships, and by evil tidings from his East African possessions, Saiyid Sa'id, after several undignified attempts to conclude a peace with the 'Utūb, finally sailed for home with his whole force on the 21st of November. The excuse to which he had recourse, that his enterprise was disapproved by Heaven, did not save him from heavy loss of prestige everywhere in the Persian Gulf; and his altered position there may have been one of the reasons for which, after 1828, he bestowed his attention chiefly on the distant and perhaps less arduous field of Africa.

#### Sequel of these events, 1828-1829.

Immediately after the departure of the hostile fleet Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to Colonel D. Wilson, the Political Resident at Būshehr, to complain of the conduct of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in joining in the attack upon Bahrain: he appealed to the fourth Article of the General Treaty of Peace, by which both himself and Shaikh Tahnūn were bound, and in which it was stated that "the pacificated tribes should not fight with each other." In reply the Resident explained the meaning of the clause to be that the signatories should not fight with each other *in a piratical manner*, but only in the way of open and declared war.

Having learned that to engage in regular hostilities was not contrary to the Treaty of 1820, the Shaikhs of Bahrain resolved to carry war into the enemy's waters and equipped for the purpose a fleet of seven large vessels, to meet which two frigates were sent to sea by Saiyid Sa'id. The 'Abi fleet sailed on the 21st of March 1829 under the personal command of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad.

The war-ships from Masqat shortly fell in with a Bahrain vessel from India, the "Saiyār," which they first tried to intimidate by long range fire and then to board; but, finding the 'Atbi crew prepared to receive them with combustibles, they sheered off again and continued the action

with their guns. The "Saiyār" made her escape during the night and eventually reached Bahrain with little damage, except to her cargo.

Meanwhile the 'Atbi squadron, after attacking on their way down the Gulf a large Baghlah belonging to the Shaikh of 'Asalu, by which they were beaten off after an encounter lasting several hours, found an easier prey in a vessel from Murbāt, which they seized at sea in the neighbourhood of Masqat. On the way home with their prize they found themselves intercepted by the two Masqat frigates near Kūh Mubārak, upon which they took the Murbāt vessel into shoal water, and, placing her between themselves and the enemy, proceeded to transfer her cargo to their own holds; darkness then coming on, they scuttled and sunk her, and by altering their course contrived to escape with their booty to Bahrain.

Murbāt, situated far off on the south coast of Arabia, was not at this time a dependency of Masqat, and the treatment by the 'Utūb of the vessel belonging to that port which they captured was consequently piracy. The Resident immediately sent an ultimatum, in which restoration of the plundered cargo was demanded, to Bahrain by two vessels of war; and so effectual was this measure that property worth Rs. 8,000 was delivered up, besides which some of the goods consigned to persons in Bahrain were handed over to the owners. A balance remained for which it was proposed that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be compelled to pay compensation in cash; but the consideration that "it would be necessary to blockade the port with four ships of war, and perhaps to destroy the shipping by means of shells and congreve rockets, for which latter purpose a small vessel would be required" was considered serious and led to a decision that no further action should be taken.

In the meantime, in response to hints thrown out by Saiyid Sa'id, who professed to be fitting out another expedition against Bahrain, the Government of Bombay had in April 1829 instructed Colonel Wilson, the Resident at Būshehr, to offer his services as a mediator. The Saiyid, who was in reality anxious to proceed to Zanzibar, and who cannot but have been aware of the favourable disposition of the British authorities towards himself, accepted the proposal with great readiness; but the victorious 'Utūb found means to bring the proceedings to a standstill by insisting that the British Government should undertake full responsibility for enforcing the observance of any treaty that might be arranged. To this condition, though the Saiyid was anxious that it should be conceded, the British Resident steadfastly refused to accede; and, after some months of unavailing effort, he declared his intervention at end. Partly, it would seem, to punish the Shaikhs of Bahrain for their

Case of a Murbāt vessel taken by the 'Utūb.

Conclusion of peace between the 'Atbi Shaikhs and the Saiyid of 'Omān, 2nd December 1829.

Reference by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the British Political Resident, December 1828.

Naval war between the 'Utūb of Bahrain and the Saiyid of 'Omān, 1829.

obstinacy, a British cruiser ordinarily stationed on the pearl banks for the maintenance of order there was withdrawn during the season 1829.

By the apparent indifference of the British authorities Shaikh 'Abdullah was brought to a more reasonable frame of mind; and at length, on the 2nd of December 1829, by the intermediacy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Nāsir of Būshehr, a peace was concluded between the belligerents. The principal conditions were that tribute should not in future be paid by Bahrain to Masqat, and that neither ruler should henceforward interfere in the affairs of the other; but a verbal agreement was added by which the parties bound themselves to aid one another in case of an attack upon either by a third party. Shaikh Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi was admitted to the benefits of this peace; but the rebellious Āl Bū Samait of Bahrain were, on the demand of the 'Atbi Shaikh, specifically excluded.

#### General history from the peace with the Saiyid of 'Omān to the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1830-1838.

Submission of the Shaikhs of Bahrain to the Wahhābi Amir, 1830-1831.

A little later commanding influence was re-established in Hasa, where the power of the Central Arabian dynasty had for a time been in abeyance, by the Wahhābi Amir Turki-bin-Sa'ūd; and effects of this change upon the position of the Shaikhs of Bahrain were instantly perceptible.

At the end of 1830 the Wahhābis presented the Shaikhs with a demand for payment of Zakāt and of compensation to the amount of \$40,000 on account of horses left under the charge of Shaikh 'Abdullah by the Wahhābis many years before, and for cession of the fort of Dammām upon the coast of Hasa; at Dammām they proposed to locate Bashīr, a son of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the former deadly enemy of the 'Utūb of Bahrain. The Shaikhs of Bahrain endeavoured to obtain the intervention of the British authorities in their favour; but, failing in this and having reason to fear a combination between the Wahhābis and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, they sent a near relation to treat on their behalf at Riyādh. In the end it was settled that the supremacy of the Amir should be acknowledged, and that Zakāt should be paid; but the transfer of Dammām appears to have been waived by the Wahhābis in consideration of the 'Utūb having made their submission. The Amir in return undertook to protect Bahrain against external aggression but their intentions were distrusted by the Shaikhs, chiefly on account of their

unfriendly conduct in locating Bashīr-bin-Rahmah on Tārūt Island opposite to the town of Qatif, where he was joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait, the constant allies of his father and the inveterate foes of the 'Atbi rulers of Bahrain.

In 1833 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain was encouraged by the departure to Masqat of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, who soon found his position on Tārūt untenable in consequence of the enmity of the people of Qatif, to throw off his allegiance to the Wahhābis. As the Shaikh had been careful, before venturing on a complete rupture of relations, to assure himself of the neutrality of the Saiyid of 'Omān, and as he was supported by the Arab tribes of the mainland, especially the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid who immediately began at his instigation to harrass the Wahhābis in Hasa, the ruler of the Riyādh was unable to make any effective rejoinder. In 1834 Shaikh 'Abdullah assumed the offensive and blockaded the Wahhābi ports of Qatif and 'Oqair. The assassination of the Wahhābi Amir a little later, by his nephew Mashāri, was generally attributed to the machinations of the Bahrain Shaikh, who celebrated the event with firing of guns and other demonstrations of joy, and who immediately profited by it to obtain possession, not without some expenditure in bribes, of the Island of Tārūt opposite to the town of Qatif. In 1835, on the failure of an attempt by the new Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, to recover Tārūt, Shaikh 'Abdullah resumed the blockade of Qatif and 'Oqair, which he had suspended, and began to plunder the shipping of both places.

In 1833, at the time of his breach with the Wahhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir had for some time been residing in Qatar to watch the proceedings of the enemy; but he seems thereafter to have returned to Bahrain. By the death of his nephew and colleague Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Salman, which occurred on the 31st of May 1834, Shaikh 'Abdullah soon afterwards became sole ruler of Bahrain; but so headstrong and impatient of his authority did his near relations, including his sons, now become, and so corrupt was his partiality, so undue his leniency and so excessive his general misgovernment when left to himself, that the internal affairs of the Shaikhdom soon began to wear a most serious aspect.

In 1835 the people of Huwailah in Qatar revolted against him and entered into a correspondence with the Wahhābis; one of his sons rebelled in concert with the Huwailah insurgents and began, with the assistance of some hundreds of Wahhābis, to commit depredations upon the sea-borne commerce of Bahrain; and another son named Ahmad, after

Supremacy of the Wahhābi Amir repudiated by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1833-1835.

Domestic affairs of the Āl Khalifah family, 1833-1835

Rebellion in Qatar, 1835.



committing some irregularities at sea for which he readily afforded satisfaction on its being demanded by the British political authorities, made his way from Qatar to Masqat with the avowed intention of obtaining support against his father from Saiyid Sa'id. The latter, however, instead of complying with the wishes of Ahmad, sent his own son Saiyid Hilal to compose the differences among the Āl Khalifah chiefs; and an agreement, more fully noticed in the history of Qatar,\* was arranged by his efforts; but it was almost immediately violated by the partisans of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who induced the Āl Bū Kuwārah to attack the inhabitants of Huwailah,—an act for which the Shaikh refused to make any reparation. This last affair led to the secession of 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the principal man of Huwailah, who at first took refuge with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, and whose later proceedings will claim notice further on.

Rapprochement between the Wahhabis and the Utūb, 1836.

About the middle of the year 1836 Shaikh 'Abdullah, alarmed by symptoms of an intention on the part of the Government of Shirāz to revise, possibly with support from the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Persian claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, took steps for a reconciliation with the Wahhābi Amīr. Faisal-bin-Turki, to whose subjects in Hasa much inconvenience had been caused by the Bahraini blockade of the Hasa coast, and whom the Egyptians had now begun to press hard upon his western frontier, received the overtures favourably, and a settlement was speedily arranged. The Shaikh undertook to pay a nominal tribute of \$2,000 a year to the Amīr; the Amīr in return promised to supply troops for the defence of Bahrain against attacks from without, and to refrain from calling on the Shaikh for marine transport in case of his deciding on an expedition against Masqat by sea; and intercourse between Bahrain and the ports of Qatif and 'Oqair was re-opened.

Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1836-38.

Meanwhile, however, the lot of the Shaikh's subjects in Bahrain was growing, from day to day, less endurable; and the islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration. The towns were in a state of ruin and decay, and house rents had fallen to one-eighth of what they had been only a few years before. Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to exercise separate and independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to extracting money from merchants and other men of means. The ordinary subject in Bahrain had no acknowledged rights; his domestic animals, even, were frequently seized on pretext of *corvée* and were not returned. The result was a general exodus of the inhabitants to every quarter of the Persian Gulf.

\* Vide page 794 ante.

The part played by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who was generally—but, as his subsequent doings proved, erroneously—supposed to have become effete by reason of old age, was ignominious in the extreme; he redressed no injuries, but merely advised the people to keep out of the way of his sons and their followers. In 1836 he declared that he was about to remove to Khor Hassān in Qatar; and the prospect of his taking such a step,—one for which they were unprepared and from which they augured trouble,—elicited transient professions of obedience and regret from the junior members of his family. That the Shaikh intended to make Qatar a base for operations against his unruly progeny in Bahrain appeared probable from a warning not to look to him for protection or redress in future, which, in the presence of the British Agent, he addressed to a Būshehri merchant for the general information of the foreign mercantile community. In 1837 he took further steps towards the execution of his threat by sending two of his wives, with their families and the furniture and even the doors of their houses, to Khor Hassān; by this proceeding his sons and other relations were considerably intimidated and induced to reform their conduct for a time.

#### British relations with Bahrain, 1830-1839.

One consequence of these differences in the Āl Khalifah family was an insult offered to the native Agent of the British Government in Bahrain, which almost brought about a rupture of relations between Britain and the Bahrain Government. The sons of the Shaikh, being aware that a sum of money on account of mercantile transactions was due by the Agent to their father, claimed that it should be paid to themselves instead; and on this pretext, by dint of abuse and ill-treatment, they succeeded in extorting some large amounts from the British representative. The Agent, from whom the Shaikh appears to have withheld his protection, then hid himself to escape from further exactions; but, having been obliged to appear for the official purpose of visiting a British ship in the harbour, he was again set upon and molested.

Insult to the British Residency Agent in Bahrain, 1834.

Reparation having been refused, a British naval force was despatched to Bahrain to obtain it, by coercion if necessary. Under this compulsion the Shaikh yielded to the demands which were now made upon him: *viz.*, that one of his sons, or in default thereof the Shaikh himself, should come off to the vessel of the Senior Naval Officer, bringing with him a robe of honour for the Agent; and that the persons who had taken an active part in the ill-usage of the latter should be flogged in presence of

the British crew, either on board the ship itself or in one of the Shaikh's boats alongside.

Non-inclusion  
of the Shaikh  
of Bahrain in  
the Maritime  
Truce, 1835.

When the first Maritime Truce was arranged in 1835 among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, as related in the history of that region, the Shaikh of Bahrain, though his position resembled theirs in that he was a party to the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, was not invited to become a signatory. The reason for the omission was two-fold: in the first place it was believed that Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose conduct in regard to the maintenance of peace at sea had hitherto been unexceptionable, would not allow himself to be drawn into a course contrary to the policy of the British Government, who could easily punish him; and, again, it was feared that the Shaikh, if admitted to membership of the Maritime Truce, might, in the not improbable contingency of war between himself and the ruler of Masqat, claim the intervention of the British Government to prevent an attack on Bahrain.

Extension  
of the  
Restrictive  
Line to  
Bahrain,  
1836.

A Restrictive Line, between which and the Persian coast no naval hostilities were in future to be permitted, was established in 1836 for Trucial 'Omān under the authority of the British Government, with the approval of the Shaikhs but without the execution of any formal engagement on their part. In the same year, in consequence of the disturbed relations which then prevailed between the ruler of Bahrain and the people of Huwailah in Qatar, the line was prolonged—with the assent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, conveyed in a letter dated 26th March 1836—from the Island of Hālūl so as to pass 10 miles north of Rās-Rakan, the northernmost extremity of Qatar, and thence through the island of Qaraiyin to Rās-az-Zor, where it met the Arabian coast.

Piracies by  
'Amāir and  
Bani Hājir,  
1837.

In 1837 the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid and some Bani Hājir who were settled at Dammām—the latter being thus, in name at least, subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain—took advantage of the anarchy at the time prevailing in Hasa, as in all other parts of the Wahhābi dominions, to inaugurate a piratical campaign against the shipping of Qatif. Some Bahrain boats also having suffered by their depredations, Shaikh 'Abdullah sought and obtained the permission of the British Government to chastise them, and was quickly successful in capturing two of their boats; in these operations five of the pirates were killed.

Maritime  
war between  
Bahrain and  
Abu Dhabi  
averted,  
1838.

Since his departure from Huwailah in Qatar in 1835, 'Isa-bin-Tarif and his followers, who belonged chiefly to the Āl Bin-'Alī and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribes, had resided at Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān and had been restrained by the influence of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf from committing raids on the territories under the Bahrain chief.

In 1838 Shaikh 'Abdullah, who insisted that the emigrants should return and settle in Bahrain—a condition to which they would by no

means agree—obtained permission to coerce them by naval means after a fixed date, the Āl Bin-'Alī and the Āl Bū 'Ainain being on their part set free to fight with him after the same; but the Shaikh, at heart reluctant to embark on a war which would almost necessarily involve him in hostilities with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, hoped to induce the British Government to put pressure on the seceders to return; and, before the arrival of the decisive day, he offered, through the British Resident at Būshehr, to let them come back to Qatar. A British war vessel was then placed at his disposal to convey him or his accredited agent to Abu Dhabi for the purpose of negotiating on this basis; but at the last Shaikh 'Abdullah refused to make any arrangement with the rebels unless it were guaranteed by the British Government, a condition to which the British authorities could not agree. War was accordingly declared. Both parties had already been informed that their operations must be conducted within the Restrictive Line.

In the troubles which ensued the people of Bahrain appear to have been the heavier losers, and in 1839 the merchants of the principality invoked the good offices of the British Resident for bringing the contest to an end by a reconciliation; but the Assistant Resident, who was deputed for the purpose to the Arabian coast, found that the parties would not agree to any settlement without a guarantee by the British Government, which he was not authorised to afford.

Meanwhile, however, a friendly correspondence had been opened between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the latter of whom was dissatisfied with the conduct of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and had already required him either to leave the country or to settle down as a law-abiding citizen; and an offensive and defensive alliance was shortly afterwards concluded between the Shaikhs with especial reference to the presence of Egyptian forces in Hasa, by which the independence of Bahrain was threatened. The result was that 'Isa-bin-Tarif decided to seek, after the pearl fishery of 1839, an asylum elsewhere than at Abu Dhabi, and consented, in the meanwhile, to a suspension of hostilities.

#### Bahrain affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-1840.

Towards the end of 1838 Faisal-bin-Turki, the Wahhābi Amīr, was captured in Kharj by Kburshid Pasha, the commander of the Egyptian Arrival  
of the

Egyptians in  
Hasa and  
demands  
of the  
Amir Khālid  
on Bahrain,  
1838.

Attitude  
of the  
Government  
of India.

Application  
for help by  
the Shaikh  
of Bahrain  
to the  
Government  
of Persia.

Arrival of  
a Persian  
envoy in  
Bahrain.

First distinct  
orders of the

forces then overrunning Central Arabia; and, after his deportation to Egypt, a puppet named Khālid was set up by the Egyptians in his place. Hasa was immediately occupied, the Wahhābi governor of that province, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisan, taking refuge in Bahrain; and designs upon the Bahrain principality itself were shortly disclosed by successive demands on the Shaikh, preferred in the name of the Amir Khālid, for payment of tribute at the former rate, for rendition of Tārūt Island and the fort of Dammām, and for the surrender of 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisan. Meanwhile emissaries of the Egyptians were engaged, in the Bahrain Islands as also in more distant places, in collecting supplies for the use of their troops.

The Indian Government, who were not indifferent to these events, directed their Resident in the Gulf to use all his influence to check the encroachments of the Egyptians; but in the absence of instructions from London they hesitated to adopt a decided line, and they felt themselves unable to hold out any definite pledge of assistance to the Shaikh of Bahrain, who now sought one. Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, in reply to a question by the Shaikh of Bahrain, consequently informed him, apparently in March 1839, that he could give no opinion as to the expediency of the Shaikh's sending a member of his family to wait upon Khurshīd Pasha in Hasa, and that the Shaikh himself must be judge of the matter.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, who was much alarmed by the proceedings of the Egyptians and perhaps even more so by a rumour, apparently well-founded, that the Sa'iyid of 'Omān was intriguing with the Egyptians to obtain and hold Bahrain as a fief under the Viceroy of Egypt; professed, in reply to the demands made on him in the name Khālid, to be a subject of the Persian Government.

For the purpose of substantiating this statement, probably at the nominee's own suggestion, the Prince Governor of Shirāz shortly sent an envoy in the person of a certain Hāji Qāsim to reside in Bahrain. This individual had formerly been the supercargo of a trading vessel, but now he was the bearer of a letter and a robe of honour for the chief of Bahrain and was escorted by a guard of 10 Persian infantry. His mission was a failure from every point of view, especially from that of his principals, who had somehow been led to suppose that the Shaikh of Bahrain was ready to pay an annual tribute in return for their countenance and protection.

The intentions of Khurshīd Pasha in regard to Bahrain having become clear, the Government of India found themselves obliged to anticipate,

to some extent, the instructions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the policy to be pursued in the Persian Gulf.

Advantage was taken of the presence of a British naval squadron in those waters to authorise Sir F. Maitland, by whom it was commanded, "strongly to use his influence" to deter the Egyptian General from further encroachments, and in particular from invading Bahrain; and the British Admiral was empowered, in event of the Egyptians persisting in their schemes and of the Shaikh of Bahrain soliciting British aid, to afford the Bahrain Government every encouragement to resist and all the support that he could render without engaging in actual hostilities; these measures in the opinion of the Government of India were likely to suffice, for the moment, to maintain the *status quo*. The Governor-General of India was not disposed, at the time, to enter into any new engagement with the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the Admiral was instructed, in case such an engagement should be suggested, so far to encourage the proposals of the Shaikh as to transmit them for the consideration of the Government of India.

In a letter, dated the 1st of April 1839, the Resident, Captain Hennell, was ordered to remonstrate with the Egyptian commander in regard to his proceedings against Bahrain; to inform him that his action was contrary to an understanding between the British and Egyptian Governments and might lead to an interruption of amicable relations; and to report on the material strength of the various parties, especially of the Shaikh of Bahrain, in the region affected.

In the meantime Khurshīd Pasha had written to the British Resident to sound him regarding the policy of the British Government in event of the conquests of the Egyptians being carried further; and Captain Hennell had replied, requesting that no active operations should be undertaken against Bahrain without notice sufficient to admit of a warning being conveyed to the British subjects resident in the islands,—an answer which the Government of India approved as well-timed and judicious and as tending to postpone a crisis until the arrival of Sir F. Maitland off Bahrain.

In a letter dated the 18th of April 1839, the Indian Government, advanced beyond the position that they had at first assumed, and empowered the Admiral, in event of the Shaikh of Bahrain having claimed British interposition and offered to place his territories under British protection, to assure him of the temporary protection of Her Majesty's squadron in the Gulf, and to intimate to Khurshīd Pasha that he had done so, and that it was incumbent on the Egyptians

Government  
of India in  
regard to the  
designs of the  
Egyptians on  
Bahrain, 1st  
April 1839.

Subsequent  
stronger  
orders  
of the  
Government  
of India,  
18th April  
1839.

to abstain from further military proceedings until both officers should receive orders from their respective Governments; should these measures fail of their object, Sir F. Maitland might inform Khurshid Pasha that he would be held responsible, if he crossed over to the islands of Bahrain, for commencing hostilities against the British Government, whose officers were authorised to defend the principality against invasion until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government should be known; and, after making this declaration, the Admiral might exercise his discretion as to the best means of defending Bahrain.

Visit of a  
British naval  
squadron to  
Bahrain.

About the same time Sir F. Maitland visited Bahrain in H.M.S. "Wellesley," accompanied by Captain Edmunds, Assistant Political Resident; and Shaikh 'Abdullah gave the latter a promise that he would take no steps to place himself under the authority or protection of a foreign power without first consulting the British Resident. It does not appear that any correspondence passed between the British Admiral and Khurshid Pasha: possibly the former had not yet received the latest instructions of the Government of India.

Report on the  
situation by  
the British  
Political  
Resident, 7th  
May 1839.

A full report on the resources of the Egyptians in Najd and Hasa, and on the power and attitude of all the Shaikhs and rulers of the Arabian littoral whose interests were threatened by their aggressions, was submitted on the 7th of May 1839 by Captain Hennell, the British Resident, in obedience to the orders of the Government of India.

In regard to the Shaikh of Bahrain it was stated that his means of resistance were such as to afford a prospect of success, if they were fairly brought into play. His insular position and the great superiority of his naval force, which included numerous war boats of the best class, were very much in his favour; and the fighting men devoted to his cause, of whom 6,000 could be collected on the islands of Bahrain and Muharraq alone, while 3,000 more could be brought over in an emergency from the 'Atbi possessions on the mainland, were brave and determined, and accustomed to service at sea as well as on land. On the other hand Shaikh 'Abdullah was hampered by the enmity of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and the seceding 'Al Bin'-Ali and 'Al Bū 'Ainain tribes; and the Shi'ah Bahārinah, the aboriginal but unwarlike inhabitants of Bahrain, groaning under the tyranny of the 'Utūb, would doubtless sympathise with any invading power. If Khurshid Pasha could once gain a footing on Bahrain Island and thereafter keep open his communications with Hasa, it was likely that the 'Utūb would succumb to his disciplined troops and artillery; but, so long as the Shaikh maintained his naval superiority, an attack on the islands must necessarily be so difficult and dangerous that there was little

probability of its being attempted by the Egyptians. The naval advantage of the 'Utūb over the Egyptians could only be destroyed by the arrival on the scene of ships from Egypt or from Masqat; and in regard to the latter it was not to be expected that the representatives of the Saiyid of 'Omān, after they had been made acquainted with the policy of the British Government, would agree to co-operate with the Egyptians.

On the 28th of July 1839 the Resident arrived off Bahrain in the H. E. I. Company's steamer "Hugh Lindsay" to interview Shaikh 'Abdullah, who had suddenly and unexpectedly acknowledged the supremacy of the Egyptians and covenanted to pay them \$2,000 a year as tribute, on condition that his local authority should be preserved intact and that no representative of Khurshid Pasha should be sent to reside in Bahrain.

Sudden sub-  
mission of  
the Shaikh of  
Bahrain to  
the Egyptians  
and protest by  
the British  
Resident,  
July 1839.

In conversation with Captain Hennell the Shaikh endeavoured to explain away his disregard of his promise to Captain Edmunds by asserting that the agreement with the Egyptians, though but recently ratified had actually been concluded before the arrival of the "Wellesley"; but he justified his action mainly on the ground of the Resident's refusal more than three months before to give him advice or a specific assurance of support, and of the virtual immunity from disturbance which he had purchased by a trifling and merely pecuniary sacrifice.

A written protest against the new arrangements, couched in nearly the same terms as another which he addressed to Khurshid Pasha, was delivered to the Shaikh by Captain Hennell, who further commented on the possibility of the Bahrain Government becoming involved, in consequence of the relations that they had formed with the Egyptians, in hostilities with Great Britain. The Shaikh, in reply, protested that he would never, even at the demand of the Egyptians, place himself in opposition to the British Government; and he offered, on condition that a distinct pledge of protection should be given him in writing, to repudiate his agreement with the Pasha and to avow himself a dependent of the British Government; on being pressed, however, to commit this proposal to writing, he declined; and he added that his repudiation of the agreement, if carried into effect, must in any case be explained by him to the Egyptians as due to compulsion by the British authorities. In conclusion he assured Captain Hennell of the unpopularity of the Egyptians, and of the extremely precarious nature of their position in Eastern and Central Arabia.

The general impression brought away by the Resident from this interview was that Shaikh 'Abdullah, now advanced in years and incapable of exertion, had submitted to the Egyptians in order to avoid a

conflict disturbing to his personal comfort ; that the sustained political and military successes of Khurshid Pasha had so shaken his naturally acute mind as to make him doubtful of the ability of the British to cope with the Egyptians on land ; but that he would gladly be freed of the Egyptian yoke if this could be achieved by British influence without any effort on his own part.

Captain Hennell, in reporting his proceedings to Government, cast doubt upon the feasibility, hitherto unquestioned, of defending Bahrain against attack from the mainland by means of ships of war ; he had now been informed that there were places where a fleet of boats might cross in safety, and where larger vessels would be prevented by shoals from approaching ; and Shaikh 'Abdullah asserted that he had himself successfully adopted these tactics in former days, when at war with the Persians who were possessed of large vessels.

Retirement  
of the  
Egyptians,  
1840.

Matters in Bahrain apparently continued as they were until the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840, whereupon their relations with the Shaikh of Bahrain were brought to an end and the affairs of the principality resumed their ordinary course. The action of the authorities in India and of the British officers on the spot was, it may be remarked, approved by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company when it reached their knowledge ; and they concurred in an opinion expressed by Captain Hennell, that it would not be expedient to assume a regular protectorate over Bahrain.

#### Civil war in Bahrain and expulsion of 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from the Shaikhship, 1840-1843.

Alienation of  
the sympathy  
of the British  
Government  
from Shaikh  
'Abdullah,  
1840.

By his conduct towards Khurshid Pasha the Shaikh of Bahrain was considered to have shown preference for an Egyptian alliance and to have forfeited the friendship of the British Government ; the possibility of his being displaced by a more favourably disposed Shaikh was discussed with equanimity by the Secret Committee of the Directors of the East India Company ; and the Government of India decided not to hold back the Saiyid of 'Oman, should he again resolve on attempting the conquest of Bahrain. Nevertheless, out of regard for the general maritime peace, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who with his dependents had migrated from Abu Dhabi to the Island of Qais in 1839 or 1840, was refused permission which he sought to put to sea against the Shaikh of

Bahrain ; and this refusal was repeated by the British Resident on a visit to Qais in May 1841. The technical ground of objection was the violation which such hostilities would involve of the Restrictive Line established in 1836. It is possible that the estrangement between the British authorities and Shaikh 'Abdullah reacted unfavourably upon the position of the latter in his own Shaikhdom ; and it may have even contributed to the troubles that now began.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from Hasa, the inhabitants of that province, or some of them, sent one Mushrif to Bahrain to propose to Muhammad-bin-Khalifah-bin-Salman, grand-nephew of the principal Shaikh of Bahrain, that he should himself assume the Government of Hasa and protect the people from Khalid, the usurping Amir of the Wahhâbis. Objections entertained by Shaikh 'Abdullah to this proposal led to a violent difference of opinion between Shaikh Muhammad and himself, which was temporarily smoothed over by a hollow reconciliation ; but a little later, after offering his services to the British Government and soliciting their assistance against his grand-uncle, Shaikh Muhammad left Bahrain for Qatar, where he ingratiated himself with the inhabitants and set on foot a vexatious opposition to his aged relation. The sons of Shaikh 'Abdullah, also, had now provided themselves with retinues of 100 to 300 desperadoes each, and openly defied their father's authority ; anarchy and confusion had overspread the whole Shaikhdom ; and the trade of Bahrain quickly declined to little more than a half of what it had been only a few years before. In 1842, when Khalid, the ex-Amir of the Wahhâbis, paid a visit to Qatar and Bahrain, Shaikh 'Abdullah and Shaikh Muhammad had apparently exchanged places, for the former was then at Khor Hassan on the mainland and the latter in Bahrain.

Breach  
between  
Shaikh  
'Abdullah  
and his  
grandnephew  
Shaikh  
Muhammad,  
1840-1842.

Such was the position of affairs when an open conflict was suddenly precipitated by an attempt on the part of Shaikh Muhammad to prevent the marriage of a young girl, belonging to Muharrag town, with Ahmad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The old chief came over from Qatar to arrange a settlement ; but, having failed in his endeavours, he took up the cause of his son. Both factions then began to enlist fighting men, chiefly Bedouins who poured over from the mainland in the hope of plunder. Muharrag was the headquarters of Shaikh 'Abdullah, Manamah that of Shaikh Muhammad, and the possession of a superior marine force enabled Shaikh 'Abdullah to blockade effectually the harbour of his antagonist. Indecisive skirmishes followed, in which Di'ajj, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, was killed upon the one side, and

Expulsion  
of Shaikh  
Muhammad  
by Shaikh  
'Abdullah,  
1842.

Muhammad-bi-Mubarak, a grandson of Shaikh 'Abdullah, upon the other. At length, in June 1842, the elder chief completely defeated the younger by attacking him simultaneously on land and sea; Manamah fell into the hands of Shaikh 'Abdullah; and Shaikh Muhammad, escaping with a few followers to Qatar, proceeded to Hasa and thence to Riyādh to seek aid of the Wahhābis. The town of Manamah was sacked by the Bedouin auxiliaries of the victor, after which the old Shaikh crossed over to Qatar and gave up Khor Hassān also to partial plunder.

Shaikh 'Abdullah then began to rebuild Zubārah in Qatar, which had lain during a number of years entirely deserted.

The relations with the Wahhābis of Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose success was more apparent than real, were at this time extremely unfriendly. On the one hand Shāfi', a chief of the Bani Hājir and a relation and staunch adherent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, was detained as a prisoner by the Wahhābi Amir; and on the other three-fourths of the population of Saihāt, of which place the headman had been arrested by 'Umr-bin-Ufaisan, the Wahhābi Governor of Hasa, had migrated to Bahrain, and a blockade of the Hasa coast was maintained by the navy of Bahrain. These circumstances inclined the Wahhābis to make common cause with Shaikh Muhammad; but for the moment they were unable to afford him material assistance.

At this juncture 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-'Alī fugitive, and Bashir-bin-Rahmah visited the British Resident at Būshehr together and requested permission to ally themselves with Shaikh Muhammad and to embark on regular hostilities against Shaikh 'Abdullah. The required sanction, in view of the old Shaikh's unsatisfactory behaviour in 1839 and again in 1842 at the sack of Manamah, was duly given, on condition that the Restrictive Line should be respected. 'Isa-bin-Tarif, it may be observed, was strongly suspected of having fomented the recent dissensions in Bahrain; while Bashir-bin-Rahmah, who could contribute 300 or 400 fighting men to the expedition, alleged that he was prevented by Shaikh 'Abdullah from enjoying the produce of his paternal estates near Dammām.

In November 1842 Captain Kemball, the Assistant Resident, was sent to Bahrain to warn Shaikh 'Abdullah of the permission for action granted by the British authorities to the hostile coalition. This communication was received by the Shaikh with consternation, almost with incredulity; he represented that, in the absence of most of his fleet and subjects, he would be unable to cope with his assailants; he hinted that

Strained relations of Shaikh 'Abdullah with the Wahhābis.

Permission given to 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah to join Shaikh Muhammad, and intimation of the same to Shaikh 'Abdullah.

he would be obliged, therefore, to enter into relations with the Wahhābis; and he finally offered to allow Bashir-bin-Rahmah to remove his produce from Dammām, provided that he did not, under this pretext, bring any large vessels into the vicinity. Captain Kemball reported these remarks to the Resident, but no further communication was made at the time to Shaikh 'Abdullah, who afterwards affected to have thought that the allies would be ordered by the Resident to suspend their operations and to have been prejudiced in his defence by this belief.

Meanwhile Shaikh 'Abdullah had opened a correspondence with the Wahhābis and had apparently offered, on condition of the release of Shāfi' of the Bani Hājir, to restore 'Oqair, of which he had somehow become possessed. A little later, whether on these or on other terms, the Wahhābi ruler set Shāfi' at liberty and suggested to the Shaikhs of Bahrain that they should compose their differences; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, who seems to have distrusted the sincerity of the Amir's mediation, replied discourteously, advising him to observe a strict neutrality. In these circumstances the Wahhābis, not unnaturally, reverted to their support of Shaikh Muhammad.

At the beginning of 1843 Shaikh Muhammad made his appearance in Qatar, of which promontory the inhabitants generally were favourable to his cause. He succeeded in occupying a small fort at Murair\* before it had been garrisoned by the opposite party, and the troops sent by Shaikh 'Abdullah to hold Murair returned without making any effort for its recovery. From the point of vantage thus secured Shaikh Muhammad at once opened communication with his associates on Qais Island.

In February 1843, alarmed by the arrival of several boats from Qais, Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to the British authorities requesting them to restrain 'Isa and Bashir; but for various reasons, and partly in consequence of a misapprehension, no reply was vouchsafed to his application.

At length Shaikh Muhammad, from Fuwairat in Qatar where he was now established, despatched a considerable force in five Baghlahs to the eastern coast of Bahrain Island; and a landing was effected at a point opposite Rifa'-ash-Sharqi. Troops sent in haste by Shaikh 'Abdullah under the command of his son Nāsir, however, succeeded in reaching Rifa' before them; and an indecisive combat took place, in which several men were killed and wounded. An attempt to surround the invaders by land and to cut off their retreat by sea seems to have been unsuccessful.

\* In the records this place is called "Meezer," but no place with such a name is known, and the reference must apparently be to Qal'at Murair which then stood 1½ miles south-east of Zubārah.

Negotiations of Shaikh 'Abdullah with the Wahhābis.

Active operations and expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah from Bahrain, January-April 1843.

In March or April of 1843 the town of Manāmah passed into the possession of a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, not without the connivance of the inhabitants, who remembered with bitterness the conduct of Shaikh 'Abdullah's Bedouins in the previous year; and shortly afterwards 'Isa bin-'Tarif and Bashīr-bin-Rahmah arrived in Bahrain with a large force.

In April the allies attacked Muharraḡ town, the seat of Shaikh 'Abdullah, and obliged him to take refuge in "a small fort, situated at no great distance from the town"—possibly that of Hālat Abu Māhur—where, finding himself completely invested, he capitulated; and the fort of 'Arād, held by his sons, then also surrendered at discretion. The sons of 'Abdullah taken prisoners at 'Arād remained, with the consent of the victor, in Bahrain; but the Shaikh himself, to whom his captors allowed only one Batil and one Ghunchah for the conveyance of his family, dependents and property, took his departure for Dammām. That place, the sole remnant of his possessions, was now governed by Shaikh 'Abdullah's son Mubārak.

#### Incidents of the civil war in Bahrain affecting the British Government.

Outrage committed at the house of the British Residency Agent, 1842.

In 1842, on the defeat of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh 'Abdullah, the town of Manāmah, as we have seen, fell a prey to the Bedouins of the successful party; and among the goods pillaged were some belonging to British subjects. But a more serious incident arose from the behaviour of the native Agent of the British Residency in Bahrain, a man of "timid and inhectic character." To this individual Shaikh 'Abdullah, in the beginning of the troubles, suggested that he should either remove to Muharraḡ or go on board a British vessel, then in the harbour, until the crisis was over; but the Agent preferred to stay at Manāmah, and, on the town being attacked, he extended the protection of his house—if not that of the British Government—to the persons and property of a number of people having no claim to it, probably in return for a pecuniary consideration. Among those who took refuge with the Agent were a son and other dependents of a blood-enemy of Shaikh 'Abdullah, one Hamūd of the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid tribe, and the Shaikh shortly appeared in person to demand, under

pain of destruction of the house, its inmates, and all that it contained, the instant surrender of these obnoxious refugees; whereupon the Agent, losing courage, caused them to be thrown from the roof, and they were cut to pieces almost before they had reached the ground. The unwarrantable and impolitic behaviour of the Agent on this occasion was punished with immediate dismissal, and the countenance of the British Government was finally withdrawn from the Shaikh, on whom, however, it was not considered necessary, in the circumstances, to make any express demand for reparation.

In March 1843, after the landing of Shaikh Muhammad's partisans on Bahrain Island, an order was promulgated by Shaikh 'Abdullah, then at Muharraḡ, that no vessel should anchor near Manāmah town. This regulation having been broken by a Ghunchah which was entitled to use the British flag, and which carried a packet and stores addressed to the British Commodore at Basidu, two boats manned by Bedouin mercenaries were sent with an order to the Nākhuda to move over to Muharraḡ; but these unreliable and dangerous messengers, on reaching the vessel, boarded her, plundered the cargo, including the British packet and stores, and hauled down and tore to pieces the British flag. On behalf of the Shaikh, who denied having ordered or in any way countenanced this outrage, it was urged that the Ghunchah had not shown her colours on entering the harbour; that her use of them was suspected to be a mere ruse; and that the fleet of 'Isa-bin-'Tarif and Bashīr-bin-Rahmah was at the time momentarily expected. A British war vessel was immediately despatched to Bahrain to make full enquiries; but, before any result had been reached, the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah by his rival rendered further action useless.

About the same time as the last affair, but possibly before it, a Chārak boat under the Persian flag, into which goods from Bombay consigned to Hindu merchants in Bahrain had just been transhipped, was plundered in the harbour of Manāmah by Bani Hajir and Sulutah Arah subject to the authority of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The hostilities in Bahrain prevented immediate attention being given to this case, and on the first accession of Shaikh Muhammad to power it was considered inexpedient to press the claim upon him too strongly; but in February of the following year (1844), on the matter being brought to his notice, he submitted without demur to the British demand for compensation.

Piracy in Manāmah harbour, March 1843.



MUHAMMAD-BIN-KHALIFAH.

1843-1868.

Continuance of the civil war after the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from Bahrain, 1843-1849.

Interference  
of the  
Wahhābi  
Amir, 1843.

In June 1843, the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah having begun to make raids upon the commerce of the Bahrain Islands from his lair at Dammām, a flotilla was sent by Shaikh Muhammad, 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah which effectually confined his boats to the limits of the Dammām anchorage. The new Wahhābi Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, whose position at home was still insecure, at first amused himself by playing off each of the Bahrain claimants against the other, and obtained promises of advantage from both; but, in the end, antipathy to the ex-Shaikh determined his attitude. Muhammad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, having sallied out of Dammām to procure boats upon the adjoining coast, was arrested by the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif; and a similar fate befell another son 'Ali, on his arriving from Lingeh to join his father with a small contingent of the Āl Bū Samait tribe.

Intervention  
of the Shaikh  
of Kuwait,  
August 1843.

A disinterested attempt to save the ex-Shaikh by mediation from the worst consequences of his defeat and expulsion was now made by Jāhir, Shaikh of Kuwait, who had hitherto refrained from interference. In August 1843, with the approval of the British Resident, Shaikh Jāhir proceeded to Bahrain with a fleet of eight large vessels, and was successful in persuading Shaikh Muhammad to invite Shaikh 'Abdullah to a friendly conference; but the former, aware that his restoration to power was not to be expected, declined to appear; nor did he at this time return to live with Shaikh Jabir at Kuwait, as the latter had intended that he should do in case no settlement were arranged.

Appeal by the  
ex-Shaikh to  
the Shaikhs  
of Sharjah  
and Dibai;  
His first  
visit to  
Būshehr.

An effort was next made by the sons of the ex-chief, Shaikh 'Abdullah, to interest the rulers of Sharjah and Dibai in their father's cause; and they obtained a promise that, on condition of there being no objection on the part of either the British Government or the Wahhābi Amir, support would be given him at the close of the pearling season. 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah, with a view to neutralising this combination, at once opened communication with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and the latter, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid,

visited them at Qais Island, where he received a valuable present. In these circumstances, and more especially as it was understood that the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Dibai did not desire to be embroiled in the affair, the reply of the British Resident at Būshehr to the ex-chief, who waited on him there, was that, while the British Government were prepared to arbitrate between the parties without themselves guaranteeing a settlement, they could neither intervene to restore Shaikh 'Abdullah to power nor permit the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to be dragged into a dangerous war without advantage to themselves or to the original combatants.

It is probable that, at his visit to Būshehr, Shaikh 'Abdullah hoped to derive some benefit from a correspondence which had already been maintained for several months between himself and Shaikh Salmān, an individual who held no official position in Persia but was a nephew of the Shaikh of Būshehr. The interchange of views appears to have been commenced by Shaikh Salmān, who did not scruple, while Shaikh 'Abdullah was still blockaded in Dammām, to promise him the military assistance of Persia. In October 1843, doubtless with a hope of alarming the British authorities, Shaikh 'Abdullah professed himself ready, if disappointed by the British Government, to throw himself into the arms of Persia; but in reply, he was merely informed that the adherence of Persia to his cause would not be recognised by Britain unless it were open and declared.

After a short sojourn at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullah returned to Dammām, whence he had come, but soon afterwards he transferred his residence to Nāband on the Persian coast, and almost simultaneously 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who chafed at the hindrances imposed on his operations by the Restrictive Line, removed his belongings from Qais Island and settled at Dohab, then called Bida', in Qatar.

About the same time, or probably earlier, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who was at heart no less an enemy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah than of his unsuccessful rival, suggested to Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, that he should profit by the dissensions of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs to conquer Bahrain, and volunteered to assist him in the enterprise. Saiyid Thuwaini referred the proposal to his father Saiyid Sa'id, the sovereign of 'Omān, then absent in East Africa; and the result was an application to the British authorities, by whose advice 'Isa-bin-Tarif's proposal was rejected. The principal reasons which influenced the British Government to dissuade Saiyid Sa'id from an invasion of Bahrain were the personal absence of His Highness from the scene; the incapacity of his representative, Saiyid Thuwaini; the probability of offence being

Persian  
intrigues,  
1843.

Migration of  
Shaikh  
'Abdullah  
from  
Dammām to  
Nāband and  
of 'Isa-bin-  
Tarif from  
Qais to  
Dohab, 1843.  
Attitude  
of the  
Government  
of Masqat  
towards  
the struggle  
between the  
Shaikh and  
the ex-  
Shaikh, 1848.



given to the Wāhhābis, which might lead to an invasion by them of 'Omān territory; the excuse which would be afforded to Persia for espousing the cause of the ex-Shaikh; and the veto which had already been placed by the British Government on action by the Shaikhs of Shārijah and Dibai.

Second visit  
of the ex-  
Shaikh to  
Būshehr,  
December  
1843 to  
March 1844.

In December 1843 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, accompanied by six armed vessels, again visited Būshehr with the object of influencing the British political representative in his favour; but he declined to agree to an interview on board a vessel in the harbour, chiefly, it was suspected, because he meant to make use of a visit to the Residency as a screen for a secret meeting with his sympathiser Shaikh Salmān. He proceeded however to press, in writing, a request for British assistance, mainly on the grounds that he had rejected overtures by the Wāhhābi Amir which tended to the establishment of Wāhhābi influence over Bahrain, and that he was entitled, as a signatory of the General Treaty of Peace, to the naval protection of Great Britain. These arguments, however, were refuted; and the claims of the ex-Shaikh to British aid were disallowed.

A few days after his arrival at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullah landed and was received with much distinction by the local authorities, probably under orders from Shirāz; three volleys of musketry were fired in his honour by the Persian regular troops; and he was provided with quarters in a bastion of the fortifications, his followers being at the same time accommodated in tents. His vessels, of which only two now remained, were brought into a backwater and drawn up on shore. It was soon rumoured that Shaikh 'Abdullah had applied to the Persian Government for the loan of 100 mounted men and 500 infantry, and that he had offered, if successful in recovering Bahrain, to repay the expenses of this force, to remit in future a large annual tribute to the Shāh, and to leave one of his sons in Persia as a hostage for fulfilment of the contract. For three months Shaikh 'Abdullah lingered at Būshehr, awaiting, but in vain, the acceptance of his proposals by the Persian Government.

In January 1844 the Shaikh, in a correspondence with the British Resident, resorted to the argument that he had been lured into a false security, while still in possession of Bahrain, by the neglect of the British authorities to reply to certain of his communications,—a contention which was not admitted; and immediately before his departure, probably in March 1844, he had a personal interview with the Resident, at which he again pleaded hard, but unsuccessfully, for the countenance of the British Government. It was clear that the hopes which he had at first placed in the Persian Government had been disappointed.

Meanwhile the position of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons at Dammām, the last remaining foothold of the family in Arabia, had become precarious. In December 1843 the Wāhhābi Amīr offered his services to the contending Shaikhs for the purpose of arranging a reconciliation between them; but his overtures were rejected by the ex-chief. Faisal-bin-Turki then declared war against Shaikh 'Abdullah and began to collect troops, partly for an investment of Dammām by land to supplement blockade by sea, and partly for the punishment of some of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood who had hitherto kept the Dammām garrison, commanded by Mubārak, Nāsir, and another son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, supplied with provisions. Two boats with commissariat and military stores for the defenders of Dammām, despatched by Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait, were captured by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah at Dohat Balbūl, whence it had been intended to send the cargoes by camel to Dammām; but the incident, which might otherwise have led to a conflict between Shaikh Jābir and the *de facto* Shaikh of Bahrain, was adjusted by the friendly intervention of the British authorities. In March 1844 the garrison of Dammām, being reduced to great straits for supplies, proposed a capitulation; but their terms were not accepted by the Wāhhābi Amīr. Shaikh 'Abdullah, on becoming aware of the critical position of affairs, crossed from Būshehr to the Arabian side of the Gulf and attempted to throw supplies into Dammām, but failed, the boat which he sent being captured by the blockading squadron. A little later the Dammām garrison surrendered to the Wāhhābis on condition that their lives should be spared and that they should be allowed to carry away their personal property, and the fort of Dammām was occupied in the name of Faisal-bin-Turki, who thereafter showed little interest in the quarrels of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs. The result must have been disappointing to Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, to whom Shaikh Muhammad had promised, as a reward for his services against Shaikh 'Abdullah, the restoration of his paternal possessions.

During the absence of the ex-Shaikh at Būshehr, a Batil, described as belonging to Bahrain but owned apparently by Bashīr-bin-Rahmah or one of his family, was unwarrantably seized on the Persian coast, and therefore on the prohibited side of the Restrictive Line, by Shaikh 'Abdullah's dependents at Nāband. A remonstrance having been addressed by the Resident to the ex-Shaikh, the latter wrote to the chief local authority at Nāband asking him to restore the Batil to the owners; but, while this message was in course of transmission by a British vessel, a change of authorities took place at Nāband, and the release of the Batil was refused by the new governor. A lengthy correspondence ensued and redress

Reduction of  
Dammām  
by the  
Wāhhābis,  
March 1844.

Maritime  
irregularity.

was eventually obtained in July 1844, not however until Bashir-bin-Rahmah, now settled like 'Isa-bin-Tarif at Dohah in Qatar, had seized two Nāband Batils by way of retaliation. Bashir, it should be added, immediately gave up these prizes when ordered to do so by the Resident on the ground that the case was already in process of settlement by the British authorities.

Visit of the  
ex-Shaikh to  
Kuwait and  
his third visit  
to Būshehr,  
1844.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, on the failure of his attempt to convey supplies to Dammām, was hotly pursued by four Batils detached from the blockading squadron, but he succeeded in making his escape to Kuwait, where for a short time he resided. On the fall of Dammām most of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons came to Bahrain and were allowed to settle in Muharraq; but Mubārak took refuge with his father's friend Shāfi' among the Bani Hajir; and Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, in violation—so his adversaries alleged—of terms arranged in the presence of the Wahhābi Amir, refused to allow the ex-Shaikh to return to Bahrain unless as a private individual and on condition that his conduct in the future should be guaranteed by the British Government,—a requirement which the propounder well knew to be impossible. After a short stay at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah returned southwards and obtained, on the way, an interview with the British Resident at Būshehr; the meeting was held, by request of the ex-chief, at a place on the seashore about three miles from the town. The object of the visitor was clearly to extort help from the British Government by a threat of combining with the Wahhābis and availing himself of their assistance to recover Bahrain; but, as no interest was shown by the Resident in his intentions or affairs, Shaikh 'Abdullah continued on his way and once more took up his residence at Nāband.

Proceedings  
of the ex-  
Shaikh  
during a  
residence,  
at Nāband,  
1844-46.

Soon after his arrival at Nāband, the ex-Shaikh, whose movements greatly alarmed the divers on the pearl banks, proceeded to the Qatar coast with the intention of attacking 'Isa-bin-Tarif at Dohah; but he found that vigilant enemy well prepared, and so sailed on into the home waters of Bahrain. Shaikh Muhammad, learning that his grand-uncle was in the neighbourhood, sent a deputation of merchants to invite him to return to his home; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, after evading compliance by insisting on conditions which he knew could not be accepted, proceeded to Qatif and thence despatched one of his sons on a friendly mission to the Wahhābi Amir. After this, seizing two small vessels by the way near the Fasht-ad-Dihal, he returned to Nāband. A letter was at once sent by the British Resident to the chief authority at Nāband, requesting him to restrain Shaikh 'Abdullah from such disorderly pro-

ceedings in future; but, though the person addressed, Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Saif by name, received the representation in a proper spirit and apparently apologised to the Shaikh of Bahrain for the mischief already done, he was unable to control the actions of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who shortly after set out on another cruise and captured two more Bahrain vessels. Annoyed by these proceedings, to which the Restrictive Line prevented his making any rejoinder, the Shaikh of Bahrain appealed to the British authorities and sent his brother 'Ali to wait upon the Resident; and the result was an injunction, issued by the central Persian Government at the instance of the British Envoy, directing the Governor-General of Fārs to compel Shaikh 'Abdullah to give up the boats he had taken and to prevent him from disturbing the peace of the Gulf. The ex-Shaikh, finding himself unsupported by Persia, gave the Resident a verbal promise to abstain, so long as he should continue to reside in Persia, from aggressions upon Bahrain; but, as he refused to confirm this undertaking in writing, a British war vessel was despatched to Nāband, and he was told to consider himself as having been formally placed under restraint.

Nāband having ceased, under these restrictions, to be a suitable place of residence for him, Shaikh 'Abdullah, in October 1845, informed the Resident of his intention to remove to Qatif. Soon afterwards an unsuccessful attempt was made by him, in conjunction with the Wahhābis, to capture Bahrain, of which the details are given in a later paragraph on the relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the Wahhābi power. On the failure of this coup Shaikh 'Abdullah once more took refuge at Kuwait.

On becoming aware of these events, the British representative at Būshehr wrote to Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait expressing a hope that he would not allow Shaikh 'Abdullah, while living under his protection, to indulge in depredations upon the trade of Bahrain; and the hint was apparently taken, for the ex-Shaikh, during his stay at Kuwait, remained altogether quiescent. In June 1846 Shaikh 'Abdullah received an invitation from the Governor-General of Fārs to return to Būshehr, where it was promised that he should be liberally entertained "until . . . the season for action had arrived"; but in August the ex-chief, who was now well aware both of the duplicity of the Persians and of their inability to assist him, declined their flattering but insincere offer.

In September 1846, probably on account of the restraints to which he was subjected at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah removed to Hasa, where he settled at first in the neighbourhood of Dammām; and at the beginning of 1847 he was living, without any followers, on Tārūt Island. During the greater part of his stay in Hasa, as explained further on, war prevailed

Proceedings  
of the ex-  
Shaikh at  
Qatif, 1845.

Proceedings  
of the  
ex-Shaikh  
during a  
residence  
at Kuwait,  
1845-46.

Proceedings  
of the ex-  
Shaikh  
during a  
residence  
in Hasa,  
1846-47.

between the Wahhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain; but no active part in the hostilities was taken by the ex-chief. It was not until August 1847, when a peace was concluded between the principal belligerents by which the Wahhābi Amīr bound himself not to abet Shaikh 'Abdullah in his machinations, that the exile suddenly woke to life, launched a vessel at Dammām with the supposed intention of proceeding to Qais to intrigue with some discontented 'Utūb there, and was joined by 'Isa-bin-Tarif of the Āl-Bin-'Alī, whose dislike of Shaikh Muhammad had now overcome his former hatred of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The demand made by the allies upon Shaikh Muhammad was for the restoration of his grand-uncle's vessels and other possessions. The immediate commencement of hostilities at sea was prevented by the arrival in the "Elphin-stone" of Commodore Lowe, who required that the regular sanction of the Resident should first be obtained by the parties; but, when this omission had been supplied, the war, which quickly took a turn unfavourable to the ex-chief, began without further delay.

The Restrictive Line was violated, at an early stage of the proceedings, by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who crossed to the Persian coast to obtain reinforcements; and Shaikh Muhammad, on his part, asked that the British Government would either restrain the 'Atbi malcontents settled on Qais or grant him leave to take suitable measures against them. This request of the Shaikh was referred by the Resident to Government; but, before orders could be received from India, the campaign had been brought to an end by a battle fought on land, in which the troops of Bahrain, commanded by Shaikh Muhammad in person, defeated the allies near Fuwairat in Qatar; 'Isa-bin-Tarif himself was among the slain. This disaster was the death-blow of Shaikh 'Abdullah's hopes. The orders of the Government of India, at length received, were that an invasion of Bahrain by the allies should be prevented, if necessary, by a British naval force; but the decision was not communicated to Shaikh Muhammad, as it might have led him to neglect precautions for his own defence.

About this time, probably in 1848, 'Abdul Jabbār Khān, the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād, opened a correspondence with both parties. To the ex-Shaikh he wrote assuring him of the active support of the Persian Government, "and begging him to make every preparation for "carrying into effect the plans he might have in contemplation,—however "momentous, however gigantic,—Persian assistance, full and powerful, "would most surely be accorded to him." His letter to Shaikh Muhammad was equally friendly and was apparently intended to blind

Death in battle of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and final ruin of the ex-Shaikh's fortunes, 1847.

Correspondence of the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād with both parties.

and mislead that overweening ruler. Steps taken by the British Resident at Baghdād resulted, however, in the discontinuance of the correspondence, on which the offending Persian functionary pretended that he had entered in ignorance of its impropriety.

The struggle between the chiefs was at length brought to an end by the death of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, apparently in 1849. This event took place at Masqat, in the course of a voyage undertaken by the ex-Shaikh with the object of persuading his former enemy, Saiyid Sa'id, then at Zanzibar, to assist him in recovering his ancestral dominions.

Death of the ex-Shaikh, 1849.

### Relations of Bahrain with the Wahhābis from the accession of Shaikh Muhammad to the death of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah. 1843-1849.

The interference of the Wahhābi Amīr in the dynastic quarrels of the Āl Khalīfah, resulting in the transference of Dammām from their possession to his, has already been described; but it remains to notice some other transactions between the Wahhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain which had no very direct connection with the dissensions among the Āl Khalīfah.

In the operations against Dammām the Amīr Faisal and Shaikh Muhammad acted in concert; and, on the fall of that place, it seems to have been arranged that the Shaikh, in return for the aid lent him, should acknowledge the supremacy of the Wahhābis and pay an annual tribute, with arrears.

Before the end of 1844 a demand for settlement of the arrears had been twice presented by the Amīr and as often evaded by the Shaikh; and in 1845 it became known that 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif, was plotting an attack upon Bahrain. The Wahhābi official, his plans not being yet matured, pretended unusual friendliness for Shaikh Muhammad; but the latter, who without difficulty penetrated this artifice, assumed the offensive, placed the ports of Hasa under blockade, and engaged in his service a noted pirate named Hamaid-bin-Majdal. At this juncture Shaikh 'Abdullah, the ex-chief of Bahrain, landed secretly near Rās Tanūrah, and sent messengers to his son Mubārak and to the Wahhābi Governor; his proposal was that he himself, with his vessels, should decoy the blockading force away from Qatif, and that, during its absence, Mubārak should cross over from the mainland and

Rupture between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābis, 1845-1847.

1845.

take possession of Bahrain. The scheme, in itself not unpromising, was frustrated by some of the 'Amāir, into whose hands part of Shaikh 'Abdullah's correspondence fell and by whom it was carried to 'Ali, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, in Bahrain. In the result, the ex-Shaikh found himself confronted, before he had reached Qatif, by the Bahrain fleet in battle array; and he had some difficulty in escaping capture by them.

1846.

Hostilities between Bahrain and the Wāhhābis, and the blockade by the former of the Hasa coast, continued throughout 1846 without advantage on either side. In September 1846 the ex-chief of Bahrain reappeared and settled in Hasa, first near Dammām and then on Tārūt Island, with the result that the blockade, which had been temporarily relaxed, again became more strict, and that two engagements took place on the mainland, in one of which the Wāhhābi governor was victorious, in the other the Shaikh of Bahrain; the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, however, did not himself take part in any of these proceedings. In October 1846 the Wāhhābi official was desirous of calling some of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to his aid and sought permission to do so from the British Resident at Būshehr, and in November the Shaikh of Bahrain applied to the same authority for leave to form an alliance with the Shaikh of Dibai; but both requests were, as usual, refused.

End of the  
war and final  
settlement,  
1847.

Early in 1847 the situation was changed by the action of Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his 'Amāir, who seceded from the party of Shaikh Muhammad and attached themselves to the Wāhhābis; and in August of the same year a settlement was arranged, under which the Amīr Faisal undertook not to encourage the ex-chief of Bahrain further, even though the latter should continue to reside in Hasa, while Shaikh Muhammad bound himself to pay tribute to the Wāhhābis at the rate of \$4,000 a year.

#### Relations of Bahrain with Persia during the same period, 1843-49.

Beyond the intrigues of Persian agents and officials in favour of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, especially in 1843-44 and 1846, which have been recounted above, there is nothing to be noticed in the relations of Persia with Bahrain at this time.

#### Relations of Bahrain with Turkey during the same period, 1843-49.

The case of Turkey, however, is different; for a claim by the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrain, afterwards urged from time to time, was advanced apparently for the first time in 1847. The views of the Porte found expression, on this occasion, in a letter addressed by the Mutasallim of Basrah to the Shaikh of Bahrain, in which the latter was invited to declare his allegiance to the Sultān and to submit detailed lists of the shipping of his principality in order that the vessels might be registered under the Turkish flag. A Turkish brig-of-war which at this time was cruising in the Gulf did not, however, visit Bahrain,—probably in order to avoid attracting unnecessary attention,—and the overtures of the Turks were evaded by Shaikh Muhammad; but the incident, as will be shown presently, afforded matter for reflection to the British Government.

#### Relations of Bahrain with the British Government during the same period, 1843-49.

Certain transactions of the British authorities in regard to Bahrain have been noticed incidentally. Such were their repeated insistence on the observance of the Restrictive Line by both factions, their withholding of the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Kuwait from participation in the war, and their discouragement of Persian intrigue and intervention; and such also, was the veto which they placed in 1846 on the design of the Wāhhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain to borrow aid against one another from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān.

On the 8th of May 1847, a treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, similar to that executed by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in the same year, was signed by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain.

The insidious advances of Turkey in 1847 led to a discussion of the politico-commercial position of Bahrain. The Shaikh complained that heavier harbour fees and other dues were levied on his vessels at Bombay than on those of Persia and Masqat; and he professed himself inclined, on account of this unfavourable treatment, to accept—as the Shaikh of

Matters  
arising out of  
the dynastic  
struggle and  
out of  
Wāhhābi  
affairs.

Treaty for the  
suppression  
of the Slave  
Trade, 8th  
May 1847.  
Proposal for  
a British  
Protectorate  
over Bahrain  
considered  
and rejected,  
1847-49.

Kuwait had already done—the Turkish flag. Enquiry having shown that the extra charges at Bombay were levied on Bahrain vessels because they did not possess registers, a refund was authorised; and the Shaikh of Bahrain was informed that in future his subjects might avoid payment of the heavier rates at Bombay by providing themselves with certificates signed by the Resident. The question raised did not, however, end here; for, in the opinion of the Bombay Government, it was obviously desirable to exclude interference by foreign powers in the affairs of the Persian Gulf, inasmuch as, without retaining the supreme authority in their own hands, the British Government could not hope to secure the performance of the objects which they had attained in that quarter at a large expense; and the Board of Directors concurred in their recommendation that “any attempts upon Bahrain ought to be resisted by the British naval force” in the Gulf, and that the British Political Resident should be so informed. In the meantime the Resident, Major Hennell, had been authorised, while avoiding discussion with the Turks, to ascertain whether the Shaikh of Bahrain was inclined to enter into a closer connection with the British power; and some months later, apparently in 1848, Shaikh Muhammad expressed a wish that his principality should be taken under British protection. Major Hennell, whose opinion had at first been adverse to the project, now recommended the Shaikh’s offer for acceptance; but in September 1849, after a protracted discussion which resulted in an agreement between the Indian Government and Her Majesty’s Government that a change of policy would be inexpedient, the Resident was directed to decline the proposal of the Shaikh, but to assure him at the same time of continuance of the good will and friendship of the British Government.

Piracies  
committed  
by one of  
the Qubaisāt,  
1848.

While this important question was pending, the conduct of Shaikh Muhammad towards the British Government was not free from reproach, especially in regard to a pirate named Khalifah, a member of the restless Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās tribe of Abu Dhabi. This individual, after plundering a number of vessels including one belonging to Bahrain, had somehow fallen into the hands of the Shaikh; and the question of his punishment was already under consideration by the British Resident, when the Shaikh, in violation of a promise given to the Residency Agent, again set him at liberty. A sharp remonstrance by Colonel Hennell produced a humble apology and a promise to re-arrest the pirate should occasion offer; but it does not appear that an opportunity of doing so was ever found.

### Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1843-1849.

The Dawāsir who now inhabit Budaiya’ and Zallāq on the main island appear to have arrived in Bahrain about 1845. On their way thither from their original home in Central Arabia, they are said to have sojourned for a few years on Zakhnūniyah Island.

Arrival of  
the Dawāsir  
in Bahrain,  
1845.

Of the conditions prevailing in the Bahrain islands during the first years of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah’s rule we have little information; but such indications as exist point to internal misgovernment. The existence, as early as 1847, of a colony of Bahrain refugees on Qais island has already been mentioned in connection with the struggle between the Shaikh and his grand-uncle; and this settlement, though the inhabitants did not actually assist the ex-Shaikh ‘Abdullah, must have been regarded by Shaikh Muhammad as in some way prejudicial to his interests, for we find him at the end of 1848 endeavouring, but without success, to persuade the Shaikh of Chārak to expel the ‘Utūb from Qais. In January 1849, disgusted by the arbitrary government of the Shaikh, four of the principal merchants among his subjects left Bahrain and after some stay at Lingeh went to reside on Qais,—a proceeding by which Shaikh Muhammad was so much disquieted that he sent his brother ‘Ali to Būshehr to seek the advice of the Resident. In reply to questions, the Shaikh was told that the British vessels in the Gulf would endeavour while in the neighbourhood to prevent the seceders from attacking Bahrain, but that it behoved the Shaikh himself to be vigilant; and the adoption by himself of a more conciliatory policy was suggested. This counsel seems to have borne fruit. Three of the merchants afterwards returned to Bahrain in a British vessel; and an amicable, if temporary, adjustment of their differences with the Shaikh was secured in June 1849.

Existence of  
a colony  
of ‘Atbi  
miscontents  
on Qais  
Island,  
1847-49.

### General history of Bahrain and policy of the British Government during the remainder of Shaikh Muhammad’s rule, 1850-68.

The affairs of Bahrain, in consequence of the irresponsible character of the ruler, of the close interest in the principality taken by Great Britain, and of claims to suzerainty advanced by the Wahhābis, the Turks and the Persians, became, after the death of the ex-Shaikh ‘Abdullah, extremely intricate. In the words of Lieutenant Disbrowe, “we have the launching

"of Buteels and the expectation of attacks; seeking the Resident's advice "and speaking disparagingly of him for giving advice; the oppression of "subjects, and the flight of the oppressed; the deputing of envoys, armed "with full powers, to effect agreements and the return of the envoys to be "censured for the agreements they had effected." We shall treat the following period of nearly twenty years chronologically, without any attempt to separate the closely intertwined threads of the narrative.

Piracy by  
Bani Hājir  
and insolence  
of Shaikh  
Muhammad,  
1850.

About the end of June 1850 a small Ghunchah from Khārag Island, bound for Qatif, was captured off Rās Tanūrah by a party of 26 Bani Hājir who were returning to the mainland in a Bahrain Baqārah; and the Khāragis, after being plundered of all that they possessed, were landed, stripped, on the Hasa coast. On the grounds that he had connected himself by marriage with the guilty tribe, that he allowed them to frequent Bahrain in considerable numbers, and that he was secretly instigating their lawless proceedings, the Shaikh of Bahrain was compelled by the British Resident, although the Bani Hājir were not his subjects and the crime had been committed in the jurisdiction of the Wāhhābis, to answer for the offence and to disburse 100 Tūmāns as compensation to the sufferers.

At nearly the same time, in the course of a correspondence relating to the death of a Bahrain subject, Shaikh Muhammad sent messages of an offensive character to the British Resident through Hāji Qāsim, the Residency Agent in Bahrain; his insulting remarks referred in part to Colonel Hennell personally, and in part to the British Government. A ship of war was immediately despatched to Bahrain to require an explanation, whereupon Shaikh Muhammad, repenting of his hasty conduct, deputed his brother 'Ali to Būshehr to offer an apology. In so far as he was himself concerned, Colonel Hennell accepted this *amende* as sufficient; but he insisted that, at the next visit of Commodore Porter to Bahrain, the Shaikh should visit that officer personally on board ship and express regret for his remarks derogatory to the British Government,—a demand to which 'Ali, on the part of the Shaikh, readily acceded and which was duly fulfilled.

In 1850 a breach between Shaikh Muhammad and the Wāhhābis seemed to be imminent; and the prospect was the more serious that the British Resident had failed in an endeavour to persuade the sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah to settle peaceably on Qais Island, in consideration of allowances to be granted by the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Ill-feeling was first excited by the Amir Faisal's treatment of an envoy named Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahīm, whom he had himself sent to Bahrain and whom, on return from this mission, he despoiled of the presents with which Shaikh Muhammad had loaded him and even impri-

Danger from  
the Wāhhābis  
and sons of  
the ex-  
Shaikh  
'Abdullah  
averted by  
British  
action,  
1850-52.  
1850.

soned,—a course of behaviour so irritating to the Shaikh of Bahrain that he threatened to blockade Qatif unless reparation were made. A little later, in April 1850, a son of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the well known Wāhhābi agent at Baraimi, visited Bahrain; and the cold reception which he naturally met with there did not tend to improve the relations between Shaikh Muhammad and the Amir.

Early in 1851 the Amir Faisal in person made his appearance in 1851. Qatar, at a place only two marches distant from Dōhah, whereupon the people of Dōhah, Wakrah and Fuwairat repudiated their allegiance to Bahrain and went over to the Wāhhābis. The Shaikh of Bahrain, against his own better judgment, then tendered a small annual tribute to the Amir,—a circumstance from it may perhaps be inferred that he had failed to observe the agreement of 1847; but his adversary rejected the offer with scorn, proposed exorbitant terms instead, and invited the sons of the late Shaikh 'Abdullah to join him from their asylum on the Persian coast. Shaikh Muhammad then blockaded the Wāhhābi port of Qatif; but the sons of 'Abdullah, arriving with a fleet which they had equipped on the Persian side, broke through the line of his vessels and entered Qatif harbour. Matters now assumed an aspect very threatening for Shaikh Muhammad; and he was, in fact, on the point of succumbing to the hostile combination when a British squadron, arriving off Bahrain, took the islands under their protection. Thereafter, at the end of July 1851, a peace was concluded between the disputants by the efforts of Shaikh Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi; Dōhah in Qatar was restored to 'Ali, brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain, from whom it had been taken; and the Wāhhābi Amir returned quietly to Hofūf.

In this year a claim by the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrain was summarily rejected by the British Government.

In 1852, enraged by the recent settlement of the sons of 'Abdullah 1852. at Dammām under Wāhhābi protection, Shaikh Muhammad proposed to withhold the instalment of tribute then due to the Amir and indulged in imprudent speeches; but by the advice of Captain Kemball, the British Resident, and of his own brother 'Ali, a man of greater self-control than himself, he was persuaded to make the required payment to an agent whom Faisal had deputed to receive it.

Soon after this Shaikh Muhammad gave way to irrational fears,—fears not only of rivals belonging to his own family but also of the Saiyid of 'Omān and even of Shaikh Tahuūn, the recent mediator between himself and the Wāhhābis; and hardly had Captain Kemball, whom he had recently insulted, undertaken a correspondence on his behalf with the

Difficulty of  
dealings with  
Shaikh  
Muhammad,  
1852.

sons of 'Abdullah, when the negotiations were frustrated by the instability and unreasonableness of Shaikh Muhammad. Yūsuf-bin-Ibrāhīm, the principal among the four Bahrain merchants who had migrated to Qais in 1849, still refused to return to his home without a guarantee of British protection, which could not be granted; and he eventually died at Lingeh in the following year (1853).

On the 10th of May 1856 an engagement relating to the Slave Trade, supplementary to the Treaty of 1847, was accepted by the Shaikh of Bahrain; in its terms it was identical with those obtained from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omāu in the same year.

In 1858 Shaikh Muhammad, now described as "a man who combined in himself the worst qualities of a tyrant, the most unbridled lust and greed of wealth, and an uncontrollable temper, ignorance and impatience against restraint," proceeded to lay an embargo on a Baghlah under the British flag, to prohibit vessels owned by Indian merchants in Bahrain from visiting Qatif, and to levy duties on exports in addition to those on imports, which alone had been taken before; and it was complained that his tone to Hāji Qāsim, the Residency Agent in Bahrain, had become very insolent.

Accordingly, in September 1858, Captain Felix Jones, the Resident at Būshehr, sent his Assistant, Lieutenant Disbrowe, in the "Clive" sloop-of-war to convey a letter and a remonstrance to the chief. The release of the impounded British Baghlah having been at once obtained, the Shaikh's brother 'Ali became, as usual, the medium of communication, and explained that the prohibition against vessels under British colours visiting Qatif was intended to prevent complications that might otherwise occur through the enmity of the Wāhhābi governor against the Shaikh of Bahrain; Lieutenant Disbrowe replied that "the British flag was fully able to uphold its dignity in every corner of the globe without assistance from other powers." In regard to customs duties, it was explained that the British Government desired that they should not be of an arbitrary or oppressive character, a proposition to which Shaikh 'Ali made no objection; and a promise was given that the Residency Agent should in future be treated with the respect due to his position. The Shaikh, after an unsuccessful attempt to induce Lieutenant Disbrowe to pay him the first visit on shore, then came off to the "Clive" and expressed his regret at what had occurred; and his call was then returned by Lieutenant Disbrowe and Commodore Jenkins under a salute to the British flag.

Supplementary engagement relating to the Slave Trade, 10th May 1856. Reparation obtained for the ill-treatment by Shaikh Muhammad of British subjects in Bahrain, 1858.

Notwithstanding the peace arranged in 1851, tension continued between the Wāhhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, and a vigilant watch was maintained by the local British authorities. In May 1853, with reference to one of the alarms of an invasion of Bahrain that from time to time occurred, the Government of India authorised the Government of Bombay to offer every obstacle to an attack upon those islands by the Wāhhābi Amīr—who was now nominally subject to the Ottoman Porte—on the ground that Her Majesty's Government would not permit the occupation of Bahrain by the Turkish Government, or by any one acting for them or in their interest. In 1859 matters again came to a head, and, notwithstanding the presence at the time of a British corvette in Hasa waters, preparations for a descent on Bahrain were made at Qatif and Dammām by the Wāhhābi governor of the littoral and by Muhammad, a son of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah; the object of the movement was to place Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in possession of Bahrain, and the excuse was that the Shaikh of Bahrain had instigated certain tribes of Qatar to attack the subjects of the Wāhhābi Amīr. Some Turkish and Persian vessels were seized by the confederates in a piratical manner and their crews impressed for service on the intended expedition. The British Resident immediately despatched Commodore Balfour to Dammām with the Persian Gulf squadron; and so threatening was the attitude assumed on arrival by that officer, whose conduct afterward received "the marked commendation of Government," that the allies at once discontinued their proceedings and the Wāhhābi governor even sued for pardon.

An inconclusive correspondence then followed between the Wāhhābi ruler, who was much annoyed at the intervention of the British authorities, and the British Resident, Captain Felix Jones, who believed that the fixed object of the Wāhhābis was "universal dominion along the coast." The Amīr asserted authority over Bahrain and declared himself a vassal of the Sultan of Turkey. The Resident, in reply, informed him of the determination of the British Government to preserve the independence of Bahrain, and remarked on the inconsistency of piratical seizures of Turkish shipping with professions of dependence on the Porte.

To Government Captain Jones made a recommendation that punitive action should be taken against the ports of Hasa; and a discussion was initiated as to the advisability of requiring Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah to leave Dammām.

Renewed danger from the Wāhhābis and the sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah again averted by British action, 1859.



Persian and Turkish protection simultaneously invited by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1859.

Towards the end of the year 1859, probably in connection with this crisis, Shaikh Muhammad made simultaneous applications for protection to the Persian Governor of Fars and to the Turkish Wali of Baghdad. The response of the Turks was delayed by the absence of the Wali from his headquarters; but a Persian agent in the person of one Mirza Mebdi Khan, a well-known Anglophobe, almost immediately arrived in Bahrain, the Persian flag was hoisted, and Persian sovereignty was proclaimed. Scarcely, however, had these ceremonies been performed, when Muhammad Baig, the emissary of Mustafa Nuri Pasha appeared; the Persian flag was again lowered; and the Turkish flag was raised in its place. To complete the absurdity of the situation the Persian agent refused to leave Bahrain or to surrender his imaginary authority in the Shaikhdom.

Discussion of the policy to be adopted by Britain in regard to these events, 1860-61.

Sir H. Rawlinson, the British Minister at Tehran, who differed from Captain Jones, the Resident, in regarding these matters as of slight account, contented himself with obtaining from the Shah's ministers an assurance that no military occupation of Bahrain should be undertaken by Persia until the question of title had been settled by diplomatic discussion; and he advised Captain Jones that, while hostilities against Bahrain from any quarter were to be repelled by force of British arms, the voluntary tender by the Shaikh of allegiance to any other power might, so long as it was not followed by a military occupation, be ignored as of no practical importance. On consideration of the correspondence the Government of Bombay instructed the Resident at Bushahr not to interfere with the occupation of Bahrain, whether by Persia or by Turkey, otherwise than by protest and by an intimation that the matter had been reported to Her Majesty's Government; but at the same time the agents of both powers were to be distinctly warned that aggression by Bahrain, or in the name of Bahrain, upon neighbouring tribes would not be allowed by the British authorities, and would even be prevented by force if necessary. In referring the general question to the Secretary of State, the Government of Bombay observed that the tranquillity of the Persian Gulf, which had been so long preserved by the policy of the British Government, seemed to demand that Bahrain should be regarded as subject neither to the Sublime Porte nor to Persia; and they recommended that the independence of the principality should be recognised, and that those engagements which in the interests of commerce, humanity and public security had been concluded between it and the British Government should be maintained. This view was approved by Her Majesty's Government in February 1861.

In the meantime the Persian and Turkish agents had apparently vanished from Bahrain.

In May 1861 it became known to the Resident that Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, without reference to himself, had commenced a blockade of the Hasa coast and was harassing the pearl fishers of Qatif and Dammam, at the latter of which places Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, son of the late ex-chief of Bahrain, was still located.

Captain Jones immediately proceeded to Bahrain, where he arrived on the 18th of May, with the full Gulf squadron; but he could not prevail upon the Shaikh to discontinue the blockade of the Wahhabi coast. The explanation of the Shaikh's obstinacy was, or at least was believed to be, a promise by Persia to procure him the assistance of a French vessel. Having exhausted all his arguments in vain, the Resident placed the matter in the hands of Commodore Drought, who was immediately successful, without the firing of a single shot, in capturing two of the finest war vessels of Bahrain, the "Tawilah" and the "Hamrah."

The Shaikh then made submission, and, after some negotiations conducted through his brother 'Ali, consented to sign a Convention proposed by Captain Jones. By this agreement, executed on the 21st of May 1861, Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah acknowledged the validity of the treaties and conventions concluded with the British Government by his predecessors in office; he promised to abstain, on condition of being supported by the British Government against external aggression, from "the prosecution of war, piracy and slavery by sea"; he engaged to submit cases of aggression on himself or his subjects by sea to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf as arbitrator and to look to him for redress, as also to make reparation for such maritime offences as might in justice be charged against himself or his subjects; and he undertook to recognise the jurisdiction of the British Agent and Political Resident over British subjects of every kind in Bahrain, and to permit the latter to reside and trade in his dominions, subject only to an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. in kind or in cash upon their goods, which should not be more than once levied. Matters having been thus arranged, the Resident restored the war vessel "Tawilah," but retained the "Hamrah." One result of the Convention was to assimilate the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain, who was not a party to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, to that of the Trucial Shaikhs.

The Government of Bombay approved the proceedings of Captain Jones and referred the Convention, which they considered to be advantageous notwithstanding that it had been obtained by the Resident without

Convention with Britain signed by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 21st May 1861.



previous express sanction, to the Government of India, by whom it was accepted on the 9th of October 1861. The Resident was at the same time instructed not to return the "Hamrah" until the Shaikh, by his conduct, should show himself worthy of such consideration.

Meanwhile a suggestion made by the Resident in connection with the attempted invasion of Bahrain in 1859,—that Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, who had repeatedly been warned not to disturb the peace and of whose proceedings the Shaikh of Bahrain had frequently complained, should he removed from Dammām—had been adopted by higher authority. It was intended by Government that the exile, on condition of residing at Kuwait or somewhere in Persia, should receive an allowance from the Shaikh of Bahrain. The Resident was warned, in case of force being required, to confine his operations to the sea and not to let himself be drawn into land operations.

Accordingly, in June 1861, the Resident wrote to the Wāhhābi Amīr, requiring him to eject Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām; and in November 1861, no reply to the letter having been received, he proceeded with the squadron to Dammām, from which, after a bloodless bombardment of an hour's duration, the son of the ex-chief with all his followers ineffectually fled. No opposition to the proceedings of the squadron was offered by the Wāhhābi garrisons at Qatif or Dammām; and the result was reported to be welcome to the traders of Hasa, and even to the Wāhhābi authorities, whose failure to expel the refugee was due merely to ordinary Arab notions on the subject of hospitality.

A protest against the action taken at Dammām was made soon after by the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād and was answered by the British Political Agent at that place; but, as it related to the political position of Hasa, not Bahrain, it need not be noticed here.

Neither the treaty obligations which he had incurred nor the valuable assistance rendered to him in the expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām availed for long to keep the Shaikh of Bahrain in good relations with the British Government. In 1863, after the appointment of Colonel Pelly to the Persian Gulf Residency, the "Hamrah" was returned to Shaikh Muhammad at the suggestion of the new Resident, as the earnest of a policy of conciliation which he intended to pursue; but this concession failed to elicit any acknowledgment from the Shaikh beyond "a remark disrespectful to the Viceroy"; and ill-usage of British subjects commenced with such vigour that on one occasion the whole Indian community took refuge at Būshehr, whence the more wealthy among them refused to return.

Various claims arose against the Shaikh, of which one was in 1864 investigated by the Resident and settled by an agreement in writing, executed by the Shaikh and his brother, to pay a sum of 17,000 Qrāns. In the spring of 1865, on again visiting Bahrain, Colonel Pelly found that the compensation promised had not been paid, and that on the contrary a further sum of 3,000 Qrāns had been extorted by the ruler from the Hindu complainants. The Resident on this occasion confined himself to a written remonstrance; but in December of the same year, having failed to convince the Shaikh after a week's argument of the necessity of fulfilling his engagements, Colonel Pelly caused the Bahrain war Baghlah "Dinār," of 500 tons and pierced for 10 guns, to be seized. Hardly had the Resident recommended to Government the sale of this vessel for the benefit of the British Indian claimants than the Bahrain authorities came to their senses and satisfied the demand against them; but in the meantime the Baghlah had been severely damaged by a hurricane, while in tow of the "Berenice," and foundered on reaching port, apparently at Būshehr.

The Government of India directed that the "Dinār" should, if practicable, be restored to the Shaikh, and an attempt was made to fulfil their instructions; but the vessel sank and was lost on her way back to Bahrain. A general order was issued by Government, in connection with this case, that the Resident should not in future undertake the confiscation of vessels belonging to chiefs on his own responsibility.

The Persian Government, who in 1862 had protested against the seizure of the Bahrain war vessel "Hamrah," now complained of the proceedings in regard to the "Dinār" on the ground that Bahrain, under the Agreement concluded by Captain Bruce in 1822,\* was a dependency of Persia.

The Government of India, to whom the allusion was unintelligible referred to the Government of Bombay and were informed of the nature of Captain Bruce's Agreement and of its having been at the time instantly repudiated. Upon this the Government of India acquainted Mr. Alison, the British Minister in Persia, with the circumstances of the case and with their own opinion that, whatever might have been the pretensions of Persia (or the grounds of the same) to the sovereignty of Bahrain in former days, the Shāh could not now be regarded as possessing, in point of fact, any rights in the principality.

This communication to the British Legation at Tehrān was approved by Her Majesty's Government in 1867, and the matter apparently dropped

\* Vide page 849 ante.

Expulsion  
of Muham-  
mad-bin-  
'Abdullah  
from  
Dammām,  
November  
1861.

Misbehaviour  
of the Shaikh  
of Bahrain  
in regard to  
British  
subjects,  
1863-65.

Reassertion  
by the  
Persian  
Government  
of their claim  
to Bahrain,  
1866-67.

Claims of the  
Wahhābi  
Amir to  
Bahrain,  
1866-67.

At the time of Colonel Pelly's visit to Bahrain in December 1865, a rupture of Anglo-Wahhābi relations being then imminent, reason was found to suspect the existence of an understanding between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābis; and the seizure of the "Dīnār" was dictated, in part, by the expediency of clipping the wings of the Shaikh in case he should suddenly resolve to throw in his lot with the Amir. The Shaikh, it is true, in making his submission, professed a wish to be delivered from the power of the Wahhābis; but his request was considered by the Resident to be insincere. Colonel Pelly was accordingly instructed to report on the political position of Bahrain with reference to the Wahhābi power.

The result of his enquiries was to show that the Shaikh held himself to be independent of the Wahhābis in so far as the islands of Bahrain were concerned, and that the annual tribute of \$1,000 which he indubitably paid was on account of his possessions in Qatar, the object of payment being to secure the latter against attack by Arab tribes under Wahhābi influence. In submitting this information Colonel Pelly reminded Government of the\* decision of the Court of Directors in 1847, that any attempt upon Bahrain should be prevented by a British naval force, if necessary; of the orders† of the Government of India in 1853, that every obstacle should be offered to the Wahhābi Amir, then regarded as a Turkish agent, should he seek to attack Bahrain; and of the‡ acceptance by the Secretary of State in 1861 of the view that the independence of Bahrain should be recognised and that the engagements between the Shaikh and the British Government should be maintained.

In March 1867, the Government of India enunciated an opinion that the Shaikh was independent of all other powers in respect of his insular possessions, and that he did not owe fealty to the Wahhābis unless in regard to Qatar.

In 1867, disturbances of a very unusual and serious character broke out between the Shaikh of Bahrain and his dependents in Qatar. A Bedouin of the promontory having been seized and deported to Bahrain by Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Muhammad, the representative of the Bahrain ruler at Wakrah, the headmen of Wakrah and Dōhah combined to demand his release, and, on their request being refused, took measures to expel Shaikh Ahmad from Wakrah; but their action was forestalled by that individual, removing himself, with his family and goods, to Khor Hassān. A seeming reconciliation then took place, the Shaikh of Bahrain releasing

the imprisoned Bedouin and the headmen of Qatar apologising to the Shaikh for their behaviour; but on the part of the ruler of Bahrain the proceedings were merely a blind to cover preparations for revenge. Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, one of the Āl Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah whose influence afterwards became paramount in Qatar, having been invited to Bahrain for the purpose of making a permanent arrangement in regard to the administration of the promontory, was on his arrival treacherously cast into prison; and no sooner had this capture been effected than Shaikh Muhammad despatched a fleet of 24 boats, carrying 500 men, under the command of his brother 'Ali, and a land force of 200 men under Shaikh Ahmad, his agent, to punish the people of Dōhah and Wakrah. At the same time he sought assistance from the Shaikhs of Dibai and Abu Dhabi; and the latter, disregarding the advice of the British Agent at Shārajah, sent about 2,000 armed men in 70 boats to the Qatar coast; but the Shaikh of Dibai, with greater prudence declined to join. The Abu Dhabi fleet was the first to arrive on Qatar, and succeeded in pacifying the suspicions of the inhabitants until the arrival of the Bahrain armament, by which about 40 vessels belonging to Qatar had been captured on the way over. The towns of Dōhah and Wakrah were then sacked by the allied forces, even the rafters and doors of the houses being removed; and the inhabitants, who had been ordered to go forth and settle elsewhere, were plundered, when they tried to obey, of such possessions as remained to them. A number of the people were deported, and most of those who were left then voluntarily dispersed and sought asylum at various places on the coasts of Arabia and Persia. These events took place in October 1867. The damage inflicted on the people of Qatar was estimated at over \$200,000.

The victims of this treacherous outrage immediately appealed for redress to the Wahhābi Amir, who maintained a claim to authority over Qatar, and it was soon reported that he had received their representations sympathetically and had assured them that, "as his intentions and those of the British Government coincided," no further harm should befall them from the direction of the sea. A demand by the Amir for the return of the spoil taken and for the repatriation of the exiles was flouted, however, by the Shaikh of Bahrain, and led only to the deportation afresh of certain Qatari families who had meanwhile been allowed to return to their homes. Instructions were then issued by the Wahhābi Amir to his representative in Hasa to prepare for an attack on Bahrain; but, beyond the plunder of some Bahrain subjects by a tribe of the Hasa coast, no visible results followed.

Plunder of the Qatar coast by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and retaliation by the inhabitants of Qatar upon Bahrain, 1867-68.

\* *Vide* page 882 *ante*.

† *Vide* page 887 *ante*.

‡ *Vide* page 888 *ante*.

In June 1868 the injured Qataris took the law into their own hands and attempted a retaliatory attack on Bahrain; but the movement began and ended, it would seem, with a somewhat severe naval engagement.

Action of  
the British  
authorities  
with  
reference  
to the  
attack on  
Qatar, 1868.

The seerey and rapidity with which the campaign of the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi against Qatar was arranged and carried out had deprived the British Government of an opportunity for prevention or intervention; but, the affair having quickly come to be regarded throughout the Gulf as a test of British preparedness to maintain peace at sea, it was resolved to inflict an exemplary punishment upon the offending chiefs and not to accept the excuse, which would probably be tendered by Shaikh Muhammad, that he was entitled to punish by any and every means his refractory subjects in Qatar.

Preparations  
and  
negotiations.

Much delay was caused, however, by the demands of the Abyssinian expedition upon the marine resources of the Government of India; and, for the time being, the only vessel actually in the Gulf was the "Hugh Rose" gunboat, manned entirely by natives of India and unable to steam for more than eight consecutive hours. In May the steamer "Sind" was placed at the Resident's disposal for a blockade of Abu Dhabi, with the Shaikh of which place it was intended first to deal; but, by an extraordinary oversight on which the Government of India afterwards animadverted severely, she arrived in the Gulf without any shot for her guns. Meanwhile the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi whom the Shaikh of Bahrain had privately agreed to reimburse for any indemnity that might be extracted from him by the British Government, had recourse to a policy of shifts and evasions; but on the 8th of June 1868 these were cut short by a letter from the Resident, in which he was called upon to pay 125,000 Qrāns as damages, to restore to Qatar the persons and property that he had removed, and to express regret for the past and an intention of behaving better in future. The news, received in June 1868, of retaliatory action by the people of Qatar accelerated the progress of events; and on the 23rd of July H. M. S. "Vigilant," which had arrived on other duty at Bombay, was despatched to the Persian Gulf. The commander, Captain R. A. Brown, was instructed to enforce upon the Shaikh of Bahrain, by all means at his disposal but in consultation with Colonel Pelly, the immediate payment of \$100,000, the surrender of the armed Baghlahs employed by the Shaikh in his expedition, and the provision by the Shaikh of such

security for good conduct as the Resident might deem suitable; and demands of a similar character, to be finally disposed of on the spot, were authorised in the case of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

No action was taken, however, until the beginning of September,\* when Colonel Pelly with H.M.S. "Vigilant" and the gunboats "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose" proceeded to Bahrain, and Shaikh Muhammad, well aware that a reckoning was at hand, fled to Qatar. On the 6th of September 1868 an Agreement was executed by Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, a brother of the absconding ruler who had been to some extent associated with him in the administration, whereby he undertook to make over the war Baghlahs and Batils of the ruling family of Bahrain to the British Naval Commander and to pay \$25,000 in cash to the British Resident on the next day; to pay a further sum of \$75,000 in three annual instalments; and to appoint, for the better preservation of the peace at sea, an agent to represent him at Būshahr in his dealings with the British Residency. The Agreement also declared, on the authority of the principal inhabitants of Bahrain as well as of Shaikh 'Ali himself, that Shaikh Muhammad had by his piratical proceedings and flight forfeited the chiefship, and that Shaikh 'Ali had thus become sole ruler of Bahrain; and the latter pledged himself, in the event of his brother returning to Bahrain, to arrest him and hand him over to the Resident. The condition as to the surrender of the war fleet was duly performed; the vessels composing it were burnt; and the fort of Muharraḡ, or rather of Abu Māhur, was also destroyed along with its armament. When about one-fifth of the fine, however, had been collected, it was distributed rateably among the sufferers, and the remaining four-fifths were remitted.

Settlement  
with Shaikh  
Ali-bin-  
Khalifah,  
6th  
September  
1868.

The subsequent proceedings of the Resident upon the coast of Qatar and at Abu Dhabi form part of the history of those districts and need not be related here; but it may be mentioned that Colonel Pelly succeeded in effecting an arrangement, in regard to tribute and other matters, between the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dohah and the new Shaikh of Bahrain. The tribute in question may have been the whole or a part of the sum that was paid by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Wahhābis on account of Qatar.

Protests against the action of the British political representative were shortly received from various Persian authorities; one, in which Bahrain

Persian pro-  
test against  
the British

\* These delays are not fully explained. That which occurred between the beginning of February and the middle of July was attributed by the Government of India to the inaction of the Bombay Government.

proceedings  
in Bahrain  
and reply  
of Her  
Majesty's  
Government,  
1868-69.

was claimed to be "the property of Persia," was addressed by the Shāh's ministers to Mr. Alison, the British Minister at Tehrān; another, of similar purport, was sent to Colonel Pelly by the Kārguzār at Shirāz; and a third, with which were enclosed two letters from the deposed Shaikh of Bahrain, was lodged at the Foreign Office on the 13th of April 1869 by the Persian Minister in London. A principal ground of complaint was that no previous notice had been given to Persia of the British intention to proceed against Bahrain.

In a reply, sent on the 29th of April 1869 after consultation between the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India, and the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Persian Minister was reminded that the Shaikhs of Bahrain had, at different periods in the past, entered into direct engagements with the British Government, he was further assured that the sole objects of the British Government in holding the Shaikhs to those engagements were the prevention of piracy and of the slave trade and the maintenance of the police of the Gulf—duties of which Great Britain would gladly, if it were possible, divest herself in favour of Persia. In conclusion a promise was given that, should punitive measures against the Shaikh of Bahrain again become necessary, Her Majesty's Government would, if practicable, cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand, and that in cases in which this might be impossible, in consequence of the delay which a reference to the Court of Tehrān would involve, a full communication on the subject would be made to the Persian Government. The object of this reply was to avoid causing irritation at Tehrān; but it is not clear that any decided departure from the established British policy was intended by Her Majesty's Government.

#### 'ALI-BIN-KHALIFAH.

1868-69.

The rule of Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, inaugurated by his Agreement of the 6th September 1868 with the British Government, was short and tragic; it lasted less than one year.

#### Intrigues of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad, 1869.

In January 1869, at the earnest request of Shaikh 'Ali, who believed

that he could restrain his brother most effectually if he resided in Bahrain, the ex-Shaikh Muhammad was permitted by the British authorities to return home; but he at once engaged in a course of intrigues which necessitated his deportation to Kuwait. From Kuwait the ex-Shaikh removed to Qatif, where he settled down and entered into communications of sinister meaning with his relation Nāsir-bin-Mubārak—a grandson of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah—whose mother was a woman of the Bani Hājir Bedouin tribe.

#### Invasion of Bahrain and death of Shaikh 'Ali, 1869.

In August or September 1869, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak crossed over from the mainland in nine boats, accompanied by about 500 men of the Bani Hājir, and, landing in Bahrain, marched to Rifā'-ash-Sharqi, which was held in the name of Shaikh 'Ali by Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the chief who in 1861 had been expelled by the British from Damunām. A battle then took place, in which, owing mainly to treachery on the part of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh 'Ali was defeated by the invaders, and was killed on the field along with one of his sons. The usurping chiefs, over whom Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah appears to have acquired an immediate ascendancy, then occupied the towns of Manāmah and Muharraḡ; but they were unable to restrain their rabble of Bedouins, and the former place was plundered. The amount of the damage done at Manāmah, in which British Indian subjects suffered equally with others, was never clearly ascertained; but claims were afterwards registered to the amount of 21,53,797 Qrāns.

#### INTERREGNUM,

1869.

#### Immediate action by the local British authority.

When the news of this revolution reached Būshehr, the Resident, Colonel Pelly, at once despatched his Assistant, Captain Way, in

the "Dalhousie" to enquire into matters and to bring away any British Indian traders who might wish to leave; but the passion for gain among the last mentioned class was so strong that they one and all declined to be removed, preferring to remain at their own risk and do business in plundered property, which was being openly sold in Bahrain and Qatif at one-fifth of its real value.

#### Further action under the orders of the Government of India.

Instructions  
to the Resi-  
dent.

Suggestions for dealing with the crisis were made by the Resident at the beginning of October, and at the middle of November he was authorised to blockade Bahrain and otherwise use force until the chief disturbers of the peace, namely Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Nāsir-bin-Mubārak and Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, should have been surrendered; to recognise, if circumstances after execution of the first measure were favourable and the people generally seemed to approve of the appointment, 'Isa, son of the deceased 'Ali, as Shaikh of Bahrain; and to address the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān by letter, informing them of what had occurred and of the intention of Government to inflict adequate punishment. The questions of compensating persons plundered other than those who had bought in stolen property at nominal rates, and of blockading the Wāhhābi ports until the loot deposited there should have been restored, the offending Bedouins chastised and the Governor of Qatif removed, were reserved for later consideration; and the Resident was directed to exercise great caution in any communication which he might make to the Wāhhābi Amīr.

Proceedings  
in Bahrain,  
19th Novem-  
ber to 2nd  
December  
1869.

On receipt of these orders Colonel Pelly proceeded to Bahrain with H.M.S. "Daphne," Captain Douglas, H.M.S. "Nymph," and the gunboats "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose." Operations commenced on the 19th of November and were over by the 2nd of December. The Hālat Abu Mahur fort was attacked with boats on the night of the 19th November, and the garrison capitulated and surrendered Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, who was removed on board the "Daphne." Nāsir-bin-Ahmad, another Shaikh, was captured at sea. Nāsir-bin-Mubārak was shelled out of his fort—probably that of Manāmah, which was destroyed in the operations—and dislodged from another place in which he took refuge; but he succeeded in escaping to

Hasa with his followers. Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the head of the whole combination was outmanœuvred and gave himself up. Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali came over from Qatar, where he was residing, and was installed as ruler without interference on the part of the British Resident, amid every sign of popular rejoicing. Captain Douglas received some contusions by the explosion of a mine, but he was not seriously injured.

The three captured Shaikhs and two other ringleaders were deported to India, where they were at first confined in the fort of Asirgarh, and subsequently in the fort of Chunar. Nāsir-bin-Ahmad died at Chunar in 1873, and Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in 1877; and the remaining three prisoners were then removed to Aden, where in 1880 two of them were released.

Treatment of  
the prisoners  
and compen-  
sation of  
sufferers.

An arrangement was made with Shaikh 'Isa, at his accession, that the property of the ringleaders should be forfeited and the proceeds applied to the relief of the innocent sufferers by the invasion. The payment of this indemnity continued by instalments until 1876, when it was completed.

#### Connection of the Wāhhābis with the invasion.

It was at first suspected that the Wāhhābi Government were partially responsible for these ruinous disturbances in Bahrain, and a statement obtained currency that the Bani Hājir had at first refused to act without the authorisation of the Amīr, which Nāsir-bin-Mubārak accordingly obtained by a visit to Riyādh; but the Government of India, as we have seen, declined to hold the Wāhhābi Amīr responsible without fuller proof of his complicity and information as to the degree of his control over Hasa. The event proved the wisdom of this decision, for the Amīr subsequently wrote to the Resident disclaiming connection with the outrage; and, his guilt not being clear, it was ultimately found sufficient to remind him that the invasion had been made from his territory, where also Nāsir-bin-Mubārak had afterwards taken refuge and much of the plunder of Bahrain had been deposited, and to request, without the addition of any threat, that he would prevent in future such outrages as that which had occurred.

**Position of the Government of Persia in regard to the invasion  
and to Bahrain generally.**

**Interception  
of a Persian  
message off  
Bahrain.**

After the arrival of the British expedition off Bahrain, a native vessel from Daiyir on the Persian coast, flying the Arab flag, attempted to run the blockade. On being boarded she was found to carry an emissary from Mirza Mehdi Khān, the Persian envoy to Bahrain in 1859, with a dress of honour and letters in which Persian countenance and support were promised to Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the chief filibusterer; the letters stated that Mirza Mehdi Khān had been deputed to "the Persian ports and islands," but they were unaccompanied by any proper Farman of the Shāh's government. The vessel was detained for having endeavoured to break the blockade; and the letters were delivered by the British authorities to the prisoner Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah and were by him handed over to Colonel Pelly.

**Protest by  
the Persian  
Government.**

In accordance with the orders of Her Majesty's Government issued a few months previously, a telegraphic communication had been made through the Resident, before the sailing of the expedition, to the British Minister at Tehrān for the information of the Persian Court. It stated that, under orders from India, Colonel Pelly was about to call the chief in possession of Bahrain to account for his breach of the maritime peace, and for his unprovoked attack on Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah who had been placed in power by the British Government. Later news of the Resident's proceedings was received with equanimity by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who merely observed that the Government of Persia were interested equally with the Government of Great Britain in the maintenance of the peace by sea, and that they had heretofore had no reason to object to the punishment of the delinquents; but he commented unfavourably on the action of the British authorities in preventing a Persian agent from landing and holding communication with the Shaikhs, and this complaint was repeated in an exaggerated form by the Persian Minister in London.

Shaikh 'Isa-bin-Khalifah, shortly after his installation, received a letter from Haidar Khān, Zābit of the Dashti district upon the Persian coast, in which he was advised to place himself under the protection of the Shāh; but the incident was of no importance.

**Opinion of  
the Govern-  
ment of**

In two despatches to the Secretary of State, dated the 22nd of February and the 20th of May 1870, the Government of India repelled certain charges which had been brought by the Persian Government

against their officers; and, in view of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the question of Persia and Bahrain, they dwelt at length on the evils that were likely to arise from a renunciation by the British Government of their beneficent supervision of the peace of the Persian Gulf, as also on the inconveniences of any policy by which it might be attempted to associate the Persian Government with the British in that task. They pointed out that Persia, having no navy whatever, was incapable of assisting Great Britain to maintain the peace at sea and even more so of taking Great Britain's place, should that place be relinquished; had the case been otherwise, even, and had Persia possessed some power at sea, her intervention would merely have embroiled her with the Sultanate of 'Omān, with the Arab principalities, with the Wahhābi power and with Turkey, to all of which she was antagonistic; indeed the assertion by Persia of claims to Bahrain had already caused the revival of similar obsolete pretensions on the part of Turkey and other powers. By their treaty engagements with Arab Shaikhs the British Government were themselves pledged to maintain the peace and to obtain reparation for maritime aggressions; and, in the opinion of the Government of India, the British protectorate in the Gulf should be regarded as a matter of obligation rather than of right. In the later of their two despatches the Government of India observed: "If we are no longer prepared to continue the performance of the tasks we have undertaken, we must withdraw altogether; but the consequences of such a step would be so disastrous, not only to our national honour, but to the peace of the Gulf, to the prosperity of the tribes inhabiting the littoral, and to the lives and property of our subjects, who, during the peace of the last fifty years, have settled on the shores and embarked enormous capital in the pearl fisheries and the trade with the mainland, that we cannot contemplate this course as one of which Her Majesty's Government could for a moment entertain." This conclusion does not appear to have been contested by the British Government.

**Protest by the Porte against the action of the British Government  
in Bahrain.**

A protest was also entered by the Turkish Minister in London against the recent proceedings of the British authorities in Bahrain, which were represented as acts of British sovereignty over "a portion of Turkish

territory." In reply to this remonstrance, however, the Ottoman Minister was informed that the British Government could not recognise the Turkish claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain.

#### SHAIKH 'ISA-BIN-'ALI,

from 1869.

The reign of Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali, begun in the somewhat striking manner described above, was disturbed during a number of years by the ambitious projects of the Porte and the formation of an Ottoman province upon the adjoining mainland. Against the danger of annexation by the Turks, however, Bahrain was steadily protected by the British Government; and in 1895, with the frustration by a British naval force of an invasion of the islands which had been attempted by Arabs with the countenance of the Turks, fear of aggression finally passed away.

#### Affairs Arising out of the Turkish Annexation of Hasa, 1871-72.

The Turkish annexation of Hasa in 1871 was accompanied by unmistakable symptoms of a desire on the part of the Turks to lay claim to all the districts, including Bahrain, over which the Wahhābis had at any time exercised even transient sway. In 1870 Mid-hat Pasha, Wāli of Baghdād, the prime mover in the affair, formulated a definite claim to "Bahrain and its dependencies" as appertaining to the "Qaim-Maqāmlīq of Najd," and therefore to the Ottoman Empire; and in 1871 the British Resident at Baghdād received information to the effect that, if the contemplated expedition to Najd were successful, the Turks would next turn their attention to Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate. Timely British protests, however, made at Constantinople in April and May 1871, drew from the Porte a repudiation of their supposed designs on these countries; and the leaders of the Turkish expedition received instructions from their Government which debarred them from even approaching Bahrain. At the end of May 1871, Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident, was instructed to visit Bahrain with the "Magpie," "Bullfinch" and "Hugh Rose"; to inform the Shaikh

Turkish expedition to Hasa prevented from approaching Bahrain, 1871.

who had asked for advice and protection, of the assurances obtained from the Porte; and to promise that, so long as the Shaikh continued to observe the Convention of 1861, the reciprocal obligations of Britain towards him would be fulfilled.

At an early stage of the Turkish proceedings in Hasa, the Bahrain outlaw Nāsir-bin-Mubārak had attached himself to the Ottoman expedition and had been employed as a medium of communication with the Arabs of the adjoining districts. In August or September 1871 an Arab of the Bani Hājir tribe was employed by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to convey a letter from the Turkish commandant in Hasa to Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāmi Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar; and this individual, having imprudently embarked in a Kuwait vessel which touched at 'Aqāriyah on the coast of Bahrain and having, it was stated, been recognised there as one of the slayers of Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah in the invasion of 1869, was put to death by some subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Among other letters found on his body and delivered to the Shaikh of Bahrain, by whom it was opened, was one from the son of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah that ran: "The Turkish Government are mindful of Qatar, Bahrain and other places, in view of putting down their enemies, so that their friends may rejoice. Please God, you will soon receive news that may gladden you." The letter of the Turkish commandant was returned, unopened, to the master of the Kuwait vessel, by whom it was conveyed to its destination. Some fear was felt at first lest this incident should be utilised by the Turks as a pretext for aggression on Bahrain, and precautions were taken by the British Government and by the local British authorities to oblige the Turks to resort to diplomatic, and abstain from forcible methods. Among them was a reminder conveyed through the British Resident at Baghdād to Mid-hat Pasha, then on his way to inspect the new province of Hasa, of the assurances given by the Turkish Government that there should be no interference with Bahrain. A demand for reparation was eventually made on the Shaikh by a Turkish Commadore, who arrived off Bahrain on the 22nd of November 1871 with a corvette and gunboat; it was answered by 'Isa-bin-'Ali in a conciliatory letter to Mid-hat Pasha, written apparently under the advice of Colonel Pelly, who had come to Bahrain. In his communication the Shaikh expressed regret that he had not been informed of the establishment of direct Turkish rule in Hasa, that a man belonging to a tribe at feud with the people of Bahrain and connected with Nāsir-bin-Mubārak should have been selected as a messenger and allowed to land in Bahrain, that this

Murder of a Turkish messenger in Bahrain, 1871.



emissary should have been permitted to proceed on his journey without any credentials to prove his connection with the Turks, and, finally, that a person employed by the Turkish Government to carry a despatch should have been found at the same time in possession of a letter to a Shaikh of Qatar in which it was stated that the Porte desired to annex Bahrain. Colonel Pelly presently withdrew to Büshehr, leaving Major Grant, the First Assistant Resident, to watch events locally and meet any Turkish attempt at aggression. In a reply to the letter of the Shaikh, Mid-hat Pasha did his best to dispose of the objections raised, and concluded with a demand for "10,000 legal Dirhams of pure silver" to be paid to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, "Qāim-Maqām of Qatar," as blood-money on account of the murdered tribesman; he tried at the same time to convey the impression that he was empowered to take forcible action in case of a refusal. At the end of January 1872 the Shaikh of Bahrain, advised by Colonel Pelly, replied to this demand by a suggestion that the matter should be arranged between the British and Turkish Governments, by whose joint decision he would abide; but the Porte preferred that it should be settled direct between the parties by agents,—a course to which the British Government were willing to agree on condition that there should be no resort to compulsion or a show of force. No further steps, however, were taken by the Turks.

Demand by the Turks for the surrender of two boats, 1871.

In December 1871, before the case of the messenger had been finally dropped, the Turkish Qāim-Maqām of Qatif wrote to the Shaikh of Bahrain demanding, on behalf of a resident of Qatar, the surrender of two boats which had been presented by Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi Amīr, to certain inhabitants of Bahrain before the arrival of the Turks in Hasa. After some correspondence, in which the Qāim-Maqām adopted an arrogant and domineering tone, Shaikh 'Isa, under advice from Colonel Pelly, offered to hand the boats over in the presence of British officers to any person whom the Wālī of Baghdād might depute to receive them; this proposal was prompted by a doubt as to the justice of the means by which Sa'ūd had originally obtained possession of the boats.

Turkish aggression checked, 1871-72.

It may be added here that, before his return to 'Irāq, Mid-hat Pasha questioned a respectable pearl-dealer of Qatif as to the feasibility of arranging that a petition for the annexation of Bahrain to Turkey should be signed by 50 or 60 substantial merchants and others in the islands; and the general tendency of his proceedings made it clear what his intentions, or at least his wishes, in regard to the Shaikhdom were. The decided attitude of the British Government and the constant presence of British ships in Bahrain prevented, however, any actual

interference on his part with the principality; and this result was felt, throughout the whole Gulf, to be a salutary and well-timed check to Turkish pretensions and encroachments. At the beginning of 1872 an assurance was obtained from the Porte that they did not contemplate any change of policy and that they had no idea of extending Turkish sovereignty to the "independent tribes" of the Persian Gulf; but, during most of this year also, the British Assistant Political Resident continued to reside in Bahrain.

### General history of Bahrain from the Turkish annexation of Hasa to an attempted invasion from the mainland, 1871-95.

In August 1871 'Abdul 'Azīz, a son of the late Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd, visited Bahrain and was received by the Shaikh with much ceremony. In October 1871 a misunderstanding arose between Shaikh 'Isa and two of his brothers in consequence of a claim by the latter to one-half, instead of one-third, of the revenues of the principality; and, rather than compromise his position at a time when his difficulties with the Turks were at their height, the Shaikh appears to have conceded the demand.

Miscellaneous affairs in Bahrain, 1871.

No event worthy of notice occurred after this until 1874, when, in the course of the summer, fears began to be entertained of a descent by the tribes of Qatar upon Bahrain. The danger was a real one inasmuch as Manāmah and Muharraq were both open towns, while the Shaikh maintained no armed force, except a small guard, and was inclined to neglect all precautions and look to the British Government for protection. For the hostile movement Nāsir-bin-Mubarak, who lived in Hasa and was dependent on the bounty of the Turks, appears to have been partly responsible; and it should be observed that a request of his to the British Resident to intercede with the Shaikh of Bahrain in regard to some ancestral property had at the time been recently rejected. In August some 300 or 400 of the Bani Hājir, headed by blood-relations of Nāsir-bin-Mubarak, collected upon the Qatar Coast and made serious efforts to obtain boats for a piratical descent upon Bahrain; but their proceedings were regarded with disfavour by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and were frustrated for the time by the presence of the Bombay Marine vessels "May Frere" and "Hugh Rose." Eventually the would-be raiders procured a few boats from Dōhah and plundered a

Threatened invasion of Bahrain and the question of Zubārah in Qatar, 1874.



Bahrain trading vessel, but they were prevented by the British ships from approaching the islands. Meanwhile H. M. S. "Nimble" and H. M. S. "Magpie" arrived off Bahrain, and it was decided that one ship of the Royal Navy should be retained there until the danger was over. The Government of India also suggested to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte should be requested to control such of the restless tribesmen as were subject to its authority. Debarred from action at sea, the Bani Hājir turned against Zubārah on the Qatar coast, a village and fort of the Na'im, who were close allies of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the small summer garrison of Zubārah held out gallantly until relieved by their fellow tribesmen, who suddenly returned in strength from Bahrain and the pearl banks and inflicted a severe defeat upon the assailants. It was reported that Barrak-bin-'Aair, the tribal Mutasarrif who ruled Hasa under the Turks at this time, had encouraged the disturbances; but Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, was instructed to avoid addressing any local Turkish authority on the subject, and rather to concentrate his attention on the protection of British interests and the observance of British treaty obligations in Bahrain. Probably in consequence of representations made at Constantinople, the Turkish gunboat "Iskanderieh" soon after paid a visit to the coast of Qatar to enquire into the tribal movements. Not long afterwards, the redoubted Nāsir-bin-Mubārak left Hasa and appeared on the coast of Qatar, whence he wrote to Colonel Ross begging that he might not be prevented by the British Government from obtaining his just rights in Bahrain; but he was informed in reply that any attempt at aggression on his part would meet with active opposition from the British Government. At this stage of matters the Shaikh of Bahrain sought leave from the Resident to reinforce his Na'im allies at Zubārah, whom he considered to be in great danger, and the desired permission was granted on condition of his restricting himself to purely defensive arrangements. By the Government of India, who in 1873\* had adopted the view that the Shaikh of Bahrain had no possessions on the mainland of Qatar and that his rights there were of a very uncertain character, the action of the Resident was

\* In 1871 the Government of Bombay requested Colonel Pelly to report on the question of sovereignty over Qatar, but Colonel Pelly asked permission to defer doing so as there was a probability of the Turks withdrawing from Hasa. In 1873 Colonel Ross reported † that the whole coast of Qatar had fallen under Turkish influence, and he was instructed by the Government of India to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain from interference on the mainland on account of the doubtful character of his alleged rights and influence.

† Vide page 815 ante.

not entirely approved and they requested that the Shaikh should be withheld in future from entanglements on the mainland and advised to rely exclusively on the naval protection of Britain.

At the beginning of 1875 fighting continued around Zubārah between the Na'im of that place and the Bani Hājir; but the Shaikh of Bahrain under British advice held himself aloof, so far as he could, from the quarrel. A claim which he made to the sovereignty of all Qatar and a protest by him against the restraints imposed on him by the British Government are noticed in the history of Qatar. In August 1875, having been informed that a crew of Bani Hājir had put to sea to commit piracies, he allowed five armed vessels under his brother Ahmad to leave Bahrain and search for the pirates at a great distance beyond his own territorial waters; and by this act, which was regarded as virtually one of aggression, he again incurred the disapprobation of the Government of India. In the autumn of 1877 it was stated that the Shaikh still maintained very close relations with the Na'im of Zubārah, whom he subsidised, permitted to visit Bahrain, and enlisted, to the number of 100, in his hodyguard; that he allowed those in his service to return to Zubārah whenever that place was threatened; and that he had again thrown reinforcements and supplies into Zubārah itself. Not all of these allegations were substantiated, however, and Colonel Ross, in reporting these matters, pointed out that, if the Shaikh were to offend the Na'im by withdrawing his favour from them, they would probably combine with the Bani Hājir. The Government of India accordingly decided that the question need not be pursued further.

During 1875 and 1876 peace and prosperity prevailed in Bahrain, and only occasional visits were paid to the islands by British war vessels and by the Assistant Resident in the Residency steamer. One or two political murders, however, occurred.

The connection of Bahrain with Zubārah, of which place the headman and his son were on one occasion hospitably entertained by Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali only a few days after an atrocious piracy committed by their people on a passing boat, reacted unfavourably on the conduct of Bahrain subjects at sea; and more than one incident giving rise to complaint took place. On the 2nd of September 1878 two Bahrain vessels carrying 50 armed men, which had been sent on a cruise round the islands, crossed over to the Dhahrān coast and, after a fray with some Bedouins there, carried away a boat. Again, on the 4th of September, a fleet of three Bahrain craft, despatched by the Shaikh to patrol towards the Fasht-ad-Dibāl proceeded instead to Rās Rakan and fired on two vessels which

Subsequent relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with Zubārah, 1875-77.

Lawless proceedings at sea of Bahrain vessels, 1878.

refused to halt when ordered, wounding one of the crews. The sufferers in the latter case proved to be subjects of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali was accordingly obliged by the Resident to apologise to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and to afford compensation to the wounded man, besides punishing the chief offenders in both cases. The boats in question appear to have been employed in guarding the seas between Bahrain and the promontory of Qatar, where dangers that might at any moment extend to Bahrain had begun to gather round Zubārah.

Fall of Zubārah, 1878.

In November 1878, as more fully related in the history of Qatar, the Na'im settlement of Zubārah was completely destroyed by a hostile combination of Bedouins under the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain refugee; and fears, which subsequently proved to be unfounded, were entertained of an immediate attack upon Bahrain. During this crisis a vigilant watch over the safety of Bahrain was maintained by British vessels, and armed boats belonging to the Shaikh were stationed at various points under the orders of the British naval authorities; some of these boats, as shown in the last paragraph, occasionally exceeded their instructions. The Shaikh of Bahrain, who considered himself in honour bound to assist the Na'im of Zubārah, chafed angrily against the policy of inaction imposed on him by the British Government; and it cannot be questioned that the disappearance of Zubārah from the shore of Qatar exposed Bahrain to a greater risk of invasion, without warning, from the mainland. The homeless Na'im of Zubārah, to the number of about 300, soon afterwards took refuge in Bahrain.

Prevalence of piracy and general insecurity in Bahrain, 1878-79.

Meanwhile, as related in the history of Hasa, piracy, chiefly by Bani Hājir, became rampant in the seas adjoining Bahrain; and on land, simultaneously, an outbreak of robberies accompanied by murders took place. The most dangerous gang of criminals in Bahrain was one headed by a certain 'Ali-bin-Jābir, who was eventually arrested; but, while the hands of four of his associates were cut off as a punishment, 'Ali himself was suffered to escape—not, it was thought, without the connivance of the Shaikh himself—and joined the Bani Hājir. On the 11th of February, 1879, under the guidance of 'Ali-bin-Jābir, a gang of 30 Bani Hājir from Dhahrāu made a raid at 'Aqāriyah on the west side of the main island and killed a Bahrain subject.

Action by the British authorities on sea and land, 1878-79.

The steps taken by the British Government for the suppression of piracy are described in their proper place in the history of Hasa; here it may be mentioned that H. M. S. "Spartan" and H. M. S. "Vulture" were stationed for a time in Bahrain waters, and that four vessels taken by pirates from Bahrain owners were recovered by the second of these

ships. For the restoration of security on land Captain Durand, Assistant Political Resident, was ordered to reside temporarily in Bahrain with an escort of Indian infantry, and he remained there until April, by which time the situation had greatly improved; during his sojourn in the islands he found time to study his surroundings and to write an interesting descriptive report. From the 11th to the 18th of March 1879 Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was present in Bahrain, and interviews with the Shaikh took place at which a number of subjects were discussed. Shaikh 'Isa expressed a hope that the extradition of 'Ali-bin-Jābir might be obtained from the Turks, by whom that ruffian had now been arrested and sent to Hofuf; he desired that the island of Zakhūniyah, which had become a resort of pirates, should either be kept uninhabited or be handed over to himself for occupation, and that the British Government should exact full reparation for the losses that had been inflicted on his subjects by pirates from the Turkish coast; and he referred to an intention on his own part of chastising the Dawāsir of Bahrain, whom he suspected of treason and of collusion with the Bani Hājir. In regard to Zakhūniyah he was merely informed by the Resident that his wishes would be made known to the Turks, to whom the island belonged, and, with reference to the punishment of the Dawāsir, he was advised to act in such a manner as not to cause disturbances in Bahrain; but a demand for the surrender of 'Ali-bin-Jābir was made in accordance with his request on the Wālī of Basrah, and eventually, after some delay, was successful. On his arrival in Bahrain 'Ali-bin-Jābir was duly executed. In October 1879 matters had so far quieted down that Shaikh 'Isa was able to proceed on a pilgrimage to Makkah, from which he did not return until the following January.

In December 1879 the Shaikh of Dōhah was annoyed by a migration of the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe from that place to Fuwairat; and, as the Shaikh of Bahrain was accused of instigating it, it became necessary to remind Shaikh Ahmad-bin-'Ali, then temporarily governing the principality in his brother's absence, of the British prohibition of interference by the ruler of Bahrain in affairs on the mainland.

In the summer of 1880 a rumour became current that Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the outlaw, who was now the head of the Āl 'Abdullah branch of the ruling family of Bahrain, would attempt an invasion of the islands. Nāsir, it should be observed, had now married a daughter of Jāsim, Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, who would gladly have been free of the burden of supporting him and might have profited by his establishing

Preparations by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak for an attack on Bahrain, 1880.

himself in Bahrain; and the Turkish officials in Hasa also were believed to take a strong interest in the doings of Nāsir, to whom an allowance of \$ 60 a month was paid by the Turkish Government, and whose success might have afforded them an opportunity, better than any that had yet occurred, for advancing a claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. No actual movement took place until about the beginning of December 1880, when some 600 Bedouins of the Bani Hājir, Āl Morrah and Manāsir tribes under Nāsir-bin-Mubārak appeared at Ruwais and Abu Dhulūf and would have crossed over to Bahrain in boats belonging to those villages, had the inhabitants not refused their consent. Meanwhile preparations had been made to despatch a British vessel of war to the spot, and H.M.S. "Beacon" soon after visited the Qatar coast and H.M.S. "Woodlark" Bahrain.

Action by  
the British  
authorities,  
1881.

After these events letters were written by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak himself and by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah to the British Resident, begging that Nāsir might be allowed to return to his home and property in Bahrain; but Colonel Ross replied that the title of Nāsir to property in Bahrain was not admitted and that an allowance would be granted him by the Bahrain Government only on condition of his settling in some approved locality beyond the limits of Qatar. Colonel Ross was afterwards instructed by Government to warn the Shaikh of Dōhah that, if he made himself in any way accessory to an attack on Bahrain, he would be held directly responsible,—a liability of which Jāsim now showed considerable anxiety to be free; and the Resident at Baghdād was directed to intimate formally to the Turkish authorities that, unless they could undertake to prevent and punish an attack on Bahrain from that part of the coast over which they claimed jurisdiction, the Government of India would be compelled, in event of measures for the protection of Bahrain or the redress of injuries becoming necessary, to take the matter into their own hands.

General  
tranquillity  
and miscella-  
neous affairs,  
1881—88.

After these events the situation gradually quieted down. Some distrust between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Bahrain, which had arisen on account of the supposed intention of the latter to establish the Na'im of Zubārah at Fuwairat, was removed in December 1881 by an amicable meeting in Qatar\* between Shaikh Jāsim and Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the brother of Shaikh 'Isa; and Ahmad-bin-'Ali even married a daughter of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, but the match was not supposed to have any political significance. During the same year the

\* See the history of Qatar. Ahmad apparently succeeded in inducing Jāsim to treat him with the deference due from an inferior to a superior.

numerous sons of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah became discontented with their allowances and left Bahrain for Qatar; but, by the good offices of the British Resident, a reconciliation was effected and they were persuaded to return.

In 1882 Ahmad-bin-'Ali, brother of the Shaikh, made the pilgrimage 1882. to Makkah for the second time, and Bahrain was several times visited by the British Political Resident.

Internal quiet prevailed during 1883; but some offences at sea were 1883. committed, probably by inhabitants of Hasa, for Shaikh 'Isa, on a visit which he paid to Būshehr in H. M. S. "Woodlark," asked permission to take action against pirates on the mainland. The Resident in reply pointed out the reasons which made it impossible to grant his request. There was some discontent among the Sādah of Hadd, who at one time threatened to emigrate to Tārūt Island; but in the end they did not remove. Mubārak, a brother of the Shaikh of Kuwāit, visited Bahrain in this year and was honourably received.

In 1884 a general increase of wealth and prosperity in Bahrain, due 1884. to several years of unbroken peace, became very apparent; and, while the Na'im tribe remained well affected to the Bahrain Government, presents were exchanged between Shaikhs 'Isa and Jāsim. A request from Nāsir-bin-Mubārak for the restoration of his confiscated date groves in Bahrain was rejected by the Political Resident. A visit to Basrah was paid in September by Ahmad, the Shaikh's brother.

Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, Wahhābi, visited Bahrain in 1886 and after 1886. receiving presents returned to the mainland; and a little later a similar visit was paid by 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd of the same family. Presents for the Shaikh of Bahrain arrived from the Persian Governor of Lār, but they were returned to the sender. The Na'im of Qatar continued friendly, but their friendship was dearly purchased by the sacrifice of a large portion of the public revenues of Bahrain, for which it did not appear that any adequate *quid pro quo* was obtained from the tribe.

On the occasion of the jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1887, partly at the intercession of the Porte, the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, was released from British surveillance at Aden on condition of residing at Makkah or Madinah. It may be added here that in 1889 he applied for leave to return to Bahrain, which was not granted, or for an increase of his allowance, which was refused, partly because he was in receipt of pecuniary assistance from the Turkish Government. In 1890 he died at Makkah.

1888.

In 1888, probably in consequence of difficulties with the Bani Yās of Trucial 'Omār in which he was involved and to secure the safety of funds which he was accustomed to place in Bahrain, Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah sought the friendship of the Shaikh of Bahrain, to whom he deputed his son 'Abdullah, and vague terms of amity were arranged.

Death of  
Ahmad-bin-  
'Ali, 1888.

Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the brother of Shaikh 'Isa, died of small-pox in October 1888. The position of the Shaikh was considered to have been greatly weakened by this event, for he had been accustomed to depend in everything on the advice and loyal support of Ahmad, and he was himself at this time slow and undecided in matters of business, whereas Ahmad, though sensual and devoted to field sports, possessed some ability and strength of character and was considerably feared because of his harshness. 'Abdul Wahhāb, kinsman and Wazīr of the Shaikh, retired about the same time on account of old age and was replaced at first by his son 'Abdur Rahmān, a Turkish subject, whose home was at Dārīn on Tārūt Island. After the death of Ahmad many of the mainland tribes of Qatar and Hasa, instigated by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, began to frequent Bahrain and to play upon the fears of Shaikh 'Isa, from whom they obtained presents on condition of not assisting Nāsir; and numbers of these unwelcome visitors even obtained free passages to Bahrain from the Shaikh of Saihāt or from 'Abdul Wahhāb, the late Wazīr, at Dārīn, upon whom they would quarter themselves until arrangements were made by their host. The revenues of the deceased Ahmad, amounting to half those of the entire Bahrain principality, were resumed by Shaikh 'Isa, who instead granted allowances to Ahmad's numerous progeny,—an arrangement from which trouble afterwards sprang.

1889.

In 1889 a considerable immigration of Na'im and Sulutah from Qatar into the Bahrain islands took place.

1891.

After the battle of Buraidah in 1891, in which he was defeated by Ibn-Rashīd, 'Abdur Rahmān, the head of the Wahhabi interest in Najd, took refuge temporarily in Bahrain.

1892.

There was considerable fear in 1892 of an invasion of Bahrain by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak from Qatar, where they were said to be collecting forces; and the panic in Bahrain at one time reached such a height that the resident British Indian subjects embarked their valuables on board boats in Manāmah harbour. Letters of warning were addressed by the British authorities to the leaders of the movement; a promise was obtained from the Turkish Wālī of Basrah that he would direct his subordinates in Hasa to prevent

the intended raid; and in the end Nāsir-bin-Mubārak returned quietly from Qatar to Hasa. Nāsir at this time was endeavouring to procure a location for the Bani Hājir tribe in which they might settle down permanently; and a visit which he now paid to Kuwait appeared to have had some connection with the same object.

In 1894 Shaikh 'Isa was attacked by small-pox, but by June he had recovered from the disease. In October there were fresh rumours of a descent on Bahrain to be attempted by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak; and the Political Resident caused a warning to be conveyed to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, without whose co-operation it was believed that Nāsir would not be able to effect anything.

#### Relations of Turkey with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-1895.

The anxiety of the Turks to assert authority over Bahrain has incidentally been made clear in reviewing the general history of the Shaikhdom, but we have still to refer to indications of Turkish policy that have not yet been mentioned. As Bahrain is in fact the ocean port of Hasa and affords a convenient retreat for fugitives from the Turkish coast, its continued independence must have been galling to the Ottoman authorities. They cannot but have regarded their own precarious administration of the mainland with dissatisfaction; and they may have thought that possession of the thriving and easily governed principality of Bahrain would remove their principal difficulties. If Bahrain could have been secured by indirect means it would soon have been in possession of the Porte.

In July 1872 the Porte, through their Ambassador in London, complained of acts of British sovereignty lately exercised in Bahrain, and in particular of the landing of a party of 20 British soldiers in the islands; but inquiry showed the charges to be without foundation, unless they referred to the measuring of base lines on shore in connection with a marine survey; and the Turkish Government were informed accordingly. In 1873 the preposterous statement was made by Turkish authorities that a Bahrain boat had been sunk by British officials in Bahrain for having supplied water to the Turkish steamer

Complaints  
by the Porte  
of British  
action in  
Bahrain,  
1872-73.

"Assur"; the incident, on investigation, proved to be wholly imaginary.

Sojourn of the Wahhābī 'Abdur Rahmān in Bahrain before his invasion of Hasa, 1874.

The Turks having alleged, as a serious grievance, that the invasion of Hasa by the Wahhābī 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Sa'ūd, described in the history of Hasa, had been undertaken from Bahrain, the circumstances of his descent were strictly investigated by the British authorities. It was found that the conduct of 'Abdur Rahmān during his stay of about two months in Bahrain had been outwardly correct; that the Shaikh of Bahrain, beyond entertaining him as a visitor and presenting him at his departure with a sum of about Rs. 200, had given him no assistance whatever; and that no military force had been raised by him in Bahrain, though about 50 armed Najdis had followed him from Bahrain to the coast of Hasa in a boat which they themselves hired. The Wālī of Baghdad appears to have requested leave of the Porte to proceed to Bahrain and punish the Shaikh for his complicity in the enterprise of 'Abdur Rahmān, but it was not given; and meanwhile, as a precaution, a British naval force was sent to protect the islands.

Alleged British fortifications and projected Turkish lighthouse at Manāmah, 1875.

The Porte in 1875 complained to the British Ambassador at Constantinople of the erection of British fortifications at Manāmah in Bahrain, where, they seemed to suppose, asylum would be given to fugitives from Turkish authority in Najd; and again the ungrateful task of inquiring into supposed misdeeds by their officers devolved upon the British Government. In the end it was shown that the Shaikh of Bahrain had, in May or June 1875, repaired his fort at Manāmah, but that no British official or British subject had been in any way concerned with the work. Immediately afterwards it became known, through the British Legation at Tehrān, that the Turks themselves contemplated building a lighthouse at Manāmah; and the British Government in their turn entered a protest, with the result that the project was abandoned.

Claims of Qatar subjects pressed on the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Wālī of Basrah, 1875.

In the same year the claims of two Qatar pearl merchants were pressed upon the Shaikh of Bahrain by Nāsir Pāsha, the Muntafik Wālī of Basrah, in a manner which seemed to indicate that the object of the Wālī was not so much to obtain satisfaction for the Qataris, who might have had recourse to the ordinary Salifat-al-Ghaus, as to raise a political question. The Shaikh of Bahrain was accordingly advised by the Resident, under orders from the Government of India, to deal with the claims in a fair and courteous spirit; and at the same time remonstrances were addressed to the Porte through the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

In June 1879 there were rumours that the Turks intended to establish in Bahrain a coal dépôt which would gradually be converted into a political agency; but, if any such movement had been intended, it was frustrated by an Agreement concluded between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the British Government in the following year. In November 1880 a Turkish squadron paid a visit to Bahrain, and the commander was heard to assert that Bahrain was Turkish territory.

Proposed Turkish coal dépôt in Bahrain, and visit of Turkish vessels, 1879-80.

A petition against British interference in Bahrain was submitted in April 1879 by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak and his adherents to the Grand Vazīr of Turkey; in this document the writers described Bahrain as an Ottoman possession, protested against their own expulsion by the British, and requested that Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and one of his companions should be released, and that they themselves should be allowed to return to Bahrain and resume possession of their property. The matter was taken up by the Vazīr as something quite new, as a striking illustration of the high-handed proceedings of Great Britain, and as proof that an attempt had been made, in defiance of pledges, to assert British sovereignty over Bahrain; and Her Majesty's Government, after again disclaiming the exercise of sovereignty over Bahrain which they regarded, they said, as independent, promised to investigate the acts of violence of which the petitioners complained. The result of the enquiries which they made from the Government of India, however, was to show that the petition related merely to the punishment of the principal actors in the disturbances of 1869.

Cause of the rebels of 1869 taken up by the Turkish Government, 1879-80.

In 1879 and 1880 cases occurred in which the Turkish authorities in Hasa requested the Shaikh to extradite criminals and debtors who had absconded to Bahrain; and in one instance a certain 'Abdullah, who was accused of murder, was actually surrendered. The more difficult question of debtors absconding from Bahrain to Hasa was referred by the Political Resident to the Government of India, who ordered that the Shaikh should be discouraged from entering into direct correspondence with the Turks, and that a list of Bahrain claims should be obtained with a view to the disposition of the Turkish authorities being ascertained through the British Resident. In the opinion of the Government of India requests by the Turkish authorities for extradition could not affect the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain detrimentally, but were rather an admission of his independence.

Extradition of criminals and debtors between Hasa and Bahrain, 1879-80.

In August 1887, at the request of the British Political Resident, an embargo was laid by the Shaikh of Bahrain on pearls and specie to the value of \$20,000, the property of Shaikh Jāsīm of Dohah in Qatar, which happened at the time to be deposited in Bahrain; this step was taken for the purpose of compelling Jāsīm to pay compensation for an outrage against British subjects which is described in the history

Turkish protest against the seizure of property of the Shaikh of Dohah in Bahrain, 1887-88.

of Qatar, and the result, in so far as Bahrain was concerned, was a protest addressed by the Porte to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, leading to renewed consideration by the British Government of the political position of Bahrain. The instructions finally given to the British Ambassador at Constantinople were to the effect that Her Majesty's Government were unable to admit any claim by the Porte to jurisdiction over the Shaikh of Bahrain, whom, as had been intimated before, they regarded as an independent ruler, and with whom they were themselves in treaty relations.

Warning to the Porte against attempting to land troops in Bahrain, 1888.

A few months later, in connection with a design upon Bahrain which will be noticed further on under the head of Persian relations, the Grand Vazir of Turkey was requested by the British Embassy to issue strict orders to the Turkish officials in the Gulf to abstain from every kind of interference in Bahrain, and was informed that a British man-of-war which had been stationed there had orders to prevent any landing of Arabs, Persians, or Turks. On this occasion the Grand Vazir replied that there was no intention whatever of sending Turkish troops to the islands, and he even seemed indisposed to urge the claim of the Porte to sovereignty; but it was believed that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs would have regarded the matter in a different light, and in any case subsequent events showed that the Turkish claim had not been abandoned.

Insulting correspondence of the Turkish authorities with the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1888.

In 1888 much annoyance was caused by the style of address employed by the Turkish authorities in Hasa in their correspondence with the Shaikh of Bahrain, to whom they always wrote as to a subordinate official. The direction upon the envelope frequently ran "To the Shaikh of the Island of Awāl." The explanation of this absurdity was that a Wālī of Basrah, having discovered that the name "Bahrain" had in olden times been applied to a part of the mainland also, ordered that the former use of the term "Bahrain" should be revived, and that the island should be distinguished by its ancient appellation of "Awāl": he evidently thought that the case for Turkish sovereignty would in some way be helped by the change.

Demands of the Turkish authorities for the surrender of revenue defaulters, 1890-91.

In August 1890 a very insolent letter was addressed to the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif and one Saiyid Mustafa; in it they demanded the surrender of Shaikh 'Abdur Rahīm of Saihāt who had absconded, they said, to evade payment of revenue due to the Turkish Government. Shaikh 'Isa having informed the Qāim-Maqām's agent that Shaikh 'Abdur Rahīm was not in Bahrain, an attempt was made by the party from Qatif to seize two of 'Abdur Rahīm's dependents; but it was frustrated by the servants of the Shaikh of Bahrain. As Shaikh 'Isa,

notwithstanding the aggressive behaviour of the visitors, had succeeded in maintaining his dignity, Colonel Ross did not consider further action to be required in this case; but he promised the Shaikh that, if his authority should be invaded, he would come effectually to his assistance. In June 1891 the Mutasarrif of Hasa, in a polite letter to the Shaikh of Bahrain, requested the surrender of 28 persons, said to be revenue defaulters, and the matter was referred by Shaikh 'Isa to the British Political Resident; but it does not appear how the question was ultimately settled.

In December 1892, the Wālī of Basrah being then on tour in Hasa, information reached the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah that the Porte had instructed the Wālī to treat Bahrain as a Turkish dependency, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf informed the Senior Naval Officer that he should take action, if necessary, to prevent the landing of Turkish troops in Bahrain. This step was approved not only by the Government of India but also by Her Majesty's Government, who caused the Porte to be informed of their decision. That some design on the independence of Bahrain had actually been entertained seems probable, for in the first week of January 1893 it was proclaimed at Qatif, under the orders of the Qāim-Maqām, that Bahrain and 'Omān had reverted to Ottoman jurisdiction, and Turkish flags were forced upon the owners of one or two Bahrain boats at Qatif. On the 20th of August 1893 a formal notification by the Qāim-Maqām, in which it was stated that the British Government had no connection with Bahrain and that Bahrain was a part of the Turkish Empire and would in future be treated as such, was pasted up in the bazars and coffee-houses of Qatif. Representations to the Porte followed; and at length, in December 1893, the Turkish Government professed to have issued orders for the withdrawal of the obnoxious notification, as well as instructions to their officers not to enter into disputes with the representatives of the British Government in regard to Bahrain.

Turkish sovereignty over Bahrain proclaimed at Qatif and Turkish flags forced on Bahrain boat owners, 1893.

In March 1893 the despatch of a draft of 30 Turkish soldiers to Hasa *via* Bahrain was prevented by Lieutenant Beville, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, who warned the local representative of the British India Steam Navigation Company against accepting them as passengers. His action was upheld by the Government of India; and the Porte were subsequently informed, through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, that the transshipment of Ottoman troops in Bahrain waters could not be permitted.

Transshipment of Turkish troops in Bahrain waters prohibited by the British Government, 1893.

Political status of Bahrain subjects in the Turkish dominions, 1890-94.

A question deserving separate notice, which arose during this period, was the political status of natives or subjects of Bahrain when residing or travelling in the Ottoman Empire. The point was first discussed in 1890 on a report from Lieutenant Stratton, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, who stated that the Turkish authorities were endeavouring to exact military service from *soi-disant* natives of Bahrain settled at Basrah and at Abul Khasib on the Shatt-al-'Arab, on the ground that they were Turkish subjects and amenable to Turkish law. As it was not clear that the complainants in this case really belonged to Bahrain, and as no request for British intervention had been made by the Shaikh of Bahrain, the Government of India decided not to take action in the matter.

In 1892 the question came under consideration again, in consequence of certain taxes, recoverable from Ottoman subjects only, having been levied at Basrah upon natives of Bahrain; and a demand for a refund was preferred by the British Assistant Political Agent, who contended that Bahrain and its inhabitants were under British protection. On this occasion the Turkish Government addressed the British Embassy at Constantinople and denied the title of natives of Bahrain to British protection; but the reply, given under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, was to the effect that, as Bahrain was now under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England, no interference by the Ottoman authorities with natives of Bahrain could be admitted. A year later, in April 1893, the Turkish Government again protested against the assumption by the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah of a title to protect natives of Bahrain; and once more Her Majesty's Government maintained the right of their diplomatic and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire to extend their good offices to the class of persons in question.

Meanwhile, in January 1893, a deputation of Bahrain subjects resident at Basrah had waited upon the British representative there to request British protection, and had been informed in reply that protection would be given on the condition that those claiming it should produce a letter from Shaikh 'Isa-'bin-'Ali certifying their Bahrain nationality. Arrangements were accordingly made, in 1894, for the regular issue of certificates of nationality by the Shaikh of Bahrain to boatmen and others among his subjects proceeding on voyages to Basrah.

In 1895 a test case arose through the robbery of a Bahrain subject on board a sailing vessel on the Shatt-al-'Arab at a place about 10 miles below Basrah; the crew and passengers were obliged by river pirates to

give up all their valuables; and the sum lost by the individual principally in question was considerable. A claim for redress was immediately lodged on his behalf with the Wāli of Basrah by Captain Whyte, the British Assistant Political Agent; but the Wāli refused to entertain it on the ground that the right of the British representative to protect natives of Bahrain was not recognised by the Porte. The British Embassy at Constantinople, on being informed of the incident by Captain Whyte, urged upon the Turkish Government the necessity of admitting the intervention of the British representative in the pending case and other similar cases; but, though the controversy was continued in 1896, the Turkish Government could not be induced to abandon the position that they had taken up, and no redress was obtained in the case of piracy.

#### Relations of Persia with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-95.

The Government of Persia, notwithstanding the consolidation of British influence in Bahrain and the advantage gained by the Turks in the extension of Turkish sovereignty to the adjoining coasts of Hasa, still jealously maintained their own obsolete claims to Bahrain. In May 1871, while the Turkish occupation of Hasa was in progress, the Shāh sought, through the British Minister at Tehrān, information as to the probable effect of the movement on Bahrain; and he was informed of the assurances given by the Porte that no encroachment upon the Shaikhdom would be attempted.

In September 1886 the Shāh of Persia, seized by a sudden and somewhat unaccountable desire to re-assert his sovereignty over Bahrain, verbally desired Mr. Nicolson, the British Minister at Tehrān, to convey a message on this subject to the British Government; it was to the effect that His Majesty considered the communication made to him in April 1869 as tantamount to an admission of his rights in Bahrain, and that he was anxious to establish his authority over the islands either by sending a Governor to Bahrain or by recognising the Shaikh as his representative, but that he wished the maritime police to remain in the hands of the British naval authorities. An answer was prepared by Her Majesty's Government stating that they did not concur in His Majesty's interpretation of the communication of April 1869; that, on the contrary, they

Revival of the Persian claim to Bahrain, 1886.



considered Bahrain to be independent; and that they must continue to maintain their direct treaty relations with the Shaikh: as, however, the Shāh did not return to the subject, this reply was not delivered by Mr. Nicolson. The whole of this incident was attributed, at the time, to Russian suggestion.

Persian intrigues in regard to Bahrain and British action, 1887-88.

In 1887, in connection with the losses sustained by some Persian subjects in disturbances at Dōhah in Qatar, the Shāh of Persia enquired of the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān whether any assistance could be given by the British authorities in obtaining reparation, and a hope was apparently held out to His Majesty that, after the British claims for compensation at the same place had been satisfied, the good offices desired would be afforded. In the following year, however, partly in connection with the same affair and partly, it would seem, in connection with some general scheme for extending Persian influence in the Gulf, an independent and rather underhand line of action was adopted by the Persian Government, whose proceedings, on this occasion also, were thought to have been inspired by Russia. The principal agents employed were the Malik-ut-Tujjār, Governor of the Gulf Ports, and Hāji Ahmad Khān, a Persian General; and Bahrain, as well as Qatar and Trucial 'Omān, was included in the sphere of their operations. The active proceedings of these emissaries were practically confined to Qatar and Trucial 'Omān, in the histories of which regions they are described; but it afterwards became known, partly through the disclosures of the Malik-ut-Tujjār, whom the Persian Government presently removed from his post, and partly from copies of Persian official telegrams which were obtained at Tehrān, that the Amin-us-Sultān had sanctioned a scheme proposed by Hāji Ahmad Khān for the seizure of Bahrain by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, who had seemingly undertaken to put the Persians in possession of the Shaikhdom. In these intrigues there were symptoms of concerted action between Persian and Turkish officials; but it was not believed that there could be any serious co-operation between the two Governments, whose interests on the Arab coast must necessarily be antagonistic.

In February 1888, while the principality was thought to be in danger from these intrigues, the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, caused two British vessels of war to be stationed off Bahrain with instructions to prevent, by force if necessary, any hostile attempt to land by Turks, Arabs or Persians. The Government of India, who approved of his action, requested the British Minister at Tehrān to inform the Persian Government of it; but, as the Amin-us-Sultān on being questioned disavowed all

designs on Bahrain, Mr. Nicolson thought it better to avoid the reference to forcible action.

### British relations with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-95.

Some large and important features in the relations of the British Government with Bahrain during this period have come under notice in the preceding paragraphs; but others, of a more direct and in some cases confidential character, still remain to be mentioned.

Between 1871 and 1873 a survey of the reefs and anchorages of Bahrain was carried out by the Bombay Marine schooner "Constance."

Marine Survey, 1871-73.

In 1873 one 'Abdullah-bin-Rajab, a Bahrain subject but the representative of the British India Steam Navigation Company in Bahrain and therefore constructively under British protection, was suddenly arrested by order of the Shaikh and thrown into prison without any accusation against him being formulated. The British Assistant Resident in Bahrain, on hearing of these proceedings, requested the release of the man and enquired what the complaints against him were; and the Shaikh, though he protested in somewhat violent terms against Major Grant's interference, caused the prisoner to be set at liberty. The charges, it appeared, were one of assault upon some Bahrain subjects and another of cutting wood in plantations belonging to the Shaikh, of which the first was shown to be true, but the second could not be substantiated. On remonstrance being made by the Resident, Shaikh 'Isa eventually expressed regret for the hastiness of his proceedings and made a personal apology to Major Grant for the tone of his letter to him.

Ill-treatment of the agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company, 1873.

On the 23th of April 1877 Fahad-bin-Ahmad, a first cousin of the father of Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali, was killed in Bahrain by Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the Shaikh's brother; the explanation given was that Fahad had rendered himself obnoxious and dangerous to the Government, and had threatened Ahmad-bin-'Ali when the latter was sent to deprive him of his arms. On the ground that the British Government, in consequence of the position which they had assumed in Bahrain, were bound to prevent grave outrage or oppression by the ruler, or at any rate not to remain unconcerned spectators of such acts of violence but rather use their influence to repress them, Colonel Prideaux, the British Resident, was authorised to convey to Shaikh 'Isa and to his brother the emphatic disapproval by Government of the act which they had committed and a warning against such conduct in future. The instructions were duly executed.

British censure of a political murder by the Shaikh, 1877.



First Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh with the British Government, 22nd December 1880.

We have mentioned above the Turkish scheme of 1879 for establishing a coal dépôt in Bahrain and the subsequent visit of Turkish ships to Bahrain in November 1880; and here we may add that there were about the same time indications of an awakening interest in the Persian Gulf on the part of several foreign powers, and that French, American and even Japanese vessels had visited its waters. In these circumstances Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, believing that Bahrain as one of the principal commercial centres would soon become an object of foreign attention, and finding on a visit to the islands that the Shaikh was disposed to conclude a special arrangement with the British Government, took the opportunity to obtain his signature to an Agreement which he immediately submitted for the approval of the Government of India. This Agreement, which was executed on the 22nd of December 1880, bound the Shaikh to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties with other Governments except by the sanction of the British Government, and to refuse permission to any Government other than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling dépôts in Bahrain territory, unless with the consent of the British Government. It was stipulated, however, that the engagement should not apply to or affect customary friendly correspondence with the local authorities of neighbouring states on matters of minor importance; and that the validity of the Agreement should depend on its approval and acceptance by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council. In justification of his unauthorised action Colonel Ross explained that the existence of a formal Agreement, besides being desirable from the British point of view, would be convenient to the Shaikh, who could point to it in refusing to accede to the overtures that he might receive from foreign powers. The Government of India, while they informed the Resident that it was as a rule inexpedient for political officers to enter, however guardedly, into negotiations of such a kind without special instructions, recommended the Agreement to Her Majesty's Government for acceptance; and, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, it was ultimately ratified in 1881.

Final Exclusive Agreement by the Shaikh with the British Government, 13th March 1892.

In 1892, in circumstances which are explained in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Colonel Talbot, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, recommended that fresh Agreements, embodying a provision against cession of territory to foreign Governments, should be concluded with the Trucial Shaikhs; and, on his proposals being adopted by the Government of India, occasion was found for obtaining the signature by the Shaikh of Bahrain, on the 13th March 1892, of a similar document. In

this new instrument the Shaikh undertook on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government; not to consent, without the concurrence of the British Government, to the residence within his territory of the agent of any other Government; and on no account to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of his territory save to the British Government.\*

### Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Qatar and subsequent proceedings, 1895-96.

In 1895 the danger, long foreseen, of an invasion of Bahrain from the mainland by Arab tribes under Turkish influence assumed a material shape, and was met by forcible intervention on the part of Great Britain.

In March 1895 the Āl Bin-'Alī, a discontented tribe of Bahrain, emigrated to Qatar under the leadership of a Shaikh named Sultān-bin-Salāmāh and entered into relations with Shaikh Jāsim, with whose support they shortly formed a settlement at Zubārah. As the existence of the settlement constituted a grave danger to Bahrain, Shaikh Jāsim was at once informed that it could not be permitted to continue: but he paid no attention to the warning. Meanwhile the Turkish Mutasarrif of Hasa honoured Zubārah with a visit, the work of building continued to be pushed on, and it was reported that preparations were being made by the Mutasarrif and Jāsim for hoisting the Turkish flag. The attention of the Porte was consequently drawn to the matter through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and they were informed that, if the proceedings at Zubārah were allowed to continue, the Government of India would be obliged to take measures for the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrain. A sufficient interval having been allowed for these representations to take effect, H.M.S. "Sphinx" under Commander Pelly, a nephew of the former distinguished Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was sent to Zubārah with an order requiring the immediate return of Sultān-bin-Salāmāh and his tribe to Bahrain; but the demand was met by a refusal on the part of the Shaikh, supported by a Turkish Mudīr recently posted to Zubārah, who claimed the place as a Turkish possession and the Āl Bin-'Alī as Turkish subjects. The "Sphinx" accordingly returned to Bahrain, first seizing seven boats of

Formation of a hostile Āl Bin-'Alī settlement at Zubārah in Qatar, 1895.

\* The text of this Agreement will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this chapter.

the Āl Bin-'Alī; and on the 15th of July nine more of their boats were captured and removed by the same ship. The Āl Bin-'Alī then became desirous of a reconciliation with the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the Turkish Mudir threw obstacles in the way, even to the extent of detaining some boats sent from Bahrain to fetch an Āl Bin-'Alī family who wished to return; and he was reported to have announced that Bahrain was wholly, and Qatar partially, included in the Ottoman dominions. The situation now became in various respects threatening: Shaikh Jāsim was found to have collected a large number of boats, as if a descent on Bahrain were in view; the Mutasarrif of Hasa had assembled a force at Qatiff, on the improbable plea that an expedition against Najd was designed; and the Turkish gunboat "Zuhāf" was cruising upon the coast of Qatar.

British preparations to defend Bahrain.

In these circumstances the Government of India proposed that any movement by the people of Qatar against Bahrain should be resisted by force, subject to a condition that if the hostile fleet came under Turkish colours explanations should first be demanded, and that, if the explanations were unsatisfactory, a warning should be given that the ships would be fired on if they advanced within three miles of the Bahrain coast. H.M.S. "Pigeon" was sent to join the "Sphinx" in Bahrain, and arrangements were at first made, but were subsequently cancelled, for despatching a battalion or wing of Indian infantry from Bombay. Eventually a third ship, the "Plassey," was added to the squadron of defence.

British representations to the Turkish Government.

Meanwhile, in consequence of the language and proceedings of the Turkish Mudir at Zubārah, two separate communications had been made to the Porte: on the 12th of August a protest against the action of their officials was addressed to the Turkish Government through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, an intimation being added that Her Majesty's Government did not recognise Ottoman jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar, that Ottoman claims to Bahrain, which was under British protection, were inadmissible, and that measures would be taken to protect the islands from aggression; and on the 22nd of August the Turkish Ambassador in London was reminded that Her Majesty's Government had several times before informed the Porte that they did not recognise Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar and had likewise notified to them that Bahrain was under British protection.

Destruction and capture of the hostile fleet, 6th September 1895.

Upon the spot, a crisis was rapidly approaching. On the 19th of August the Mutasarrif of Hasa wrote a bombastic letter to the Political Resident, accusing him of breaking the peace of the coast of "Najd" by seizing boats; warning him that the people of Qatar felt

impelled to attack Bahrain; stating that he himself had restrained the Qataris hitherto, but could do so no longer; asking for the return of the boats seized by Commander Pelly; and advising the removal of British subjects from Bahrain within 17 days, reckoned from the 19th of August. To this communication the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, proposed to reply that the responsibility for whatever might happen would rest on the Turkish officials, and forcible recovery of the Bahrain boats detained at Zubārah was suggested by the Government of India and authorised by Her Majesty's Government; but meanwhile, on the 5th of September, Commander Pelly received a report that the "Pigeon," which he had sent to watch the hostile fleet at Zubārah, had been boarded by the Turkish Mudir, who insisted on her immediate departure. The Mudir added threats of hostile action in case of non-compliance and intimated that Shaikh Jāsim would attack Bahrain and that the Turks would assist his operations. On the next day, the 6th of September, Commander Pelly himself proceeded to Zubārah, where, finding the Qatar boats armed and prepared for sea, he decided that Bahrain could only be saved from invasion by destruction of the enemy's vessels; the period mentioned by the Mutasarrif of Hasa, moreover, had now expired. Accordingly, after one hour's notice given in writing had elapsed, the "Sphinx" and "Pigeon" opened fire and quickly disabled 44 vessels. By the morning of the 7th of September the Turkish Mudir and his flag had disappeared, and Jāsim had hoisted a flag of truce and asked pardon, alleging that the boats had been collected not spontaneously but under the orders of the Mutasarrif of Hasa. The preliminary terms offered by Commander Pelly and accepted by Jāsim were that the Āl Bin-'Alī should evacuate Zubārah and return to Bahrain, that the Bahrain boats detained at Zubārah should be restored, and that the Shaikh's muster of Bedouins should be dispersed. The active operations concluded with the removal to Bahrain of about 120 vessels, distinct from those which had been disabled or destroyed.

With the exception of Sultān-bin-Salāmah and a few of his adherents, the Āl Bin-'Alī now returned to Bahrain; but the question of punishing Shaikh Jāsim and his allies still remained; and eventually the Shaikh was informed, in February 1896, that a fine of Rs. 30,000 must be paid, otherwise the vessels captured at Zubārah would be destroyed. Jāsim however refused to pay, on the ground that he had nothing to do with the matter; and accordingly, after three boats belonging to Bahrain had been released free of charge and 17 others belonging to the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe had been ransomed by permission of the Resident

Settlement with Shaikh Jāsim and the guilty tribes, September 1895 to April 1896.

for Rs. 6,386, the remainder, which the owners had neglected to redeem, were burnt as they lay off Bahrain in April 1896. The fines realised, as there was no compensation to be paid in the case, were credited to Indian Imperial revenues. The services of Commander Story, the Senior Naval Officer, and of the officers under his command were brought by the Government of India to the favourable notice of the naval authorities, and the conduct of the proceedings at Zubārah was deservedly commended. The most arduous part of the operations, however, was really the close watch maintained upon the place in very hot weather during the weeks preceding the active operations.

Friendly relations with Qatar were restored in 1896, when the reopening of trade with places there was formally notified in the Bahrain bazaars.

Turkish protest, 1893.

A protest was raised by the Porte against the action of the British ships at Zubārah, on the ground that it amounted to an attack upon a tribe in Turkish territory and under the protection of the Turkish flag, and therefore to an act incompatible with the friendly relations existing between Turkey and Britain. The British Government in reply merely referred to their own communications of the previous year, adding that the measures taken were necessary for the protection of Bahrain, and that Her Majesty's Government could not admit the coast on which Zubārah was situated to be part of the Ottoman Empire.

#### General history of Bahrain and British policy in the Shaikhdom from the attempted invasion of 1895 to the rupture of 1904.

After and probably to some extent in consequence of the failure of this attempt upon Bahrain, the affairs of the principality took a new departure and there was a change in the main subjects of interest and importance. The pretensions of Turkey ceased to be a cause of disquiet; trade increased and flourished in a remarkable degree; and the attention of the British Government, whose influence in Bahrain was now more powerful than before, was turned chiefly to schemes of internal improvement and reform, and to precautions against political competition on the part of European powers. Any distinction between British policy and the general course of events in Bahrain is henceforward impracticable; and we shall consequently, in what follows, deal with both together.

Shaikh 'Isa, for reasons which he did not at the time explain and has not since divulged, thought it necessary, towards the end of 1897, to make arrangements for the devolution of the Shaikhship after his own demise; and, by a will written in October 1897 and attested by the seals and signatures of a number of his principal subjects, he appointed his eldest surviving son Hamad to be his successor. In November 1897 a visit was paid by Hamad to Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident, at Būshehr; and in February 1898, on the occasion of a visit by Colonel Meade to Bahrain, Shaikh 'Isa approached him with a request that Hamad's position as heir-apparent might be recognised by the British Government. It may be mentioned that in 1890 Shaikh 'Isa had expressed a wish that an elder son of his, Salmān, should be officially recognised as his successor; but up to the death of Salmān, which occurred in November 1893 in the neighbourhood of Riyādh as he was returning from a pilgrimage to Makkah, no steps were taken by the Shaikh in the matter. The recognition of Hamad, as it might have the effect of averting a dynastic struggle on the death of Shaikh 'Isa, was recommended by the Government of India, and was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government at the end of 1898; but the announcement of the decision was postponed by the Resident, to whom discretion in the matter had been given, chiefly because efforts were being made at the time to induce the Shaikh to reform his customs arrangements and he had shown no disposition to conform to advice. Eventually, notwithstanding the continued obstinacy of the Shaikh in the matter of the customs, the communication was made to him on the 12th of February 1901. It was reported to have been received by Shaikh 'Isa with tears of emotion and to have given satisfaction to the ruling family and to the people of Bahrain.

In 1899 differences between Shaikh 'Isa and his nephew 'Ali-bin-Ahmad came to light, and supplied a probable explanation of the anxiety shown by the Shaikh in the previous year in regard to the succession of his son Hamad. The relationship of the parties was somewhat complicated, inasmuch as 'Ali's mother, after being divorced by Ahmad, had married Shaikh 'Isa and borne Hamad: thus 'Ali and Hamad were half-brothers, as well as cousins and rivals. Ahmad, the father of 'Ali and the younger brother of Shaikh 'Isa, had in his lifetime, as we have seen, enjoyed half the revenues of Bahrain; he had, by arrangement with 'Isa, assisted in the administration; and his house was an imposing edifice in Manāmah town, known as the Bait-ash-Shuyūkh, which through his occupation of it had become associated in the general mind

Regulation of the succession to the Shaikhship and domestic affairs of the ruling family, 1897-1904.

with the governorship of the port of Manāmah. 'Ali-bin-Ahmad, who at his father's death in 1888 was placed by Shaikh 'Isa on an allowance, continued to occupy the Bait-ash-Shuyūkh and to fly the flag of Bahrain on a staff over it; and, as he grew up, he seemed inclined to assert a position of semi-independence,—a line of conduct which was favoured by the apathy of Sbaikh 'Isa in regard to details of administration at Manāmah. In February 1898 'Ali-bin-Ahmad complained to Colonel Meade that his uncle was keeping him out of the estates and income which he ought to have inherited; and in November of the same year he made an urgent appeal to the Resident for assistance. Shaikh 'Isa, on enquiry being made from him, brought charges against 'Ali of interfering in the administration of Bahrain and of forming a party hostile to the Shaikh's government. At length, at the instance of Colonel Meade, 'Ali having first made proper submission to Shaikh 'Isa, a family council was convened; and a monthly allowance of Rs. 600, in addition to a lump sum annually of Rs. 800, was assigned to the youth, who was at the same time confirmed in possession of landed property of considerable value; but the agreement was not reduced to writing. 'Ali remained discontented, and in June 1901 he made a journey to Masqat, where he complained to the Sultān of his treatment by his uncle and the British authorities, and would have interviewed M. Ottavi, the French Consul, had the latter not been absent at Sūr. It was then proposed by the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain and recommended by Major Cox, the Political Resident, that the resolution of the British Government to support the authority of Shaikh 'Isa, conditionally upon his observing his obligations towards them, should be announced at a public Darbār in Bahrain; but the Government of India, who had a change in the representation of British interests in Bahrain in view, decided to postpone their decision until that change should have been carried out.

In 1902 Rashid, the third son of Sbaikh 'Isa, died of consumption. In 1904 the Shaikh's second surviving son performed the Hajj and visited Cairo, where he was treated as a guest by the British Consul-General.

A regular customs administration was first instituted in Bahrain about 1860 and remained under the direct control of the ruler until 1888, when a pernicious innovation was introduced, the collection of duty being thereafter farmed out to local contractors, generally a syndicate of Hindu merchants. About the time of the change of method the trade of Bahrain began, under the security afforded by British protection, to expand with great rapidity; and in 1899 it was calculated that the increase in less than a decade had been more than 40 per cent. But

Efforts by the British authorities to secure an improvement in the administration of the Bahrain customs, 1899-1903.

the finances of the Shaikh of Bahrain failed to benefit in a corresponding degree; the enhanced profits went chiefly to the customs contractors; and the Shaikh resorted to irregular taxation to supplement his insufficient revenues. In 1899 the Government of India thought that a reform of the Bahrain customs was desirable in order to render them more productive, and they were prepared to lend the Shaikh an officer for the purpose of carrying out the necessary improvements; but their suggestions were obstinately resisted by the Shaikh. The ruler of Bahrain was attached to the contract system, chiefly because it enabled him to obtain ready money by selling the customs for years in advance, and because it was not incompatible with discrimination of persons in collecting the duties; but the true explanation of the pertinacity with which he rejected, and continued to reject, the suggested reforms was that he regarded acceptance of British advice, and the services of a British official as compromising to his dignity and independence. On the 7th of October 1899, in violation of a promise not to extend the current customs contract without reference to the British Resident, Shaikh 'Isa, being in need of money and anxious to postpone the question of reform, granted a fresh lease for two years from the 10th of March 1902, the date to which the customs were already farmed. At the same time he enhanced the general rate of duty from 4 to 5 per cent. without giving previous notice to the British authorities of his intention to do so; and to this step, though discourteous, no technical objection could be taken.

At the beginning of 1900 a European officer, as explained in a later paragraph, was posted to Bahrain; but the Shaikh could not be prevailed on to cancel the new customs contract which he had granted. He rejected the offer of a loan which would have enabled him to pay off his debts to the contractors, and he declined the good offices of the British Government when they were tendered for the purpose of persuading the contractors, who were British subjects, to forego their legal rights.

Towards the end of 1901, the appointment of a British Director of Bahrain Customs having been recommended by Sir N. O'Connor, Ambassador at Constantinople, as a measure which would appear to the Turks a material proof of British authority in Bahrain, a customs official and a sum of money sufficient to enable him to discharge his liabilities to the farmers was again pressed upon the Shaikh's acceptance; but the Shaikh, though his financial position was deteriorating, declined the offer; and, while he outwardly professed an intention of taking the customs once more under direct management, he

was really engaged in preparations for farming them out for a fresh period upon more favourable terms. At length, at the end of 1901, it became known that Shaikh 'Isa had extended the customs lease in favour of the actual holders to the end of February 1906.

1903. The question of the Bahrain customs was after this allowed to rest until Lord Curzon's visit to the Persian Gulf in November 1903, when it formed the chief subject of discussion between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Shaikh. Shaikh 'Isa was unable to show that the change proposed in the customs arrangements was in any way detrimental to his interests, or to answer Lord Curzon's arguments that it would extricate him from his pecuniary difficulties, increase the revenues of his state, and secure a sound position for his successor Hamad, whom the Government of India had agreed to recognise; he took refuge, instead, in assertions that the matter was one which only concerned himself; he asked that the question might be postponed until his death; and in the end, he said that he must consult his son and brother. His Excellency then gave the Shaikh a final warning that the matter could not and would not be dropped; and so the discussion terminated.

1904. An enquiry by the Resident, Colonel Kemball, which followed Lord Curzon's visit, revealed a state of matters worse even than had been suspected. It was shown that the Shaikh had already leased his customs on the basis of a 5 per cent. duty up to April 1906, and on the basis of a 4 per cent. duty up to January 1908. The amounts of the contracts were as follows:—

	Rs.
1903 . . . . .	1,16,200
1904 . . . . .	1,17,500
1905 . . . . .	1,23,200
1906 . . . . .	96,200
1907 . . . . .	96,200

or Rs. 5,49,300 in all; and against this amount the Shaikh had already drawn three sums aggregating Rs. 2,12,000 from the farmers. Moreover it was calculated that the customs should yield, under direct management, about Rs. 3,50,000 per annum, or three times as much as was actually being obtained by the Shaikh.

To coerce Shaikh 'Isa into acceptance of the much needed reform would have been easy, but it was thought better that he should spontaneously consent. The proceedings were therefore again dropped while steps were taken, with the object of acquiring greater influence

over the Shaikh, to improve the character of British political representation in Bahrain. The policy of the customs farmers, it may be remarked, was weak and conciliatory towards all traders; and there was no question of injury to foreign trade in Bahrain from their proceedings, but only of great financial loss to the Bahrain Government.

In 1899 it was felt that the time had come to replace the Native Agent representing the British Government in Bahrain by a European officer. In earlier days, before the reduction of the Būshehr Residency staff in 1879, an Assistant Resident had occasionally been sent to reside in Bahrain; and since then a great development of British interests, and especially of trade, had taken place. The Agent in 1899, a local merchant named Āgha Muhammad Rahim, was moreover uncongenial to the Shaikh, over whom he possessed no influence; he was not free from suspicion of having abused his position in order to forward his own commercial interests; and the protection of British Indian traders from petty exactions was not so complete, nor the settlement of their cases so rapid, as could be desired.

British  
political re-  
presentation  
in Bahrain.

Accordingly, in January 1900, the employment of a European officer in Bahrain was sanctioned as a temporary measure, and at the end of the year, with the approval of the Secretary of State, it was made permanent. Mr. J. C. Gaskin, an uncovenanted Political Assistant of the Būshehr Residency, was the first incumbent; he arrived at Manāmah and assumed charge of his office on the 10th of February 1900.

During the years 1901 and 1902 an official residence for the Assistant Political Agent was built on the shore to the east of Manāmah town at a total cost of Rs. 31,470; when completed it was the most commodious and imposing edifice on the main island.

In 1902 the question of investing the Political Assistant in Bahrain with powers under the Merchant Shipping Act, and with those of a Notary Public, was discussed. In the end it was decided, as the matter was not urgent and various technical difficulties existed, not to pursue the matter.

In 1904, after the failure of various attempts to induce the Shaikh of Bahrain to agree to a reform of his customs administration, a further enhancement of the status of the British representative in the islands was proposed by the Government of India and approved by His Majesty's Government; it consisted in the substitution of an officer on the graded list of the Indian Political Department for the subordinate officer whose appointment had been sanctioned in 1900. The change was carried into effect on the 18th of October 1904, Mr. Gaskin being on

that date relieved by Captain F. B. Prideaux, who was afterwards invested with the local rank of Political Agent and given a guard of about 30 regular Indian infantry.

Protection of  
British  
subjects.

During the period now in question wrongs committed upon British subjects and offences against the dignity of the British Government were few, and two only need be particularised.

1897. In 1897 Saiyid Khalaf, a bankrupt trader of Bahrain and not a British subject, escaped from the custody of Sharidah, one of the Shaikh's officials, and took refuge in the house of a certain Muhammad Khalil who was then acting as British Residency Agent; whereupon Sharidah entered the house and removed him, with the assistance of another man, notwithstanding the protests of the Acting Agent. Colonel Meade, the Political Resident, while admitting that Saiyid Khalaf had no claim to British protection, considered the violation of the British Agency to be a serious impropriety and requested that Sharidah and his companion might be fined Rs. 500 each and obliged to furnish written apologies for their behaviour. With this demand the Shaikh of Bahrain immediately complied, and the fines were credited to the Government of India in the Būshehr treasury.

1899. In 1899 an incident occurred which exhibited the weakness of Shaikh 'Isa as a ruler and even brought loyalty towards the British Government into doubt. A warehouse belonging to the Shaikh, in which had been deposited a quantity of arms, the property of the Anglo-Parsi firm of Frazer, Times & Co. but at the time under sequestration at the instance of the British Political authorities, was feloniously entered by night; and two Hindus, British subjects, who occupied a part of the buildings and who imprudently disturbed the operations by appearing on the scene along with other Hindus, were wounded with daggers by the trespassers. The ringleaders in this case proved to be Sharidah, the same high-handed official of the Shaikh who has already been mentioned, his son Fahad, and one Amir Salih-bin-Rāshid, an old and favourite servant of the Shaikh. The Shaikh showed great reluctance to deal properly with the case; and it was not until strong pressure had been brought to bear that the offenders were banished from Bahrain and a sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid up by way of indemnity. Of the amount thus recovered Rs. 400 were given to Farsi and Rs. 50 to Dhar Singh, the wounded Hindus, the remainder being retained by Government. Sharidah and his son returned to Bahrain after a few months without the consent of the Government of India and were again expelled; but, after their exile had

lasted about a year, the ban was removed on condition that the Shaikh should be responsible for their future good conduct.

In June 1900 Mr. Van Lennep, the manager of the Shirāz branch of the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia, visited Bahrain and recommended the establishment of an agency of the Bank there. Accordingly a small experimental office was opened at Manāmah, in charge of an Arab British subject; but the Shaikh was influenced by Indian traders in his entourage, to whom he owed money, to discountenance and oppose the undertaking, and after about two months it was abandoned. In 1903 it was found that transshipment dues in Bahrain were levied at the high rate of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent *ad valorem* on all kinds of goods, but no action was possible at the time as there was no agreement with the Shaikh on the subject and a farm of the customs had been granted by him on the basis of this rate; the inexpediency, in his own interests, of a heavy duty on transshipment was however explained to Shaikh 'Isa under orders from the Government of India. Great natural difficulties in connection with the landing of cargo at Manāmah were partially removed in 1904 by the construction by the Shaikh of a landing stage at a cost of about Rs. 30,000; and the wharfage dues for the use of this pier were arranged on a moderate scale in accordance with the views of the Government of India.

Matter  
relating to  
British  
trade.

A detailed survey of Manāmah harbour and its approaches was made by the R.I.M.S. "Investigator" in the winter of 1901-02; and in 1904 an asphalt deposit near Jabal-ad-Dukhān, which had been discovered in 1902 and yielded excellent specimens of bituminous rock, was examined by a scientific expert, but proved to be of small extent and commercially unworthy of attention.

A visit extending over the 26th and 27th of November 1903, was paid to Bahrain, by Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, in the course of his cruise in the Persian Gulf, which is fully described in another place.

Miscellaneous  
matters.

In 1901 the senior partner of the Indian firm of Ganga Ram, Tikam Das & Co. in Bahrain proposed that a charitable hospital should be established in Bahrain to commemorate Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and offered to open the subscription list with a donation of Rs. 5,000. About Rs. 15,000 more having been subscribed, and the amount of Rs. 20,000 thus obtained being considered sufficient to provide a hospital building and quarters for the staff, the Government of India undertook to maintain and equip the institution, which was eventually opened in 1905.

In 1903 Bahrain was visited by plague and in 1904 by cholera ; particulars of both epidemics are given in the Appendix dealing with Sanitary Organisation.

#### Internal history of the Shaikhdom during the same period, 1895-1904.

Feud between the Āl Bin-'Alī and 'Amāmarah.

In November 1895 a blood-feud arose between the Āl Bin-'Alī—the tribe whose secession to Zubārah in the preceding March had been the cause of trouble--and the 'Amāmarah of Bahrain ; it was occasioned by the act of some 'Amāmarah, who shot dead Sultān-bin-Salāmah, the head of that section of the Āl Bin-'Alī who had not consented to return to their homes, while he was alone in a boat off Rās Tanūrah on the Hasa coast. In December a petition was received by the British Resident from the family of the deceased Sultān, alleging that Shaikh 'Isa had instigated the murder and had deprived them of their property in Bahrain, and Colonel Wilson accordingly wrote to the Shaikh urging him to do justice according to Arab law ; but no steps were taken by Shaikh 'Isa, whose obvious reluctance to punish the 'Amāmarah tended to confirm the suspicions against him. In 1896 'Alī, a son of Sultān, collected a Bedouin following on the mainland and tried to incite some of the Āl Bin-'Alī who had returned to Bahrain to make reprisals on the 'Amāmarah ; in this he was not successful, but some Āl Bin-'Alī who sympathised with him again left Bahrain and joined him at Ghāriyah in Qatar, no attempt being made by the Shaikh to prevent their movements ; and a piracy was committed from Ghāriyah upon a Bahrain boat. Subsequently, in 1900, a fracas occurred at sea between some boats of the Āl Bin-'Alī and the 'Amāmarah, as is related in the history of Qatar.

#### Relations with Turkey during the same period, 1895-1904.

After the decided check to Turkish policy through the failure of the attempted invasion of Bahrain from Zubārah in 1895, very little interference in Bahrain affairs was exercised by the Ottoman authorities

on the mainland. In 1897, however, the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Bahrain ; but the project was abandoned on the objections of the British delegate, who represented that Bahrain was an independent principality under British protection. In 1898 the Porte, professing to have heard that a British Vice-Consul had been appointed in Bahrain, requested Her Majesty's Government to apply to them for his exequatur ; but it was decided to reply that the British Government could not admit the right of the Turkish Government to insist that British consular officers in Bahrain should be provided with an Ottoman exequatur. Towards the end of 1900 Salmān-bin-Dī'aij, a cousin of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was murdered, along with a number of Bahrain subjects, in Dhahrān, where he had gone for sport, by Bedouins of the Āl Morrah tribe ; this incident and the reclamations to which it gave rise are described in the history of Hasa.

#### Relations with Persia during the same period, 1895-1904.

In 1899 the question of the right of natives of Bahrain to British protection in Persia was raised by the French Minister at Tehrān in connection with a claim brought by a French protégé of Persian nationality against the widow of a Bahrain subject, who was herself the daughter of an emancipated slave. The case was referred to the British Legation in consequence of certain charges of misconduct made by a French consular official against the British Residency Agent at Lingeh ; and the British Minister, on a suggestion by the Resident in the Persian Gulf approved by the Government of India, apparently stated in reply that the Shaikh of Bahrain had been precluded by treaty since 1880 from holding direct relations with any foreign power other than the British, and that his subjects abroad were under British protection.

On the 31st of August 1901 a Belgian Director of the Imperial Persian Customs visited Bahrain in a Persian Government steamer and interviewed the Shaikh, to whom he represented that he had been sent by the Shāh to arrange for the posting of two Persian customs officials in Bahrain, and that the duty of these officials would be to examine the seals placed on the cargo hatches of vessels at the Persian port last visited and to seal the hatches again at the departure of the steamers from Bahrain. The Belgian called also on the British Political Assistant

Question of the political status of natives of Bahrain in Persia, 1899.

Visit of a Persian customs official to Bahrain, 1901.



in Bahrain, whom he informed that vessels not complying with the proposed formalities in Bahrain would be repelled afterwards from Persian ports. On a protest made by the British Minister at Tehrān, the Grand Vazir of Persia expressed his astonishment and regret at the incident and declared, as did also the Minister of Customs, that the proceedings of the Director were altogether unauthorised.

#### American interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

During the decade now in question a station belonging to the Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, which had come into existence in Bahrain as early as 1893, began to attract attention. In February 1899 Mr. Zwemer, author of "Arabia, the Cradle of Islam" and head of the mission, sought the aid of Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident, in purchasing a building site but the Government of India did not consider that British assistance could with propriety be given him, and Mr. Zwemer renounced for the time the idea of obtaining land by purchase. Subsequently complaints were made by the Shaikh and other inhabitants of Bahrain of attacks by Mr. Zwemer and his Scripture readers upon the Muhammadan religion, and the Government of India were anxious that steps should be taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about the recall of the missionaries, whom they considered to be exposed to some risk of personal violence. A communication was accordingly made by the Foreign Office to the United States' Embassy in London, resulting in an injunction addressed by the Board of American Missions to Mr. Zwemer in which he was urged to exercise the utmost caution compatible with the performance of his duties; and, after the proceedings of the missionaries had lost their novelty, no further complaints regarding them were received from Bahrain. In April 1901 Mr. Zwemer asked the British Resident whether there was any agreement between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain which would debar the latter from selling property, or allowing property to be sold, to the Arabian Mission in Bahrain for the establishment of a hospital, and Colonel Kemball replied that he was not aware of any such obstacle. The Government of India were inclined to consider that the Resident's reply was inconsistent with the Exclusive Agreement of 1892; but it was eventually ruled by His Majesty's Government that in the case in question, where no suspicion of a transfer of sovereignty or

administrative rights existed, it was unnecessary and undesirable to invoke publicly the terms of the Agreement of 1892. The first hospital and dispensary in Bahrain, with 21 beds, was opened by the Mission in 1902 under the name of the "Mason Memorial Hospital." From the 1st of November 1901 the services of the physician attached to the Arabian Mission were retained by the Government of India for the benefit of their political representative in Bahrain; and in 1903, notwithstanding the decision to establish the "Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital," it was resolved to continue this arrangement on account of the good work done by the Mission.

#### German interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

The appearance in Bahrain in 1901 of a German firm, doing business in mother-of-pearl shells, gave rise to various political questions; it was a branch of the Hamburg house of Traun, Stürken & Co. and was established by a Mr. Wönekhaus, after whom, as he was a partner in the Persian Gulf branch of the business, it was styled Robert Wönekhaus & Co. This Mr. Wönekhaus, who originally came to the Gulf in 1897 and who until 1901 resided chiefly at Lingeh, was believed to have relations with the German Government; and, on a visit to the coast of Trucial 'Omān, he succeeded in obtaining by an artifice copies of the Treaties of the Trucial Shaikhs with Great Britain. Except an agency of the British house of Gray, Paul & Co. of Būshehr, who since about 1890 had been represented at Manāmah by an English-speaking native, this was the first European firm to secure footing in Bahrain.

As the Shaikh of Bahrain had reason to suppose that the new firm, then about to be established, would endeavour to deal in cheap spirits, he published, in 1900, an edict prohibiting the introduction of alcoholic liquor into Bahrain under penalty of confiscation; and the interdiction, on the understanding that it should not be interpreted as preventing the importation of liquor by Europeans for their own consumption, was held by the Government of India to be unobjectionable.

The question of the purchase of house property by Mr. Wönekhaus soon arose; and in 1902 it was ruled by the Government of India that, as the question was one of private ownership merely, no opposition need be made to the acquisition of premises by Mr. Wönekhaus, but that it

Establishment of the firm  
Messrs. R. Wönekhaus & Co., 1901.

Importation of alcoholic liquors into Bahrain prohibited, 1900.

Questions of status and protection.

should he explained to him, and also to the Shaikh of Bahrain, that no claim to extra-territoriality and no direct dealings between the Shaikh and the consular or other representatives of a foreign power could result from the title obtained. It had already been decided by the Government of India in 1900, with reference to Mr. Wönekhaus, that, in the event of mercantile or other cases arising between the subject of a European power and a subject of Bahrain, the good offices of the British representative should, as a matter of courtesy, be extended to the European subject; and that the British representative should, in case of necessity, claim the right to protect such a subject as he would a British subject.

#### French interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

In 1904, in connection with a scheme on the part of French subjects to engage in the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf, the French Ambassador in London enquired whether there would be any objection to the inclusion of Bahrain in the jurisdiction of the French Vice-Consulate at Büshehr. The Government of India, on being consulted, recommended that the reply should be delayed until certain political questions connected with the pearl fisheries which, as related in the Appendix on the pearl fisheries, were then pending had been settled; and the question, probably in consequence of the departure of the French prospectors from Bahrain, was not, apparently, repeated by the French Government.

#### Rupture between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1904-05.

Misbehaviour  
of 'Ali-bin-  
Ahmad, May-  
September,  
1904.

The differences between Shaikh 'Isa and his nephew 'Ali-bin-Ahmad have already been mentioned. In the beginning of 1904 a fresh estrangement seems to have occurred between them, for in May of that year the Shaikh complained to Mr. Gaskin that 'Ali had collected a number of bad characters in his service and had entered on a course of extortion and violence towards the general public and of disrespect, if not of disloyalty, towards the Shaikh himself. Another family council to

arrange matters was suggested; but it was considered desirable to postpone the proceedings until an improvement, then contemplated, in the status of the British political representative in Bahrain had been effected. Meanwhile, as subsequent events showed, the authority of the Shaikh in Manāmah, which he seldom or never visited, had fallen so low that there was little or no check on the disorderly doings of 'Ali's retainers, many of whom were professional negro hoolies.

On the 29th of September an attempt was made by some of 'Ali's men, under the Sukhrah system, to impress a coolie in the employment of the German merchant Mr. Wönekhaus; the premises of the firm were entered; and an assault was committed on a European assistant, a Mr. Bahnson, as well as on native members of the establishment. 'Ali himself was present and did nothing to prevent what occurred.

Outrage on  
Messrs.  
Wönekhaus  
& Co., 29th  
September  
1904.

On the evening of the 14th of November a second act of lawlessness on a more serious scale was committed. An accidental quarrel having arisen between a negro retainer of 'Ali and a Persian servant of Hāji 'Abdun Nabi, the chief Persian merchant at Manāmah, the opportunity was seized by 'Ali's bodyguard to commence an attack on all the Persians at hand. A cry was raised of "Kill the Mughals"; and Jasim, one of the leading Sunni Mullas of Bahrain, having sent the worshippers at his mosque to join in the affair, it developed into a regular anti-Shi'ah riot and ended by the Persians taking refuge in their houses. Only sticks were used, but the father and brother of 'Abdun Nabi were dangerously wounded, and seven other Persians were injured, but less seriously. Captain Prideaux, the new Political Agent in Bahrain, who had been trying without success to arrange a compromise in the case of Mr. Bahnson now interviewed the Shaikh in regard to the riot; but the Shaikh, on the ground that the Persians were Muhammadaus, declined to admit his interference and expressed an intention of having the case tried by the local Shara' courts, from which, composed as they were of Sunnis, no justice for the Persians was to be expected. Eventually it was arranged between Captain Prideaux and the Shaikh that the orders of the Resident, who was then on tour in a remote part of the Gulf, should be awaited. For several days the Persians kept their shops closed and 'Ali's men continued to behave arrogantly in the streets, for the Shaikh was afraid of his nephew and totally unable to control him; but confidence was partially restored by the arrival of H.M.S. "Redbreast" at Bahrain on the 27th of November.

Attack upon  
Persians,  
14th Novem-  
ber 1904.

Meanwhile the German complainant had placed his case in the hands of the German Consul at Büshehr, who wrote direct to Shaikh 'Isa,

demanding redress, and in reply was referred by him to the British authorities. The Persian sufferers also had telegraphed to the Shāh and had been informed in answer that the British Government would take action on their behalf.

Visit of the  
Political  
Resident to  
Bahrain, 30th  
November to  
10th Decem-  
ber 1904.

Major Cox, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived at Manāmah on the 30th of November, and the case of the German merchant was taken up first. On the 14th of December it was settled by the payment of Rs. 1,000 as compensation, and by a sound flogging publicly inflicted on four of the ringleaders in the assault, who were sentenced in addition to banishment from Bahrain. The next four days were spent in discussing the case of the Persians, but without result. The Shaikh at first endeavoured to argue that the Persians were the aggressors; but, the evidence being conclusively against this view, he eventually fell back on his original position, that the Persians were amenable to his jurisdiction alone, and that their case must therefore be tried by the Bahrain courts. The status of the Persians as foreigners resident upon an island under British protection, together with the certainty of injustice being perpetrated should the case be made over to a Sunni tribunal, forbade any concession on this point; and a deadlock ensued. Major Cox quitted Bahrain on the 10th of December to report the situation to Government, leaving the "Redbreast" to maintain order at Manāmah. In virtue of an undertaking by the Shaikh that 'Ali and his followers, within a week of the Resident's departure, should leave Bahrain for a period of three weeks, the turbulent young man sailed for Qatar on the 17th of December: his last act in Bahrain was to seize, for his own use, three Bagblahs which were at the time actually employed in discharging the cargo of the British steamer "Kangra."

Ultimatum  
presented to  
the Shaikh of  
Bahrain,  
25th Febru-  
ary 1905.

On the 23rd of February 1905 Major Cox returned to Bahrain as hearer of the demands authorised by His Majesty's Government upon Shaikh 'Isa. He had been empowered to enforce compliance with the same by the naval force, if necessary; the British cruiser "Fox" and the gunboats "Sphinx" and "Redbreast" were now assembled in the harbour; and preparations had been made for landing a force of 150 seamen and marines to protect the lives and property of foreigners in case action by the ships should be required. On the morning of the 25th of February an ultimatum was presented to the Shaikh and 24 hours were granted for fulfilment of the terms. The demands of the British Government were that six of the ringleaders in the attack on the Persians, whose identity had been established, should be expelled from Bahrain, and along with them the four delinquents who had been banished in the former

case and had returned; that Rs. 2,000 should be paid as compensation to the Persians through the British Political Agent; that a special guard of the Shaikh's own men should be stationed for the protection of the Manāmah bazaar; that 'Ali should leave Bahrain and not be permitted to return for five years; and, finally, that the system of Sukhrah or forced labour, in so far as the employes of foreigners were concerned, should be prohibited by public notification. The Shaikh was warned, in the memorandum delivered to him, that further rejection of advice in important matters would not be tolerated by the British Government, and that their support might be withdrawn, and might even take another direction, if his attitude continued unfriendly. Lastly it was explained to him in the same document that the fulfilment of the terms concerning 'Ali and the other offenders involved \* their surrender at the British Agency, whence they would be removed in a British man-of-war for conveyance to places of detention abroad. In the course of the day Shaikh 'Isa intimated that 'Ali was likely to abscond and asked assistance for the purpose of capturing him at his house. The required aid was immediately given, but 'Ali was not found; he had already fled. Shaikh 'Isa vehemently denied having connived at 'Ali's escape; he promised to have the islands scoured in pursuit of him during the ensuing night; and he agreed in the meantime to send his own son Hamad on board the "Sphinx" as a hostage.

The next morning at 8-30 A.M., half-an-hour before the expiry of the period of grace, Shaikh 'Isa arrived at the British Agency accompanied by his sons Hamad and 'Abdullah. He brought with him the compensation money and the notification in regard to Sukhrah, and he announced that the bazaar guard were ready for inspection; but 'Ali and the ten men whose surrender was required were not produced, and it was stated that they could not be found. The Shaikh, however, who still continued to assert his own good faith, assisted in the attachment of his nephew's house and moveable property, including two boats which were burnt; and on the 28th of February, when Shaikh 'Isa finally intimated that 'Ali and the others whose surrender was required had absconded to the main land and were beyond his reach, Major Cox decided, on the Shaikh undertaking to offer large rewards for their arrest, that further proceedings were unnecessary. It had been suggested by the

Submission  
of the Shaikh  
to the British  
demand,  
26th Febru-  
ary 1905.

\* Major Cox considered that the appearance of the offenders in person was indispensable, in order that their descriptions and marks of identification might be recorded for future use; and further, that unless they were removed from Bahrain under British supervision, there would be no guarantee for the order of expulsion being carried out.

Government of India that the custom houses of Bahrain should, in certain circumstances, be taken charge of but the proposal had not commended itself to His Majesty's Government; and, such being the case, further pressure could only have been brought to bear by means of a bombardment, which, in view of the Shaikh's partial compliance with the ultimatum, it appeared to Major Cox would hardly be justifiable. Hamad was next released; and the Shaikh, in token of renewed amity, presented the British Agency with a plot of land which it had been intended to purchase from him. Before leaving Bahrain, which he did on the 4th of March in order to communicate the position to Government, the Resident interviewed and sternly warned the Mullas Jāsim and Ahmad, the two chief Sunni ecclesiastics in Bahrain; these men, who were brothers, had undoubtedly had a hand in the disturbances and were deserving of being classed with Sharidah, the offender of 1899, and with Muhammad-bin-'Ahdul Wahhah of Dārīn, Turkish subject, as among the Shaikh's more mischievous advisers.\*

Surrender of  
'Ali-bin-  
Ahmad, 18th  
July 1905.

The result of the proceedings was regarded by the Government of India as on the whole satisfactory; but, as 'Ali remained at large, some apprehension continued to prevail at Manāmah. It ceased however, on the 18th of July 1905, with the voluntary surrender of 'Ali, who, accustomed to a life of ease at Bahrain, quickly tired of a wandering existence among the Bedouins of Qatar. During his absence from Bahrain he had more than once enquired on what terms he would be allowed to come in, and he had been told in reply that the original orders concerning him still held good, and that, as regarded details, he must trust to the clemency of the British Government. 'Ali was accompanied by four of the other men, his servants, whose surrender had been demanded; and it was arranged that he should reside for five years as a political *détenu* at Bombay, on an allowance of Rs.600 a month, while the rest should be imprisoned for six months in the Central Jail at Haidarābād, Sind. A warning was conveyed to Hamad, the heir-apparent, whose attitude throughout the crisis had been as little satisfactory as his father's, that the ultimate recognition of his claims by the Government of India would depend upon his future conduct.

\* Mulla Jāsim in 1892 had caused some trouble in Bahrain by persuading the Shaikh to exact death duties at the rate of one-third of each estate, but the innovation caused great dissatisfaction and was soon abandoned. Muhammad-bin-'Ahdul Wahhah appears to be the individual of that name who in 1886-87 caused some disturbance in Qatar and who temporarily succeeded his father as Wazir of Bahrain in 1888.

### External affairs and foreign interests, etc., in Bahrain, 1905-07.

The position and influence of Great Britain in Bahrain were undoubtedly consolidated by the crisis of 1904-05; and the relations of the Shaikh with the British Political Agent, though the former still regarded offers of advice as attempts to undermine his authority in internal matters, improved slowly but steadily during the following year. Foreign trade continued to expand with extraordinary rapidity; in 1905-06 it was greater by 57½ per cent. than in the most favourable year previously recorded, and in 1906-07 there was a further increase of 5¾ per cent., and a total value of Rs. 4,73,18,202 was attained.

The course of affairs was not, however, equally satisfactory in all departments. No progress was made in the matter of customs reform, on which so much stress had been laid by the British Government; and the existence of a large contraband trade to Persia, partially accounting perhaps both for the increase of trade and for the unwillingness of the Shaikh to allow any interference with his customs arrangements, came to be suspected.

It was felt also that some features of the internal administration of Bahrain were not altogether creditable to the protecting British power. The slave trade still flourished, and slaves were freely imported from Qatar and Hasa, and occasionally from Sūr in the 'Omān Sultanate. Oppression of subjects too was rife, carried on not only by the Shaikh and by members of the Āl Khalifah family, but also by petty magisterial and revenue authorities, and especially by the Qādhis, who were addicted to gross abuse of their functions; the chief sufferers from the arbitrariness of the administration were the aboriginal cultivating population, who lived in a condition of virtual serfage and were liable to forced labour and to other hardships.

The question of a remedy for these evils and of a strieter definition of the subordinate relations of the Shaikh with the British Government was raised after the crisis of 1904-05 and was duly considered by His Majesty's government, who resolved, however, to pursue a cautious policy. It was decided that, for the time being, the activity of the British political authorities should be confined to the direction and control of the Shaikh's external relations, and that amelioration of the internal government should be sought by indirect and pacific means,

Position of  
Great Britain  
in Bahrain.

through increase of influence with the Shaikh and by gaining his confidence and trust. In 1905 the Political Agent was authorised to manumit slaves, in suitable and deserving cases, without reference to the Resident at Bushehr; and in that year and in 1906 efforts were made to obtain confirmation, through the Shaikh of Bahrain, of an informal undertaking given in 1895 by some of the chief men of Bahrain to the commander of H.M.S. "Pigeon" that they would not in future buy, sell, or give away slaves; but the endeavour was not successful.

British  
surveys, etc.

In the season 1904-05 a marine survey of Khor-al-Qal'ai'ah was carried out by H.M.S. "Redbreast," Commander Somerville; and in 1905 a plane-table land survey of the islands of the Bahrain archipelago was made on the scale of one inch to a mile. Excavation of some of the sepulchral mounds for which Bahrain is famous was commenced during the winter of 1906-07 by Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent, in the neighbourhood of 'Ali.

Turkish rela-  
tions.

The Turkish Government showed an undue interest in the crisis between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1904-05; and, though reminded that the Bahrain Islands and the inhabitants were under British protection, they continued to press for explanations until His Majesty's Government cut the matter short by declining to continue the discussion. With an interval, possibly from the autumn of 1905 to the spring of 1907, during which they were sent by land, the Turkish official mails between 'Iraq and Hasa continued to be exchanged *via* Bahrain, as they had been for a long time previously; and in 1907 it was ascertained that a Turkish employé was maintained in Bahrain for the purpose of making the arrangements. Shaikh 'Isa's relative and principal adviser, the Turkish subject Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārin, maintained a pernicious influence over him; and in 1906 rumours were current, which were apparently not altogether devoid of foundation, that the Shaikh desired to place himself under the protection of Turkey.

Persian rela-  
tions.

The Persian Government, though they gratefully concurred in the steps taken by the British Government in 1905 to obtain redress for their subjects who had suffered at Manāmah, re-asserted in the same year their ancient claim to sovereignty over Bahrain; and they obstinately refused to consider natives of Bahrain, while residing in Persia, in any other light than that of Persian subjects. In February 1906, after a prolonged argument and not without instructions from His Majesty's Government, the British Legation at Tehrān declared that they maintained the British right to exercise good offices on behalf of Bahrainis in

Persia and refused to entertain any further representations from the Persian Government on the subject of the Persian claim to Bahrain, which was now stated to be "entirely inadmissible"; but in September 1906 the question was once more revived by the Grand Vazir of Persia in a letter in which he referred to Captain Bruce's unauthorised Agreement of 1822. In reply to the Vazir's arguments it was pointed out that the Agreement in question, so far from having been ratified by the British Government, had been expressly repudiated; that Captain Bruce had been removed from his post; and that the Shāh of Persia, on his part, had withheld his approbation from the Agreement, and had censured the Prince of Shirāz for entering into such an engagement without proper authority.

In 1906 the German Hamburg-Amerika line inaugurated a service in the Persian Gulf, where their first steamer, the "Candia," called at Manāmah on the 26th of August. Mr. Wöckhaus, whose own business was not in a thriving condition, was appointed agent in Bahrain, and made an effort to obtain the privilege of flying the flag of the line over his house; but the Shaikh was inflexible in refusing to grant any such concession.

German,  
French and  
other inter-  
ests.

In the summer of 1905 Bahrain was visited by a French family interested in the pearl trade, who were joined there by M. Gognier, the notorious Anglophobe arms dealer of Masqat. A memorial against his own treatment by the British Government, which was sent by Shaikh 'Isa a little later to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy of India, was probably inspired by M. Goguyer.

In 1905 Bahrain was visited by plague for the second time in three years, as noted in the Appendix on Epidemics, the victim of greatest importance being this time the notorious Sharīdah. In 1906 the Shaikh was inclined to impose a special tax upon Jews, of whom about 50 had settled in the islands during the previous ten years; but he allowed himself to be dissuaded from doing so by the British Political Agent.

General  
affairs.

#### ANNEXURE No. 1.—EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAIKH OF BAHRAIN WITH THE BRITISH GOVERN- MENT, 13TH MARCH 1892.

I, Esau-hin-Ali, Chief of Bahrain, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do

hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, viz.:—

*1st.*—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

*2nd.*—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

*3rd.*—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

Dated Bahrain, 13th March 1892, corresponding with 14th Shaaban 1309.

ESAU-BIN-ALI,  
*Chief of Bahrain.*

A. C. TALBOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*  
*Resident, Persian Gulf.*

LANSDOWNE,  
*Viceroy and Governor-General of India.*

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,  
*Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.*

## CHAPTER VI.

### HISTORY OF HASA.\*

#### First Wahnābi occupation of Hasa, 1795-1818,

When the Wahnābis first appeared from the interior upon the shore of the Persian Gulf, the Shaikhs of the Bani Khālid tribe were the rulers of Hasa; and theirs was the first organised administration at the coast to go down before the onslaught of the ferocious sectaries. The rule of the Bani Khālid was mild and favourable to commerce. In 1790, import duties at Qatif amounted only to one per cent. *ad valorem*; foreign merchants were well treated; and there was a considerable trade with Najd. The residence of the Bani Khālid chiefs was in the Hasa Oasis.

By the year 1795 the Wahnābi Amir had broken the power of the Bani Khālid and had taken partial possession of Hasa, which he immediately converted into a base for the further extension of his influence towards Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and 'Omān. His proceedings in relation to those districts are described in their separate histories and here we are only concerned with events in the oases of Hasa and Qatif and in the deserts adjoining them.

In 1799 the first actual crossing of swords between the Ottoman Porte and the Wahnābi power occurred, the place being near Thāj in the Hasa region; this campaign, however, belongs rather to the history of Najd, in which it is related.

Conquest of Hasa by the Wahnābis, about 1795.

Consolidation of the Wahnābi position in Hasa, 1795-1810.

\* Almost the only authorities, apart from the records of the Government of India, which deal with events or with conditions prevailing in Hasa are Sadleir's *Diary of a Journey across Arabia* (in 1819), published in 1866, and Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865; and both of these are rather descriptive than historical. The most useful compilations based on official sources are the following: *Bombay Records*, XXIV, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs, 1873-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, supplies a number of interesting details regarding British naval action on the coast of Hasa.



In 1800 the Wāhhābis took the town of Qatif by storm, with great slaughter of the inhabitants. In 1801 opposition to Wāhhābi rule probably still persisted, or had been revived, in Hasa; for in that year it was reported that communication between Qatif and Najd was suspended, and that the Central Arabian trade from India, which ordinarily followed the Hasa line, was being carried on instead through Basrah and Kuwait; but by 1802 the position of the Wāhhābis in Hasa was sufficiently consolidated to admit of their helping the 'Utūb of Bahrain to cast off the yoke of the ruler of Masqat. In 1810 the Bahrain islands with the adjacent mainland districts of Qatif and Qatar were formed into a Wāhhābi governorship over which was placed a certain Abdullah-bin-Ufaisān, the seat of administration of the group being in Bahrain. In 1811 the progress of the Egyptians obliged the Wāhhābi Amir to withdraw military garrisons which he had established at Hofūf and Qatif; but in 1814 his influence, though it had ceased in Bahrain, was still paramount in Hasa.

#### Settlement of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Hasa.

Fort built  
by Rahmah  
at Dammām.

The famous pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, an 'Atbi of the Jalāhimah section who had already a settlement at Khor Hassān in Qatar, about this time built himself a fort at Dammām on the coast of Hasa, at the extreme southern end of the Qatif Oasis.

Expulsion of  
Rahmah by  
the Wāh-  
hābis, 1816.

Here he remained as a staunch supporter of the Wāhhābi interest until 1816, when, having deserted the Wāhhābi cause and joined with the Saiyid of 'Omān in an attack upon Bahrain, then more or less under Wāhhābi protection, he found himself obliged to cross the Gulf and seek an asylum in Persia. In July 1816, before his final departure from the Arabian side, Rahmah's fort at Dammām was blown up by the Wāhhābis.

#### First Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-19.

Arrival of  
the Egyp-  
tians in  
Hasa, 1818.

After capturing the Wāhhābi capital of Dara'iyah in September 1818, Ibrāhīm Pāsha, the commander of the Egyptian forces, removed the inhabitants of the town to Hasa and himself proceeded thither: his intention seems to have been to make that relatively fertile province

the headquarters of his Arabian administration. Of the movements of the Egyptians in Hasa very few details are known; but it appears that Ibrāhīm Pāsha was assisted by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, who came over for the purpose from Būshehr, in reducing by artillery fire the Wāhhābi port of Qatif. Rahmah profited by his good understanding with the Egyptians to settle again at Dammām, where he at once began to rebuild the fort destroyed by the Wāhhābis two years before. At the end of 1818 a large force of Arabs from the Pirate Coast arrived at Qatif in 17 war-vessels to assist the Wāhhābis against the Egyptians; but they were too late, and returned peacefully *via* Bahrain.

#### Events during the first Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-19.

At noon on the 18th of June 1819, in carrying out a mission to Ibrāhīm Pāsha of which the objects and incidents are described\* in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Captain G. Forster Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment arrived off the coast of Hasa; but an ignorant Būshehri pilot ran the Hon'ble Company's cruiser "Vestal," on which he was a passenger, upon a sandbank, and there she remained fast during the night. The Egyptian authorities on shore were slow to render assistance; but on the afternoon of the 19th of June a complimentary deputation from Rahmah-bin-Jābir appeared on board, and on the next day the "Vestal" was brought safely into Qatif harbour with the morning tide by two intelligent pilots whom Rahmah sent. Captain Sadleir had intended to make 'Oqair the point of his departure for the interior, but he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Rahmah and the Egyptian sub-governor of Qatif, and on Monday the 21st he landed at Saihāt, towards the southern end of the Qatif Oasis. This change of plan, for which he cannot be blamed, probably cost him some valuable days, and so may have contributed to the failure of his mission.

At the time of Captain Sadleir's arrival, the Egyptians, having found it necessary to concentrate their forces in Arabia, were about to evacuate Hasa. Khalil Āgha, the Egyptian sub-governor of Qatif, had already received orders to return with two subordinates to Hofūf, making over his charge to Mushrif, a nephew of Shaikh Muhammad, the head of the Bani Khālid; the roads between Qatif and Hofūf were unsafe; and attacks on Egyptian convoys between Hofūf and the

Journey of  
Captain  
Sadleir  
through Hasa  
and evacu-  
ation of the  
province by  
the Egyp-  
tians, 1819.

\* *Vide* page 661 *ante*.



military headquarters of Ibrāhīm Pāsha in Najd had begun to occur. As Khalil Āgha, whose authority had been maintained only by a force of 60 Arab hirelings and was now almost gone, appeared indisposed or unable to make any arrangements, Captain Sadleir decided to accept an offer of the Bani Khālīd chiefs to forward him on his journey, and accordingly left Sailāt on the 28th of June 1819 under the protection of Mushrif; but the conduct of the latter in the desert was "that of a barbarian who had got his prey in his power, and determined not to lose the opportunity lest another so favourable should not offer;" and the behaviour of the senior Shaikh, Muhammad, who was incompetent and very deaf, and of his brother Majid was hardly better. Captain Sadleir did not reach Hofūf until the 11th of July; he had been dragged in the interval on a preposterous round to the wells of Badrāni, 'Aziz-al-Mā, Mulaihab, Abwāb, Umm Rubai'ah, Hafairah, 'Ain Dār and Dumaiyagh, and to the village of 'Ayūn; and in the course of his wanderings he had suffered extreme discomfort and anxiety, and had been obliged to submit to very unreasonable extortions on the part of the Bedouins.

At Hofūf the British envoy was well received by Muhammad Āgha, the Egyptian Kāshif or Governor of Hasa, who had lately received orders to transfer the province to the Shaikhs of the Bani Khālīd and to rejoin Ibrāhīm Pasha in Sadair with the Egyptian garrison of Hasa. Of the latter only about 250 men now remained, and the Egyptian officers whom Captain Sadleir met, worn out with long service in a rude and inhospitable country, were delighted at being thus recalled to headquarters. Muhammad Āgha at first professed a strong interest in the object of Captain Sadleir's journey and offered to take him with him as a companion on his own withdrawal, for which the date fixed was the 22nd of July; but on the 21st, after sending some transport to Captain Sadleir, he slipped away privately without further notice. Captain Sadleir followed, later on the same day, with the main body of the Egyptian troops; and on the 24th, before leaving the Hasa district for Najd, he passed a second time by the wells of Umm Rubai'ah. While at Hofūf Captain Sadleir learned that the intruding Egyptians, during their occupation of the country, had enforced their authority by very arbitrary means, and that their departure was awaited by the inhabitants with the utmost impatience.

Ibrāhīm Pasha seems to have hoped that by retaining a garrison at 'Anaizah in Central Arabia, he would be able to keep up communication with Hasa and to extract a regular tribute from the Bani

Khālīd Shaikhs, whose authority over that province, overthrown by the Wāhhābis, was re-established at the removal of the Egyptian officials.

At the time of Captain Sadleir's visit no Christians or Hindus were to be found at Qatif, nor, in the unsettled state of affairs then prevailing, could any person be induced to act as a broker; for any man who gave signs of possessing money would have been immediately laid under contribution by the Egyptians. In 1823, however, at the time of the Political Resident's voyage along the Arabian coast, there was a native Agent of the Būshehr Residency at Qatif, whom Lieutenant McLeod proposed to transfer to Sharjah on the Pirate Coast.

Existence of a British Agent at Qatif, 1823.

### Proceedings of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, 1818-26.

After his re-establishment at Dammām in 1818 during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, Rahmah-bin-Jābir began to harass the 'Utūb of Bahrain with increased success; and so disturbing to the general peace was this maritime struggle that between 1822 and 1824, as related in the history of Bahrain, the British political authorities constantly tried to arrange matters between the parties. At length in February 1824, as described in the history of Bahrain, a peace was concluded, of which one condition was that Rahmah should not interfere to prevent the punishment by the Shaikhs of Bahrain of the refractory Āl Bū Samait tribe, who had recently settled under his protection at Dammām.

Peace arranged between Rahmah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain, 1824.

Rahmah then paid a visit to Masqat; and, on his return to Dammām, he proceeded to blockade Qatif, of which place the inhabitants had recently ceased to pay him tribute, or rather blackmail, for the protection of their commerce at sea. Rahmah was at this time approaching seventy years of age, and ill-fortune had made havoc of his material resources; but he was animated by a spirit as haughty and indomitable as ever. On the Shaikh of Būshehr proceeding, under the orders of the Shīrāz Government who were piqued at the reconciliation between Rahmah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain, to detain the family of one of his sons, Rahmah about June 1824 sought permission of the British authorities to declare war against the Shaikh; but the incident was eventually settled by the release of the prisoners at the instance of the Resident and their return to Dammām. Meanwhile, whether by the submission of the people of Qatif or by profitable captures made in

Other events, 1824.

the course of his operations against them, Rahmah's financial difficulties had been to a great extent relieved.

Rahmah's  
blockade of  
Qatif, 1825.

Early in 1825 Rahmah paid another visit to Masqat; and he also obtained from the British Political Resident an authorisation, of which he did not apparently avail himself, to take part, on the side of Shaikh Tahnūn, in a war then in progress between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Shārijah in Trucial 'Omān. Towards the end of 1825, trouble having again arisen over the blackmail payable by the people of Qatif, Rahmah, in total disregard of remonstrances by the British political authorities, began to harry the defenceless merchant vessels of that port. Two British cruisers were accordingly stationed off Dammām, and it was at first intimated to Rahmah that, unless he discontinued these depredations, active proceedings would be taken against him; but ultimately it was decided to refrain from coercion unless he should extend his depredations beyond the shipping of Qatif, and a further remonstrance was addressed to him. The obstinacy of Rahmah was attributed to his confidence in the reviving power of the Wahhābis, to whom, he believed, the renewal of piratical disturbances at sea would not be unwelcome.

New breach  
between  
Rahmah and  
the Shaikhs  
of Bahrain.

Meanwhile a fresh rupture had occurred between Rahmah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain; but the hostilities had not free course until after the removal, in consequence of the decision not to interfere between Rahmah and the people of Qatif, of the British cruisers from Dammām. Neither Rahmah nor the 'Atbi Shaikh being fully prepared for a regular war, both of them requested the British Resident to impose a truce, and their suggestions were apparently entertained; but, the Resident having insisted that the people of Qatif should be included in the truce—a condition to which Rahmah would not agree, matters were in the end allowed to take their course.

Last engage-  
ment and  
death of  
Rahmah,  
1826.

About the end of 1826, finding himself hard pressed by his enemies who had now invested Dammām, Rahmah crossed the Gulf to Būshehr and sought to interest the Resident in his case; but, failing in this, he recruited some 25 or 30 Balūchis for service and returned with them to Dammām, where a Bahrain fleet was then lying. On arrival at Dammām he fired a salute by way of insult,—an act which so incensed the 'Utūb that Ahmad-bin-Salmān, a nephew of their principal Shaikh, volunteered to attack him with his own Baghlah, and, the offer being accepted, immediately laid his vessel alongside that of Rahmah. A very determined struggle then ensued, in which the Bahrain warship once drew off to take more men on board from the rest of the

'Atbi fleet; and it continued till Rahmah, who was now totally blind, aware that his vessel must in the end be boarded and captured by superior numbers and that no quarter was to be expected, gave orders to grapple with the enemy. Taking his youngest son—a boy eight years of age—with him, he caused himself to be guided to the powder magazine, blew up the vessel with his own hand, and so perished along with all his companions. The explosion set fire to the attacking vessel, which also blew up, but not until after those on board had been rescued by their friends.\*

In his appearance, vividly depicted by Buckingham in 1816, Rahmah seems to have been nothing short of repulsive. His clothing was squalid in the extreme. His face, "naturally ferocious and ugly," was disfigured by scars and by the loss of an eye, his "figure presented a "meagre trunk, with four lank members, all of them cut and hacked, "and pierced with wounds of sabres, spears, and bullets, in every part, "to the number perhaps of more than twenty different wounds." The bone between the shoulder and the elbow of his right arm was completely wanting, in consequence of a wound, but he could still grasp a dagger in his right hand and make shift to use it with the help of his left. His spirit was truculent and revengeful; but he bore calamity with a fortitude not less remarkable than the callousness that he showed in inflicting suffering. Among his own followers, many of whom were slaves, he was said to maintain discipline by free recourse to the death penalty; and none ventured to disobey his orders. He showed his prudence in avoiding, throughout his life, direct collision with the British Government; and, from the friendliness of his personal relations with some of the British officers at the Būshehr Residency, it may be inferred that he possessed redeeming qualities. Nevertheless his death was felt as a relief throughout the Gulf.†

#### Reconquest of Hasa by the Wahhābis, 1824-31.

The Bani Khalid Shaikhs, replaced in authority over Hasa by the Egyptians, succeeded in maintaining their position for some years; but,

Indecisive  
hostilities  
between the

\* This is the generally received account of the affair; but if, as appears to be stated, there were no survivors of Rahmah's crew, it is difficult to understand how the circumstances of the explosion ever became known.

† The only description of Rahmah by one who had seen him will be found in Buckingham's *Travels in Assyria, etc.*, pages 356 to 358. That censorious and somewhat pharisaical writer evidently failed to appreciate the old sea-wolf.

Wahhābis  
and the Bani  
Khālid,  
1824-30.

as the Wahhābi Amīr, who now professed allegiance and paid tribute to the Egyptians, was soon at war with the Bani Khālid, it is improbable that money from Hasa can for long have continued to reach the Egyptian exchequer. The Bani Khālid made Hofūf their capital, and held possession besides of the seaport of Qatif. Hostilities between the Wahhābis and the Bani Khālid began about 1824, but until 1830 the results were inconclusive.

Final defeat  
of the Bani  
Khālid, by  
the Wah-  
hābis, 1830.

At the beginning of 1830 the Bani Khālid Shaikhs took the initiative by marching with a large body of their tribe upon Najd, and Faisal-bin-Turki, the son of the Wahhābi Amīr, moved out from Riyādh to meet them. At this juncture the Bani Khālid had the misfortune to lose their best military leader in the person of Shaikh Majīd, who was taken ill and died; and the command of the forces devolved, with the consent of Majīd's brother, the aged Shaikh Muhammad, who was conscious of his own incapacity, upon Barghash, a nephew of Muhammad. The new leader, after some delay, advanced against the Wahhābis who fell back before him; but hardly had he done so when Turki-bin-'Abdullah, the Wahhābi Amīr, who had left Riyādh in person on the night of the 23rd March 1830 at the head of 1,200 men, succeeded in passing round one of his flanks and seized Wabrah,\* the base of his operations and the source of his water supply, which he had left unguarded in the rear. The Bani Khālid thus found themselves cut off from water and placed between two bodies of the enemy, who, after allowing a day to pass, attacked them next morning upon both sides, completely routing them and capturing the whole of their women, children, tents, horses, camels and cattle. The Shaikhs Muhammad and Barghash escaped in safety to Hofūf, where for a short time they prolonged their resistance; but, on the majority of the Beni Khālid making submission and the march of the Wahhābis being continued to Hofūf, the capital of Hasa fell, and Qatif, too, shortly surrendered.

Enlightened  
policy of the  
Wahhābi  
Amīr in  
Hasa, 1831.

The power of the conqueror, whose policy—unlike that of his ancestors and predecessors—was distinguished by tolerance and conciliation, was rapidly established in Hasa, where he placed some garrisons and contented himself with levying the usual Zakāt; and in 1831 Turki returned to the interior. The change of masters was beneficial to the country, inasmuch as the anarchy and civil war which had prevailed under

\* The name is given as "Dabrah" in the records, but no such place is known. Wabrah, a well-known watering station and the crossing place of many routes in Summān, must be meant. The Arabic characters for "W" and "D" may sometimes, be mistaken for one another.

the Bani Khālid Shaikhs were quickly brought to an end. A few demonstrations against the Wahhābis were attempted by Muhammad, the surviving Bani Khālid Shaikh; but they were feeble and ineffective.

### Events during the second occupation of Hasa by the Wahhābis 1830-38.

From Hasa, as a base, the Wahhābi ruler at once sought to extend his influence over the Bahrain Islands; but his success in this direction was by no means so complete or so permanent as in Hasa; and the friction with the 'Utūb of Bahrain which his ambition excited was prejudicial to the tranquillity and economic well-being of the mainland.

When, in 1830, the Amīr called upon the Shaikhs of Bahrain to acknowledge their allegiance to himself, it was his intention to establish Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, a son of the deceased pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, at Dammām, as a check upon the 'Utūb; and the project was supported by Saiyid Sa'id of 'Omān, who had harboured Bashīr since the death of his father in 1826, and who looked for his assistance in case of a fresh expedition from Masqat against Bahrain. In their settlement with the 'Utūb of Bahrain however, in 1831, the proposal relating to Dammām was dropped by the Wahhābis; but almost immediately after, at the intercession it would appear of Saiyid Sa'id, they gave Bashīr permission to settle on Tārūt Island, opposite to the town of Qatif, and to build himself a fort there at Dārīn. Bashīr was shortly joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait tribe, who had, like his own family, an irreconcilable feud with the Shaikhs of Bahrain; but, having incurred the enmity of the people of Qatif, he found himself unable, even with the help of the Āl Bū Samait, to maintain his position at Dārīn; and in 1832, after destroying the fort that he had just built, he removed again to Masqat with his immediate followers.

In 1831, encouraged by difficulties which had arisen in Najd between Turki-bin-'Abdullah and one of his own relations who claimed the Amirate of the Wahhābis, some Bani Khālid of the 'Amāir section made a simultaneous attack on Hofūf and Qatif, but without success.

A feud had meanwhile sprung up between the 'Amāir of Jinnah, supported by some of the Sūdān tribe, and the inhabitants of Qatif. The original cause was the refusal of the Qatif people to continue payment of certain blackmail claimed by the 'Amāir; but feeling had been

Establish-  
ment of  
Bashīr-bin-  
Rahmah on  
Tārūt Island,  
1831-32.

Difficulties of  
the Wahhā-  
bis in Hasa,  
1831-35.

greatly inflamed by losses, including a chief, suffered by the 'Amāir in attempts to enforce their demands; and the mediation of the Wahhābi Amir failed to appease the strife. It resulted from this feud that in 1832 the 'Amāir boarded a Bahrain vessel near Qatif and put to death 12 out of 30 natives of that town whom they found on board, and that in 1833, with the connivance of the 'Utūb of Bahrain, they established themselves at Dammām, blockaded Qatif, and began to prey upon its commerce.

Emboldened by these disorders the Shaikhs of Bahrain in 1833 renounced their allegiance to the Wahhābi Amir, and the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif, apparently considering the situation of his master to be desperate, sought their protection; but, by the energy of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, the dangers which threatened his authority in Hasa were temporarily surmounted, and Zakāt was collected, possibly for the first time, from the inhabitants of the Hasa coast.

Seizure of  
Tārūt Island  
by the 'Utūb,  
1834.

In 1834 the Bahrain Shaikh blockaded the Wahhābi ports of Qatif and 'Oqair, and, on the assassination of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, annexed the island of Tārūt to Bahrain, besides instigating the Bani Khālid to attack the Wahhābis in Hofūf, and Qatif; but the movement on Hofūf was frustrated by 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, the Wahhābi Governor, with great loss to his assailants, and the insurgent Bani Khālid were driven to seek refuge under the guns of the Bahrain garrison on Tārūt.

Authority  
over Hasa  
asserted by  
the Egyptians,  
1835.

About the middle of 1835 there arrived at Masqat from Makkah, a respectable merchant formerly of Bahrain, named 'Abdullah-bin-Mashāri, who brought with him letters from Ahmad Pasha, the Egyptian Governor of Hijāz, addressed to the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābi Amir; the purport of the credentials was that the bearer had been granted a farm of the revenues of Qatif for \$20,000 to \$24,000 per annum by the Egyptian Government, and that he should be allowed to assume and exercise his authority as lessee without opposition. It is probable that the object of the Egyptians in making this appointment was to prepare the way for a reconquest of Najd from the west by creating embarrassments on the Wahhābi Amir's eastern border. 'Abdullah-bin-Mashāri was courteously received by Saiyid Sa'id, who provided him with a Batil to carry him from Masqat to Qatif; but Faisal-bin-Turki, who had in the meantime removed his father's murderer, the usurper of the Wahhābi Amirate, sent a body of troops to defend his rights at Qatif, and the would-be tax-gatherer disappeared from that place very soon after his arrival. The sons of Bin-Mashāri were subsequently found to have procured letters of recommendation from the Government of Bombay.

The Wahhābi force sent to expel Bin-Mashāri from Qatif afterwards attempted to recapture Tārūt from the Shaikh of Bahrain, but their efforts were unavailing; and the 'Utūb at once retaliated by resuming the blockade of Qatif and 'Oqair, which they had withdrawn.

At the middle of 1836, Bahrain being now threatened by the Persians and Najd by the Egyptians, the 'Utūb and the Wahhābis found mutual advantage in a settlement of their differences. The first overtures proceeded from the Shaikh of Bahrain, but they were readily accepted by the Amir; the 'Utūb placed themselves under the protection of the Wahhābis, and the 'Athi blockade of the Hasa coast was discontinued. In 1837, the power of the Wahhābi Amir in Hasa being paralysed by a struggle which had begun in Najd between himself and an Egyptian nominee named Khālid, the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid, along with some Bani Hājir who had settled at Dammām under the protection of the 'Utūb of Bahrain, began to commit piracies on Qatif and Bahrain boats; but the Shaikh of Bahrain, having obtained the permission of the British Resident at Būshehr, immediately took measures against them and put an end to their depredations.

#### The second Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-40.

At the close of 1838 the active operations of the Egyptian army in Najd came to an end on the surrender of the Wahhābi Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, at Dilam in Kharj, whence he was sent a prisoner to Egypt. Before this event a conspiracy among the 'Amāir Bani Khālid at Hofūf in favour of the Egyptians had been detected and severely punished by the Wahhābi commander in Hasa, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, who put three of their principal men to death. On the fall of Dilam the Hasa and Qatif Oases immediately submitted to the Egyptians, while the representative of the Wahhābi Government sought an asylum in Bahrain; and the Egyptians, throwing off their disguise as supporters of the pretender Khālid, announced that their conquests were made in the name of Muhammad 'Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. It is not clear whether Khurshid Pasha, the Egyptian general, whose headquarters during his occupation of Najd were first at Sulaimiyah in Kharj and later at Tharmidah in Washam, ever visited Hasa in person; but a regular Egyptian administration was established there without delay, a garrison of 300 irregulars being placed at Hofūf, and smaller posts at Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair upon the coast.

Failure of the  
Wahhābis to  
recover Tārūt  
and appropriation  
of  
Dammām  
by the  
'Utūb, 1835.  
Rapprochement  
between the  
'Utūb and  
the Wahhābis,  
1836-38.

Expulsion of  
the Wahhābis  
by the Egyptians,  
1838-39.

Proceedings  
of the Egyptians  
in Hasa,  
1839.

For a time it appeared probable that the Egyptian commander would attempt to extend his conquests so as to include both Bahrain and 'Omān, and the proceedings on the part of the British Government to which this anticipation gave rise are described at length in the histories of Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain; but in the end no actual movement was made by him in either of these directions, and the submission tendered by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Egyptians early in 1839 was consequently gratuitous and unnecessary. In 1839, during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, an expedition, consisting partly of Egyptian troops and partly of Bani Hājir of the Makhadhhabah division, was despatched from Hofūf against the Na'im of Qatar who had refused to pay tribute; but the assassination of Muhammad Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Hasa, by some Arabs in the vicinity of Hofūf necessitated its recall.

Evacuation  
of Hasa by  
the Egyptians,  
1840.

The position of Khurshīd Pasha in Najd was one of great and increasing difficulty. The hostility of the country people made it difficult for him to provision his posts or to keep open his communications; four armed vessels with military stores, which he expected on the coast of Hasa from the Red Sea, did not arrive, and their place was ill-supplied by a Kuwait boat which in November 1839 brought a single cargo of ammunition; it gradually became clear that the reduction of Bahrain, which was probably the main object of his excursion to the shores of the Persian Gulf, would not be permitted by the British Government; and finally his master, Muhammad 'Alī of Egypt, had begun to regard his successes with jealousy and dislike. In the circumstances a general retirement became necessary; and in Hasa, the first district to be evacuated, it seems to have been carried into effect in April or May 1840. The last act of the Egyptians in Hasa was the execution of Barghash, a Shaikh of the Āl Humaid section of the Bani Khālid, who they were reported to have put to death in revenge for the shooting of their Governor, Muhammad Effendi. At the time of the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, the blockade of the ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair, which they held upon the coast, had begun to be seriously contemplated by the British Government.

Internal affairs of Hasa from the second occupation by the Egyptians to the present occupation by the Turks, 1840-71.

A distribution of events in Hasa, during the generation following the evacuation of that province by the Egyptians in 1840, under the heads

of internal affairs, relations with Bahrain, and British relations is necessarily somewhat artificial; but such a classification must, for the sake of clearness, be adopted.

At their own withdrawal the Egyptians left their creature Khālid in possession of the Amirate of Najd, supported by about 800 of their troops. The new ruler, apparently unconscious of the real weakness of his position, at first indulged in dreams of foreign conquest; and about October 1841 he moved down to Hasa with the intention, as was supposed, of sending an expedition against 'Omān; but difficulties nearer to the seat of his power soon recalled him to Najd. In December 1841, or early in 1842, he was expelled from Riyādh by 'Abdullah-hin-Thinaiyān, a more powerful rival, and retired to Qatif with his foreign troops, whose presence was obnoxious to his subjects and was one of the principal causes of his downfall. The inhabitants of Hasa had already opened a correspondence with the new Amir, 'Abdullah; and the people of Qatif soon forced Khālid to dismiss his Egyptian soldiers and take refuge with Mubārak, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain, in the seaside fort of Dammām further down the coast. He was received by Mubārak as a welcome guest; and, in April 1842, he paid a visit to the Shaikh of Bahrain at Khor Hassān in Qatar, was treated there with much respect, and was encouraged to hope for assistance in recovering Qatif. Operations undertaken in his interest against the Hasa Oasis and the port of 'Oqair were temporarily successful, but Mubārak-hin-'Abdullah was soon in full retreat to the coast before the victorious army of 'Abdullah, and Khālid then left Dammām for Kuwait.

Hasa under  
the Amir  
Khālid, 1840-  
42.

No internal events of importance characterised the short reign of Khālid's successor, 'Abdullah, over the province of Hasa. At the end of 1842 the inhabitants who had so readily professed allegiance to him began, in consequence of his exactions in Qatif, to be discontented with his rule; but there was not as yet any open movement among the settled population against his authority. A number of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood at first refused to submit to him, but these he appears to have coerced with success. In 1843 his sovereignty ceased.

Hasa under  
the Amir  
'Abdullah,  
1842-43.

In 1851 Faisal, the successor of the Amir 'Abdullah, visited Qatar, and it may be presumed that he made a tour in Hasa at the same time. The object of his visit to the region appears to have been the chastisement of some of the Bedouin tribes; and at the present day he is remembered as the only ruler of Najd who ever pursued the wild Āl Morrah into their sandy retreats with any success.

Hasa under  
the Amir  
Faisal, 1848-  
65.



# Relations of Hasa with Bahrain during the same period, 1840-71.

The affairs of Hasa at this time however, are of little interest apart from the relations of the province with Bahrain, and these last are so fully described in the history of Bahrain that it will be unnecessary to do more than briefly refer to them here.

Invitation to the Bahrain Shaikhs to annex Hasa, 1840.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from the country, Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah of Bahrain was invited by a section of the inhabitants through one Mushrif, possibly a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid,\* to assume authority over Hasa and exclude the Egyptian puppet Khālid. This invitation, which was declined through the influence of 'Abdullah, the senior Shaikh, was one cause of the dissensions, ending in civil war, which shortly broke out between the joint chiefs of Bahrain.

Friction between the Wahhābis and Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, 1842-44.

In the first phase of the struggle between the rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, the elder, 'Abdullah, was successful; and the younger, Muhammad, in 1842 retired to Hasa and thence journeyed to Riyādh, where the new Amir 'Abdullah showed a disposition to take his part. The result was an estrangement between the Wahhābi Amir and the reigning Shaikh of Bahrain; the Shaikh blockaded the coast of Hasa and gave asylum in Bahrain to most of the inhabitants of Saibāt, who emigrated from that place on account of a grievance against the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif; and the Amir, on his part, arrested a chief of the Bani Hājir, named Shāfi', who was closely related to the Shaikh. Dammām on the Hasa coast was still a dependency of Bahrain, but it was claimed, as a paternal inheritance, by Bashīr-bin-Rahmah. From the course of the negotiations for the release of Shāfi' it appears that the port of 'Oqair was also, at this time, held by the Bahrain Shaikh; but it cannot have remained long in his possession.

Recovery of Dammām by the Wahhābis, 1844.

On his expulsion from Bahrain, in April 1843, Shaikh 'Abdullah established himself with his sons at Dammām, his only remaining possession; and there he was shortly blockaded from the sea by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, assisted by Bashīr-bin-Rahmah and 'Isa-bin-'Alī; while on the landward side the place was invested, at the end of 1843, by

\* There is nothing, however, to show whether this was the Mushrif by whom Captain Sadleir was uncivilly treated in 1819.

a Wahhābi force. In March 1844 Dammām surrendered to the Wahhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah himself being at the moment of capitulation somewhere outside the cordon by which the place was surrounded. The Wahhābis then occupied Dammām in the name of their own Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, much to the disappointment of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, to whom possession of it had been promised by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain. These events are more fully related in the history of Bahrain.

In 1844 or 1845 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah began to negotiate with the Wahhābis for their support, which they readily granted, probably because they found that Shaikh Muhammad, since his accession, was no longer amenable to their influence. In 1845, on war being declared between the Wahhābis and Bahrain, the Shaikh of Bahrain placed the Hasa coast under blockade and took into his service a pirate named Hamaid-bin-Majdal, of whom we shall presently have more to say under the head of British relations; while the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, on his part, landed secretly in Hasa near Ras Tanūrah. In correspondence with his son Mubārak, who since the fall of Dammām had been living among the Bani Hājir Bedouins on the mainland, and with 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif, the ex-Shaikh attempted to arrange for an invasion of the Bahrain Islands; but his plans were frustrated, when on the point of execution, through their becoming known to the Shaikh of Bahrain. The blockade of the Hasa coast by the Shaikh of Bahrain's vessels continued throughout 1846; in September of that year the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah settled temporarily near Dammām, under Wahhābi protection, removing shortly after to Tārūt Island; and some fighting occurred on the mainland between the principal belligerents, in which the ex-Shaikh did not take part. At the beginning of 1847 the pirate Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his dependents of the 'Amāir tribe deserted the Shaikh of Bahrain and joined the Wahhābis, and terms of peace were shortly afterwards arranged between the Wahhābi Amir and the Shaikh of Bahrain, by which the former bound himself no longer to support the pretensions of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah. The latter, finding himself betrayed, soon after took ship at Dammām, and he did not again make Hasa a base for his operations.

Coalition between the Wahhābis and the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, 1845-47.

In 1850 the relations between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābi Amir again became strained, and in 1851 the Shaikh once more had recourse to a maritime blockade of Hasa; but the sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, crossing with a fleet from the Persian coast, forced their way into the harbour of Qatif and placed their naval resources at the disposal of the Amir Faisal. Aggressive action against Bahrain by the

Sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah re-established by the Wahhābis at Dammām, 1852.

Wahhābis and their allies was prevented by the arrival of a British squadron off the islands; but the sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah received a reward for their services from the Wahhābis in the shape of permission to re-occupy Dammām.

Attempted  
invasion of  
Bahrain from  
Qatif and  
Dammām,  
1859.

In 1859, as more fully related in the history of Bahrain, preparations were made at Qatif by the Wahhābi Governor of that place and at Dammām by Muhammad, a son of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, for an invasion of Bahrain; but their plans were upset by the arrival on the scene of a British naval force under Commander Balfour, whose menacing attitude completely cowed the Wahhābi official.

Expulsion of  
Muhammad-  
bin-'Abdullah  
from  
Dammām by  
British  
action, 1861.

The presence of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah at Dammām, in close relations with the Wahhābi power, had now for some years been a standing danger to the Shaikhdom of Bahrain; and, after a discussion suggested by the events of 1859, the Government of India decided that he should be expelled. To a previous suggestion by the Resident, Captain Felix Jones, that Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah should be removed, the Wahhābi Amir had sent an indignant reply; and in 1861, on a requisition to the same effect being addressed him under the orders of Government, he remained silent. Accordingly in November 1861, as described in the history of Bahrain, Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah and his dependents were compelled, under the fire of a British warship, to evacuate Dammām.

Invasion of  
Bahrain from  
Hasa, 1869.

The connection of the Hasa province, which served as a base to the marauders, with the successful invasion of Bahrain in 1869 by the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and others, aided by the Bani Hājir tribe of the mainland, is fully noticed in the history of the Bahrain Principality.

#### British relations with Hasa during the same period, 1840-71.

Piracy by a  
Dammām  
boat, 1840-  
41.

Early in 1840 a piracy was committed between Khor Mūsa and the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arah upon a boat belonging to Kuwait. The perpetrators remained undiscovered until August 1841, when a follower of Mūbarak-bin-'Abdullah, then governing Dammām on behalf of his father, was shown to have been of their number. A demand was accordingly made upon the Shaikh of Bahrain for payment of 274 Muhammad Shāhi rupees or, alternatively, for the surrender of the pirate and his boat; and compliance with the former condition was obtained.

Mission of  
Lieutenant

The mission of Lieutenant Jopp, who in November 1841, visited the Wahhābi Amir in Hasa, had reference to the designs which that chief

was supposed to entertain in the direction of 'Omān, and will be more appropriately described in another place.

Jopp to  
Hasa, 1841.

More than once between 1845 and 1854 the attention of the British authorities was attracted to the coast of Hasa by the misdeeds of Hamaid-bin-Majdal, a member of the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid tribe, who, as related elsewhere, combined with the Shaikh of Bahrain against the Wahhābis in 1845 and in 1847 transferred his support to the other side. Early in 1845, Hamaid, who had broken with a part of his tribe, had forsaken his usual residence on Abu 'Ali Island, and was already in the service of the Shaikh of Bahrain, seized a Baqārah belonging to Khārag as she was entering the port of Qatif with a cargo of wheat from Rig and carried her to Abu 'Ali Island; the crew, after being despoiled of all their property, were allowed to make their way home in their empty vessel. The damages were estimated at 1,500 Muhammad Shāhi rupees; and it was reported that Hamaid-bin-Majdal, on being warned that the goods he was plundering belonged to a person under British protection, merely laughed and asked "Who are the English?"

Piracy by  
Hamaid-bin-  
Majdal  
and his  
punishment,  
1845-1850.

Such open contempt of the maritime peace and its guardians could not be tolerated; and in May 1845 the Resident deputed his Assistant, Captain Kemball, to superintend the punishment of the pirate, who had now established himself on the island of Jinnah. This service, which was undertaken by Commodore Hawkins, I.N., with his flagship "Coote" and the schooner "Constance," supported by two armed Baqārahs, was attended by serious difficulties of navigation; and Hamaid, who seems to have believed his island inaccessible, replied insolently to the first summons to submit; but, when morning broke, he found himself surrounded by the boats of the squadron and hastened to apologise. He was obliged to surrender his Baghlah, which was retained till the following October and was then redeemed by him on payment of 2,059 Muhammad Shāhi rupees in cash and 141 in kind, the total demand against him being thus liquidated. The operations at Jinnah were extremely trying to those engaged in them on account of the terrific heat of the sun, the season being June; and the skilful management and successful issue of the expedition were highly commended by the Court of Directors.

In the summer of 1846 the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif had the presumption to address the British Resident, demanding that he should expel Hamaid-bin-Majdal from his abode and compel him to return a Ghunebah and five other vessels belonging to Qatif which he had seized; in case of failure the Governor threatened to give the Bani Hājir and other Bedouin tribes of the mainland permission to commit piracies. A

British naval  
demonstration  
at Qatif,  
1846.



Fresh piracy  
by Hamaid-  
bin-Majdal  
and  
repetition  
of his  
punishment,  
1854.

friendly but effectual admonition was immediately conveyed to the arrogant official by two British emissaries.

In 1854 Hamaid-bin-Majdal, who was now apparently settled at 'Anik near Qatif town, committed another piracy by seizing a large Baghlah which he refused to give up, though the Resident, Captain Kemball, went in person to demand its surrender; he seemed to consider himself completely protected by the Turkish flag, which he had hoisted over his dwelling. On the matter being referred to Bombay, orders were received to destroy a Baghlah belonging to the pirate, by force if necessary, but to avoid operations on land.

In November 1854 a squadron of vessels of the Indian Navy arrived off 'Anik; it consisted of the flagship "Clive," Commodore Robinson; the "Falkland," Commander Hewett; the "Tigris," Lieutenant Foulerton; and the "Constance," Lieutenant Crane. 'Anik itself was unapproachable from the sea; but a Baghlah, round which the Arabs had constructed a sand-bag battery, was observed on shore in an assailable position, and was attacked with a flotilla of 13 boats, one of which was a rocket-boat, while the other 12 carried two 12-pounder and six 8-pounder guns besides a force of 200 seamen and marines. During the attack the tide went out; the heavier of the British boats were left high and dry; and a large force of Arabs swarmed down to capture them, but were repulsed by a hot fire of artillery and musketry. When the tide again rose, Hamaid-bin-Majdal thought it prudent to send off a flag of truce, and the Baghlah was surrendered, and next morning was burnt by the boats of the squadron, which returned to shore for the purpose. On the British side only a few men were wounded in this affair, but the Arabs lost heavily and were much demoralised by the shells and rockets.

The British naval demonstration at Qatif and Dammām in 1859 and the expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām by a British force in 1861 have already been noticed above in connection with Bahrain relations. The British proceedings at Dammām in 1861 elicited a strong protest from the Turkish Wāli of Baghdad in the following year, on the ground that Dammām was in the territory of "Faisal Bey, the Qaim Maqām of Najd," and formed "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan"; to which the British Resident replied, denying the claim of Turkey, and asserting the right of Britain to deal directly with the Wahhābi Amir.

In 1866, in consequence of a rupture between the British Government and the Wahhābi Amir, operations were undertaken by H.M.S. "High-flyer," Captain Pasley, at Qatif and Dammām, the only points except

British  
operations at  
Qatif and

'Oqair in the Wahhābi dominions which were accessible to a naval force: the circumstances and the general scheme of action are given in the history of Najd. On the 13th of January 1866 an ultimatum, in which 17 days were allowed for compliance, was transmitted to the Amir at Riyādh through his representative at Qatif. On the 30th of January, after an interview in Elphinstone Inlet with Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, Captain Pasley with the "Highflyer" again arrived at Qatif and ascertained that there was as yet no reply to the ultimatum. Accordingly, on the 2nd of February, boats under Lieutenant Fellowes entered Qatif harbour and destroyed the small fortification of Burj Ahul Lif, as also a native vessel which was not worth removing. On the next day boats were sent under Lieutenant Long to demolish, if possible, the fort at Dammām. A party were landed, who had to wade a considerable distance, and attacked the place; but, finding the garrison much stronger than had been represented and being unable to effect an entrance, they retired with a loss of three men killed and two officers and three men wounded. On the 4th of February the attack on Dammām was renewed by Lieutenant Long at high water, and the fort was plied with shot, shell and rockets; but the wall could not be breached, and the place remained in the hands of the enemy. The British ship then returned from Hasa to the lower end of the Gulf, and more successful operations were carried out at Sūr. The failure of the proceedings on the Hasa coast may perhaps be attributed to the want on the "Highflyer," of a European officer possessing local knowledge and experience; for the only political representative with Captain Pasley was the Residency (Native) Agent from Shārajah, whom Colonel Pelly, in his own unavoidable absence, had deputed to accompany the expedition.

During this period a small trading colony consisting of Hindu subjects of the British Government came into existence at Qatif; they were engaged chiefly in the importation of general merchandise and in the exportation of boiled dates to India. The first British Indian house established at Qatif was that of Kalunga, a wealthy merchant of Kach, who commenced business in Hasa about 1864. Two other Hindu firms followed about 1866.

British  
commercial  
interests.

#### Annexation of Hasa by Turkey, 1871.

So far back as 1866 designs of territorial expansion in Eastern Arabia had been betrayed by the attitude of Turkish officials in 'Irāq

Meaning of  
the Turkish

forward  
movement.

towards the Shaikh of Kuwait; and in 1871 the forward policy of the Ottoman Government, or of its local representatives, suddenly took shape. The causes which led to this movement are not discoverable in the Persian Gulf itself: they were probably of a general nature, connected with a desire on the part of the Turkish Government to assert their authority over the Arabian continent as a whole.

In the Persian Gulf, where much jealousy of the position acquired by Great Britain had for some time been shown by Turkish officials, the object of the Porte appears to have been nothing less than the extension of their influence over the coast and islands of the Arabian sea-board from Kuwait to Masqat; but, as will be shown, the realisation of their scheme was confined within narrower limits by natural obstacles and by British opposition.

The principal promoter of the movement was Mid-hat Pasha, the Turkish Governor of 'Irāq at the time; and an opportunity for action was provided by dissensions in the Wahbābi ruling family of Najd. Soon after the death of the Amir Faisal-bin-Turki in 1865, a conflict had broken out between his sons 'Abdullah and Sa'ūd; and the Turks profited by the situation to recognise 'Abdullah, the elder, as Qāim-Maqām of Najd on their behalf, and so to obtain from him an admission of their suzerainty over Central Arabia.

Discussions  
between the  
Porte and  
the British  
Government.

Some hint of the intentions of the Turkish Government appears to have reached the Government of India at the beginning of 1871, and in February, Colonel Herbert, the British Political Resident at Baghdād, was ordered to enquire into the matter. At first no confirmation of the rumour was forthcoming; but eventually, at the end of March, the Resident reported that a Turkish expedition would shortly be sent by sea from 'Irāq to Qatif for the purpose of supporting the cause of the Amir 'Abdullah in Central Arabia. The Government of India immediately drew the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the undesirability of the warlike operations contemplated by the Porte, which would involve a breach of the maritime peace and might be destructive of British trade, besides leading to political complications. Colonel Herbert having been further informed at Baghdād that it was intended to establish Ottoman supremacy over "Bahrain, Masqat and the independent tribes of Southern Arabia," a further communication was made by the Indian to the Home Government; and, at the end of April or beginning of May, an assurance was obtained from the Porte at Constantinople that they did not harbour the ambitious designs attributed to them. It was added by the Turks on this occasion that their sole object was to restore tranquillity

in Najd, and that there was no question of disturbing the peace at sea, but only of transporting a force by water to a point on the coast from which it could march into Najd. In May it was ascertained that Mid-hat Pasha, who in 1870 had described Bahrain and its dependencies as "countries of the Ottoman dominions, appertaining to the Qāim-Maqāmliq of Najd," was aware of the pledges given by the Porte; and he stated that the commander of the expedition had received explicit instructions that "he should on no account turn his eyes on Bahrain." Meanwhile the Shah of Persia had enquired of the British representative at Tehrān about the intentions of the Turkish Government in respect of Bahrain, and had been informed of the assurances given at Constantinople. Considerable irritation at the interest shown by Great Britain in the Turkish movements in Arabia was expressed by the Grand Vazir at Constantinople; and it became necessary to disabuse him of an impression, which he appeared to entertain, that resistance by Arabs to lawful authority of the Sultan of Turkey was encouraged by the British Government.

The prospect of a disturbance of the peace of the Gulf, so unusual in its nature, placed the Government of India in a difficult position; and the narrowness of the legal or treaty basis on which the established practice of interdicting all armed movements by sea rested now became for the first time fully apparent. The question was one not of hostilities between signatories of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, but of a possible war between signatories and non-signatories, for which that treaty made no provision. The Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Pelly, was soon approached by Arab chiefs with indirect queries whether the British Government would prevent the maritime tribes from proceeding to the assistance of the Wahbābi Sa'ūd, against the Turks; and Sa'ūd made an explicit request in writing that either the Shaikh of Kuwait should be prevented by the British Government from assisting the Turks or he himself should be considered at liberty to take action by sea. On the one hand it was felt by the British authorities that to restrain the Arabs would be to give indirect assistance to the Turkish expedition, on the other that to let them loose might be to upset the political equilibrium of the whole Gulf and at the same time to provide the Porte with an excuse for conquering and annexing their countries. Ultimately, on the 30th of May 1871, the Resident was instructed to visit Bahrain and to assure the Shaikh that, so long as he continued to observe his Convention of 1861 with Britain, the obligations of the British Govern-

British policy  
in the Persian  
Gulf in  
connection  
with the  
Turkish  
expedition.

ment towards him would be\* fulfilled; and on the 5th of June Colonel Pelly was further instructed to interdict the Trucial Shaikhs from maritime operations, whether on the side of or against the Turks, and to use his influence with all other chiefs for the purpose of maintaining the peace at sea. No reply was sent at the time to the Wahhābi Sa'ūd. When the crisis arose there was not a single British war vessel in the Gulf; but eventually the "Bullfinch" reached Bahrain on the 3rd of June, the "Magpie" passed Jāshk on the 5th of June, and the "Lynx" arrived at Hanjām on the 16th of July.

The Turkish Government were subsequently informed of the instructions given to the British Resident, and the Grand Vazir expressed his thanks; he added, however, that, if any of the Trucial Shaikhs should voluntarily offer their services to the Porte, the same would be accepted, as the Turkish Government had no cognisance of the arrangements in regard to the maritime peace in the Gulf. To meet this evasion the Turkish Minister was immediately supplied with copies of the engagements between the British Government and the Trucial Shaikhs.

Occupation  
by the Turks  
of the Qatif  
Oasis.

Precise details regarding the Turkish operations are, for the most part, wanting. The naval portion of the expedition, seen by Colonel Herbert at Basrah at the beginning of May, consisted of the steam corvette "Broussa," 23 guns; the steamer "Nimone" originally unarmed, in which four guns had been placed; the "Khojah Bey," an old wooden guardship long deemed unseaworthy, 18 guns; and three Basrah-built brigantines, little better than the "Khojah Bey," carrying 12, 6 and 4 guns. Two other steamers were added later; but the bulk of the transport must have been provided by the Shaikh of Kuwait, who was subsequently found to have joined the expedition in person with 300 vessels belonging to his port. Saiyid Muhammad Sa'id, a son of the Naqib of Basrah, Mansūr, a Shaikh of the Muntafik, and other influential Arbas from 'Irāq accompanied the troops, apparently as "parlementaires" or political intermediaries. The Turkish force, which consisted of about 4,000 regular troops and 1,500 Arab auxiliaries with nine guns, disembarked at Rās Tanūrah on the 26th of May 1871 and marched by land to Qatif town, meeting with slight opposition by the way. The Wahhābi Governor of Qatif having refused to surrender, the town was attacked by land and sea on the 3rd of June and was taken after a three hours bombardment. A column was then sent out which occupied 'Anik after a show of resistance,

\* A general assurance of support must have been intended. In the Convention, however, protection by Britain except against "Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf" does not appear to be promised.

capturing there three guns and a quantity of ammunition; it proceeded next to Dammām, which fell on the 5th of June. 'Abdul 'Aziz, a son of the Wahhābi Sa'ūd, escaped from Dammām before it was taken; he left behind him a prisoner, Muhammad-bin-Faisal, whom the Turks released; and nine iron and two brass guns and a quantity of military stores also came into their hands. At the end of June the Kuwait fleet had returned home and the Turkish force was still in the Qatif Oasis; but an advance was contemplated.

On his first reaching Qatif town a manifesto was published by Nāfiz Pāsha, the Turkish Commander, in which it was announced that the expedition had come to restore the authority of 'Abdullah, the Qāim-Maqām of Najd; that Sa'ūd, the rival of 'Abdullah, and his supporters would be pardoned if they came in and made submission; and that, in the meanwhile, the tribes which remained peaceably in Qatif and Hasa would enjoy Turkish favour and protection.

Turkish  
proclamation  
at Qatif.

Early in July the Turkish force left Qatif for Hofūf: the march across the intervening desert occupied, though unopposed, 15 days. Thereafter, the Hasa Oasis having been occupied without any fighting, the Arab contingent of Muntafik and others, as also the political intermediaries, were dismissed to their homes; the cause of this appears to have been, in part at least, commissariat difficulties; and the Muntafik, who returned by land *via* Kuwait, lost many horses on the way from scarcity of fodder and of water. From the time of disembarkation the Turkish expedition had been a prey to starvation, enteric fever and cholera; the march to Hofūf had further weakened its strength; and it was now brought to a complete standstill in Hasa by hot winds and a violent outbreak of malaria. In August, when the total Turkish force in Hasa was estimated at 3,400 men,—*viz.*, 2,500 at Hofūf, 500 at Qatif, 150 at 'Oqair and 250 on the march,—one third of the whole were reported sick and ineffective; and the Turkish Commander, who had become uneasy in regard to his communications with the coast, enlisted 900 natives of the country as soldiers on pay of \$6 a month. A shock was given to Muhammadan sentiment throughout the province by the arrival at Qatif of a ship-load of wine sellers and Baghdad prostitutes; but the trading classes seemed on the whole to prefer the disadvantages of Turkish administration to the greater severities and exactions of the Wahhābis.

Advance by  
the Turks  
into the Hasa  
Oasis.

At the time when the Turkish force first landed in Hasa, the Wahhābi brothers 'Abdullah and Sa'ūd were fighting with each other in the interior, at a distance of some 200 miles from the coast. The advantage appeared to rest with Sa'ūd, the opponent of the Turks, who had obtained posses-

Proceedings  
of the  
Wahhābis.

sion of the capital, Riyādh. In August 'Abdullah arrived at the Turkish headquarters, having been prevented by the insecurity of the roads from coming in earlier; but in October, seeing that the intention of the Porte was not to re-establish but to supplant his authority, he fled, preceded by his brother Muhammad and accompanied by his son Turki, from Hofūf to Najd. In October no movement took place upon either side. In November Sa'ūd attacked the Turks in Hasa; but he was beaten off and retired with his Bedouins to the deserts in the direction of Qatar, where he remained for a considerable time. Correspondence with a view to a reconciliation and joint action against the Turks then began between Sa'ūd and his brother 'Abdullah, but it had no result.

Visit of Mid-hat Pasha to Hasa, November-December, 1871.

On the 9th or 10th of November 1871, Mid-hat Pasha, the Wālī of Baghdād, anxious to see the fruits of his action with his own eyes, left the Shatt-al-'Arab for Kuwait, where he spent one day, and thence proceeded with three steamers, carrying a considerable number of troops, to Qatif. He reached that port on the 13th or 14th of the month, and on the 21st embarked again with an escort of 300 men for 'Oqair, from which he made his way to Hofūf. The objects of the Pasha's visit to Hasa, as stated by the Turkish Commodore in conversation with Colonel Pelly, were to enquire into certain complaints of corruption, to settle the administration of Hasa, and to arrange for the further advance of the Turkish troops to Riyādh; but the garrison of Hasa was found in so miserable a plight, able only to act on the defensive, that the last of these ideas was necessarily abandoned. Mid-hat Pasha contented himself, accordingly, with proclaiming the deposition of the Wahhābi rulers of the Al Sa'ūd family and the appointment in their place of Nāfīz Pasha as Mutasarrif of Najd; but he had not relinquished his unexecuted schemes. On his way back to Baghdād, where he arrived on the 28th of December, the Wālī purchased the "Snipe," a steamer formerly British, to maintain communication between Basrah and Qatif. Mid-hat Pasha had brought a large number of invalid soldiers back with him to Baghdād, and on the 1st of January 1872 he despatched a fresh draft of 300 men from there to Hasa.

Bearings of the Turkish expedition on Qatar and Bahrain affairs.

The assurances given by the Turkish Government that no aggression would be committed upon Bahrain, or upon independent Arab tribes, were not very rigidly construed by the agents of their policy. About June 1871 Mid-hat Pasha denied, in a communication to Colonel Herbert, the possibility of the existence of independent tribes in Najd; and the comprehensiveness of the name "Najd" in his estimation was indicated by a list, published in the Baghdād official journal, which included among

the "houses and gardens" of Najd the towns of Sharjā Dibai and Ahu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān. As related in the history of Qatar, the Turkish flag was hoisted at Dōhal on the coast of that promontory in July 1871 and a Turkish garrison established there in January 1872; and it seems not improbable that, but for the attitude of the British Government and the constant presence of their war vessels, some similar measures would have been attempted in Bahrain, where, as described in another place, more than one endeavour was made by the Turks to intimidate the Shaikh. From an early stage of the proceedings the Bahrain exile Nāsir-bin-Mulārak was found to be present with the Ottoman forces; and a disposition to intrigue with the Turks was at one time shown by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, but after a visit which he paid to the Sultan of O'mān in 1872 his attitude was found to have changed. Early in 1872 the Turkish Government gave fresh assurances that their action would be confined to vindicating their authority in districts to which their title was undisputed, and they referred to the recent recall of Mid-hat Pasha from Baghdād as a proof that they did not mean unduly to extend the field of operations.

#### Military occupation of Hasa by the Turks, 1872-74.

In the spring of 1872 negotiations with Sa'ūd were opened by Raūf Pasha, the new Wālī of Turkish 'Irāq; and Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdur Rahmān with a certain Fahad-bin-Sanaitān, arrived in Hasa to treat with the Turks. 'Abdur Rahmān was indeed to visit Baghdād, where he was detained under surveillance until August 1874; and not long afterwards Fahad-bin-Sanaitān was accused of intrigue by Muhammad Pasha, who had meanwhile succeeded Nāfīz Pasha as Mutasarrif, and was sent in irons from Hasa to Baghdād. Muhammad Pasha was followed in the Mutasarrifate by Faiz Pasha; and in 1873, while the garrison were relieved and efforts were made to establish regular steam communication between Basrah and Qatif, the scheme of advancing to Riyādh seemed to have been abandoned.

Negotiations with the Wahhābis.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Hasa began to tire of Ottoman rule and to complain loudly of oppression by the Turkish officials and soldiery; and it was reported that the Government had no well-wishers left among the local Arabs. The Turkish troops continued to be decimated by disease.

Internal affairs.

British  
relations.

In 1873-1874 a marine survey of the Hasa coast was carried out by the British schooner "Constance" under special arrangements with the Porte and with the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq.

### Government of Hasa by the Turks through a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid, 1874.

Installation  
of Barrak-  
bin-'Arair,  
March 1874.

In March 1874 the Turks, finding the Hasa province a serious drain upon their military and financial resources, made a short-lived experiment in economical administration: it consisted in a sweeping reduction of the garrison and in the substitution of \*Barrāk-hin-'Arair, head of the once dominant Bani Khālid tribe, as Mutasarrif in place of a Turkish official. The new Governor was installed by Nāsir Pāsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, who arrived at Rās Tanūrah with the steamers "Athaur," "Ālūs," "Lebanon" and "Sinope"; he brought with him Ahmad Pāsha, who had been appointed to command the remaining troops, and a supply of grain for the Turkish posts. A large assembly was held in Hasa, in which the appointment of Barrāk was announced; and Nāsir Pāsha then returned to Basrah with the bulk of the troops and a number of prisoners, the latter being persons who had sent in memorials against the exaltation of Barrāk. The tribal Mutasarrif was provided with a corps of Dhāhi-tiyahs or military police, by means of which, and of the tribes well affected to himself, it was hoped that he would be able to maintain his authority.

Rebellion,  
and  
overthrow  
of Barrāk.

These arrangements lasted for some months; and at first, but for frequent complaints of the exactions of the Mutasarrif and for various symptoms of the unpopularity of Turkish rule, affairs seemed to progress smoothly enough. Early in the autumn of 1874, however, the Wahhābi 'Abdur Rahmān, having been permitted to leave Baghdād, proceeded to Bahrain and thence opened a secret correspondence with some of the tribes on the mainland.† A few weeks later he landed at 'Oqair; thousands flocked to his standard; and Shaikh Barrāk shortly found himself invested in the fort of Hofūf. The Turks, with unusual promptitude, despatched a force of 2,400 infantry and 4 guns under Nāsir Pāsha, who was responsible for the arrangement made with

\* The name also occurs as "Bazih," "Bazeh," etc., but Barrak appears to be the correct form.

† A protest made by the Turkish Government in regard to 'Abdur Rahman's proceedings in Bahrain is noticed in the history of that principality.

Barrāk, by sea to the scene of the revolt; and "the work of retribution was quick, decisive and terrible." 'Abdur Rahmān fled; his force dispersed in all directions; and the Hasa Oasis was given up during several days to the excesses of the Turkish soldiery. Order being restored, Nāsir Pāsha in February 1875 returned to 'Irāq, leaving his son, Mazaiyid Pāsha, in charge of the province *vice* Barrāk deposed; and about the same time Hasa and the other districts depending on Basrah were separated from Baghdād and formed into a separate Basrah Wilāyat under Nāsir Pāsha,—an arrangement which continued until 1880.

### Subsequent events in Hasa, 1875-77.

During the next three years few reports, except such as related to the occasional relief of Turkish troops, were received of affairs in Hasa. In 1876 Mazaiyid Pāsha was succeeded as Governor by one Sa'id Bey. In 1877 abortive negotiations took place between the Turks and 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, Wahhābi, with a view to the appointment of the latter as Turkish Mutasarrif of Hasa.

Miscellaneous  
affairs, 1875-  
78.

### Serious outbreak of piracy upon the Hasa Coast, 1878-80.

In 1878, in consequence of an alarming outbreak of piracy with which the Turks showed themselves unable to deal, Hasa became for a time the chief centre of interest in the Persian Gulf; the Bahrain Islands and the promontory of Qatar were affected by the rapidly spreading disorder; and large questions of British policy and of the position and responsibilities of the Turkish Government in Eastern Arabia arose and were discussed. The piratical trouble appears to have been closely connected, in its origin, with a rebellion in Qatif.

In order to enable the seriousness of the situation to be appreciated, it is necessary first to give a brief account of the depredations committed by the pirates; and in doing so it will be advisable to include some crimes belonging properly to the Qatar district which cannot be conveniently treated of elsewhere.

A gang of Bani Hājir, having crossed the Gulf, seized and plundered some Persian vessels near Shaikh Shu'aib Island, wounding two men; then, attacking a boat of unknown nationality, they murdered the Nakhuda,

Piracies from  
August to  
November  
1878.

carried off Rs. 10,000 in cash, and returned to Qatar. Another gang, consisting partly of Bani Hājir and partly of Āl Morrah, seized a Shū'ai belonging to 'Amāir of Qatif; put to sea in the same and captured a Qatif Baqārah, which they carried to Dammām; took and plundered a Qatif Māshuwah; proceeded in the Qatif Baqārah to the Qatar coast, where a Baqārah of Dōhah fell a prey to them off Rās Laffān; and finally carried their plunder to Dōhat-as-Salwa and there released the prize in which their cruises had been made. A party of Bani Hājir Bedouins under Zāid-bin-Muhammad, one of the Bani Hājir of Dhahrān, having embarked at Dōhah as passengers in a Rās-al-Khaimah vessel, compelled the master to put ashore at a place on the coast of Qatar; re-inforced there by 17 other Bedouins they sailed for the Persian coast; between the islands of Qais and Hindarābi they captured a Māshuwah, owned upon the Persian side, wounding the Nākhuda and his son; they then returned to Rās Laffān on the coast of Qatar, where they transferred four of their victims to the Rās-al-Khaimah boat and let it go, but two of the Māshuwah's crew they retained as prisoners. A Bahrain Māshuwah, on her way from Qatif to Bahrain, was attacked and plundered by Bani Hājir near Dammām, and two slaves on board of her were carried off. Another Bahrain Māshuwah met with similar treatment in the same neighbourhood at the hands, it was supposed, of the same gang. On the 4th of September a Qatar Māshuwah bound for 'Oqair was attacked, while passing Zubarah, by the people of that place in two Baqarahs; three passengers were killed on the spot, six were wounded of whom one died, a girl was kidnapped, and property worth \$700 was taken; the attack was led by Muhammad-bin-Rāshid, son of the headman of Zubarah, whose father, looking on from the top of his fort, found nothing to censure in his proceedings except that the lives of any of the victims should have been spared. At Dārīn on Tārūt Island a boat belonging to a Baghlah owned by Ibrāhīm-bin-Yūsuf, a naturalised British subject, was seized by a gang of 25 Bani Hājir under the aforesaid Zāid-bin-Muhammad, who carried it off to Dammām; the crew were then released except a boy and a slave; these the pirates kept. A Būm, anchored in the inner harbour at Qatif town, was seized by Bedouins, probably 'Amāir, and was carried off along with her cargo of dates, the Nākhuda and two sailors being at the same time kidnapped; she was afterwards seen prowling in a piratical fashion off the Bahrain islands. A Dangi, while lying in the inner harbour of Qatif, was surrounded by four boats of the Amāir and plundered of \$200, a large sail and her small boat. A boat from a Ghunchah belonging to Rās-al-Khaimah was attacked on shore by six or seven 'Amāir under the very walls of the Qatif fort, and

property worth more than \$360 was plundered; the robbers fired after their victims, as they attempted to escape by swimming, and wounded the Nākhuda; the boat was taken to 'Anik. A Māshuwah, carrying passengers for Bahrain, was seized at the town of Qatif by a gang of 'Amāir and carried off. On the 27th of September a Bahrain Baqarah, arriving near Qatif town, was attacked by a Būm and a Māshuwah, containing respectively 13 and 16 Bani Hājir, and was robbed of her sails, small boat and gear; the personal effects of the crew were taken and a slave kidnapped by the pirates, who lauded with their spoil at Dammām.

All the above cases, which are probably not given in their strict chronological order, appear to have occurred during the months of September and October 1878.

At the end of December 1878 Mansūr-bir-Manākhir, a Shaikh of the 'Ajmān, and Zāid-bin-Muhammad, already mentioned, having seized by force a boat belonging to Bahrain, put to sea and plundered two vessels near Qatif town, from one of which they carried off property worth Rs. 20,000; ten vessels carrying Turkish troops from Qatif to 'Oqair were in sight at the time, but disregarded the appeals of the victims for assistance. Early in 1879 a new gang of Bani Hājir, encouraged by the successes of Zāid-bin-Muhammad, started under another leader and took two Bahrain vessels laden with dates; after despatching their booty to the interior they sailed again in quest of fresh plunder. On the 11th of February a daring raid was committed in Bahrain by a band of 30 Bani Hājir from Dhahrān, who landed at 'Aqāriyah and killed a Bahrain subject. A whole series of piracies ensued, committed by Zāid-bin-Muhammad of Dhahrān and his Bani Hājir followers with the assistance of some of the 'Ajmān; it culminated, in July 1879, in an attack upon a Bahrain pearl vessel, in which one of the crew was killed and three were wounded, while the vessel herself with property worth 2,000 Qrāns and two slaves, was carried off but ultimately recovered.

In June 1879 the pecuniary loss caused by these offences was estimated to have reached 67,000 Qrāns, in the recovery of 8,334 Qrāns out of which the British Government, through its subjects, was interested. In one case two native vessels bound for Kārachi, the "Harsingar" and the "Futtehkar," had been fired into and plundered by pirates at a distance of only two miles from Qatif town.

In June and July of 1880 fresh piracies by Zāid-bin-Muhammad and his associates were reported.

The Turkish administration would gladly have ignored these atrocities, though committed invariably by their nominal subjects and to a large extent in Turkish territorial waters; but the British Government, by

Piracies from  
December  
1878 to July  
1879.

Local action  
by Turkish  
and British  
Governments.



whom peace in Hasa waters had formerly been maintained, could not acquiesce in a policy of inaction.

1878.

In October 1878, in connection with the serious crime then recently committed off Zubārah, Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was instructed to ask the Turkish Wālī of Basrah that the offending township should be punished, and to make an offer of British naval assistance. About the same time H.M.S. "Vulture," Commander Pringle, succeeded in capturing fifteen piratical vessels of the 'Amāir off Qatif and three vessels and four boats belonging to the Bani Hājir, two of which were prizes from Bahrain, in the waters to the south of Qatif. All these craft were handed over to the Turkish Governor of Qatif on a receipt; and the important services rendered by the ship were subsequently acknowledged both by the Government of India and by the Foreign Office in London. In a friendly interview with Colonel Ross at Basrah in the month of October, 'Abdullah Pasha, the Turkish Wālī, declined the help of British ships, but promised to punish Zubārah if the guilt of the place were established to his own satisfaction; in the meanwhile, however, Zubārah ceased to exist, having been destroyed by tribal enemies as described in the history of Qatar.

1879.

In January 1879, the disorders still continuing, a Turkish force marched by land against the small coast settlement of Qal'āt-al-Husain in Dhahrān; but it did not succeed in capturing any of the pirates or in recovering any of the stolen property; and meanwhile two Turkish vessels of war, the "Broussa" and the "Iskanderia," which had been sent to the coast of Hasa by the Turkish Ministry of Marine, had both broken down. In February, chiefly for the protection of Bahrain, H.M.S. "Spartan" was stationed off the coast of Qatif, and the Assistant Political Resident, Captain Durand, was posted temporarily in Bahrain; and by April two Bahrain vessels carried off by pirates had been recovered by H.M.S. "Vulture," and matters had to some extent quieted down. In July, in consequence of the renewed piracies of Zāid-bin-Muhammad, representations were made to the Porte and to the Turkish Governor of Basrah, but without satisfactory, or indeed any, result. In November Zābit Pasha, the successor of 'Abdullah Pasha at Basrah, was urged to take action for the suppression of piracy in Hasa; but he showed no disposition to comply. In December the Shaikhs of Qatar were warned by letters from the British Resident in the Gulf, delivered through the Senior Naval Officer, to avoid becoming implicated in the crimes of Bani Hājir.

1880.

In April 1880 Zābit Pasha was addressed regarding the pirate Zāid-bin-Muhammad and replied that he had not yet been able to effect his capture

Finally in March 1881, worn out by the importunity of the British authorities, by whom further complaints had been raised in consequence of fresh misdeeds by Zāid in the months of June and July preceding, the Wālī of Baghdad informed the British representative there that "no piracy or plunder of vessels had been committed by Zāid-bin-Muhammad" and "that perfect tranquillity and security prevailed on the Qatar coast by land and sea."

In short, though Hasa had become in name a Turkish province, maritime security along the coast—so far as it existed at all—was maintained by the action, now legally unjustifiable, of the British Government.

#### Discussion as to Turkish jurisdiction and responsibility on the coast of Hasa, and orders as to British action in future upon the same, 1878-81.

A very difficult problem had thus arisen through the substitution of nominal Turkish jurisdiction for virtual British jurisdiction upon the coast of Hasa, and through the uncertainty which prevailed as to the extent of littoral over which Turkish rights were claimed, or should be admitted to exist. On the one hand it was desired to avoid giving offence to Turkey: on the other it was abundantly clear that any concession to the Porte would result in a proportional increase of piracy.

The Government of India, who began to consider the question in 1878 and whose opinions were expressed in May 1879, deprecated the recognition of Turkish authority anywhere to the southward of 'Oqair, except at the town of Dōhah in Qatār only, where a Turkish garrison was maintained. They considered that the Shaikhdoms of Trucial 'Omān should be expressly placed beyond the sphere of Turkish influence not only in regard to the coast but also in regard to the interior; and that stipulations should be made in respect of Bahrain implying British protection of that principality and enabling the Shaikh, though otherwise debarred from interference on the mainland, to pursue aggressors upon his islands into Turkish jurisdiction. To mark and secure, from an international point of view, the political position of the Arab Shaikhs in question, it was suggested that arrangements should be made for the payment by them in future of a small tribute to the British power in return for its protection. With reference to the prevention of piracy it was proposed

View of the  
Government  
of India.



that pirates should continue to be pursued by British vessels into Turkish waters, and even upon the Turkish coast within the range of naval fire, but that otherwise operations upon the mainland should devolve upon the Turkish authorities; that pirates captured by British ships under these conditions should be dealt with by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf; and that the Turkish administration should be held responsible for obtaining redress in the case of all piracies committed from Turkish jurisdiction.

Opinion of  
Her Majesty's  
Government.

The India Office were at first disposed to concur in the recommendations of the Government of India; but the Foreign Office considered that the acceptance of the scheme by the Porte, involving, as it did, the abandonment of considerable territorial pretensions on the part of Turkey and the admission of foreign interference in waters admittedly Turkish, was not to be expected. The establishment of a declared protectorate over the Arab principalities concerned was likely, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, to give rise to inconveniences even more serious than those which it was sought to avoid. The Foreign Office inclined to the view that British naval interference in Turkish waters should only be exercised in special circumstances, when the consent of the local Turkish authorities had been obtained.

Action by  
British  
vessels on the  
Hasa coast  
suspended  
May 1879.

Meanwhile the question of the employment of British ships of war against pirates in Turkish waters or on the Turkish coast, authorised by the Government of India in March 1879, had been referred by the Naval Commander-in-Chief in India to the Admiralty, and by the Admiralty to the Foreign Office. In May 1879 a suspension of the operations in question was directed; and later, as the Law Officers of the Crown held them to be internationally unjustifiable even in the peculiar circumstances of the Hasa coast, they were prohibited.

Negotiations  
with Turkey.

As time went on, however, and insecurity in the Gulf showed no signs of abating, it became necessary to insist on attention being paid to representations, from time to time addressed by the British Government to the Porte, which had hitherto been met by evasion and delay. Sir H. Layard, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was accordingly instructed to suggest an arrangement by which the Turkish Government should permit action, when indispensable for the suppression of piracy, by British vessels within the three-mile limit to the north of 'Odaid; and it was intended that certain stipulations for Turkish co-operation when available, for the transfer of prizes to the Turkish authorities, and generally for the maintenance of the dignity of Turkey in her own waters should form part of the understanding. Negotiations on this basis continued at

Constantinople during a part of the year 1880, but were altogether fruitless.

All efforts to arrange the matter by conciliatory action having thus failed, it was ultimately decided by Her Majesty's Government, in 1881, that British Naval Officers on the East India Station should not be hampered by the three-mile limit in pursuing piratical craft in Turkish waters; and subsequently it was explained by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India that the intention of this order was somewhat wider than it appeared to be; for it meant, in fact, that "the commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf should have liberty to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbance of the peace of the seas, avoiding, however, the raising of needless questions with the Turkish authorities, where they exist, or unnecessary encroachment upon the jurisdiction of the Sultan, wherever it may really be effectively established along the coast north of 'Odaid." No decision as to the proper limits of Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Eastern Arabia resulted from the correspondence and negotiations described above; indeed care was taken to avoid raising the question with Turkey, whose claims were understood to be excessive, comprising Bahrain and all 'Omān; and, apart from a resolution not in any circumstances to recognise Turkish sovereignty over Bahrain or over countries to the east of Khor-al-'Odaid, Her Majesty's Government themselves abstained from forming any conclusion

Final orders  
in regard to  
British naval  
action.

### Turkish Governors of Hasa, 1878-1907.

The narrative of internal affairs in Hasa, from the year 1878, may now be resumed. We shall first mention the names of the governors by whom the province was successively ruled, and then notice the events of the period, on which their personalities do not appear to have exercised much influence.

Sa'id Bey, appointed in 1876, remained in power until the next year, when he was recalled, not before he had earned for himself a good reputation as an administrator.

Sa'id Pasha, his successor, was a native of Baghdād, of non-Turkish birth, and a man of some intelligence and activity; during this, his first term of office, he gained the esteem and good-will of the people of Hasa and maintained an efficient administration. His removal, in 1879,

Mutasarrifs  
of Hasa,  
1876-77.

1877-79.

resulted from the disgrace and dismissal of his patron, 'Abdullah Pasha, Wali of Basrah, by whom he had been nominated.

1879-80.

In December 1879, Sa'id Bey was re-appointed to the Mutasarrifate and sustained his previous good reputation until his final departure in 1880. In 1880 Hasa, with the other districts depending on Basrah, was again incorporated in the Wilayat of Baghdad.

1880-81.

Sa'id Bey was relieved by 'Abdul Ghani Pasha, sent from Constantinople, who was described as a religious fanatic of weak intellect. A revolt of the 'Ajman tribe in 1880 led to the suspension and confinement of this governor by the military officer commanding the troops; and, though a commission which was sent to enquire into the case reported in his favour, 'Abdul Ghani Pasha was removed in the following year.

1881-85.

Sa'id Pasha was then appointed Mutasarrif for the second time, and discharged the duties of his office with ability and in a conciliatory spirit from 1881 until 1885. In 1884 the Basrah districts, including Hasa, were finally separated from Baghdad and constituted into a separate Wilayat.

1885-86.

Nazih Pasha relieved Sa'id Pasha in November 1885, but his term of office was short, terminating early in 1886.

1886-87.

His successor, Muhammad Salih Pasha, remained in power from March 1886 till some time in 1887.

1887-90.

From 1887 to January 1890 Hasa was governed by Rifa'at Bey, during whose term of office a visit was paid to Qatif and Qatar by Nafiz Pasha, Wali of Basrah. His removal was attributed, by one account, to friction between himself and the military authorities in Hasa; but it may have been due merely to a change of Wali at Basrah, where Nafiz Pasha about the same time made way for Hidayat Pasha. Rifa'at Bey appears to have been an energetic administrator.

1890-91.

The post of Mutasarrif was held from 1890 to 1891 by 'Akif Bey, a military officer with a large programme of political reform and aggrandisement, the greater part of which he was unable to execute. He left, on account of ill-health, early in 1891, and was said to have died on the way home.

1891-94.

In May 1891 Sa'id Pasha assumed the governorship of Hasa for the third time; he remained until April 1894, when he resigned. During his Mutasarrifate the Wali of Basrah made a tour in Hasa, which lasted from October 1892 till May 1893 and is described further on; and some effort was apparently made to improve the administration, the Qaim-Maqam of Qatif being removed in July 1893 and replaced, in January 1894, by one Rauf Effendi.

The next Governor was Ibrahim Pasha, formerly in charge of 1894-96. Hodaidah, who held office until 1896.

Sa'id Pasha was then appointed to Hasa for the fourth time; he was 1896-1900. recalled for the last time in 1900. In conversation with the British Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, on his final return to Iraq in January 1901, Sa'id Pasha attributed his removal to the machinations of the military commandant in Hasa, whom he described as "an ignorant Turk." It seemed that his later policy in Hasa had been to supersede the regular Turkish garrison, in part, by a locally raised force; and that the commandant, annoyed by his aspersions on the troops, had succeeded in convincing the superior authorities that the pro-native policy pursued by Sa'id Pasha had been responsible for the introduction of modern rifles into the country in quantities which endangered the safety of the Turkish army of occupation. Sa'id Pasha died in retirement at Baghdad in 1905.

The military Commandant who had traduced Sa'id Pasha succeeded him as Mutasarrif; but his rival's depreciatory estimate of his character was evidently not erroneous, for he only retained his position until September 1901, when he was dismissed on account of the universal discontent excited by his high-handed proceedings.

Another military officer, named Taufiq Bey, then acted as Mutasarrif.

1900-01.

A civil Mutasarrif was again appointed in 1902, in the person of 1902-05. Saiyid Talib Pasha, son of the Naqib of Basrah, who arrived in June of that year. He showed considerable energy in dealing with tribal disorders; but his illegal exactions were boundless, and culminated, early in 1903, in his plundering the house of Haji Mansur Pasha, one of the Baharinal of Qatif, manager of the Dairat-as-Saniyah properties in Hasa and probably the richest merchant in the whole province, whom he charged with disloyalty to the Turkish Government, and whose brother, Ahmad-bin-Juma, he imprisoned. The spoil of Haji Mansur's house filled three sailing vessels, of which the departure was reported by the British representative in Bahrain, while their arrival at the Naqib's residence at Sabiliyat on the Shatt-al-'Arab came in due course to the notice of the British Consul at Basrah. Talib Pasha was temporarily recalled in October 1903, when Faiq Pasha, the military Commandant, was nominated to act as Mutasarrif during his absence; but he was not finally removed from his appointment until February 1905. His treatment of Haji Mansur appears to have been the cause of his dismissal.\*

\* Talib Pasha appears to have been the author of a long iminute, pan-Islamic in tendency, on Turkish policy in Arabia, of which a copy was obtained by the British Embassy at Constantinople.

1905-07.

The next Governor was Najib Pasha, under whom troublesome bickering continued between Hāji Mansūr and the customs farmers of the province: the cause of the latter, who had been under the protection of Tālib Pasha, was now supported by the military authorities generally and by a number of the civil officials. Najib Pasha was still in power at the beginning of 1907.

Fiscal and  
general  
administration  
of  
Hasa, 1877-  
1907.

From the first the government of Hasa by the Turks has been carried on at a financial loss; and many of the political difficulties with which local Governments have had to contend may be traced to the efforts of successive Mutasarrifs, doubtless under orders from Constantinople, to develop the local revenue and make it balance the expenditure.

1882.

At the beginning of 1882, probably under 'Abdul Ghani Pasha, harbour dues began to be collected at Dārin from vessels entering or leaving the port of Qatif; and vigorous efforts were made to collect arrears of agricultural revenue, fixed at Rs. 1,70,000, from the villages of the Qatif Oasis. The latter demand, in some cases at least, referred to plantations once owned by the Wahhābi Amirs which had escheated to the Turkish Government and had greatly deteriorated through inattention. In one case troops with a gun were marched out to coerce a refractory village, but it was found deserted.

1887-88.

In 1887, under Rifa'at Bey, a spasmodic attempt was made to create an ocean port at Dārin, for the purpose of capturing the Hasa and Central Arabian trade of Bahrain; but the experiment was a failure and was discontinued in the following year.

1891.

In 1891 great discontent was reported to prevail at Qatif on account of "new laws" regarding land tenures, succession, and probate duty. The cause of these troubles may have been the institution in Hasa of a branch of the Department of Land Records; for the Tāpu, established in 'Irāq in 1889, would naturally be extended to Hasa soon afterwards.

1894-95.

Throughout 1894 a struggle was maintained at Qatif between the merchants and the Turkish collectors of revenue; it related to the enhancement of a tax upon dates for export; and it was accompanied by a demand for arrears on account of two previous seasons. Notwithstanding deputations to Basrah and emigration to Bahrain, the authorities appear in the end to have carried their point. These events occurred under Ibrāhīm Pasha, who also attempted to recover increased tribute from the 'Ajman, Āl Morrah, and other nomads; but the main result, as will be seen further on, was the dragging of the Mutasarrif into a quarrel between two Bedouin tribes.

About the end of 1900 the Governor of Hasa was directed to levy an extraordinary contribution of 12,000 Liraḥs on the province for the benefit of the Imperial Turkish Treasury. This demand accentuated general dissatisfaction that already existed among the wealthier inhabitants of Hasa, by whom it had to be met.

In 1901 it was stated in Bahrain by the retiring Mutasarrif of Hasa that the annual revenue of the province was 60,000 Liraḥs, of which 54,000 was swallowed up by army expenditure, leaving a deficit after civil charges had been met.

An enumeration of the date palms in the Qatif Oasis, made in 1903, was said to have resulted in an immense increase in the registered number of taxable trees.

The customs of the province for the year 1905-06 were leased for an amount greater by  $37\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. than in the preceding year; and in 1906-07 the amount of the farm was higher, by  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., than in 1905-06. In the autumn of 1905 and spring of 1906 a census of the population was attempted in the Qatif and Hasa Oases, apparently with a view to the imposition of a poll tax; but serious riots resulted at Hofuf and Mubarrāz, and the proceedings were stopped.

### Political administration and tribal disturbances, 1878-1907.

The political condition of Hasa, outside the two principal oases, was during this period one of chronic insecurity: in this respect no progress appears to have taken place during the last thirty years, but rather the reverse.

In the summer of 1878 a rising against Turkish authority, headed by Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān, sons of the late Wahhābi ruler Sa'ūd, took place in the Qatif Oasis; Dammām passed temporarily into the hands of the Wahhābis; and the town of Qatif was closely invested for a time by hordes of Bedouins. These were dispersed in the first instance by the accidental appearance of H.M.S. "Vulture," and afterwards large Turkish reinforcements arrived from 'Irāq. In December the sons of Sa'ūd, unable to make head against the Turks, took refuge in Bahrain; but they were not allowed to remain there. Many of the people of Qatif had also sought an asylum in Bahrain during the investment of their own by the Bedouins.

Rebellion,  
1878.

1879.

In 1879, in consequence of raids committed by some of the Bani Khālīd about Qatif, Sa'id Pasba with the gunboat "Iskanderia" visited and destroyed one of their forts, apparently that of Qasr Āl Subaib upon the coast to the northwards, after which the guilty section submitted and gave hostages for their future good behaviour. The Mutasarrif was unable, however, to make any impression on the marauding Bani Hājir; and a respectable merchant of Hasa was at this time waylaid and murdered by Zaid-bin-Muhammad, the well-known pirate belonging to that tribe.

1880-81.

In 1880 the 'Ajman tribe attacked the Hasa Oasis, expecting to take the Turkish garrison at a disadvantage; but the Commandant, who had been apprised of their intentions, gave them a warm reception, killing 60 of the 'Ajman and capturing two of their Shaikhs. The civil Mutasarrif, 'Abdul Ghani Pasha, seems to have been locally considered accountable for this incident; and, as already mentioned, the military authorities in Hasa even proceeded so far as to place him under arrest on some charge arising from the affair. On his return to the province in 1881, Sa'id Pasha tried to induce the chiefs of the 'Ajman to return to Hasa, whence they had fled; but for some time they refused to be cajoled.

1882-92.

During several years after this, the province enjoyed peace; but about 1890 disturbances again became rife; and at length, in 1890 or 1891, a large date caravan was plundered by Bedouins of the Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir, and other tribes. This necessitated a temporary withdrawal of the tribal subsidies paid by the Turkish Government; and several camelmen were executed in connection with the raid. 'Akif Bey, the Mutasarrif at the time, seems to have advocated the formation of a camel corps to deal with the Bedouins and to escort caravans between Hofuf and 'Oqair; and he also proposed the establishment of a number of posts, some of which were sanctioned.

1892-93.

Possibly in consequence of these arrangements, travellers by the Hofuf-'Oqair road passed unmolested during the rest of 1891 and part of 1892; but on the 14th of May 1892 a very serious outrage was committed by 300 Bedouins of the Manāsir, Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah tribes, who attacked a caravan proceeding under an escort of 25 Turkish soldiers from Hofuf to 'Oqair, killed 15 and wounded 10 persons, carried off cash and goods to the value of Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 20,000 respectively, and plundered 40 pilgrims who were marching with the caravan. Numerous robberies, attributed to the Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah, began to occur in the vicinity of Hofuf; and the townspeople no longer dared

to make journeys, unless in armed parties of 20 or more and protected by the presence of tribal Rafiqs. About the middle of October 1892 the Wālī of Basrah arrived at Qatif, evidently to enquire into the state of affairs in Hasa, and proceeded *via* 'Oqair to Hofuf. At Hofuf his first act was to take security from the chief people of the town and neighbourhood that they would have no dealings with the marauding tribes, whereupon the latter retired into the desert. In February 1893, when the Wālī made an excursion to Qatar, Arabs were engaged to protect caravans travelling by the Hofuf-'Oqair road; and the regular troops were employed in raiding the Bedouins, not altogether without success. About the same time the help of the Sbaikh of Kuwait appears to have been invited, for in March Sbaikh Mubarak of that place arrived in Hasa by land with a number of mounted men. In May 1893 the Wālī, after witnessing with his own eyes a serious Turkish disaster in Qatar, returned to Basrah by way of Qatif; he had failed to restore security; and the Hofuf-'Oqair road was still considered unsafe. In June 1893 a grand attack by the Manāsir, Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah upon the Bani Kbalid was expected, and caravans for 'Oqair were again provided with military guards; but the raid did not take place.

In February 1894 a caravan on the way from Hofuf to Qatif was attacked and plundered by Bedouins of the Dawāsir tribe; but the robbers, on finding that it was under the protection of a Dōsiri Rafiq, made restitution. In 1895, the Mutasarrif having required the Bedouin tribes of Hasa to render an increased tribute, the 'Ajman pleaded their inability to pay until property raided from them by the Mutair should have been recovered, whereupon the Governor, with the assistance of the 'Ajman and other tribes, attacked the Mutair and captured some of their animals.

In April a post-runner was waylaid and robbed between Qatif and Hofuf by some Āl Morrah, and pursuit of the raiders was undertaken by mounted troops from Hofuf. Meanwhile, however, the Āl Morrah gang were attacked by Dawāsir, and the troops, coming up, saw and fell upon these last, with the result that two Turkish soldiers were killed and two wounded and that the Dawāsir took three of the cavalry horses.

In 1901 the road from Hofuf to 'Oqair again became very unsafe; and on the 30th of April 1902 a large caravan, while moving down to the coast under an escort of 120 regular cavalry, 30 regular infantry and 80 mounted Dhābitiyahs, was attacked and captured at Qōfdiyah, about 15 miles from 'Oqair, by Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir; among the Āl Morrah the Āl Bahāih section were prominent in this affair. The

escort were for the most part, either killed or taken prisoners and kept by the Bedouins as hostages for the safety of fellow-tribesmen then in jail at Hofuf. The booty of the robbers consisted of goods worth about Rs. 1,00,000 in addition to some 600 camels and 800 donkeys. In June 1902 Talib Pasha arrived as Mutasarrif of Hasa, and in July the Turkish garrison of the province was increased by 500 infantry, 200 cavalry and 4 light guns. On the 10th of September a column, sent out from Hofuf, succeeded in surprising a large camp of Āl Morrah at Zarnūqah, about 40 miles south of the Hasa Oasis; many Arabs were killed, including a brother of one of the Shaikhs of the Āl Bahaiih, and much Bedouin property fell into the hands of the Turks. The new Mutasarrif further interdicted the people of Hasa from trading with the Āl Morrah; and in October, after a skirmish with an Āl Morrah escort, a caravan of 80 camels, laden with rice and dates for the tribe, was captured by the Turks; on this occasion there were several casualties on the Turkish side. Probably with a view to strengthening their hold upon the Arab tribes, as also to asserting their sovereignty over the coast to the northward, the Turks, in 1902, established Dhabitiyah posts upon the islands of Musallamiyah and Jinnah.

At the beginning of 1903 the internal position must still have been unsatisfactory, for, in January of that year, another battalion was added to the Hasa garrison.

1906-07.

In January 1906 a serious fracas occurred at Ruqaiqah, a great Bedouin camping ground one mile to the south of Hofuf, between the 'Ajman and Āl Morrah tribes; but the Turks intervened and stopped the fighting. A day or two later Muhammad-bin-Sharaim, the chief Shaikh of the Āl Morrah, was murdered, and the tribe seem to have considered the Turks in some way responsible for the event; the result was that, on the 3rd of March following, a large caravan on the Hofuf-'Oqair road was ambuscaded by Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir and Manāsir at Baraimān, a place only five miles from Qofdiyah, where a similar disaster had taken place in 1902. On the present occasion the Turkish escort of 45 men and a number of camelmen and travellers were killed, and property to the value of Rs. 3,00,000 was carried off. No retributory measures were undertaken by the Turks; and in April, August and September other caravans were surprised and looted by Bedouins on various roads leading to or from the Hasa Oasis. In August a collision occurred between the inhabitants of Mubarraz and an encampment of the 'Ajman, in which several lives were lost; and in October a more serious conflict took place between the townspeople of Hofuf, aided by the Turks, and

Bedouins of more than one tribe; in this last affair the troops suffered about 20 casualties and temporarily lost a gun.\* At the end of December military reliefs from Basrah began to reach Hasa, and advantage was taken of the temporary increase of the garrison to overawe, and to some extent pacify, the Hasa Oasis and surrounding districts; the withdrawal of the relieved troops, who appeared somewhat shaken by the experiences which they had undergone on their service in Hasa, then commenced. In February 1907 Sa'adūn Pasha, the chief man of Mubarraz, and his son left in haste for Basrah to assure the Turkish authorities there of their innocence in regard to the disturbed state of Hasa.

#### Piracies upon the Hasa coast, 1881-1907.

Meanwhile the scourge of piracy continued upon the coast of the Hasa province, though generally in a milder form than during the epidemic of maritime lawlessness in 1878-80.

In May 1881 the celebrated Bani Hājir pirate, Zaid-bin-Muhammad, tried unsuccessfully to seize some boats belonging to the 'Amāir; petty piracies near Qatif and between Qatif and Bahrain followed; and finally the Bani Hājir attacked an 'Amāir boat and killed two men. Notwithstanding the fact that these outrages were committed in the immediate neighbourhood of Qatif, no steps were taken by the Turks to secure or chastise the Bani Hājir.

In June 1883 Bani Hājir pirates seized a Bahrain vessel near the coast of Qatif and plundered it, after mortally wounding the Nakhuda. A month later four slaves who had been carried off in the affair were restored to the owners through the Turkish authorities in Qatif.

In August 1884 Bani Hājir committed a piracy on a Qatar boat anchored off Qatif, and some members of the tribe were arrested by the Turkish authorities.

In 1886 a number of piracies occurred in the harbour of Qatif, in which boats belonging to Bahrain suffered. Their continuance unpunished was a cause of much disgust to the Shaikh of Bahrain, and a general

Piracies from 1881 to 1888 and Turkish inaction.

1881.

1883.

1884.

1886.

\* According to a letter received at Basrah from the Tābur Aghasi at Hofuf, the losses of the Turks were very much more severe: viz., two officers and 76 men killed, 59 men wounded, and 85 mules, 141 rifles and one gun lost; and the village of Shaqiq was plundered and burned by the Arabs. The gun, according to the same authority was bought back for \$700.

feeling of insecurity was diffused along the coast. A Turkish government steamer was anchored at Qatif when these outrages occurred, yet no attempt was made by the Turkish authorities to prevent them or to punish the malefactors.

1887.

In 1887 there was a large crop of offences. On the 1st of August a Bahrain boat was taken by Bani Hājir and robbed to the amount of Rs. 645; in July a Kuwait fishing boat was plundered off Rās Tanūrah of property worth \$400, four of the crew being wounded; in September a boat belonging to a brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain was looted by 80 Bedouins, in Qatif harbour, of every article of value; on the 14th of September a Kuwait boat off Dārin suffered loss, at the hands of a large band of Bedouins, to the extent of Rs. 2,318; on the 16th of October a Bahrain boat was pillaged off 'Anik by a gang of Bani Hājir; on the 22nd of October a Tārūt boat was similarly treated, also by Bani Hājir; and on the 27th of October two vessels, one belonging to Kuwait and the other to Bahrain, were attacked by Bani Hājir near 'Oqair, two sailors and five passengers were wounded, and everything moveable on board of either was carried off.

1888.

In April and May 1888 two or three more cases of piracy occurred in Qatif waters notwithstanding that Nāfiz Pāsha, Wālī of Basrah, had visited Qatif in the preceding February and taken security from Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārin for the prevention of piracy in the neighbourhood.

Discussions  
regarding  
Piracy  
between the  
British  
Government  
and the  
Porte, 1883-  
89.

In 1883, in connection with the piracy committed in that year, a reference was made to the Porte by Her Majesty's Government; but, in consequence of redress having been afforded, though incomplete, and of the undesirability of raising the question of Turkish jurisdiction on the eastern coast of Arabia, the proceedings were ultimately allowed to drop. In 1887 and 1888 several remonstrances were addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of maritime disorders in the neighbourhood of Qatif; but the only result was the despatch of an additional Turkish gunboat to the Hasa coast. This was a futile proceeding, for the Bani Hājir, whom it was chiefly necessary to coerce, were not a maritime tribe and only carried on their piratical practices by means of borrowed or stolen boats, while the waters which they frequented were generally too shallow for effective action by an armed steam vessel. An increase of the Turkish naval force in the Persian Gulf, besides being useless, was undesirable; and an effort was therefore made to impress on the Porte the greater need for action on land, with the result, apparently, that in 1889 a military post for the prevention of piracy was temporarily estab-

lished on Rās Tanūrah. The trouble taken by Her Majesty's Government was not altogether thrown away, for there was now a brief cessation of piracy, and, when outrages recommenced, some attempt was made by the Turks to deal with the pirates on land.

In the pearl fishing seasons of 1891 and 1892 piratical offences abounded once more on the coast of Hasa. On the 18th of June 1891 a gang of 14 men, believed to be Bani Hājir, boarded a Shū'ai lying at Saihāt, killed one of the crew, and threw the others into the sea; Turkish troops were apparently sent in pursuit of the raiders. The same gang then attacked another boat, which, after killing one of the crew, they completely stripped; and a Turkish gunboat went to search for them, but they could not be found. In July a Qatif Shū'ai was boarded by 18 Bani Hājir near 'Oqair, one of the crew was wounded, all property on board and the gear of the vessel herself were taken, and two slaves and a cousin of the Nākhuda were carried away; in this case a Turkish military detachment turned out, but effected nothing. On the 20th of August, 16 Bani Hājir took possession of a Shū'ai from Tāhiri, a place on the Persian coast, with cargo for Bahrain and plundered her of goods to the value of Rs. 2,495, which they landed at Dōhat-as-Salwa; the Turks in this case took no action. In the next year, on the 1st of May 1892, a Bahrain boat putting into Dārin on the way to Qatif was pillaged by three Bedouins. On the 21st of May two Qatif Shū'ais were seized by Bani Hājir; but one was recovered, after pursuit of the pirates, by Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, a notable of Qatif. On the 6th of June a gang of 25 Bani Hājir seized a Baghlah at Qatif and plundered a Qatif vessel of her cargo and gear besides Rs. 1,300 in cash; an armed boat was sent after the pirates by the Turks, but failed to come up with them. Finally, in September, a party of Bani Hājir Bedouins attacked a boat from Hasineh on the Persian coast while beached at Qatif, killed the Nākhuda, wounded two of the crew and carried off \$700; in this instance Turkish troops went in pursuit and captured 10 of the robbers, but none of the booty was recovered. In 1892 a boat containing 20 Turkish soldiers was detailed by the authorities at Qatif to convoy boats passing between that place and Bahrain; but even after this some petty piracies occurred and went unpunished.

With a view to the restoration of order it was proposed in 1891 by Colonel Talbot, Resident in the Persian Gulf, and recommended by Colonel Mockler, Resident at Baghdād, that the consent of the Ottoman Government should be obtained to the action of British cruisers in Qatif waters, either in combination with or independently of Turkish vessels;

Fresh  
outbreak of  
piracy and  
ineffectual  
action by the  
Turks, 1891-  
1892.

British  
proceedings  
in regard to  
the piracies  
of 1891-1892

but Her Majesty's Government decided that the scheme of separate action by British cruisers adopted in 1881 should continue to be followed, and that Turkish co-operation should not be invited. In some of the cases of piracy partial redress had been afforded by the Turks; and it was decided by Her Majesty's Government to refrain, in these circumstances, from further demands for reparation.

Further  
piracies.

In September 1893 a Kuwait vessel, beached at Qatif, was attacked by 15 robbers; one of the crew was wounded and one of the marauders killed. Pursuit was made by Turkish customs guards, but was ineffectual.

In 1895 a single Arab,\* while travelling as a passenger in a boat from Qatif to Bahrain with Tek Chand Dwarka Das of the Indian firm of Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Co. in Bahrain, made a brutal and treacherous attack upon his Hindu fellow passenger. The Baniyah, by throwing himself overboard, escaped with the loss of a hand and other severe wounds; and the Arab then caused himself to be landed upon the coast with all the valuables—chiefly pearls—which the boat contained, estimated at Rs. 40,000. From the records it does not appear that satisfaction was ever demanded or obtained for this heinous outrage upon a British subject.

1896.

In 1896 Turkish gunboats were present more continuously than usual on the Hasa coast; but the Bani Hājir, nevertheless, committed some piracies in Bahrain waters.

Serious  
recrudescence  
of piracy,  
1899-1900.

In 1899 a fresh outbreak of piracy began along the shores of Hasa; it was directed, as usual, chiefly against Bahrain shipping, the richest and the most defenceless in those seas.

The first case brought home to Turkish subjects was the plunder, on the 11th August 1899, of a Bahrain jolly-boat upon the Shiqqatah pearl bank to the north-west of Bahrain; the robbers were 'Amāir of Hālat Dārīn on Tārūt Island, and the loss caused was estimated at Rs. 1,500.

The next year, on the 17th of August 1900, another Bahrain boat was boarded off Rās Tanūrah, again by natives of Dārīn; property to the value of Rs. 3,924 was carried off, and a passenger who threw himself into the sea to escape the pirates was drowned. On the 2nd of September 1900 a Bahrain vessel was taken at sea, only a few miles north of Manāmah town, by Bani Hājir buccaneers, the damage done on this occasion amounting to Rs. 732; and on the same day a predatory attack was made, likewise by Bani Hājir, upon some Arabs on the island

\* This Arab was apparently Ahmad-bin-Salman, who afterwards became a notorious pirate. See two pages further on.

of Umm Na'asān. On the 6th of September a Bahrain boat was attacked near 'Oqir by Bani Hājir of the Āl Muhammad section; two men were wounded and much property was carried away, of which the bulk belonged to merchants of Hasa.

In the last of these instances Sa'īd Pāsha, the Mutasarrif of Hasa, bestirred himself to the extent of sending out troops by whom tribal camels were seized and Shaikhs arrested, and the Hasa merchants received compensation, but none was obtained by such of the sufferers as happened to be subjects of Bahrain; and in the Shiqqatah and Rās Tanūrah cases partial redress only was afforded to the Bahrain complainants. The matter was accordingly brought, through the British Consul at Basrah, to the notice of the Wāli; but the latter treated the subject nonchalantly and ultimately refused to disavow it on the ground that Bahrain was a Turkish, not a British, dependency.

In August 1901 fresh demands for indemnification and for the suppression of piracy were made on the Wāli of Basrah, but without apparent result. So far as could be learned, the only Turkish measure for maintaining security at sea off Hasa continued to be, as in the past, the rare despatch from Qatif to Bahrain of an armed boat, which, after remaining for a few days at Manāmah, was accustomed to return direct to the Turkish coast.

Accordingly, with a view to ascertaining the steps, if any, taken by the local Turkish authorities, a visit by H. M. S. "Sphinx" to Qatif was authorised, and in February 1902 was carried out; but the results were unsatisfactory, and no information of the kind desired was obtained. On the other hand the Commander of the British vessel and the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, who accompanied him, were treated with marked discourtesy; they were detained first at the customs house and then at the port office, they had great difficulty even in obtaining an interview with the Qāim-Māqam, and they were prevented from entering the town.

In 1902 a fresh series of maritime outrages began, and a new pirate leader made his appearance, who soon proved himself a worthy successor of Zāid-bin-Muhammad; this was Ahmad-bin-Salmān, the son of a member of the ruling family of Bahrain by a daughter of a Shaikh of the Āl Muhammad section of the Bani Hājir. Ahmad had been for long an outlaw from the Bahrain islands and had lived for a time in Qatar, but he was now virtually domiciled in Turkish territory.

Early in July 1902 this individual, with some Bani Hājir companions, stole a boat from Saihāt near Qatif and put to sea for nefarious pur-

Behaviour of  
the Turks in  
regard to the  
piracies of  
1899-1900.

Visit of  
H.M.S.  
"Sphinx"  
to Qatif,  
1902.

Piracies of  
Ahmad-bin-  
Salmān,  
1902-1907.



poses ; but, having been driven on shore shortly afterwards by adverse winds, the boat was recovered by an armed party from Saihāt. On the 4th of August Ahmad succeeded in carrying off another boat from Sanābis on the island of Tārūt ; and, after crossing on the same day to the island of Umm Na'asān in the Bahrain principality, he seized a Bahrain boat of 28 tons burden, which he took over to Dhahrān along with its crew and cargo. On the 12th of August, he utilised his new prize to capture another Bahrain vessel off Dha'āin in Qatar and returned to his base of operations, which was now at Dōhat Dhalūn, with plunder worth Rs. 5,400, chiefly in pearls. Up to this time Ahmad had retained some connection with Qatar, where his family in September 1902 were still living at Sumaismah, and he had disposed there of part of the proceeds of his Umm Na'asān raid ; but the fruits of his second piracy were bestowed in Turkish territory, and his family soon followed him thither. In October 1902, on representations made by the British authorities to the Wali of Basrah, Ahmad seems to have been captured by the Mutasarrif of Hasa. That official, in response to a request made direct and not through British intermediacy, returned a slave taken in the second piracy to the owner at Bahrain, and intimated that the rest of the stolen property was being recovered.

1903.

In July of 1903 news was received that Ahmad, who had meanwhile been released or allowed to escape, was encamped with four 'Amāir companions at 'Anik, and subsequently at Saihāt, waiting for an opportunity to recommence his depredations. The fact was brought to the notice of the Ottoman authorities, who professed in reply that an effort had been made to arrest him and that he had escaped along the coast in the direction of Kuwait ; but the worthlessness of their assertions was soon demonstrated by Ahmad's reappearance in Hasa, where on the 15th of August he made an unsuccessful attempt to seize a boat at Dammām. He was then tried in his absence by the Hasa courts and was said to have been condemned " par contumace " to fifteen years' imprisonment.

1904.

Nothing more was heard of Ahmad until the summer of 1904, when, early in August, he commandeered a boat on the Qatif coast near Safwa ; and a few days later, with 14 companions, he boarded a Qatar vessel anchored on the Faslit-ad-Dibal and carried off plunder to the value of Rs. 3,642. This was the only piracy in connection with which his name was specifically mentioned in 1904 ; but the Turkish coast continued unsafe, and, on the night of the 4th of December 1904, a Persian Būm lying at Qatif was entered by robbers who killed three of the crew and carried off property worth \$2,000. In this case

the authorities at first arrested three inhabitants of Tārūt Island and two others, on suspicion ; but in the end the Persians got no satisfaction. A few weeks later the Persians returned in a sailing boat with a considerable force and attacked the first local boat they saw, which happened to belong to Dārin, killing three Turkish subjects.

On the 25th of June 1905, his family being then settled at 'Anik near Qatif, Ahmad-bin-Salmān re-appeared and captured a boat, and on the next day he took another boat ; in these proceedings two men were killed and two wounded, and property valued at Rs. 3,600 was carried away. A month later 10 Bedouins in a Shū'ai, calling themselves followers of Ahmad, held up a vessel between Qatif and Bahrain, from which, after killing a boy and wounding two men, they removed property worth about Rs. 1,000. In October three Bedouins, who were proceeding as passengers in a boat from Dōhah in Qatar to Bahrain, suddenly fell upon and murdered another passenger, robbed all the other persons on board, and compelled the boatmen to change their course and sail to the Dhahrān shore in Hasa.

1905.

Early in July 1906 Ahmad-bin-Salmān woke to life once more and seized two small Bahrain boats on the coast of Dhahrān while the crews were collecting firewood ; one he disabled, and in the other he embarked with his companions, some 10 men of the Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah tribes. The pirates, most of whom, being landmen, suffered severely from sea-sickness, spent a week ashore near Rās-al-Buraīqat during a spell of bad weather, after which they moved to Dōhat 'Ain-as-Saih. On the 14th of July they fell in with a Budaiya' Būm, carrying passengers for Qatif ; this vessel carried only two firearms, but the owners made good use of them and not only wounded Ahmad himself but killed his most enterprising lieutenant, one of the Āl Morrah. This misadventure put an end to the proceedings of the gang for the season.

1906.

In June and July 1905 Captain F. B. Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, made two sailing trips of about four days' duration each in search of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, on which he was accompanied by about 50 of the armed retainers of the Shaikh of Bahrain ; but the whereabouts of the pirate could not be discovered. A fugitive slave of Ahmad, an eye-witness of the second piracy committed by his master during the season, was however found by Captain Prideaux and was sent to Qatif to give evidence before the Turkish authorities ; the Qāim-Maqām there apparently threw the witness into prison, but he also arrested four of the followers of Ahmad,—a step to which the gang replied by a third piracy, committed in July. In September Captain Prideaux visited Qatif and had

British  
action in  
regard to the  
piracies of  
Ahmad-bin-  
Salmān.  
1905-07.

a friendly interview with a new Qāim-Maqām who had recently arrived ; the meeting resulted in the release of the slave witness, who was subsequently manumitted.

In the summer of 1906, in consequence of the re-appearance of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, a British gunboat remained at Bahrain or on the banks during the greater part of the pearl-fishing season. In August the pirate paid a visit to Dōhah, and, though it appeared to have been of a furtive character, an explanation was required of Shaikh Jāsim ; but no further action was taken.

1907.

In June 1907, in consequence of a report that Ahmad was about to recommence his depredations, H.M.S. "Lapwing" visited Qatif in order that her commander might discuss the subject amicably with the Qāim-Maqām ; but the meeting was declined, and the British officer and his party were treated with gross discourtesy, regarding which representations were made to the Porte by His Majesty's Government.

#### British relations with Hasa, 1871-1907.

Political and  
general  
relations.

The relations of the British Government with Hasa during the period now under examination, for the most part either arose out of piracies, and have therefore been already described, or had reference to Bahrain and will be noticed in a later paragraph. Here it may be mentioned that in 1884 the "Mubārak," a vessel belonging to a British Indian trader in Bahrain, was impressed by the Turkish authorities at Qatif to carry troops to 'Oqair ; but, the matter having been represented at Constantinople, compensation was promised and assessed at Rs. 50.

Commercial  
relations.

We have adverted above\* to the establishment at Qatif, before the Turkish annexation, of an Indian trading community ; and we may now trace the subsequent history of the settlement.

1871-1890.

With the effective occupation of Hasa by the Turks and the institution of custom houses the period most favourable to foreign trade probably came to an end ; but the affairs of the British Indian colony remained in a flourishing condition for some years longer. It has been estimated that, when the prosperity of the Hindu merchants was still at its height, trade worth not less than 15 lakhs of rupees per annum used to pass through their hands ; and in the busy season when temporary visitors were added to their number, as many as 60 trading Hindus, all however unaccompanied by their families, might be found simultaneously

*Vide page 965 ante.*

at Qatif. About 1880 Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Company, one of the leading Hindu firms in Bahrain, made an effort to improve their position by establishing a strong agency in charge of Hindus at Qatif ; and their example was followed by another Indian house.

Ultimately, however, in consequence of the exactions of the customs 1890-97. contractors and of obstacles thrown in their way by the port officials at the instigation of local merchants, the trade of the Hindus began to decline. Merchandise exported to India was liable to a duty of 1 per cent. only ; but the duty was collected at the time of shipment at a rate of 8 per cent., the amount leviable on goods exported to Persia, and in practice the rebate of 7 per cent., legally recoverable on proof of arrival of the consignments in India, was seldom or never obtained from the contractors. The excess duty thus recovered from the Indian traders in three seasons was estimated, at the end of 1894, at Rs. 19,500 ; but the refund obtained in consequence of representations by the British Government amounted to Rs. 5,012 only. The other principal difficulties from which the Hindus suffered were intentional delays in weighing of their goods by the customs authorities, detention of their vessels for unreasonable periods in quarantine, executive orders which made it impossible for them to obtain animals for transport, and failure of the Turkish authorities to assist them in the recovery of debts. Political disorders and lawlessness eventually increased the difficulties of the situation ; and, after the serious outrage committed in 1895 on one of the agents of Messrs. Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Co., the Hindus gradually withdrew from Qatif altogether. Their business, by 1897, had fallen to a half or even one-third of its former amount ; and what remained was conducted on disadvantageous terms through local Muhammadan agents.

With characteristic pertinacity, however, the British Indian traders of Bahrain clung to the idea of re-establishing their position at Qatif ; and in 1901 they offered to contribute Rs. 1,200 a year for 5 years towards the pay of a British consular representative at Qatif, should one be appointed. In November 1903, on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to Bahrain, they renewed their request for consular protection in Hasa ; and they subsequently offered to guarantee a contribution of Rs. 2,000 a year. The necessity for some action was clear, inasmuch as the sum wrongly recovered as customs duty at Qatif from British Indian merchants amounted, in the year 1903 alone, to not less than Rs. 25,000. Representations were accordingly made to the Turkish Government on the subject of these exactions, and a promise was obtained from the Wālī of Basrah that they should be discontinued, and that items already levied

in excess should be refunded. In consequence of these assurances a scheme which had been prepared for British consular representation, *viz.*, to obtain recognition of the Political Agent in Bahrain as Vice-Consul for Hasa and to post a native agent under his orders to Qatif, was again laid aside.

#### External relations of Hasa other than those with Great Britain, 1871-1907.

The close connection of Hasa with Bahrain, due to the commercial dependence of the province upon that Shaikhdom, necessarily continued under Turkish rule. Bahrain was the principality most seriously affected by the piratical developments, already described, upon the Turkish coast; and Hasa was naturally the base from which, as explained in the history of Bahrain, the Turks sought to assert their influence over those islands.

One tragic incident, however, unconnected with either of these questions, falls to be noticed here. At the end of 1900 Salmān-bin-Dī'aj, a first cousin of 'Īsa-bin-'Alī, the ruling Shaikh of Bahrain, proceeded on a hawking expedition, with his sons Dī'aj and Bishr and a nephew named 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Rāshid, to the coast of the Dhahrān district in Hasa. The Shaikhs were accompanied by 20 servants and by four Bedouin Rafiqs; of the Rafiqs one belonged to the Āl Morrah, one to the 'Ajmān, and two to the Bani Hājir tribe. In the early morning of the 3rd of December 1900 the party were suddenly attacked in their camp at the Bin-'Aqdān well, five miles inland from Dohat 'Ain-as-Saih, by a band of about 50 Āl Morrah Bedouins of the Āl Bahaiḥ section, headed by Rāshid-bin-Maqāriḥ, a chief of the Āl Bahaiḥ, one of whose sons had been killed in the previous year, in pursuance of a blood feud, by 'Amāmarah subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Of the Bahrain party only Bishr, the son of Shaikh Salmān, and two of the tribal representatives escaped,—alive though not unwounded; and a Dōsirī of Bahrain, who belonged to a separate hunting party but happened to be in Shaikh Salmān's tent when the surprise took place, shared the fate of his entertainers. On the side of the assailants the leader Rāshid with one of his sons was killed, and one or more tribesmen were wounded. Thirty camels and twenty rifles were part of the spoil carried off by the Āl Bahaiḥ, whose object was probably plunder rather than reprisals—not warranted in the circumstances by any Arab custom—against the Shaikh of Bahrain.

The corpses of Shaikh Salmān and his party were buried by Muḥammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Qatif who went to the spot for the purpose.

Through the British Consul at Basrah this massacre was brought to the notice of the Wālī of the Basrah without delay, and the Turkish authorities at first held out hopes of early redress. At this early stage of the matter they probably underestimated the difficulty of coercing the Āl Bahaiḥ and feared retaliatory measures by the Shaikh of Bahrain against the tribe; indeed their apprehensions of action by the Shaikh were unmistakably betrayed in letters which they addressed to him. Soon, however, having become aware of the elusive habits of the offending section and also, no doubt, of the intention of the British Government to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain from immediate reprisals, their anxiety to placate the latter grew perceptibly cool.

Serious representations to the Porte were delayed for a time by doubts on the part of His Majesty's Government as to the expediency of admitting that Turkish territory extended so far south as the scene of the occurrence; but they were eventually made, in August 1901, on the ground that the Āl Bahaiḥ had retired into country under Turkish control. Before the occurrence of a Turkish disaster, which has already been mentioned above, at Qōfdiyah near 'Oqair in April 1902, the Turkish Government had so far yielded to the British representations regarding the Dhahrān massacre as to send stringent orders to their local officers for the arrest and punishment of the murderers. The fact that the Āl Bahaiḥ had taken a leading part in the Qōfdiyah affair subsequently supplied the Turks with a separate incentive to action; and for a short time the negotiations in the Shaikh of Bahrain's case assumed a more promising aspect, especially after the success of the Ottoman troops against the Āl Morrah in September 1902.

Meanwhile the Shaikh of Bahrain had been asked by the Government of India to state the reparation to which he considered himself entitled, and had replied that the murder of three of his own relations could only be expiated by the surrender to him, without conditions, of an equal number of the Āl Bahaiḥ; that blood-money to the amount of Rs. 23,520 was due to him on account of the 20 retainers and the Dōsirī visitor; and that the value of the property plundered was Rs. 11,620. The Turks demurred to the claim, both on account of its nature and its amount; and it is probable that their successes against the tribe were not, in fact, more than sufficient to wipe out their own claims arising from the Qōfdiyah outrage. In the interim the Āl Bahaiḥ, through the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar, had made advances to the Shaikh of Bahrain for

an amicable settlement, and the Shaikh had been authorised by the British Government to respond ; but the Āl Bahaiḥ eventually hung back, and the intended negotiations did not take place.

In 1903, no steps having as yet been taken by the Turkish authorities to compensate the Shaikh of Bahrain for the massacre, discussion of the case was resumed between the British Government and the Porte. An assertion by the Porte that the murderers had all been killed in subsequent encounters with the Turkish troops having been disproved, and the unwillingness or inability of the Turks to take further action having become clear, His Majesty's Government decided that the Shaikh of Bahrain might be authorised to proceed in his own way against the Āl Bahaiḥ, provided that nothing was done in territory recognised as Turkish. This decision was communicated to the Porte in October 1904, but it was withheld from the Shaikh in consequence of his misconduct in certain matters which form part of the history of Bahrain.

In February 1905 a fresh outrage on Bahrain subjects was committed by the Āl Bahaiḥ tribe at Dōhat Huwaiqil in Barr-al-Qārah. The victims on this occasion were the crews of two Māshuwahs from Hadd on Muharraq Island, who had landed to collect firewood ; they were attacked by a gang of 35 Bedouins, two of their number were dangerously wounded by the bullets of the Āl Bahaiḥ, and a slave belonging to the party was carried off. In 1907 it appeared that the Āl Bahaiḥ, whom the Shaikh had prohibited from visiting Bahrain, considered themselves, on this account, as at feud with the whole Arab population of the islands.

The Turkish Mutasarrifs of Hasa were, after the occupation of the province, the principal instruments of the Turkish policy of expansion on the side of Qatar and Trucial 'Omān ; but their proceedings in this respect, belonging rather to the history of Qatar, are described in another place.

Relations  
with Qatar  
and Trucial  
'Omān.

Relations  
with Kuwait.

The use of Kuwait to some extent as a base of operations and the assistance given by the Shaikh of Kuwait in the Turkish conquest of Hasa in 1871 have been noticed above, as has also the co-operation of a Kuwait contingent under Shaikh Muḥarak to restore order in Hasa in 1893. Towards the end of 1899 an Irādē, authorising the construction of a line of telegraph from Basrah to Qatif which would necessarily have passed through Kuwait, was issued by the Sultān of Turkey ; but no steps were taken to give the scheme effect.

Relations  
with Najd.

The negotiations and other dealings of the Turks in Hasa with the Wahhābi rulers of Central Arabia have been described above in so far as

they related to the occupation of Hasa by the Turks and to the further designs of the Porte upon Najd. In 1892 asylum and a pension were provided by the Turks for 'Ahdur Rahmān, the fugitive head of the Āl Sa'ūd of Najd, who had been expelled from Central Arabia by Ibn-Rashīd.

Occasional communication was held also with Ibn-Rashīd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar. Thus in March 1894 the 'Ajmān tribe, having been attacked by Ibn-Rashīd, apparently in the coastal tract of Salā' towards Kuwait, appealed to the Turks for redress on the ground of their being tributary to the Porte, and the Mutasarrif of Hasa wrote on their behalf to the Amīr ; but to his letter Ibn-Rashīd merely replied that the 'Ajmān were robbers, and that action had been taken against them in the interests of law and order. In 1895 Ibn-Rashīd complained that intercourse between Kuwait and Najd was being interrupted by the raids of the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah and other tribes nominally subject to Turkey, and requested the Mutasarrif of Hasa either to reduce them to order or to permit him to do so ; but the only response to this request seems to have been an attack by the Turks assisted by the 'Ajmān upon the Mutāir, a tribe generally regarded as under the protection of the Amīr, of which an account has already been given above.

In July and August 1905 'Ahdul 'Aziz, son of the Wahhābi Amīr, whose power had again superseded that of Ibn-Rashīd in Central Arabia, paid a visit to the part of the Jāfūrah desert adjoining Dōhat-as-Salwa. His presence, though he was nominally at this time a Turkish official, appeared to be embarrassing to the authorities in Hasa ; but he hospitably received a Turkish Tāhūr Āghāsi who was deputed to call on him in his camp at Da'ailij in Jāfūrah.

## CHAPTER VII.

## HISTORY OF KUWAIT.\*

## Early History.

Foundation  
of Kuwait by  
the 'Utūb,  
1716.

The foundation of the town of Kuwait, though a modern event, is the subject of various and conflicting traditions. The first settlers, however, almost certainly belonged to the 'Utūb, a tribe consisting of three principal divisions, the Jalāhimah, Āl Khalifah and Āl Subāh, and said to be derived from the 'Anizah of northern Central Arabia. † Kuwait seems to have come into existence about the commencement of the 18th century, according to one account in 1716; and from the name it may reasonably be conjectured that the place was in the beginning an ordinary Arab settlement protected by a small fort. According to a tradition preserved by the Āl Subāh family who now govern Kuwait, the reason why the ancestors of their section came to Kuwait was that they had been expelled by the Turks from Umm Qasr upon Khor Zubair, an earlier seat from which they had been accustomed to prey as brigands upon the caravans of Basrah and as pirates upon the shipping of the Shatt-al-'Arab. When the settlement at Kuwait was formed, the Jalāhimah section were headed by one Jābir, the Āl Khalifah by Khalifah-bin-Muhammad, and the Āl Subāh—according to one tradition—by a Shaikh named

\* For facts in regard to the history of Kuwait, we are not so entirely dependent as in the case of Qatar, Bahrain and Hasa on official records and compilations, and the following published works may be cited: Ives' *Voyage*, 1773; Seetzen in Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz*, July to December 1805; Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahabys*, 1834; Stoequeler's *Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage*, 1832; Pelly and Colvill's *Recent Tour round the Northern Portion of the Persian Gulf*, in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, Volume XVII, 1865; Pelly's *Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, 1866; and Pelly's *Report on the Tribes, etc., around the shores of the Persian Gulf*, 1874. The official publications containing most information are: *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf*, 1801-53, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Kuwait Affairs*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Najd Affairs*, 1804-1904, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency.

† There is also a division known as the Āl Fādhil, but they have played no part in history.

Sulaimān-bin-Ahmad; and the Āl Subāh enjoyed some sort of political predominance over the other divisions of the tribe. According to another authority the chief Shaikh of the Āl Subāh at the time of the foundation of Kuwait was one Rahim.

In the first fifty years after its foundation, the town of Kuwait grew rapidly in wealth and importance; and the 'Utūb, partly by means of matrimonial alliances with other tribes in the neighbourhood, succeeded in making their position good against the Bani Khālid, who till shortly before had dominated the whole north-eastern coast of Arabia. The chief of Kuwait from about 1756 to about 1762 was Shaikh Subāh, who was succeeded by his son, Shaikh 'Abdullah.

In 1758, when Dr. Ives and his party passed through Khārag on their way from India to Europe, friendly relations prevailed between Baron Knipphausen, the head of the Dutch settlement on Khārag, and the Shaikh of Kuwait, "a man greatly obliged to him, and in some measure under his influence"; and it occurred to the Baron that arrangements might be made through the Shaikh for the British travellers to accompany a caravan proceeding from Kuwait by the desert to Aleppo—a route which, though more arduous, was shorter in time than that by Basrah and Baghdad. A boat was accordingly sent, on the 31st of March, to fetch the Shaikh from Kuwait to Khārag; but he did not make his appearance until the 14th of April; and his demands, when he came, were so extortionate and so firmly maintained as to make the Baron secretly doubtful of the expediency of the plan which he had himself proposed. The British party, on becoming aware of this, relieved him from his embarrassment by suggesting that, for various reasons, they should continue their journey by the Basrah-Baghdad route.

In 1766, in circumstances of which no explanation except one probably fanciful is extant, the Āl Khalifah division of the 'Utūb separated themselves from the rest of the tribe and removed to Zubārah in Qatar, where they became an independent colony. They were followed, after a short interval, by the Jalāhimah; and the Āl Subāh remained in exclusive possession of Kuwait.

Friendly relations between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and those of Zubārah must, if ever interrupted, have shortly been resumed, for in 1776 one of the Shaikhs and a number of the chief inhabitants of Kuwait took refuge at Zubārah in consequence of the capture of Basrah by the Persians. The fall of Basrah did not, however, injure Kuwait; on the contrary, a considerable part of the trade of Basrah was diverted, during the Persian occupation of that place, to Kuwait.

Rapid growth  
of the  
settlement,  
1716-66.

Relations of  
the Dutch at  
Khārag with  
the Shaikh  
of Kuwait,  
1758.

Emigration  
of the Āl  
Khalifah and  
Jalāhimah  
from Kuwait  
to Zubārah  
in Qatar,  
1766.

Effect on  
Kuwait of  
the capture  
of Basrah by  
the Persians,  
1776-79.

Opening of  
British  
relations  
with Kuwait,  
1775-78.

The recorded history of British relations with Kuwait opens in 1775, when, on the investment of Basrah by the Persians, the British desert mail from the Gulf to Aleppo began to be despatched from Kuwait instead of Zubair. This arrangement was continued during the Persian occupation of Basrah until 1779, but it did not work very satisfactorily as the messengers were not under any proper control, and one packet was lost *en route* about the end of 1778.

Kuwait a  
dependency  
of Basrah,  
1775.

In 1775 Kuwait was regarded as a dependency of Basrah; and, at the breaking up of the Anglo-Turkish squadron at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab on the departure of the British Agency to Büshehr, it was considered a safe place at which to drop the Turkish and Arab personnel.

Arrest of a  
French officer  
at Kuwait by  
a member of  
the H. E. I.  
Company's  
Basrah  
Factory,  
1778.

An unusual incident occurred at Kuwait at the end of 1778, or possibly in January 1779. On the 3rd of August 1778 M. Borel du Bourg, a young French officer, left Marseilles with despatches in cypher for the French authorities in Pondichery and Mauritius. He was travelling from Aleppo to the Persian Gulf, when, in the desert at about 15 days' journey from Basrah, a party of Bedouin Arabs threatened him, and he had the misfortune to shoot one of their number. Severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he saved his life by throwing himself on the protection of the oldest of the robbers and promising to pay a sum equal to £100 English on condition of being conveyed in safety to Kuwait. On arrival at Kuwait he succeeded in borrowing the promised amount from an Armenian of the place, after which he wrote to M. Rousseau, the French Consul at Basrah, desiring to be supplied with the means of continuing his journey to Pondichery. The French Resident having refused or hesitated to honour the draft of his fellow-countryman, it was carried by the Arab messenger to the British Factory at Basrah, of which the staff in this manner became aware of M. du Bourg's presence in Kuwait.

A difficult question was thus raised, for a report had reached Basrah of war having been\* declared between Britain and France, in which case it would be incumbent on British officials abroad to seize wandering French emissaries; but, on the other hand, the consequences to the British Resident were likely to be serious if he took action against M. du Bourg on information which subsequently proved to be incorrect. Mr. W. Digges Latouche in charge of the British Factory,

\* The report was not incorrect. From 1778 to 1783 there was war between France and Britain, in consequence of the former power having openly sided with the United States of America in their War of Independence.

"perhaps as benevolent, humane and generous a being as ever existed," decided in the end that the Freuchman must be arrested, and sent his Second in Council, Mr. Abraham, in a cruiser, to put the resolution in effect. The vessel anchored out of sight of the town; and after dark Mr. Abraham, accompanied by the captain Mr. Sheriff, a man of remarkably powerful physique, proceeded on shore in a boat. The chief obstacle to the execution of their orders was the opposition of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who, though a well-wisher of the British Government, was strongly averse to the seizure of a person at the time enjoying his hospitality; after a protracted argument, however, his objections were withdrawn, principally, it would seem, in consequence of an assertion that M. du Bourg was a fraudulently absconding debtor. The British representatives then proceeded to M. du Bourg's house, and, on the door being opened by the French officer, who was in momentary expectation of a reply from the French Resident at Basrah and appeared dressed in nothing but his shirt, Captain Sheriff seized him in his arms and held him fast, while Mr. Abraham searched his apartments. The despatches were found; but M. du Bourg succeeded in destroying the key of the cypher, which was concealed in the lining of his coat, and their meaning was never ascertained.

It is pleasant to know that on arrival at Basrah M. du Bourg, whose misfortunes seem to have excited the greatest commiseration in his captors, and who was so incensed against M. Rousseau that he refused to hold any communication with the French Consulate, became the object of "every respect and attention" in the British Factory; that his wound, which for want of treatment had grown dangerous, was cured; and that he was eventually despatched on his homeward journey *via* Aleppo "with every assistance he could receive from the gentlemen of our Factory."

As related in the history of Bahrain, the 'Utüb of Kuwait took a leading part in the expulsion of the Persians from those islands and in the reduction of Bahrain to an Arab principality under their 'Atbi kinsmen of Zubārah. Three years previously, in 1780, they and their fellow-tribesmen of Zuhārah had been at war with the Ka'ab tribe of 'Arabistān; but the circumstances are not known.

Kuwait, of which the prosperity was at this time considered to stand necessarily in an inverse ratio to that of Basrah, benefited greatly through the occupation of the latter town by the Persians, in consequence of which the whole Indian trade with Baghdād, Aleppo, Smyrna and Constantinople was between 1775 and 1779 diverted to it. Even

Participation  
of the 'Utüb  
of Kuwait in  
the 'Atbi  
conquest of  
Bahrain,  
1783.

Trade of  
Kuwait,  
1775-90.

after this, until 1781, merchandise for Aleppo was sometimes forwarded by direct caravan from Kuwait, thus escaping the duties levied by the Pasha of Baghdād on goods forwarded through Basrah. By 1790 Kuwait had begun to share in the commercial prosperity which the seizure of Bahrain had brought to the whole 'Utūb tribe by drawing them into the carrying trade; and goods were imported from Masqat, Zubārah, Bahrain and Qatif. Merchants were efficiently protected at Kuwait, and the duty on imported goods was levied at the low rate of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.

#### Temporary location of the Basrah (British) Factory at Kuwait, 1793-95.

Staff and  
establish-  
ment of the  
Factory.

On account of difficulties with Turkish officials, described elsewhere in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, the staff of the British Factory at Basrah withdrew from that place on the 30th of April 1793\* and established themselves temporarily at Kuwait, where they remained until the 26th of August 1795. From the selection of Kuwait as a place of retreat from the Turks, it is clear that, whatever may have been the case in 1775, it was not in any real sense a Turkish dependency in 1793. The head of the factory was Mr. S. Manesty, a gentleman who played a conspicuous and somewhat eccentric part in the relations of Britain with Turkish 'Iraq about this period; and among those who accompanied him in his migration were the Joint Factor, Mr. Harford Jones, afterwards Sir Harford Jones Brydges, British Envoy to Persia; also a Mr. Reinaud, who at a later time attained celebrity as the first European visitor to Dara'iyah in Najd. For the protection of the British Factory at Kuwait a small cruiser was kept anchored in the bay, and a guard of sepoy under a native officer was stationed on shore. The staff of the Factory suffered much discomfort at Kuwait from the intense heat, which caused them sleepless nights, and from "the supply of water,.....infamously bad in quality, being at once salt, sweet and bitter"; and failure of health after a time obliged Mr. Harford Jones to proceed on leave to Europe.

\* In Sir Harford Jones Brydges' *Wahauhy* the date is given as 1792, but this is probably a misprint.

During the sojourn of the factory at Kuwait the Wahhābis were at war with the place, which they were anxious to reduce to submission; and they frequently showed themselves in the neighbourhood, causing incessant alarms. The town was at this time poorly defended by a mud wall, which, in the rainy season, frequently crumbled down in large breaches to the great alarm of the inhabitants; but the courage of the people was sustained by their confidence in Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, described as a venerable old man of commanding appearance, whom they regarded more as a father than as a governor. In general a Wahhābi attack did not amount to more than a temporary seizure of the wells by a party of ten or twenty Bedouins, whom the matchlockmen of the town ordinarily succeeded in dislodging after a bloodless skirmish at very long ranges; but belated wanderers near the town were treated by the Wahhābis with great inhumanity, the women being carried off and the men instantly put to death. It is recorded, on the authority of Dr. Seetzen, that Mr. Reinaud on one occasion actually saw two Wahhābis murder an unfortunate Kuwaiti upon the seashore and wash their hands in his blood. During the stay of the East India Company's servants at Kuwait only one serious attack in force, which was easily repulsed, was made by the Wahhābis. The real attitude of the British Factory towards these conflicts is uncertain: in theory it was one of neutrality.\*

Wahhābi  
aggressions  
on Kuwait,  
1793-95.

\* The statements made by Sir H. J. Brydges in his *Wahauhy* (pages 12 to 16) and by Mr. Reinaud in his conversations with Dr. Seetzen (see Von Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz*, July to December 1805, pages 234 to 235) are irreconcilable. Sir Harford represents the grand attack as having been made by about 500 Wahhābis, who were driven off by a single shot from an old gun that had been brought ashore by the Shaikh from one of his vessels; and he is careful to explain that the Factory had no share in the proceedings, and that good relations were, on the contrary, studiously maintained with Ibn Sa'ūd. Mr. Reinaud, on the other hand, places the strength of the enemy at 2,000 camels, each carrying two men, the front rider armed with a gun and the other with a lance to protect his companion while reloading; he alleges that, under Mr. Manesty's orders, two guns were landed from the British cruiser, that the sepoy guard of the Factory took part in repelling the attack, and that the Wahhābis lost heavily in their flight along the beach by the fire of the cruiser herself; and he adds that the resentment of the Wahhābis at this interference expressed in depredations upon the Company's desert mail, was the cause of his own mission to Dara'iyah. Sir Harford may be the more reliable authority; but, on the other hand, it seems unlikely that Mr. Reinaud's circumstantial story should be altogether a fiction.



### History of Kuwait from the removal of the British Factory till the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1795-1838.

Internal  
history.

During more than 40 years after the return of the British Factory to Basrah, the name of Kuwait was seldom mentioned in the political correspondence of the Persian Gulf.

In 1820 Kuwait was represented as containing an armed population of 5,000 to 7,000 men, of whom only a few hundred were 'Utūb by race, and as dependent for its water supply upon the island of Failakah. In 1829 the authority of the Shaikh of Kuwait was partially acknowledged by the Bedouin tribes upon the coast as far to the southward as Rās Khafji; the annual imports of Kuwait were estimated at \$5,00,000, the exports at nearly \$1,00,000; and the place, which was flourishing in consequence of the peaceful policy of its ruler, was credited with the possession of a mercantile marine of 15 Baghlahs from 450 to 100 tons, 20 Batils and Baghlahs from 120 to 50 tons, and 150 other boats from 150 to 15 tons. In 1831 the town extended one mile along the shore with a depth of quarter of a mile, and the streets were wider than those of Masqat or Būshehr; but the only defence was a wall less than a foot thick on the side towards the desert, outside of which was a trench; and two honey-combed pieces of ordnance protected each of the three gates. The Shaikh in 1831 levied a duty of 2 per cent, upon all imports, but maintained no armed force.

The solidarity of the 'Utūb of Kuwait with those of Bahrain and Qatar appears to have been maintained during this period; and the Shaikhdom continued to resist, on the whole with success and latterly under the protection of the Turks, the efforts of the Wahhābi Amīrs to incorporate it with their dominions. Shaikh 'Ahdullah-bin-Subāh governed Kuwait until 1812, when he died, much regretted by all on account of the mildness of his rule, which favoured commercial development, and under which the population of the town had increased very greatly. Shaikh 'Ahdullah was succeeded by his son Jābir-bin-'Ahdullah.

In 1831 the fleet of Kuwait assisted that of the Ka'ah Arabs to blockade Basrah in the interest of Dāwud Pāsha, who was about to be displaced from the governorship of Turkish 'Irāq; and about the same time Kuwait began to flourish with increased vigour in consequence of misfortunes by which Basrah had been overtaken.

In 1800 or 1801, in consequence of asylum having been afforded to some of the 'Atbi leaders whom he had recently expelled from Bahrain, ai yid Sa'id of Masqat appears to have visited Kuwait with a fleet by way of naval demonstration, if not of attack; and it is possible that on this occasion he succeeded in obtaining from the Shaikh the homage which he now apparently claimed as his due from all the 'Utūb. In 1809, on the eve of the first British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, the pirate-politician Rahmah-bin-Jābir of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who extended to the 'Utūb of Kuwait his desperate hatred for those of Bahrain, captured 20 Kuwait Batils which were making a voyage to Masqat. 'Ahdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, one of whose sons was in charge of the convoy and lost his life in the affair, then vowed to punish Rahmah by means of a naval expedition against Khor Hassān; but it does not appear that he ever carried his threat into execution. In 1817 vessels from Kuwait frequented the ports of Bahrain and were the chief means by which plunder brought to Bahrain by Qasimi pirates was conveyed across the Gulf for disposal in Persia.

In consequence of the descents by the Saiyid of 'Omān upon the Bahrain Islands in 1800 and 1802, a temporary *rapprochement* seems to have taken place between the 'Utūb of Kuwait, as well as those of Bahrain, and the Wahhābis; and in 1803, at the bidding of the Wahhābi Amīr and not without reluctance on their own part, the people of Kuwait abandoned the pearl fishery for the year and proceeded to cruise, along with their kinsmen of Bahrain and the Qawāsim of Trucial 'Omān, against the flag of Masqat; but in this enforced and distasteful employment they seem to have met only with reverses.

In 1805, alarmed by the evident intention of the British authorities in India to take action against the piratical Qawāsim, the 'Atbi Shaikhs of Kuwait and Zubārah, after describing themselves as subject to the Wahhābi Amīr, represented the probability of their being compelled by him to engage in depredations on British trade, and suggested that the British Government should guarantee to them, in case of their severing their connection with the Wahhābis, a safe retreat in Bahrain; but their proposals were not entertained.

At some time before this, apparently about 1801, some impetus was given to the development of Kuwait by troubles between the Wahhābis and their subjects in the region of Hasa; by these disturbances the ordinary route of Indian merchandise to Central Arabia was closed for a time, and the place of Qatif and 'Oqair as ports of entry for the interior was taken by Kuwait and Basrah. In 1809 the Wahhābi ruler, on

Relations of  
Kuwait with  
Bahrain.

Relations  
of Kuwait  
with the  
Wahhābis.

account of the refusal of tribute by the Shaikh and the repulse of a Wahhābi expedition from Kuwait in 1808, was found to be urging the Qāsimi Shaikh and the Saiyid of 'Omān to undertake a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah,—a summons which neither saw fit to obey. In 1813-14 the port of Kuwait was reported to be independent of Wuhhābi influence.

Relations of  
Kuwait with  
Turkey.

In 1829 it was stated that the Shaikh of Kuwait acknowledged the authority of the Turks, to whom he paid an annual tribute of 40 bags of rice and 400 Frāsilahs of dates, and from whom he received every year a dress of honour. About 1836 Shaikh Jābir, being called upon to do so by the Turkish authorities, assisted them to reduce the rebellious town of Zubair to submission; but his part in the operations was confined to a blockade of the approaches to Zubair by water. On the fall of the town one of the Zubair family of Zubair, named Ya'qūb, took refuge at Kuwait, where he was subsequently alleged to have sold to the Shaikh the estate of Sūfiyeh in the Ma'amir district on the Shatt-al-'Arab,—a circumstance which was to give rise to many troubles in the future.

In 1809 the Shaikh of Kuwait offered to join the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah with his own fleet, which was larger than that of the Qawāsīm, but his proposal was not entertained by the British commanders.

Relations of  
Kuwait with  
'Arabistān.

In 1837 Shaikh Thāmir, Chief of the Ka'ab tribe, in 'Arabistān, seems to have temporarily taken refuge at Kuwait, in consequence of the occupation of his town of Muhammāreh by the Turks.

British  
relations  
with Kuwait.

In 1821-22, on account of difficulties with the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq, the British Residency at Basrah was for a short time removed from that place to an "island," possibly Failakah, in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Kuwait.\* Captain Taylor, then in temporary charge of the Residency, struck his flag at Basrah on the 15th of December 1821 and remained in Kuwait territory until the 19th of April 1822, when he returned to Basrah with his whole establishment.

After this Kuwait appears to have escaped notice by the British authorities for a considerable period; and in 1831, when the traveller Stoequeler visited the port, he was assured that no European had been seen there for many years,—an assertion which the curiosity manifested by hundreds of people in his appearance and dress seemed to corroborate.

\* An inference that Kuwait was not as yet fully subject to the influence of Turkey (see preceding paragraph) might perhaps be drawn from this circumstance. The reference to an "island" may have been made in error.

### Kuwait affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-40.

In 1838, on reaching the coast of the Persian Gulf in Hasa, the Egyptians sent an agent to reside at Kuwait, nominally to purchase supplies; and some boat-loads of barley, obtained from the Shatt-al-'Arab, were in fact forwarded by this individual to Qatif. It was believed, however, that his real functions were those of a political emissary and news writer, in connection with the design of Khurshid Pasha to wrest 'Irāq from the Turks; and he was treated with much distinction by the Shaikh of Kuwait, who gave him the seat of honour in all assemblies. The only consignment of military stores that reached the Egyptians by sea during their occupation of Hasa was one brought to Qatif, in November 1839, by a Kuwait Ghunchah from Hodaidah in the Red Sea. The fleet of Kuwait, at this epoch, was said to be large and well-appointed.

Posting of  
an Egyptian  
agent to  
Kuwait,  
1838-39.

Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait had always been regarded as a good friend of the British Government, and in his written correspondence he had never failed in courtesy; but in 1839, estranged possibly by the neglect of the official representatives of the British Government to conclude treaties or cultivate personal relations with him, and overawed, like the Shaikh of Bahrain, by the successes of Muhammad 'Alī's troops in Arabia, he was guilty of marked discourtesy to a British officer. On the 30th of October 1839, Lieutenant Edmunds, the Assistant Resident at Būshehr, deputed by the Resident to interview Shaikh Jābir with reference to the establishment of a British line of post across the desert from Kuwait to the Mediterranean, arrived at Kuwait in a British war vessel, which on anchoring fired the usual salute in honour of the Shaikh. The salute was not acknowledged, and, when a letter from the Resident was sent to the Shaikh on shore, only a verbal message was returned promising an answer the next day. The deputation of relatives and followers, moreover, ordinarily sent on board by Arab Shaikhs to welcome a British official visitor, did not make their appearance; and Lieutenant Edmunds remained on board his ship, without any further communication taking place between himself and the Shaikh, until the third day. He then requested a meeting with Shaikh Jābir, which was granted; but on his arrival the old man, whom he found surrounded by a concourse of people, only half rose from his seat, did not lay aside the pipe which he was smoking, and denied that it was a custom at Kuwait to return the

Discourtesy  
of the Shaikh  
of Kuwait to  
the British  
political  
authorities,  
October-  
November  
1839.

salutes of British vessels ; he produced however a reply, ready written, to the Resident's letter. Lieutenant Edmunds and Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, both considered the unusual conduct of the Shaikh on this occasion to be due not to ill-will but principally to a desire to mislead the Egyptian agent at Kuwait as to the nature of his relations with the British power ; and, this view having been adopted by the Government of India, it was decided that no formal remonstrance need be addressed to the Shaikh.

Question of establishing a British settlement in the vicinity of Kuwait, 1839.

In returning to Būshehr Lieutenant Edmunds visited Failakah Island, on the suitability of which for the site of a British naval and military station to replace Khārag he reported unfavourably ; but he was much impressed with the potentialities of Kuwait itself, and thought that the place might be found well adapted for certain purposes by the British Government. Perhaps in the same connection Lieutenant Felix Jones of the Indian Navy also reported on the harbour of Kuwait in this year.

#### History of Kuwait from the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians to the annexation of that province by the Turks, 1840-71.

During the 30 years that followed the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Eastern Arabia, the political relations of Kuwait were mainly with the Turkish province of 'Irāq ; but friendly intercourse was maintained with the representative of Britain in the Gulf, and there were signs of increasing intimacy between the rulers of Kuwait and Central Arabia. On the other hand the close connection, founded on kinship, between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Bahrain, which had been suspended since about 1820, appeared, after a short revival in 1843-46, to die a natural death.

Internal history.

During the greater part of this period Kuwait was ruled by Shaikh Jābir, who died in or about 1859 and was succeeded by his son Shaikh Subāb. The Government of Shaikh Subāb,—who in 1863 was described as a fine, stout, hale old man, more than 80 years of age, rough in appearance and manner but kind of heart,—was patriarchal ; and he sat daily at the gate to superintend the affairs of his subjects. In the town of Kuwait there was little interference by officials with the life of the people, and punishments were seldom inflicted ; political authority was exercised by the Shaikh, but judicial power belonged to the Qādhi alone ; there

were no customs or other taxes, the revenue for public purposes consisting of about \$20,000 a year which was voluntarily contributed by merchants and others ; and religious toleration, extending even to Jews, was the rule. Beyond the limits of the town the influence of the Shaikh reached some 8 or 10 miles. Bedouins were not allowed to enter Kuwait armed. Shaikh Subāb, at his death in or about 1866, was succeeded by his eldest son 'Abdullah.

The intervention of Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait in Bahrain affairs, occasioned by the struggle there between Shaikhs 'Abdullah and Muhammad of the ruling Āl Khalifah family, is described at length in the history of the Bahrain principality. Here it will be enough to recall the facts that in August 1843 the Shaikh of Kuwait of his own motion, but not without the approval of the British authorities, visited Bahrain and tried, in vain, to reconcile the rivals ; that in 1843 or 1844, at the imminent risk of a collision with Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, which in fact was only averted by the intervention of the British authorities, he attempted, unsuccessfully, to provision the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah's fortress of Dammām, then invested by the Wahhābi forces on land and blockaded by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad at sea ; that in 1844, after the fall of Dammām, he harboured for a short time the fugitive Shaikh 'Abdullah at his town of Kuwait ; and, finally, that he allowed the ex-Shaikh to remain at Kuwait from 1845 to 1846, during which period, as particularly requested by the British Resident at Būshehr, he was careful to restrain his guest from the commission of maritime irregularities. In 1869 Muhammad, an ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, was deported to Kuwait, but he did not remain there long.

Relations of Kuwait with Bahrain.

At the epoch now under consideration, the attitude of the Kuwait Shaikh towards the Wahhābi power, hitherto that of a declared opponent or at best of a nominal and unwilling feudatory, became decidedly less antagonistic. In 1841 'Abdullah-bin-Thana'iyān, a relative and competitor of Khālid, the *de facto* Wahhābi Amīr, took refuge at Kuwait, where he stayed for a short time only ; but before the end of the same year, on 'Abdullah, who had meanwhile returned to Central Arabia, obtaining the upper hand, Khālid in his turn sought and found an asylum at Kuwait. In 1863 friendly relations existed between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Faisal-bin-Turki, who then ruled Najd, but no tribute was paid by the former to the latter. In 1866, as we shall see further on, the Wahhābi Amīr 'Abdullah, who maintained an agent at Kuwait for political purposes as his father too had done even so early as 1851, was prepared to assist the Shaikh in a quarrel which occurred between the

Relations of Kuwait with Najd.

latter and the Turks; and it may have been at this time that, as described in the history of Najd, he passed near to Kuwait in returning from a raid upon the tribes of Turkish 'Irāq.

Relations of  
Kuwait with  
'Arabistān.

In 1841 the Ka'ab Shaikh Thāmir appears to have sought an asylum at Kuwait for the second time, having been expelled from his hereditary possessions in 'Arabistān by the Persian Governor of that province; but he soon migrated to Basrah.

British  
relations  
with Kuwait.

Official intercourse between the British Resident in the Gulf and the Shaikh of Kuwait appears to have been infrequent; but personal relations continued on an excellent footing. On his visit to Kuwait in 1863 Colonel Pelly, the Resident, accompanied by Dr. Colvill, arrived at Jahrah by land from Basrah on the 3rd of March; the next day he was conducted by Mubārak—a son of the ruler—to Kuwait, where he spent a couple of days with Shaikh Subāh; on the 7th of March, under arrangements made by the Shaikh, Colonel Pelly left Kuwait by sea for Turkish territory; and he passed two days, on the way there, in the Khors adjoining Bubiyan Island. Colonel Pelly's remarkable journey to Riyādh in the spring of 1865 was begun at Kuwait, where he spent several weeks, including one at Jahrah, in making his arrangements and awaiting the permission of the Wahhābi Amīr. The possible future of Kuwait as a commercial port and as a meeting-place of sea-borne and other trade, together with its suitability in certain circumstances for the site of a British telegraph station or coal dépôt, were clearly realised by Colonel Pelly, who even remarked, with extraordinary presence, that Khor 'Abdullah might hereafter become the chief line of approach by steamer to the commercial capital of Turkish 'Irāq, and that its head might one day be connected by a railway with the Mediterranean. By April 1866 the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company had begun to call frequently at Kuwait; but their visits were suspended soon after for political reasons which will presently be explained.

Relations of  
Kuwait with  
Turkey,  
1840-63.

The relations of other powers with Kuwait were less close however than those, arising from contiguity, which were maintained by Turkey. In 1847 the example of the Shaikh of Kuwait was quoted by the Shaikh of Bahrain in justification of the latter's own avowed intention of placing himself, in certain conditions, "under the guardianship of the Porte." In 1863 Shaikh Subāh assured the Resident that the rulers of Kuwait had always been tributary to the Turkish Government; but it was ascertained by Colonel Pelly, from another source, that the use of a distinctive flag had at one time been practised by the Shaikh of Kuwait for some

years together, and that it had only been discontinued because trade carried on under it did not meet at Bombay with treatment so favourable as that under a recognised flag: the reason of discontinuance was thus the same as that which in 1847 inclined the Bahrain Shaikh also to seek the protection of Turkey. In 1863 there was no mention of tribute paid by Kuwait to Turkey, but complimentary presents of dates were sent to Kuwait by the Turks in token of their own suzerainty, and as payment for the supposed protection by the Shaikh of the mouth of Shatt-al-'Arab.

In 1866 trouble arose out of the possession by Shaikh Subāh of Süfiyeh, the estate on the Shatt-al-'Arab alleged to have been purchased by Shaikh Jābir from a member of the Zuhair family of Zubair some 30 years earlier.\* This property was now sequestered by a Turkish Qaim-Maqām in consequence of a claim, raised by the Zuhair, that the vendor had been owner of a share only and not of the whole of Süfiyeh. At the same time Shaikh Subāh was required to expel from other lands, owned by him at Fāo, some cultivators who had immigrated from Persian territory. The Turkish officials from the first showed a strong prejudice in favour of the Zuhair claimants; and 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, who went to Basrah as his father's agent in the case, narrowly escaped being thrown into jail there because he refused to make payment, on his own responsibility, of the value of seven years' produce which the plaintiffs were held by the Turkish authorities to be entitled to receive. Eventually, however, the dispute was settled by the Wālī of Baghdād in favour of the Shaikh of Kuwait. The proceedings of the Turks in this case were regarded by the inhabitants of Kuwait as intended to bring them into collision with those of Zubair; but they were prepared for a conflict; and the British Agent at Basrah, in reporting the matter, remarked that "rather than submit to a Turkish Government at Kuwait the people to a man would abandon the place." The final order of the Wālī, upholding the Kuwait Shaikh's title to Süfiyeh, was perhaps due to a report that Shaikh Subāh, with the object of attacking Zubair if the decision should go against him, had obtained a promise of countenance and armed support from the Wahhābi Amīr.

Dispute  
regarding  
the Süfiyeh  
estate in  
Turkish  
territory.

In 1866 Nāmiq Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of 'Irāq, evinced intentions of converting the nominal suzerainty of the Porte over Kuwait into a real control; the arrival of two Turkish corvettes from Constantinople was looked for; and it was apprehended by Colonel Kemball, the British Resident at Baghdād, that "the prescriptive freedom of Kuwait"

Designs of  
the Turks on  
Kuwait and  
suspension of  
the British  
steamer  
service, 1866.

\* Vide page 1008 ante.

might shortly become a thing of the past. The visits of British merchant steamers to Kuwait were regarded with extreme jealousy by the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq, and the latter appeared to be collecting statistics to prove that the prosperity of Kuwait was injurious to Basrah. The Shaikh of Kuwait, alarmed at the prospects raised, begged that his town might not be made a port of call by British steamers; and a suspension of the service was accordingly recommended by Colonel Kemball.

#### SHAIKH 'ABDULLAH-BIN-SUBĀH. 1866-92.

From the death of his father, probably in 1866, until his own demise in 1892, Kuwait was ruled by 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh.

#### Relations of Kuwait with the Porte, 1866-92.

Participation  
of Kuwait in  
the Turkish  
expedition to  
Hasa, 1871.

During the whole period of his rule Shaikh 'Abdullah appears to have maintained very close relations with the Turks, and to have been an obedient and even enthusiastic instrument of Turkish policy. In 1870 or 1871 he became the medium of overtures from 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, the displaced Wāhhabī Amīr, for the assistance of the Turks. In 1870 he supplied sea transport, to the amount of about 300 native vessels, for the Turkish forces sent to conquer Hasa; he accompanied the expedition in person; and it was chiefly through his agency that the Shaikh of Dohah in Qatar was persuaded to accept the Turkish flag.

Visit of  
Mid-hat  
Pasha to  
Kuwait, 1871.

When Mid-hat Pasha, Wālī of Baghdād, went on a tour of inspection to the new Hasa province at the end of the year, he halted on the way for one day at Kuwait, where he was said to have "installed" the Shaikh. The investiture of the latter was probably with the rank of Qāim-Maqām on the part of the Turkish Government, which he subsequently held; for, from language held by the Porte in 1901, it appeared that the Turkish Government considered Kuwait to have been annexed at the same time as Hasa.

#### Relations of Kuwait with the Wāhhabīs, 1866-92.

At some time between 1872 and 1874 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, a claimant of the Wāhhabī Amirate whose attitude towards the Turks was

somewhat uncertain, was apparently permitted by the Shaikh to reside in the neighbourhood of Kuwait. In 1872, as related in the history of Najd, the town of Kuwait was threatened by the Wāhhabī Amīr Sa'ūd; but the Shaikh, after drawing away his leading supporters, attacked him and put him to flight. About 1884 the Shaikh of Kuwait appeared to favour the cause of the Shammar Amīr, who had then begun to commit aggression on the Wāhhabīs.

#### Relations of Kuwait with Great Britain, 1866-92.

In the time of Shaikh 'Abdullah direct relations with Kuwait do not appear to have been cultivated by the British political authorities in the Persian Gulf; and the place was evidently regarded as under the exclusive influence, if not the sovereignty, of the Porte. In 1876 the Acting Political Resident, Colonel Prideaux, mentioned Kuwait along with Qatif and 'Oqair, as a Turkish port on the Arabian side of the Gulf. In 1888, in consequence of fears of an advance by the Turks against 'Omān, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was informed by Her Majesty's Government that they admitted the existence of Turkish jurisdiction on the Arabian coast as far south as Qatif and were anxious that it should be effectively exercised within those limits, but that beyond Qatif they considered the local chiefs to be independent; no communication, however, in this sense was made to the Porte at the time. The orders under which, as described in the history of Hasa, British naval officers were authorised, in 1881, to take measures even in Turkish territorial waters for the suppression of piracy were doubtless intended to apply to the littoral of Kuwait as well as to that of Hasa and Qatar.

British  
indifference  
to Kuwait  
affairs.

#### Relations of Kuwait with Arab states and tribes, 1866-92.

In 1869 the ex-Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain was deported to Kuwait; but he did not remain there long. In 1883 Mubārak, a younger half-brother of the Shaikh of Kuwait, paid a friendly visit to Bahrain, where he was warmly welcomed and hospitably treated and received many presents at his departure. Before this Mubārak had been occasionally employed by the Turks upon diplomatic errands, and the fact

Visit of  
Mubārak to  
Bahrain,  
1883.

caused his proceedings in Bahrain to be watched with attention ; but it did not appear that his journey in this instance had any political motive.

Friction  
with the  
Bani Hājir,  
1892.

In March 1892 an attack was made on the marauding Bani Hājir, probably in Hasa, by a relative of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who killed four of them and carried off a number of their camels and sheep ; and somewhat later the Bani Hājir retaliated by surprising a Kuwait boat at night and killing two of the crew.

#### SHAIKH MUHAMMAD-BIN-SUBĀH.

1892-96.

#### Internal history of Kuwait, and relations with the Turks, 1892-96.

Shaikh 'Abdullah was succeeded by his full brother Muhammad, whose Shaikhship was short and, except for the manner of its ending, uneventful.

Despatch of  
a force to the  
aid of the  
Turks in  
Hasa, 1893.

Shaikh Muhammad was before long invited by the Turks to co-operate in restoring order in Hasa, where in 1892 serious troubles had broken out ; and in March 1893 Mubārak-bin-Subāh arrived in Hasa for this purpose with a large force of Bedouins, having marched all the way by land from Kuwait.

Assassina-  
tion of  
Shaikh  
Muhammad,  
1896.

In May 1896 Shaikh Muhammad, along with his full brother Jarrāh, was assassinated in the interests of his half-brother Mubārak ; Muhammad, it was said, fell by the hand of Mubārak himself, while Jarrāh was killed by another of the family, assisted by a man of the 'Ajman tribe. It is not clear whether this event was due to public or domestic differences, or whether it was prompted solely by greed and ambition on the part of Mubārak. According to one account Shaikh Muhammad was generally unpopular as a ruler ; and this much at least is certain, that the Kuwait public showed no signs of disapproval.

#### British relations with Kuwait, 1892-96.

Political  
status of  
Kuwait.

During the short period of Muhammad's rule British relations with Kuwait were still in abeyance, and there was no sign as yet of any

change in the views of the British Government regarding the political position of Kuwait. In April 1893 Sir C. Ford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, stated officially to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government admitted the existence of Turkish sovereignty along the coast from Basrah to Qatif. In 1895, however, a piracy was committed in the Shatt-al-'Arab on the "Haripasa," a British-protected vessel ; and, partly from the proceedings to which this case gave rise, but not before the death of Shaikh Muhammad, there arose a doubt in the mind of the British authorities as to the nature of the connection between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turkish Government.

#### SHAIKH MUBĀRAK-BIN-SUBĀH,

from 1896.

#### General history of Kuwait from the accession of Shaikh Mubārak to the Exclusive Agreement with Britain, 1896-99.

During the first three years of his reign the position of Shaikh Mubārak, in danger as he was of revenge from members of his own family and without external support, seemed very precarious.

The sons of the murdered Shaikh Muhammad and his brother Jarrāh removed, after remaining a short time at Kuwait, to Turkish 'Irāq, where their cause was warmly taken up by their maternal relation \* Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah (generally known as Yūsuf Bin-Ibrāhim) of Dorāh on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab, a wealthy merchant and landholder of the Basrah Wilāyat. Efforts were made by Yūsuf to interest the Wālī of Basrah and even Ibn-Rashid, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, in the case of the young men, and no means of harassing Shaikh Mubārak was neglected. On the 30th of June 1897 a boat expedition, organised by Yūsuf on the coast of the Hindiyān district in Persia, appeared off

Proceedings  
of the sons  
of Muham-  
mad and  
Jarrāh,  
1896-98.

\* The relationship was rather complicated. 'Ali-bin-Jābir, who was the youngest brother of Shaikh Subāh of Kuwait, married the youngest daughter of 'Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhim, and had by her three daughters, of whom the eldest married Shaikh Muhammad and became the mother of his sons Subāh, Sa'ūd, Khālid and 'Adhbi, while the second married Jarrāh and bore a son Hamūd and a daughter who married her own first cousin Subāh-bin-Muhammad. An elder daughter of 'Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhim married 'Abdullah, a first cousin of her own father, and became the mother of Yūsuf.

Kuwait; but it retired, as the place was found in a state of defence, without firing a shot. Possibly at the instigation of Yūsuf, the inhabitants of the Turkish frontier town of Zubair petitioned the Porte for the removal of Mubārak from Kuwait; and one of the sons of the late Shaikh Muhammad made overtures to the British political authorities, offering to accept British protection if his birthright was restored to him through their influence. In August 1897 Yūsuf was in Bahrain, having perhaps been obliged by the Turks to leave 'Irāq in consequence of his escapade at Kuwait, and solicited the good offices of the British Government; but he was told that no support could be given him against the Shaikh of Kuwait. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubārak had proposed that the question between his nephews and himself should be referred to the arbitration of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but, partly through the unwillingness of the Shaikh of Bahrain to act as arbitrator, this suggestion, to which the Government of India were ready to agree, came to nothing. During 1897 and 1898 it was frequently reported that an attack on Kuwait by the Shaikh's nephews was impending; but Mubārak, with great steadiness, professed his ability to repulse any attempt that might be made.

Attitude of  
the Turkish  
authorities  
towards  
Shaikh  
Mubārak.

The attitude of the Turks towards Shaikh Mubārak was for a considerable time one of neutrality. His usurpation of the Shaikhs'hip had been represented to the Porte by Hamdi Pasha, then Wālī of Basrah for the first time, as a favourable opportunity for establishing close Turkish control over Kuwait; and, though Mubārak on his accession had professed loyalty to the Sultān and even hoisted the Turkish flag, as was observed by the officer commanding H.M.S. "Sphinx" at a visit to Kuwait in July 1896, his fate, as regarded Turkish recognition, remained for long in suspense. On one side were ranged the influence of the Shaikh's nephews and of their relations and the political considerations urged by the Wālī of Basrah; on the other were the bribes lavished by Shaikh Mubārak on Rajab Pasha, Mushir of the Baghdad Army Corps, on the Shaikh-ul-Islām and Shaikh 'Abul Huda at Constantinople, and on others; and these last in the end prevailed. Meanwhile, however, the Wālī's policy of administrative absorption was not altogether rejected; and in February 1897, in anticipation of a resolution passed in that year by the Board of Health at Constantinople, a Turkish quarantine official arrived at Kuwait and took up his residence there, *à titre provisoire*, without any protest, so far as is known, on the part of the Shaikh. At length, in December 1897, Muhsin Pasha, who had replaced Hamdi Pasha as Wālī of Basrah, was informed by telegram of

the appointment of Shaikh Mubārak by Imperial Iradé to the Qāim-Maqāms'hip of Kuwait; the Shaikh's name began to appear in the official almanac of the Wilāyat, and his correspondence with Basrah to be carried on, under that style; and an annual allowance of 150 Kārāhs of dates was assigned to him, which was subsequently, it would seem, commuted into a cash salary of about £300 a year.

Besides the constant danger from his own relations, Shaikh Mubārak had before long to face a wide but ineffectual combination contrived by Yūsuf Bin-Ibrāhīm of Dorah during his visit to Bahrain in the summer of 1897. In September of that year it was reported that Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāwī Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, was making preparations for an attack on Kuwait by land and sea in conjunction with the Shaikh's nephews, and was endeavouring to draw Ibn-Rashīd into the scheme and to detach the 'Ajmān tribe from Shaikh Mubārak. In the beginning of November this attack, though discountenanced by the Turks, seemed to be on the point of execution; but eventually it did not take place. On the other hand the Shaikh of Kuwait inflicted some loss on the Bani Hajir tribe, who were among the adherents of the Shaikh of Dōhah; and early in 1898 a small rising against the Turks took place at Dōhah, which was attributed to a belief that the attack by the Kuwait Shaikh on the Bani Hajir had been instigated by the Turkish authorities.

Hostility  
of the  
Shaikh of  
Dōhah in  
Qatar,  
1897-98.

In November 1898 the Naqīb of Basrah was sent by the Turks to arrange a settlement between the two Shaikhs; but his mission was a failure.

By these and other events the attention of the British Government was gradually attracted to Kuwait; and an opinion began to gain ground among British officials that the connection of the Turkish Government with Kuwait was less close than, in recent times, had generally been supposed. An absurd rumour which obtained currency in Palace circles at Constantinople in 1896, that the murder of his brothers by Mubārak had been instigated by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, led to enquiries being made by the British Embassy in the Turkish capital; and these showed that there were persons, even there, who asserted Kuwait to be entirely independent of the Porte. At the end of 1896, the case of the "Haripasa" piracy being then under consideration, it was suggested that the Shaikh of Kuwait, for reasons described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, should be held accountable; but this proposal did not commend itself to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Sir P. Currie thought that the Shaikh of Kuwait,

British  
doubts as to  
the nature  
of the  
connection  
between the  
Shaikh of  
Kuwait and  
the Turkish  
Government,  
1896-97.



while he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was in reality an independent potentate and only nominally subject to the Sultan; but the Government of India, considering that for practical reasons such a view was to be voided, were inclined, early in 1897, to advise that the responsibility for the actions of the Shaikh should be fixed upon the Turkish Government. At length, in consequence of information supplied at Constantinople in March 1897 by Captain Whyte, who had shortly before been Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, Sir P. Currie enquired the view of Her Majesty's Government regarding Turkish authority at Kuwait. He was informed in reply that Her Majesty's Government had never admitted Kuwait to be under the protection of the Turkish Government, but that the existence of Turkish influence would probably be difficult or impossible to deny.

Overtures of  
the Shaikh  
for British  
protection,  
February-  
August 1897.

No remonstrances on the crime by which he had attained the chiefship were ever addressed to Shaikh Mubarak by the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; but the Shaikh in July 1896, when his port was visited by H.M.S. "Sphinx," showed evident signs of alarm, declined to visit the ship, and made evasive replies to questions about his use of the Turkish flag. The impression formed by Commander Baker on this visit was that Kuwait, in theory an independent principality, had fallen greatly under Turkish influence, especially since the accession of Mubarak. Matters remained unchanged until February 1897, the month in which the Turks sent a sanitary official to Kuwait, when Shaikh Mubarak suddenly requested an interview with Colonel Wilson, the Political Resident, or with an agent deputed by him. In view of the rumours that had prevailed at Constantinople a few months previously concerning British interference at Kuwait the matter was referred to Her Majesty's Government, who replied that the interview might be granted, subject to the discretion of the Political Resident; and shortly afterwards it became known that the object of Shaikh Mubarak was to ask for British protection. Meanwhile the "Haripasa" piracy case had been proceeding; and at the beginning of May, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, the Resident in the Gulf was directed to warn the Shaikh of Kuwait, when he should meet him, that his responsibility would be enforced if his subjects were not restrained in the future from committing attacks upon British Baghlahs: this order was the first sign of a changed view of the political position of the Shaikh of Kuwait on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Towards the middle of July, or about three weeks after the attack attempted

by Yusuf of Dorah on Kuwait, no interview having as yet taken place between the Resident and Shaikh Mubarak, it became known that a delegate from the Shaikh had arrived in Bahrain and was on his way to visit the Resident, Colonel Meade, at Bushehr; but, on hearing that Yusuf of Dorah was also expected in Bahrain, this individual returned to Kuwait without accomplishing his mission. Meanwhile another case of piracy occurred in the vicinity of Kuwait.

In August Mubarak represented that he had no one sufficiently intelligent to send as a representative to Bushehr and asked that a delegate from the Residency to whom he could explain his views might be sent to visit him. In accordance with his wish Mr. J. C. Gaskin, Extra Assistant to the Resident, was deputed to Kuwait in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," and arrived there on the 5th of September 1897. Shaikh Mubarak, whose negotiations for recognition by the Porte were still pending, declined to go on board the "Lawrence" lest by doing so he should give offence to the Turkish authorities; and two interviews, at both of which Captain Hewett of the "Lawrence" was present, took place on shore. As regards piracy at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the Shaikh denied that subjects of Kuwait had ever engaged in piracy, but he admitted that some of the inhabitants of his estates on the banks of the river, over whom he had no control, might be guilty; he had, he said, offered to police the river mouth, but the Turks had declined to allow him to do so, and Kuwait boats were now unable to visit the Shatt-al-'Arab unless in twos and threes for mutual protection; to the best of his ability, however, he would co-operate with the British Government for the suppression of piracy. With reference to his own overtures, which it was the principal object of Mr. Gaskin's visit to investigate, Shaikh Mubarak stated that he and his people, in order to prevent the annexation of Kuwait by the Turks, who had shown themselves grasping and unreliable, desired to be taken under British protection in the same manner as the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān; and he promised that, if this were done, he would assist the British Government with all the force at his command in maintaining law and order in his part of the Gulf.

The request of the Shaikh was at once reported to Her Majesty's Government, who replied that they were not disposed to bring Kuwait under protection or to interfere more than was necessary for the maintenance of the general peace in the Persian Gulf. A few days later, on the 20th of October, in consequence of a report that a Turkish gunboat was about to leave Basrah for Kuwait, the question was again raised

Mr. Gaskin's  
visit to  
Kuwait,  
September  
1897.

Overtures of  
the Shaikh  
declined by  
the British  
Government,  
October  
1897.

by the Government of India, who mentioned that Kuwait appeared to be a centre of piracy \* and an emporium of the slave trade, and enquired whether, in these circumstances, a modification of policy might not be desirable; but the Secretary of State for India adhered to his original instructions, adding that there was nothing in the political situation of Kuwait to hamper naval officers in bringing home to the Shaikh his responsibility for piratical acts.

Overtures of the Shaikh renewed, November 1897.

In November 1897, when an attack on Kuwait by Shaikh Jāsim of Qatar and Yūsuf of Dorah was believed to be imminent, H.M.S. "Pigeon" was sent to Kuwait to watch events, the commander being instructed not to interfere unless British interests were directly menaced; and Shaikh Mubārak seized the opportunity to repeat his request for British protection.

Danger to Kuwait from Russia and Turkey, 1898.

At length, in 1898, circumstances arose which compelled the British Government to consider measures for the exclusion of foreign influence from Kuwait. There was reason to think that the Russian Government wished to establish a coaling station at that place; and attempts were being made to obtain from the Porte a concession in favour of Count Kapuist, a Russian subject, for the construction of a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, a scheme which, in the absence of any arrangement between the British Government and the Shaikh, might end in the creation of Russian territorial rights at Kuwait. At the same time, notwithstanding the recent recognition of Shaikh Mubārak as Qāim-Maqām, tension of which the causes were not evident appeared to exist between the Shaikh and the Turkish authorities; the appointment of a Turkish Commission to investigate complaints against the Shaikh was reported; and rumours began to circulate of the possible despatch of a Turkish force from Basrah by sea to Kuwait.

### The Exclusive Agreement with Britain, 23rd January 1899.

Orders of Her Majesty's Government.

In January 1899, with a view to forestalling Russian action, it was decided by Her Majesty's Government that an engagement on the model of the Agreement of 20th March 1891 by the Sultan of 'Omān should be obtained from the Shaikh of Kuwait, binding him and his successors

\* The correctness of this allegation seems to be doubtful; there may have been some confusion between Kuwait and the Shaikh's estates in Turkish 'Iraq. At no time before or since have there been complaints of piracy by inhabitants of Kuwait.

not to alienate any portion of his territory to foreigners without the consent of the British Government; and it was hoped that, in this manner, the necessity of taking overt steps towards the establishment of a British protectorate would be avoided. The consideration to be offered the Shaikh was a single payment of £5,000 or less, or an annual subsidy not exceeding £200.

Under these orders Colonel Meade, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, proceeded in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to Kuwait, where he arrived on the 21st of January 1899; the Turkish corvette "Zuhāf" was then in the harbour, but she left on the following day. On the 23rd of January the desired Agreement was signed by Shaikh Mubārak, who in it pledged himself, his heirs and his successors not to receive the agent or representative of any foreign power or government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation, or for any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the government or subjects of any other power without the previous consent of the British Government. This last obligation was to extend to any portion of the Shaikh's territory which might at the time be in the possession of the subjects of any other government. Hamūd and Jābir, the brothers of Mubārak, were present at the signature of the Agreement, but they refused to attest it as they disapproved of its terms; the Shaikh, however, assured Colonel Meade that the concurrence of his brothers was not necessary to make the Agreement binding on his successors.

A letter was then given to the Shaikh by Colonel Meade, in which, on behalf of the British Government, he assured the Shaikh, his heirs and his successors of the good offices of the British Government, so long as they on their part should continue to observe the obligations of the Agreement. In this document the secret character of the Agreement was emphasized, and payment was promised of a sum of Rs. 15,000 which had been fixed as the consideration for its execution.\*

It was subsequently explained by Colonel Meade that the condition against the reception of foreign representatives was inserted by him because Shaikh Mubārak stated that advances had been made to him by the French, and that the reference to territory already in the possession of foreign subjects was intended, primarily, to guard against the transfer of house property owned by Turkish subjects at Kuwait to Russians or others.

\* The text of both Agreement and letter will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this chapter.

Signature and terms of the Agreement, 23rd January 1899.

Letter supplementary to the Agreement, 23rd January 1899.

Explanation of unauthorised conditions.

Ratification  
of the  
Agreement,  
16th  
February  
1899.

Her Majesty's Government, on the proceedings being reported to them, approved the action of the Resident and authorised ratification of the Agreement, notwithstanding that it went beyond what they had intended; and it was accordingly ratified on the 16th of February. A hope was also held out to Shaikh Mubarak, under the orders of the Secretary of State, that the British authorities would do what they could to protect his interests and those of his brothers in the matter of their estates at Fao, a share in which was claimed by the nephews in Turkish territory. Of the sum of £1,000 paid to Shaikh Mubarak half was contributed by the Home Government and half was charged to Indian revenues.

#### General history of Kuwait from the Exclusive Agreement to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1899-1904.

Attempts  
by Turkey to  
assert  
authority at  
Kuwait and  
resistance of  
the Shaikh,  
January-  
September  
1899.

The next few months witnessed strenuous efforts by the Turkish authorities at Basrah, possibly due to their having become aware of the Shaikh's Agreement with Britain, to assert themselves at Kuwait; Shaikh Mubarak on his part showed a new intractability in his dealings with the Turks; and a rather strained situation arose. On the occasion of Colonel Meade's visit to Kuwait objections were made by the Turkish sanitary *préposé* there, an ordinary Arab, to the landing of the Resident's party from the "Lawrence," as being a breach of the Turkish sanitary regulations. They were disregarded, and a protest by the Turkish Government followed, but had no result. In February 1899 a movement against Kuwait by sea was apprehended on the part of the Turks, and the question of protective measure was considered by Her Majesty's Government, who decided that in case of need a serious warning should be addressed to the Porte, and that until this had been done no forcible action should be taken by British ships. In March the state of affairs seemed so critical that the Government of India caused H.M.S. "Lapwing" to be stationed for a time in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, and the employment of a secret news-writer at Kuwait was sanctioned. In the same month, the Russian gun-vessel "Gilyak" called at Kuwait, and the Russian Consul from Baghdad, who was on board, had an ordinary interview with the Shaikh. In May Shaikh Mubarak, who now appeared anxious to precipitate matters with the Turks, established regular customs at Kuwait and began to realise an enhanced duty of 5 per cent. on all imports, including those from

Basrah and other Turkish ports which had hitherto passed altogether free. On the 2nd of September a Turkish harbour-master, with five soldiers, arrived to take charge of the port of Kuwait; but the Shaikh declined to receive him, and he was obliged to return to Basrah the next day; instructions, however, reached Basrah from Constantinople that the matter should not be dropped. Next it was reported that the Turks intended to establish a customs house at Kuwait and to connect Fao with Qatif by a telegraph through Kuwait, and that the Turkish military authorities were demanding forcible action against Kuwait.

In consequence of these indications of a forward Turkish policy, a warning was in September 1899 conveyed to the Porte by the British Ambassador at Constantinople under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government: it was to the effect that the British Government, while they entertained no designs on Kuwait, had friendly relations with the Shaikh; and that, if any attempt were made to establish Turkish authority or customs control at Kuwait without previous agreement with Her Majesty's Government, a very inconvenient and disagreeable question would be raised. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply gave assurances that the reception of a harbour-master by the Shaikh would not be pressed any further; that there was no intention of establishing an Ottoman custom house at Kuwait; and that no military expedition against Kuwait was contemplated, for, though operations had been proposed by the Wali, the Sultan had withheld his sanction. Later it was represented to the British Ambassador that his language had greatly disturbed the Sultan, who regarded it as indicative of a desire on the part of the British Government to interfere with Turkish liberty of action in Turkish territory; but Sir N. O'Connor, while avoiding the direct issue—that of the dependence of Kuwait on Turkey—reiterated the warning already given; and the matter was dropped for a time. The Wali of Basrah also was cautioned, through the local British Consul, not to take hostile action against Kuwait.

In the following month, October 1899, it was ascertained that Shaikh Mubarak had undoubtedly applied through the Shaikh of Muhammarah to be taken under the protection of Persia; but this move, which the Shaikh took no pains to conceal, was perhaps contrived by him merely to test the degree of interest taken by the British Government in Kuwait. His advances were rejected by the Shah.

Meanwhile Mubarak had taken precautions, by means of intrigues at Basrah, to counteract the more dangerous results of his uncompromis-

Warning  
by the British  
Government  
to the  
Porte, Sep-  
tember 1899.

Dalliance of  
the Shaikh  
with Persia,  
October  
1899.

Change of  
Wali at  
Basrah, 1899.

ing policy towards Turkey; and, acting in concert with the Naqib of Basrah, he succeeded in procuring the removal of Hamdi Pasha, the Wālī of the day, an honest but unpopular official, and the appointment in his place in autumn 1899 of Muhsin Pasha, a military officer, who was prepared to represent Kuwait affairs to the Porte in a new light. One of the chief dangers which Shaikh Mubarak had at this time to avoid was arrest while making an official visit to Basrah in person,—a mark of submission on which the Turkish Government strongly insisted. Muhsin Pasha played his part well; and not only were no further encroachments on the Shaikh's independence attempted by the Turks for more than a year and a half, but, as we shall presently see, Mubarak safely paid the required visit to Turkish territory, received a Turkish official decoration from the Sultān, and was enabled to harass with impunity the Turkish vassal Ibn-Rashid of Najd, and even to invade and temporarily occupy a part of his principality.

Visit of a  
German  
Railway Com-  
mission to  
Kuwait,  
January  
1900.

Before these occurrences, however, a German Commission visited Kuwait in search of a suitable terminus for the projected Baghdad Railway; it was headed by Herr Sternrich, the German Consul-General at Constantinople; and, but for the Agreement of 1899, concluded chiefly in view of a similar Russian project, and a warning conveyed to the Shaikh by the Commander of H.M.S. "Melpomene" that he should make no arrangement with the Commission without the approval of the Government of India, the incident might have had results prejudicial to the position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. From Mubarak's account of his interview with the Commission, which took place at Kuwait on the 19th of January 1900, corroborated as it was by a subsequent report of the Commission itself, it seems that the Shaikh expressed himself unfavourably as regards the establishment of a railway terminus within his jurisdiction, and that he made it clear to the members of the Commission that the real control of the country rested with himself and not with the Sultān of Turkey. The Commission apparently tried to open negotiations with him for the sale of Kādhmah at the head of Kuwait bay and for the lease of the lands surrounding Kawaikib and Ghadhāi,—a scheme involving the acquisition in all of a plot of about 20 square miles; but their intentions were frustrated by Mubarak's strict observance of his obligations to the British Government, in which he was probably fortified by a doubt of the good faith of the Commission, and by a suspicion that their proposals might be a skilfully disguised movement on the part of the Turks. At

Basrah the head of the Commission had given out that it was the intention of the promoters of the railway to deal with Turkey direct and to ignore the Shaikh of Kuwait.

These proceedings of the Baghdad Railway Commission made it necessary that the views of Britannia in regard to Kuwait should be stated clearly to the Porte and the German Government. Accordingly, on the 15th April 1900, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in the course of an interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, insisted on the fact that, although the British Government did not wish to interfere with the Sultān's authority in the Persian Gulf, still they were desirous of maintaining the *status quo*, and could not view with indifference any action which would alter it or give to another power rights or privileges over territory belonging to the Shaikh of Kuwait. On the same day Sir N. O'Connor saw the German Ambassador, and, in order that no doubt should remain in his mind, placed before him in explicit terms the British position with reference to Kuwait, making it clear that the Shaikh was not at liberty to cede or in any way to alienate to the Baghdad Railway Company either Kādhmah or any part of his territory, without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

British  
declaration to  
Turkey and  
Germany in  
regard to in  
Kuwait,  
April 1900.

We may now resume the main thread of our narrative. In the summer of 1900 there began a series of movements which led, first, to a remarkable incursion by Mubarak into the very heart of Central Arabia, and eventually to the restoration of the Wahhābi dynasty in Southern Najd. Since 1897, 'Abdur Rahmān Ibn-Sa'ūd, the rival in Najd of 'Abdur 'Aziz Ibn-Rashid, had been residing at Kuwait as a pensioner of the Shaikh,—a circumstance in itself sufficient to predispose Ibn-Rashid to enmity against Mubarak. The natural resentment of the Shammar Amir against the harbourer of his enemy had doubtless been inflamed by Mubarak's fugitive nephews and Yūsuf of Dorah, who early sought Ibn-Rashid's assistance and by 1900 appeared to have become his permanent clients. How exactly hostilities in the interior commenced is uncertain; this much is known, that Ibn-Sa'ūd departed from Kuwait in August 1900 and in the following month, having achieved some substantial successes, appealed to his protector Mubarak for reinforcements. About the same time or a little later, from his haunt on the Euphrates, Sa'dūn Pasha, a Muntafik outlaw of Turkish 'Irāq, raided some of the nearer tribes dependent on Ibn-Rashid; and indications were not wanting of his having acted, in this matter, in collusion with the Shaikh of Kuwait. Shaikh Mubarak himself was absent from his capital while the French Government vessel "Drome" was at Kuwait

Outbreak of  
hostilities  
in Central  
Arabia, 1900.

from the 14th to the 16th of October; and at the end of the month, when Colonel Kemball, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, called at Kuwait with orders to impress on the Shaikh the advisability of abstaining from action that might afford a pretext for Turkish interference, Mubarak was still invisible. In the light of what followed it is not unreasonable to conclude that at the time he was actively employed in the desert in forwarding the interests of his protégé Ibn-Sa'ūd.

Intervention  
of the Wālī  
of Basrah,  
November  
1900.

At the end of October 1900 Ibn-Rashid appeared at Samawah on the Euphrates with a large following; he demanded of the Turkish Government redress for the injuries inflicted on his subjects by Sa'dūn, satisfaction from the Shaikh of Kuwait, and justice for the nephews of the latter; and he threatened to attack Kuwait if his requests were not conceded. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubarak had effected a junction with Sa'dūn, and an armed collision between the allies and Ibn-Rashid appeared to be imminent, when the Turks suddenly intervened with marked success. Through the influence of Saiyid Ahmad and Saiyid Talib, sons of the Naqib of Basrah, Ibn Rashid was persuaded to return home and Shaikh Mubarak to meet the Wālī of Basrah at Rāfidhiyah, a country house of the Naqib near Zubair; while Sa'dūn, by other means, was induced to vanish temporarily from the scene. On the 17th of November Mubarak came in with the Wālī, his friend Muhsin Pasha, to Basrah, where he passed the following day, received the order of the Mejdieh of the second class, and promised to abstain from relations with "foreign powers;" and by the 24th of the month he had returned in safety to Kuwait. The Turkish demand for an official visit by the Shaikh had thus been satisfied and a decided triumph achieved by Muhsin Pasha, who, besides averting a serious crisis, had successfully asserted the authority of the Porte over two of the principal chiefs in Arabia.

Invasion  
of Central  
Arabia by  
the Shaikh  
of Kuwait,  
December  
1900—March  
1901.

But the arrangement thus concluded was a hollow one, for the Shaikh's submission was feigned, and he was in reality on the point of adopting an audacious and independent policy. Ibn-Rashid was now harrying the Bedouin adherents of Kuwait in the Dahānah and Summān deserts; and, on the 18th of December 1900, Mubarak, after announcing that he could not abstain from hostilities while Yūsuf of Dorah was harboured by Ibn-Rashid, placed himself at the head of his forces and marched on Hafar, where the enemy was supposed to be encamped. The Kuwait force was composed mainly of 'Awāzim, Rashāidah, Mutair, 'Ajmān, Bani Hājir and Bani Khālid Bedouins; but it included also a number, estimated at 1,000, of

Kuwait townsmen and refugees from Najd. At the beginning of February 1901 the Shaikh was compelled, by the defection of some of his Mutair allies, to fall back into the neighbourhood of Kuwait; but the check was of short duration. He had before this been informed by letter of the desire of the British Government that he should abstain from compromising displays of activity; and, as he had disregarded the advice, it was thought inexpedient to repeat it. The account of his subsequent Central Arabian expedition will be found in the history of Najd. At the outset it was a brilliant success: Qasim was occupied; the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd was appointed titular governor of Riyādh; some members of the family of Ibn-Rashid entered into negotiations with the triumphant invader; and Mubarak strengthened his position among his Bedouin adherents by espousing a daughter of Sultān-ad-Dawish, a leading chief of the Mutair. A severe engagement, however, which took place on the 17th of March at Sarif, about 20 miles north-east of Buraidah in Qasim, though it was attended by heavy loss on both sides, so altered the aspect of affairs that Shaikh Mubarak was obliged to beat a hasty retreat from Najd. Much anxiety prevailed in Kuwait and rumours that the Shaikh himself was among the slain had obtained currency there, when, on the 31st of March, he regained his capital safe and un wounded, followed at an interval of four days by Ibn-Sa'ūd and Sa'dūn. The dispersed Kuwaitan army straggled home in small detachments during the following month; but there were at least 50 \* who never returned, among them the Shaikh's brother Hamūd with his son Subāh and the Shaikh's nephew Khalifah, all of whom fell in the battle of the 17th March.

The seriousness of the situation created by this adventure was quickly brought home to the Shaikh. It seemed to be the intention of the Turkish Government to make the Mushir of Baghdad their agent in investigating the affair from their side,—a measure which would have deprived Shaikh Mubarak of the benefit of his understanding with Muhsin Pasha and might even have brought that official himself into trouble; but, for the time being, the negotiations remained in the hands of the Wālī. Muhsin Pasha was the guest of the Shaikh at Kuwait from the 19th to the 23rd of May 1901, and he took advantage of Mubarak's dejection and alarm to press on him the acceptance of a Turkish military garrison at Kuwait. The Shaikh, however, while he treated his visitor with respect and courtesy and even accompanied him

Visit of the  
Wālī of  
Basrah to  
Kuwait and  
request of  
the Shaikh  
for British  
protection,  
May 1901.

\* Possibly the loss was greater than 50. Local tradition already had it in 1907 that no less than 700 townsmen of Kuwait fell, of whom 150 were put to death as prisoners, in cold blood, after the battle!

as far as Fao on his return voyage to Basrah, retained firmness enough to concede nothing; but he felt a greater need of support after the insidious attempt just made to beguile him into surrendering his independence; and on the 28th of May, through the commander of H. M. S. "Sphinx," he approached the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf with a request that the British Government would assume a permanent protectorate over Kuwait as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it is certain, he had also held communication with the Russian Consul-General at Baghdad. The declaration of a British protectorate over Kuwait, involving as it must large international questions and responsibility in future for controlling the actions of the Shaikh, did not recommend itself to His Majesty's Government; and at the end of June the proposal was rejected. Overtures for British protection received from Ibn-Rashid about the same time were similarly repelled.

Incident at  
Kuwait and  
arrangement  
between  
Britain and  
Turkey to  
maintain the  
*status quo*  
there, August  
—September  
1901.

While the Shaikh of Kuwait's request was still under discussion the attitude of the Turks grew menacing. A considerable military force, of which the destination was at the time believed to be Kuwait, was assembling on the Euphrates; and the Sultan of Turkey, under the influence of the German and Russian Embassies at Constantinople, was urging the Wali of Basrah by telegram to arrange for the establishment at Kuwait, by pacific means, of a custom house and telegraph office, as tangible proofs of Ottoman authority. To meet these dangers the commander of the British gunboat "Perseus," then at Kuwait, was authorised under instructions from His Majesty's Government to prevent, by force if necessary, the landing of Turkish troops; and Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident, who visited Kuwait for the purpose, gave Shaikh Mubarak a qualified assurance of support, conditional on his continuing to observe the Agreement of 1899. On the 24th of August 1901 the Turkish sloop-of-war "Zuhaf," heavily laden with stores, entered Kuwait harbour, where the "Perseus" was already lying; and the Turkish commander was immediately warned by the commander of the "Perseus" of the order against the landing of Turkish troops. On the 25th of August the Turkish officer had an interview with the Shaikh, at which he tried in vain to obtain from him an admission of Ottoman sovereignty; he then left for Fao, threatening the Shaikh with future punishment. Protests against the action of the "Perseus" were soon received in London from the German and Turkish Ambassadors; in that presented by Turkey the British Agreement of 1899 was declared to be invalid, as having been made with a Turkish official. The British reply

was, in both cases, that His Majesty's Government had no desire to disturb the *status quo* at Kuwait; and, on the 9th of September, the controversy between the British Government and the Porte regarding Kuwait was closed, to all appearance, by a mutual engagement to respect the *status quo*.

While the discussions just described were proceeding in Europe Ibn-Rashid was not inactive. At the end of September 1901 his partisans raided a camp of the Rashaidah not far from Jahrah; and, though eventually driven off, they succeeded in carrying away a considerable booty and killed several men of a Kuwait force which was sent against them. The Bedouin inhabitants of the whole country-side then flocked into the neighbourhood of Kuwait town for protection, and a huge camp was formed, containing thousands of Bedouins with their flocks and herds, which extended along the coast as far as Ras-al-Ardh; but, a second raid by Ibn-Rashid's men in the neighbourhood of Jabal 'Amudah and Ras Misha'ab having proved less successful than the first, the invaders retired towards Central Arabia, and the enormous gathering of refugees at Kuwait melted away as suddenly as it had formed. Ibn-Rashid lingered for some time longer at Hafar, and his protracted stay there, taken in conjunction with the proceedings of the Turks, caused Shaikh Mubarak much uneasiness. During this disturbed period several British gunboats were held in readiness at or near Kuwait; the naval authorities were empowered by the Government of India to use force to repel an attack by Ibn-Rashid; and a scheme for the defence of the town was arranged by the Senior Naval Officer. The experience gained and the observations made on this occasion showed that Kuwait was not defensible against a land attack by naval means alone. Shaikh Mubarak, in return for the good offices exercised on his behalf, was required to promise compliance with such British advice as might be given him, and he did so.

At the middle of November 1901, Ibn-Rashid having in the meantime moved down from Hafar to Safwan, a place on the frontier between Turkish 'Iraq and Kuwait, the Naqib of Basrah visited Kuwait with a telegram from the Sultan of Turkey. In this telegram the Wali of Basrah was directed to send the Naqib to interview Shaikh Mubarak and warn him that his course of action was rash and impious, and that he should seek safety by returning to his religious duty and propitiating the Sultan. According to one account, Shaikh Mubarak in reply made commonplace professions of loyalty to the Porte and complained of the doings of Ibn-Rashid and Yusuf of Dorah; but the Naqib seems to have reported to his own Government that the Shaikh repudiated the suzerainty of the Sultan and that he had referred the

Panic at  
Kuwait on  
the approach  
of Ibn-  
Rashid,  
September—  
October  
1901.

Crisis at  
Kuwait due  
to attempts  
by Turkey to  
upset the  
*status quo*,  
November-  
December  
1901.

Turkish authorities to the British Government. In consequence of a representation by the British Ambassador at Constantinople these proceedings of the Naqib were disavowed by the Porte. A more determined effort to upset the *status quo*, the maintenance of which had so lately received the assent of the Ottoman Government, was made a fortnight later, when on the 1st of December the "Zuhāf," carrying the Naqib and a brother of the Wālī of Basrah, once more steamed into Kuwait harbour, the British cruiser "Pomone" and gunboat "Redbreast" being then anchored in the bay. A Turkish ultimatum was presented to the Shaikh, requiring him either to receive at Kuwait a Turkish military detachment—which, it was promised, should be under his own orders—or to leave Kuwait and retire to Constantinople or its neighbourhood; and great stress appears to have been laid on the alternative demand. On the 3rd of December three days' grace was obtained by the Shaikh in order that he might consider his reply; but on the 4th of December, the "Redbreast" having left with correspondence for Būshehr, this concession was withdrawn, and Mubārak was informed that he must give his answer immediately. The "Sphinx" having arrived from Būshehr without a written guarantee of protection from the Resident, such as he had hoped might be given, Mubārak evidently wavered; but, under pressure from the senior naval officer present at Kuwait, he at length informed the Sultān's messengers that he was prevented from giving a reply by threats of force on the part of the British naval authorities—a statement which Captain Simons personally confirmed in the presence of the Turkish emissaries. The Naqib and the Wālī's brother, finding their purpose frustrated, then withdrew on board the "Zuhāf," which took her departure early the next morning; while Captain Simons, as a precaution, spent the night at the Shaikh's house. Not until the 6th of December, when the crisis was already past, did the orders of His Majesty's Government reach Kuwait: they were to the effect that, as the Naqib's action amounted to a breach of the understanding between Turkey and Britain, His Majesty's Government would support the Shaikh and would not tolerate an attack by Turkish troops or ships on Kuwait, that the Shaikh should not leave Kuwait, and that he should continue to observe his engagements with the British Government. This message was received with much satisfaction by the Shaikh, who communicated it to all his principal men. About the time of the Naqib's mission, or possibly after its return, Muhsin Pasha was superseded in the Wāliship of Basrah.

The proceedings of the Turkish agents at Kuwait were immediately repudiated at Constantinople by both Porte and Palace. Nevertheless, towards the end of December 1901, the continued presence of Ibn-Rashid with a part of his forces in the vicinity of Basrah, his constant communications with the Wālī and the Mushir, his orders for great quantities of supplies, and instructions which were sent from Constantinople to provide him with a large sum of money from the Basrah treasury, then empty, caused lively apprehensions to be entertained of a land attack on Kuwait by the combined forces of the Turks and the Amīr; and simultaneously a prohibition of the export of goods from Basrah to Kuwait came into force, confirming these fears. Dispositions were instantly made by the British naval force at Kuwait to co-operate in the defence of the town; two Nordenfeldts and two Maxims were temporarily placed in the Shaikh's fort at Jahrah near the foot of Kuwait bay; and on the 1st of January 1902 the "Fox" and "Perseus" were ordered from Bombay to join the "Pomone," "Sphinx" and "Redbreast," which were already at Kuwait, with extra guns. Ibn-Rashid, deterred by these significant measures or perhaps held back by the Turks, did not approach any nearer, and he was soon reported to have withdrawn as far as the wells of Lainah in his own country, whereupon the general alarm subsided and the naval guns which had been landed were re-embarked. The crisis at Kuwait was witnessed by the Russian protected cruiser "Varyag," which arrived on the 21st December 1901 and left again on the 24th, after offers made to the Shaikh "to assist him in maintaining his independence."

The Turks, however, had not abandoned their determination to coerce, by one means or another, the ruler of Kuwait; and the cessation of their activity in one direction was followed by an advance in another, which indicated a change in their tactics and initiated a new phase of the Kuwait question. A report having been received that Turkish military posts had lately been established at Umm Qasr and Safwān, the despatch of a British gunboat to Khor 'Abdullah and Khor-as-Sabiyah to verify the facts was authorised. This duty was carried out by H.M.S. "Sphinx," which left Kuwait on the 14th February 1902 and returned within a week after ascertaining that a Turkish post of 40 men existed at Umm Qasr and a larger garrison at Safwān; in the course of his cruise Commander Kemp collected important data regarding Khor 'Abdullah, the extreme value of which in relation to railway projects had not previously been realised; and on his return journey he discovered a Turkish outpost of 20 men upon the eastern side of Būbiyān.

Attack on Kuwait threatened by the Turks and Ibn-Rashid and preparations made by a British naval force to defend Jahrah and Kuwait, December 1901—January 1902.

Occupation of Safwān, Umm Qasr and Būbiyān Island by the Turks, 1902.



Island, where it had been established only a fortnight before. In March the Turkish garrison of Basrah was largely increased, and it was feared that the occupation of Haqaijah and possibly of Sabiyah, two places on the mainland opposite to the west side of Būbiyān, was contemplated; by way of forestalling such a movement Shaikh Mubārak was advised to occupy Haqaijah effectively, which he did by placing 40 men there. About the same time it transpired at Constantinople that the Turks no longer regarded Kādhamnah in Kuwait bay as the probable terminus of the Baghdād railway; and it was reported that their attention had now been directed, in this connection, to Khor 'Abdullah and its branches. His Majesty's Government considered that, on the information available as to previous ownership, it would neither be safe to contend that the establishment of Turkish posts at Umm Qasr and on Būbiyān was a breach of the *status quo* nor justifiable to demand their abolition; but the Porte were informed that their occupation of those places could not be regarded as prejudicing the rights of the Shaikh of Kuwait. Incidentally, in the course of these discussions, His Majesty's Government informed the Government of India that they acknowledged Kuwait to be a part of the Ottoman dominions, subject however to the qualifications on which they had always insisted, *viz.*, that the Sultān's authority was of an unsubstantial character, and that the Shaikh enjoyed a large measure of practical independence; but this view was not, it should be observed, communicated to the Porte, as had at one time been intended. Shaikh Mubārak was so alarmed by the new Turkish policy of gradual encroachment that in March he offered the Wāli of Basrah a large bribe, which was not accepted, in order that it might be stopped.

In April 1902 the Shaikh complained of the attempted occupation of Musallamiyah Island, at the southern end of his territories or sphere of influence, by a Turkish detachment from Qatif; but, as it appeared that the island might legitimately be regarded as falling within the Turkish Sanjāq of Hasa, he received no encouragement from the British Government to contest the rightfulness of the Turkish claim.

The Turkish Government meanwhile resorted to other means besides territorial encroachment of harassing the Shaikh of Kuwait and making him repent his estrangement from them. A serious claim in respect of the family estates situated on the Shatt-al-'Arab was brought against him by his fugitive nephews in the Turkish courts; and the sequestration of some of the lands, *pendente lite*, caused him pecuniary inconvenience. Frequent raids upon the flocks and herds of Kuwait subjects

on the border near Safwān took place; they were generally organised by Yūsuf of Dorah at Zubair, and the Turkish garrison at Safwān made no effort to prevent them; but in some instances they were answered by reprisals from the Kuwait side. An attack was made also on Sabiyah, upon Khor-as-Sabiyah, by Yūsuf of Dorah's men, and some camels were carried off. On the 28th of May 1902 the Shaikh's agent at Basrah was arrested, and his house searched, on the charge of his being a subscriber to an Arabic newspaper called "Khilāfat," at that time published in London and treated throughout the Ottoman dominions as a seditious print; and having been found guilty of the charge, he was sentenced to ten years' incarceration in a fortress. The result of this case was a severe blow to the prestige of the Shaikh of Kuwait; nor was the event without political significance, for among the papers seized at the agent's house were some that cast light upon the Shaikh's relations with the British Government. The title-deeds of the Shaikh's properties in Turkish 'Iraq, which fell into the hands of the Ottoman officials by the same chance, were subsequently recovered through the good offices of British diplomacy,—a matter of no little importance to the Shaikh inasmuch as the land dispute between him and his nephews was still unsettled.

Raids on Kuwait territory by Bedouin supporters of Ibn-Rashid still continued to occur; and in August 1902 a fight between some of them and the subjects of the Shaikh of Kuwait took place at a spot, apparently the wells of Subaihiyah, only 30 miles from Kuwait itself. At this time events in Najd had turned, temporarily, in favour of Ibn-Rashid; and, as there was a fear that Shaikh Mubārak might proceed to the assistance of his ally Ibn-Sa'ūd, he was expressly warned by the British Resident, Colonel Kemball, under orders from His Majesty's Government, not to encourage any action by which he was likely to become involved in difficulties with Najd or with the Turkish Government. Meanwhile the Shaikh, in view of the aggressiveness of enemy, had formally applied to the Resident for two or three guns, to be mounted on his fort at Jahrah for defence against Ibn-Rashid in case he should approach from that side; but the request was refused as it was feared that he might use the guns, if supplied, for offensive operations; and instead he was informed, after the middle of October 1902, that, if he remained at Kuwait and observed his engagements to Britain, the British Government would charge themselves with the defence of such of his districts as adjoined the bay of Kuwait. The Shaikh expressed himself much disappointed, but he promised to abide by the advice given him.

Relations of Kuwait with Najd and restricted guarantees of support by the British Government, August to October 1902.

Other means employed by the Turks to harass the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1902.

Attempted surprise of Kuwait by the Shaikh's enemies, September 1902.

The most dangerous and direct assault to which Mubarak had yet been exposed,—one of which the Turkish Government may or may not have been cognisant,—was arranged in the early autumn of 1902 by Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah of Dorah and came within a measurable distance of success: its object was to seize the town of Kuwait by a *coup de main* and, probably, to assassinate Shaikh Mubarak. A large body of Sharifāt Arabs from the Persian side, under the command of 'Adhbi-bin-Muhammad and Hamūd-bin-Jarrāh, Shaikh Mubarak's nephews, and well armed with rifles, embarked in boats at Dorah on the Shatt-al-'Arab; after leaving the river they loitered on the open sea, probably waiting for night. News of the expedition was received at Fāo on the 3rd of September by Commander Armstrong of H.M.S. "Lapwing," and he immediately hastened to Kuwait to give the alarm, but he found the town already under arms in consequence of information which had reached the Shaikh through his own people. The next day search was made without success for the enemy and their boats; but on the morning of the 5th they were discovered by the British gunboat in Khor 'Abdullah; and two of their Būms, which contained altogether 100 to 150 Arab riflemen and hoisted no flag, were pursued by the armed boats of the "Lapwing." Headed off from the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the fugitives eventually ran their boats ashore in deep mud to the east of the river, and, concealing themselves in the long grass, opened a hot fire at close range on their pursuers. One British bluejacket was killed and two were wounded; but the Būms with their contents, including scaling-ladders, were captured and taken away. One of the Būms was subsequently proved to be the personal property of Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah, and both were ultimately destroyed at sea outside of the three-mile limit. The later history of this case will be found elsewhere; but the chief result, in so far as Kuwait was concerned, was the flight or expulsion of Yūsuf from Turkish 'Irāq to Najd, where he attached himself to Ibn-Rashid. Before leaving the country, however, he took part in a final attack from Zubair upon tribesmen residing near Jahrah under Shaikh Mubarak's protection.

Demonstration by Ibn-Rashid against Kuwait, 1902-03.

With the episode just described serious attempts from without to overthrow the power of Shaikh Mubarak came to an end; and the attention of the Turks was diverted from Kuwait to Central Arabia, where a contest between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashid was now being waged. One other set of small movements in the neighbourhood of Kuwait remains, however, to be mentioned. In December 1902 Ibn-Rashid again entered Kuwait territory and advanced within 12 hours

of the town, but was driven back by Shaikh Mubarak's men upon Hafar; and the Shaikh himself then moved to Jahrah, where he began to collect a force for purposes of defence, or possibly for offensive action. Fears having been expressed by the Turkish authorities that the concentration at Jahrah portended an attack upon Zubair, the Secretary of State requested that the Shaikh might be warned, as before, to avoid measures likely to involve him in difficulties in Central Arabia or with the Turkish Government; but these instructions had been anticipated by Colonel Kemball, the British Resident, who on the 18th of January 1903 had a long and friendly interview with the Shaikh at Kuwait and impressed on him the advisability of abstaining from action against Ibn-Rashid, especially as the power of that chief was now, according to Mubarak's own admission, on the wane. After this, at the beginning of March 1903, the Wahhābi Amir, accompanied by his brother Muhammad, visited Kuwait to confer with Mubarak, whose son Jābir was still at Jahrah, holding that place with an armed force. This was the end of the alarms caused at Kuwait by Ibn-Rashid.

In these improved circumstances the visit of the Russian cruiser "Askold" to Kuwait on the 14th of December 1902 and the joint visit of the French cruiser "Infernet" and the Russian cruiser "Boyarin," which lasted from the 4th to the 8th of March 1903, caused no anxiety in regard to the local situation. On the latter occasion, however, an interview at which Central Arabian affairs were discussed took place between the Russian Consul-General from Bushahr and 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of Ibn-Sa'ūd, who happened to be present in Kuwait.

Visits of Russian and French war vessels to Kuwait, 1902-03.

A visit paid to Kuwait by His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on the 28th and 29th of November 1903, which is described fully in another place, marked the consolidation of British influence in the principality and placed in a clear light the Shaikh's cordial relations with the British Government and his dependence upon the British power; indeed the Shaikh, on receiving a presentation sword from the hands of the Viceroy, spontaneously described himself as a "military officer of the British Empire." The ovation which Lord Curzon received on landing seemed to bear witness to the popularity of British connection; and the impression produced on the minds of the people and their chief by the sight of the East India Squadron must be reckoned among the important political results of His Excellency's tour in the Persian Gulf. Shaikh Mubarak was shown over the flagship "Hyacinth" and was much interested by what he saw, this being the first time that he had set foot on the deck of a man-of-war. At a

Visit of Lord Curzon to Kuwait, November 1903.

private interview on the R.I.M.S. "Hardinge" His Excellency impressed on Shaikh Mubarak the inadvisability of his embroiling himself in the strife of Central Arabia, as, though the British Government had promised to protect him against an attack on Kuwait, they would be unable to interfere if he involved himself in difficulties in the interior; and to this the Shaikh replied that he fully understood His Excellency's advice and that he would be guided by it. On the 30th of November the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," carrying Lord Curzon, entered Khor 'Abdullah and proceeded up the creek as far as the junction of Khor Umm Qasr and Khor Zubair, where a short halt was made.

#### Appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1904.

Proposal to establish a British post office and dispensary at Kuwait, 1901-04.

Soon after His Excellency the Viceroy's visit, the British Government decided to take advantage of what seemed a convenient opportunity of securing, by a single measure, the improvement of postal communication with Kuwait, the extension to the town of the benefits of medical skill, and an increase in the efficiency of British political representation with the Shaikh. In July 1901 the British India Steam Navigation Company had established an agency at Kuwait and made the place a port of call for their steamers, and in November of the same year Shaikh Mubarak himself had suggested the establishment of a British post office; but, as a post office could not be established except as an adjunct to a British Political establishment and the time was not propitious for a change in the status of the British representative, who was as yet merely a native news-writer, the project remained for a time in abeyance. In accordance with a renewed request for a post office made by the Shaikh at the time of Lord Curzon's visit, however, it was resolved in 1904 to establish one in charge of a native medical subordinate, who could also carry on medical work among the people. The only condition insisted on by the British Government was one to which the Shaikh readily assented, that he should undertake not to allow the establishment of a post office by any other country; and an Agreement to this effect was obtained from him, of which the text is given in another place.\* In July 1904, however, after the necessary preliminaries had been arranged, it was found advisable to suspend action lest certain negotiations should be prejudiced, which, as related further on, were then proceeding at Constantinople for the evacuation of Būbiyān Island by the Turks.

\* See Annexure 4 to Appendix K.

The post office scheme was in fact destined to remain inoperative; and it was in the end superseded by a measure of greater importance that had been under consideration by the British Government in the summer of 1903,—the appointment to Kuwait, namely, of a British officer whose principal duty, it was originally intended, should be to curb the aggressive tendencies of Shaikh Mubarak. In the spring of 1904, in consequence of interference which the Turks had begun to exercise in Central Arabia to the disadvantage of Shaikh Mubarak's ally Ibn-Sa'ūd, the project of stationing a British political officer at Kuwait was revived, but with a different purpose and a considerably enlarged scope. On the 24th of June 1904 the despatch of a European Political Agent to Kuwait was authorised by His Majesty's Government; and on the 6th of August Captain S. G. Knox arrived at Kuwait from Būshehr duly accredited to the Shaikh, by whom he was well received, and the existing news-agency was abolished. An Assistant-Surgeon soon afterwards joined the Agency in his professional capacity; but, though he was accompanied by a postal subordinate, the establishment of a regular post office was still deferred.

The instructions given to Captain S. G. Knox on his appointment reflect the policy of the Government of India and were as follows. The Agent's first object should be to cultivate and maintain close and friendly relations with Shaikh Mubarak and the other principal personages in Kuwait. The interests of British trade and traders at Kuwait and in the adjacent tracts of Arabia should be safeguarded. A vigilant watch should be kept over the proceedings of the Turks on the boundaries of Kuwait territories, and the Political Agent should endeavour to ascertain the true limits of Mubarak's effective occupation upon Khor-as-Sabiyah. Matters showing an intention on the part of the Turks, or of any other power, to interfere with or disturb the existing *status quo*, or anything which would lead to a belief that other powers had designs on or in connection with possible harbours within or without Kuwait territory, should be at once reported; and special but unobtrusive attention should be paid in this respect to Khor 'Abdullah and the waters adjacent to Būbiyān Island and Umm Qasr. The Political Agent should also endeavour to secure early and accurate information regarding the struggle between the Ibu-Rashid and Ibn-Sa'ūd families for the supremacy in Najd. Finally, he should investigate the alleged importation of arms at Kuwait, especially of rifles for Ibn-Sa'ūd; but, pending further instructions, he should neither authorise nor forbid the Shaikh to continue the existing trade in arms.

Establishment of a British Political Agency at Kuwait, August 1904.

Instructions of the Political Agent on appointment.

In November 1904 the Turkish Government complained of the appointment of the British Political Agent at Kuwait as an infringement of the *status quo*. Important questions relating to the Aden frontier were then pending between the British and Turkish Governments, which made the occasion an unfavourable one for raising the whole question of Kuwait; and it was accordingly decided by His Majesty's Government that the newly appointed Agent should be withdrawn as soon as it was possible to do so without inconvenience, the withdrawal however to be temporary only, and to be so carried out as not to bear the appearance of a concession to Turkey. During his sojourn at Kuwait Captain Knox had successfully carried out, in complete harmony with Shaikh Mubarak, such of his instructions as depended for their fulfilment on himself; and his tenure of office had not been marked by a single untoward incident.

Captain Knox remained at Kuwait until the 16th of May 1905, when he was obliged by illness to take leave to England, his temporary withdrawal being thus brought about in such a manner that its cause was disguised from the Shaikh and that the unfortunate results which might otherwise have followed were averted. The current duties of the Agency were carried on, until Captain Knox's return on the 25th of October 1905, by the Assistant Surgeon, Dāwud-ar-Rahmān.

#### General history of Kuwait since the establishment of the Political Agency, 1904-1907.

We may now trace the history of one or two questions which continued to occupy attention after the arrival of Captain Knox at Kuwait; but some of the facts which it will be necessary to mention belong to a period earlier than 1904.

Reference has already been made to a dispute between Shaikh Mubarak and his fugitive nephews regarding certain family estates situated in Turkish territory on the Shatt-al-'Arab; and we have seen that a hope was held out to the Shaikh, soon after the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement in 1899, that British influence would be used to prevent injury to his interests in that direction. The estates in question, of which the proprietary shares were in dispute, were situated at Gardilan and on 'Ajairāwīyah Island near Basrah, at Zain opposite the mouth of the Kārūn River, at Sūfiyah in the Dawāsir tract, and at Fāo. The Shaikh

Case of the  
Shaikh of  
Kuwait's  
estates in  
Turkish  
'Iraq, 1901-  
1904.

was able to protract matters for a couple of years by declining to submit to the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts; but in December 1901, the Turks having resolved to break down his opposition to their authority at Kuwait, he was called upon to defend his case in a Basrah tribunal; and, on his failing to do so, judgment was given against him in default, and he was ordered to make over the estate at Zain to his nephews.

Shaikh Mubarak at once appealed to the Sultān of Turkey with the result that, early in 1902, an Imperial Iradé was issued for the appointment of a Commission to settle the whole dispute between him and his nephews. After much difficulty and delay a settlement was arranged by Hāji Mansūr, representing Shaikh Mubarak, and 'Alīd al-Wahhāh-al-Qirtās, representing the opposite side, in communication with Mr. Crow, H. B. M.'s Consul at Basrah, who, under instructions from Constantinople, had been admitted to a share in the proceedings; and this settlement, after being approved by the Commission and accepted by the parties, was embodied in a deed executed at Basrah on the 11th of July 1904 and attested, not only by the Wālī of Basrah and his Council, but also—at the request of Shaikh Mubarak—by the British Consul. The general effect of the settlement was to confer on Shaikh Mubarak undivided ownership and possession of the whole property at Fāo, while an absolute and exclusive title to the Gardilān, 'Ajairāwīyah, Zain and Sūfiyah estates and a money payment of £77,296½ was obtained by the opposite party. The share of the nephews in ancestral moveable property at Kuwait was mentioned in the deed but was not affected by it, the rights and shares of both parties therein being maintained unaltered; but the title of Shaikh Mubarak to certain moveable property at Kuwait was expressly validated.

Early in 1904 the Shaikh applied for a loan of Rs. 1,00,000 from the Government of India to enable him to carry out the terms arranged; and this was readily granted, without interest, on condition that he should not borrow from any other lender without the consent of His Majesty's Government until the debt had been repaid in full, and that repayment should be completed by the end of 1905. The Shaikh, who has always shown himself a good man of business, discharged the obligation nearly a year before expiry of the period fixed.

A peculiar incident, which gave some trouble at the time but had no political consequences, occurred at the Shaikh's Fāo estate on the 10th of October 1904, when the Shaikh's land agent brought off to H.M.S. "Merlin" the dead bodies of an Arab man and woman together with three Turkish gendarmes in custody, by whom, he alleged,

they had been murdered. The commander of the "Merlin" refused to receive the agent's prisoners on board, and the matter thus lost its importance.

Discussions  
regarding  
the Turkish  
occupation  
of Būbiyān  
Island, 1904.

In 1904, after Lord Curzon's inspection of Khor 'Abdullah, representations were made by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government as to the extreme undesirability of allowing both sides of that inlet—perhaps the most convenient terminus for a railway from Baghdād to the Persian Gulf—to fall permanently into the hands of a power not very amenable to British influence. The question of Būbiyān Island, which the Shaikh of Kuwait asserted to belong to his principality, and the occupation of which by the Turks was regarded by His Majesty's Government as a breach of the engagement to respect the *status quo* at Kuwait, was raised diplomatically at Constantinople; but no favourable opportunity of pressing for evacuation of the island could be found, and the Turkish post on Būbiyān was not withdrawn.

#### Relations of Kuwait with Turkey and Central Arabia during the same period, 1904-1907.

Mediation of  
the Shaikh  
of Kuwait  
between the  
Turkish  
authorities  
and Ibn-  
Sa'ūd, Feb-  
ruary 1905.

In the history of Najd it is related how a Turkish force was despatched in May 1904 from 'Irāq to the aid of Ibn-Rashīd, only to be overwhelmed in Qasīm in the course of the following summer, by Ibn-Sa'ūd and his allies; also how in the winter of 1904-1905 the Turks prepared a second expedition, and thereby so alarmed Ibn-Sa'ūd that he agreed to a settlement which included the pacific occupation of Qasīm by an Ottoman force. Here it is enough to observe that the arrangement in question was brought about largely through the instrumentality of Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, who assumed, somewhat unexpectedly, the role of intermediary. Two meetings for discussion were held on the frontier between Kuwait and 'Irāq—the first at Safwān on the 8th, and the second at the Qash'āniyah wells on the 13th of February—between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Mukhlis Pāsha, the newly appointed Wālī of Basrah, and at both of these Shaikh Mubārak was present with a large escort; but he declined, content with having brought the principals together, to become *in propria persona* a party to their arrangements.

The use by Shaikh Mubārak in his correspondence in this business of the title "Ruler of Kuwait and Chief of its Tribes," instead of that of

"Qāim-Maqām," gave some offence to the Turks; but it did not affect the course of the negotiations. A suggestion made by the Wālī at these meetings, that Turkish civil officials and troops should be sent to Kuwait, was met by Shaikh Mubārak, according to his own subsequent statement, with a *non possumus* reply and with a declaration of his loyal adherence to the connection which he had formed with the British Government.

Probably in consequence of the services which he rendered upon this occasion, the relations of Shaikh Mubārak with the Turkish authorities at Basrah were, from 1905 onwards, much more friendly. In August 1905 the Shaikh subscribed £T450 towards the erection of new Turkish barracks at Basrah; and, on the donation being cordially acknowledged, he professed devotion to the Sultān of Turkey and promised a further subscription of £T200. In 1905 a continuous stream of Turkish military deserters and officials escaping from Najd began to pour into Kuwait, where they arrived in a miserable plight: they were invariably fed and sent on to Basrah by Shaikh Mubārak. The number of these refugees up to March 1906 was about 500; in August Farīq Sadiq Pāsha himself came in with an escort of about 150 men; and at the end of December some 800 more men, almost the last remnants of the Turkish army of occupation in Qasīm, reached the neighbourhood of Kuwait. This last body were not allowed by the Shaikh to enter the town, probably from fear that an occupation might be attempted. For the purpose of collecting and forwarding this rabble, the Shaikh of Kuwait's imprisoned agent, 'Abdul 'Aziz, the conditions of whose imprisonment had already been mitigated at the instance of His Majesty's Government, was allowed by the Turks to proceed to Kuwait; and there he was afterwards allowed to reside in a sort of open arrest, as the property which he owned in Turkish 'Irāq afforded a sufficient security against his attempting to escape. From the autumn of 1905 until the spring of 1907 the Turkish official mail between 'Irāq and Hasa was sent by land through Kuwait territory, instead of by British steamer *via* Bahrain, as had hitherto been the rule; but Shaikh Mubārak declined to have anything to do with the arrangements or to accept responsibility for the safety of the mails, which in the end returned to the original route by sea. In August 1906 it was announced that Shaikh Mubārak had contributed £T500 to the Hijāz Railway fund, but this was not his first subscription, for he had already, in January 1904, received the medal conferred by the Sultān on distinguished subscribers.

After 1905 amicable relations continued to prevail between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Wahhābi Amīr; the former, as related in the history

Subsequent  
relations of  
Shaikh  
Mubārak  
with the  
Porte,  
1906-1907.

Subsequent  
relations of  
Shaikh

Mubarak  
with Central  
Arabia,  
1905-1907.

of Najd, began in 1906 to exert himself, at the request of Ibn-Rashid, to arrange a reconciliation in Najd; and after the death of Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah near Hail in January 1906 the Shaikh of Kuwait even showed some sympathy for the Shammar Amīr. In March 1906 Shaikh Mubarak appeared (or pretended) to entertain a utopian scheme for a friendly partition of Central Arabia under which Jabal Shammar would fall to Ibn-Rashid and most of Southern Najd to Ibn-Sa'ūd, while he himself would take possession of Qasim and of the Wahhābi districts of Sadair and Washm. In July 1906 his efforts in the cause of peace were finally successful. The Kuwait Hajj to Makkah, for some time interrupted by the wars in Najd, was resumed; and in 1906 the number of persons who travelled in it was about 2,000 souls.

#### Relations of Kuwait with Great Britain, 1904-1907.

Notwithstanding the cessation of hostility between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turks, the relations of the former with the British Government and with the officers representing them at Kuwait continued to be excellent. The only exception was a temporary and partial estrangement at the beginning of 1906 due to remonstrances, made by Captain Knox under the orders of Government in regard to the arms trade at Kuwait, which are noticed in the Appendix dealing with that subject.

Question of a  
distinctive  
flag for  
Kuwait.

A question which in 1907 had been pending for a considerable time, but remained unsettled, was that of the adoption by the Shaikh of Kuwait of a flag distinguishable from the Turkish. A change was first proposed in 1901, when a differentiation of the Kuwait flag from that of Turkey appeared desirable for more than one reason, but principally on account of the inconsistency of preventing the disembarkation of Turkish troops at a place where the Turkish flag was flown. The Government of India considered that the Shaikh ought to fly the red Arab flag; and the Shaikh, though he urged that the crescent had been used by his grandfather, his father and himself as a Muhammadan, not as a Turkish emblem, was willing to abandon it. In consequence, however, of the arrangement made by the British Government with the Porte in September 1901, for the maintenance of the *status quo* at Kuwait, the matter was dropped for a time.

In 1904, in connection with a disension—which will be mentioned further on—as to the protection of Kuwaitis in Persia, the question of the flag was revived; and the Shaikh, having been approached under the

instructions of His Majesty's Government, in July 1905 expressed his willingness to adopt a flag of crescent design distinguished from the Turkish flag by the addition of the word "Kuwait," as also certificates of nationality for vessels belonging to his port. In March 1906, however, Shaikh Mubarak demurred, in the absence of an explicit guarantee that Kuwait vessels would not be harassed at Turkish ports, to the use of Roman letters on the flag; but he agreed that the name "Kuwait" might appear on it in Arabic characters. The adoption of the proposed flag, as thus finally modified, was then approved by His Majesty's Government; but again, in September 1906, the Shaikh represented that even the slight innovation to which he had consented might lead to unfavourable treatment of Kuwait vessels in Turkey, and requested an assurance on the subject by the British Government. The matter was then once more referred by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government.

Advantage was taken of the favourable disposition of Shaikh Mubarak, after the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, to obtain fuller information about the surroundings of Kuwait both on land and at sea. In December 1904 a party of officers employed on this Gazetteer untried by land, in company with Captain Knox, from Kuwait to the Turkish border; and the opportunity was utilised to carry a plane-table survey, on a large scale, from Jahrah and the northern shores of Kuwait Bay up to the Turkish frontier posts of Safwān and Umm Qasr. In April 1905, Captain Knox made a tour into the country to the south of Kuwait, and in January 1906 he attained the distant but important point of Hafar, never before visited by a European, on the border between Kuwait territory and Central Arabia, Bedouin escorts being provided on both occasions by Shaikh Mubarak. In the winter of 1906-1907 the Political Agent made two more interesting journeys to the south of Kuwait, on the first of which it was found possible for Mrs. Knox to accompany him.

Land explorations and marine surveys, 1904-07.

A marine survey of Kuwait Bay by the R.I.M.S. "Investigator" was begun in November 1904, and continued season by season until November 1907, when the work was completed.

#### Relations with Persia, 1904-1907.

In September 1904 considerable feeling was aroused at Kuwait by the unjustifiable seizure of two Būms belonging to the port by the

Harassment of Kuwait

subjects by  
the Persian  
Imperial  
Customs,  
1904-05.

Persian Customs steamer "Mozaffari," and a general disposition was remarked about this time, on the part of the recently re-organised Persian Customs, to interfere in a vexatious manner with Kuwait subjects and their boats upon the Persian side of the Gulf. The suspicion that Kuwait boats were engaged in running arms to Persia may have been, in some cases, not devoid of foundation; but gratuitous interference with Kuwait vessels generally was now pushed to such a point that the Government of India were constrained to draw the attention of the Secretary of State and the British Minister at Tehran to the matter.

Status and  
protection of  
Kuwait sub-  
jects in  
Persia,  
1904-06.

In March 1905 the general question of the status and protection of Kuwaitis in Persia was discussed by the British Minister at Tehran with the Persian Government in connection with the difficulties just described. Sir A. Hardinge explained that Kuwait was *de facto* independent of Turkey, which had not established or maintained an effective control over the country; and he endeavoured, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to secure for Kuwaitis in Persia the same position in respect of the good offices of Great Britain as was conceded in the case of Afghans, *viz.*, "that the friendly recommendations and wishes of the British Government on their behalf should be accepted." It appeared, however, that the Persian Government, while not averse in principle to the intervention of British diplomatic and consular representatives on behalf of Kuwaitis in Persia, were unwilling to concede the point in practice lest by doing so they should give umbrage to Turkey, whose representatives had already protested against the intervention of the British Resident at Bushahr in Kuwaiti cases. Instructions were in the end given by the Persian Government to the Director-General of Customs at Bushahr not to treat Kuwaitis with such harshness as to bring Kuwait cases into prominence, but at the same time he was enjoined not to admit the intervention of the British Political Resident on their behalf. Up to 1907 no real settlement had been reached.

Friendship  
of Shaikh  
Mubarak and  
the Shaikh of  
Muhamma-  
reh.

A strong personal friendship of some length of standing existed between Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait and Shaikh Khaz'al, the Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh; but its basis, unless it consisted in a certain similarity in their political position, was not apparent. Frequent visits were paid by Shaikh Mubarak to Muhammareh and Failiyeh.

#### Relations with European powers other than Britain, 1904-07.

After 1904 an overt interest in Kuwait affairs was not displayed by any European power other than Great Britain. In September 1904,

soon after Captain Knox's arrival at Kuwait, the Shaikh received a communication from Basrah suggesting that he should profit by the visit of certain Russian officials, then at Basrah, to obtain a reconciliation with the Turks; and it was added that the Russian and French Governments, if the Shaikh consented to receive a Russian and a French Consul at Kuwait, would guarantee the arrangements made. The exact source of this message, to which Shaikh Mubarak sent a formal and meaningless reply, was not discovered. In September 1905 Mr. Babnson, representing the German firm of Wönekhaus and Company in Babrain, arrived in Kuwait to enquire into prospects of trade, but the Shaikh did not allow him to remain long.

#### Internal affairs of the Kuwait principality, 1904-07.

Previously to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, no cognisance at all was taken by the British political authorities of the internal affairs of the Kuwait Shaikhdom; and after that event only so much attention was given them as the interest of the British Government in the general prosperity and stability of the Shaikh's Government warranted. It appeared that no one could be more competent than Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait to manage his own affairs.

Two of the sons of Shaikh Mubarak died in 1906, one of them being Fahad, his youngest, who two years before had been sent for medical treatment to India. The establishment of a British dispensary in Kuwait was partially due to the solicitude of the Shaikh for the life of this child.

Dynastic  
matters.

Notwithstanding a great increase in the trade of the port the Shaikh enhanced all taxation at Kuwait, and some discontent was occasioned thereby. Custom duties, in particular, were augmented; but care continued to be shown for the convenience of merchants, for the reception of whose goods a stone warehouse, spacious and secure, was provided, and the Customs Department in general, under the management of one of the Shaikh's slaves, appeared to be well administered. Export and import duties by land were likewise increased; and in 1907 there were complaints of new and burdensome dues levied on the pilgrims of the Kuwait Hajj at their return. The most serious grievance of the tax-payer was, however, a sudden demand, made in January 1907, on the owners of houses in Kuwait town built on land which had been provided free by the Shaikh. A large part of the

Finances.



town was included in this category, and here it was required of the occupants that they should either pay three-fourths of the value of the buildings, when the property would remain their own, or accept one-fourth the value from the Shaikh and surrender their houses. Heavy taxation was a new feature in the administration of Kuwait, and the reasons for resorting to it in a time of exceptional peace and prosperity were not altogether clear. In 1906-07 Shaikh Mubarak purchased a new steam-yacht at a cost of over a lakh of rupees; and this, with expenses of maintenance, may have accounted in part for the pecuniary difficulties which he now began to allege.

Tribal  
affairs.

The tribal affairs of the Kuwait principality were ordinarily so well managed that nothing was heard of them, and opposition to the wishes of Shaikh Mubarak was rare on the part of the tribes subject to his influence. Towards the end of February 1907, however, a raid was committed by some of the 'Ajman on Arabs living in the desert immediately around Kuwait town and depending on the Shaikh's protection; but Mubarak at once took steps to revenge the outrage, and the 'Ajman would have been attacked in force had they not submitted, promised restitution, and surrendered Muhammad-bin-Hithlain, one of their principal Shaikhs, who was then imprisoned at Kuwait. A levy of the inhabitants for military service against the 'Ajman and also, on another occasion, for the collection of Zakat from various Bedouin tribes, caused considerable dissatisfaction against the Shaikh in the town of Kuwait.

ANNEUXRE NO. 1.—AGREEMENT BY THE SHAIKH OF KUWAIT REGARDING THE NON-RECEPTION OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND THE NON-CESSION OF TERRITORY TO FOREIGN POWERS OR SUBJECTS, 23RD JANUARY 1899.

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, on behalf of the British Government on the one part, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or

at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the former on behalf of the British Government and the latter on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures on this, the tenth day of Ramazan 1316, corresponding with the twenty-third day of January 1899.

(Sd.) M. J. MEADE,  
*Political Resident in the  
Persian Gulf.*

MUBARAK-AL-SUBAH.

(L.S.)

Witnesses.

(Sd.) E. WICKHAM HORE,  
*Captain, I.M.S.*

MUHAMMAD RAHIM BIN  
ABDUL NEBI SAFFER.

(Sd.) J. CALCOTT GASKIN.

(L.S.)

Letter accompanying the execution of the above Agreement.

Dated the 23rd January 1899.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL M. J. MEADE, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SHEIKH MUBARAK-BIN-SUBAH, Sheikh of Koweit.

*After compliments.*—In view of the signing to-day of the agreement, so happily concluded between you, Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah, on behalf of yourself, your heirs and successors, on the one part, and myself, on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, I now assure you, as Sheikh of Koweit, of the good offices of the British Government towards you, your heirs and successors as long as you, your heirs and successors scrupulously and faithfully observe the conditions of the said bond.

The three copies of the bond will be sent to India to be ratified by His Excellency Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Her Imperial Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and, on their return, one copy, duly ratified, will be conveyed to you, when I will take measures to send you, as agreed, a sum of Rs. 15,000 from the Bushire Treasury. A most important condition of the execution of this agreement is that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and not divulged or made public in any way without the previous consent of the British Government.

## CHAPTER VII.

### HISTORY OF NAJD OR CENTRAL ARABIA.\*

#### The Wahhābi movement.

The present era of Central Arabian history began with the rise of Wahhabism, by which the course of events in Najd has since been largely determined. Consequently, in dealing with the era, it is necessary first of all to enquire into the origin of Wahhabism.

Concerning the founder of the Wahhābi sect, though he lived only a century and a half ago, and though general attention was early drawn to his proceedings by their political results, few authentic details have been preserved and the extant information is conflicting. It is agreed that he came of the Bani Tamīm, a solid agricultural tribe of Najd, and 1691 is given as the year of his birth; but the honour of having been his birthplace is contested by the southern town of Hautah and the village of 'Ayainah in Wādi Hanifah. Even his name is doubtful; by some it is said that he was called 'Abdul Wahhāh, by others that this was his patronymic, and that he himself was Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb-bin-Sulaimān. He studied abroad at Basrah, at Damascus, and perhaps elsewhere; but finally he returned to his native country, where, about the year 1742, he began to expound and inculcate the doctrines which he had evolved during his years of study. According to the account which represents 'Ayainah as his native place, it was there that he began his public mission and there that he met, after a time, with opposition

The founder  
of Wahha-  
bism.

\* The following are the principal authorities for the history of Najd: Corancez *Histoire des Wahabis*, 1810; Sadleir's *Diary of a Journey across Arabia in 1819*, published 1866; Mengin's *Histoire de l'Égypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly*, 1823 (not obtained by the present writer); Burekhardt's *Materials for a History of the Wahabys*, 1831; Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahabys*, 1834; *Bombay Selections XXIV, The Persian Gulf*, 1856; Palgrave's *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 1862-63*, published in 1865; Colonel L. Pelly's *Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, 1866; Colonel E. Ross's *Memoir on Nejd*, in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1879-80; Mr. C. M. Doughty's *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 1888; Baron E. Nolde's *Reise nach Innerarabien*, 1895; and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1804-1904*, printed in 1904. The writings of Mr. C. Huber also contain some historical information regarding Najd.

which obliged him to transfer the scene of his activities to the neighbouring town of Dara'iyah; but all authorities concur in stating that his later and more influential years were passed at Dara'iyah. He is said to have been married twenty times and to have had eighteen children. The 14th of June 1787 is mentioned as the day of his death.

Wahhabism  
in its religious  
or original  
aspect.

Wahhabism was at first a purely religious movement; afterwards, through force of circumstances, it acquired a secular and political character. In the beginning it was a reformation of Muhammadan doctrine and practice, inspired by the ideal of a return to the pristine purity of Islam, and took the form chiefly of a protest against superstition and luxury in the Muhammadan world. That the Wahhābi belief, if tried by the standard of the Qurān and the best accredited traditions of Islām, will be found strictly orthodox seems to be generally admitted; and the difference between the true Wahhābi and the ordinary Muhammadan appears to be due to the declension of the latter from the spirit of his own religion rather than to any eccentricity on the part of the former.

Wahhabism  
in its political  
or secondary  
aspect.

The adhesion of numbers of converts to the reformed faith in Central Arabia, together with the failure of that faith to find acceptance elsewhere, soon invested the movement in Najd with a political, a national, and even a military importance. Community of belief first paved the way for submission to a common administrative authority; by this authority individuals were compelled to obey the law and warring townships and districts were welded together into a solid and well-ordered principality; and, once internal unity had been established, a militant enthusiasm for the propagation of their religious principles abroad, not unmingled perhaps with a patriotic desire to cast off the hegemony of the Red Sea districts of Hijāz and Yaman, awoke in the hearts of the people. For the sharp conflicts between the Wahhābis and their neighbours which soon began, and which continued so long as the Wahhābis retained their religious fervour, neither party can be held solely responsible. The Wahhābis on their part displayed great intolerance, especially towards the Turks, whose morals they regarded as lax and non-Muhammadan; while their opponents, conscious of the logical soundness of Wahhābi doctrine and exasperated by the pharisaism of Wahhābi virtue, had recourse to calumnies and misrepresentations. The result was that each side virtually placed the other outside the pale of Islām, and that the Wahhābis, who were the more warlike, declared the lives and property of their antagonists to have been forfeited by religious infidelity and applied themselves to execute the sentence. On the one hand it must be admitted that the opposition to

the Wahhābis proceeded largely from persons, such as the Sharifs of Makkah, whose pecuniary interests the discouragement of honours paid to the memories and tombs of the illustrious dead threatened to affect; and, on the other, that the common herd of Wahhābis, while they did not understand the higher principles at issue but rather dwelt with narrow-minded complacency on such details as the prohibition of gold and silk attire, of rosaries, and of tobacco, revelled in the pillage and plunder which the punishment of the unbelievers rendered lawful and even obligatory. With Christians and Jews the early Wahhābis did not come much in contact; but their feelings towards such appear to have been much less bitter than towards those whom they regarded as false Muhammadans.

These preliminary observations will be illustrated by the history which follows of the Wahhābi power in Najd.

#### MUHAMMAD-BIN-SA'UD, before 1765.

The first secular chief to adopt Wahhābi principles, and to bring his policy and administration into harmony with them, was Muhammad-bin-Sa'ud, Shaikh of Dara'iyah, in whose town and under whose protection the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wahhāb lived during the later and most active part of his career. Muhammad-bin-Sa'ud belonged to a family, known as the Āl Maqran, of the Misālikh section of the Wald 'Alī division of the 'Anizah tribe; and from the name of his father was derived the alternative family name of Āl Sa'ud, which has been transmitted to his descendants, and in virtue of which the Wahhābi Amir is to the present day called "Ibn-Sa'ud," in contradistinction to "Ibn-Rashid," the Amir for the time being of Jabal Shammar. At the time of his adopting Wahhābi beliefs Muhammad-bin-Sa'ud was at feud with Daham-bin-Daus, Shaikh of the neighbouring town of Riyādh; and the strength which Wahhabism gave to his cause enabled him to break the power of this rival, whom he at first reduced to the position of a tributary. He also carried his arms into the eastern province of Hasa; but against the Bani Khālid Shaikhs, who for about a century had been predominant in that region, he failed to obtain any success.\*

\* According to another account however, Muhammad, though he achieved the unification of a great part of Central Arabia, including possibly Jabal Shammar, made it his maxim "not to undermine the cliff," or, in other words, not to provoke neighbouring powers of dangerous strength. If so, his policy of caution and restraint must very soon have been abandoned by his successor for one of aggression.

'ABDUL 'AZIZ-BIN-MUHAMMAD.  
1765-1803.

Muhammad was succeeded on his death by his son 'Abdul 'Aziz, who had frequently commanded the Wahhābi forces in the field, and who had taken in marriage a daughter of the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wahhāb.

Affairs in Najd, 1765-1803.

On his accession to power 'Abdul 'Aziz delegated the duty of directing military operations to his son Sa'ūd, who conducted them on the whole with striking success.

Reduction of  
Riyadh, 1772.

Riyādh, already made tributary, was finally reduced in 1772, the Shaikh Daham-bin-Daus taking refuge in Hasa, and was incorporated with the Wahhābi dominions.

Assassination  
of the 'Amir  
Abdul 'Aziz,  
1803.

The histories of the time contain no further notice of events in Najd until they mention the assassination of 'Abdul 'Aziz, which took place at Dara'iyyah on a date variously given as the 4th of October and the 12th of November 1803. The scene of this deed was a public mosque at the time of evening prayer, and the perpetrator was a Persian Saiyid,\* whose relations the Wahhābis had murdered. The assassin was immediately put to death. 'Abdul 'Aziz had attained, it is said, the age of 82 years.

Operations of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia, 1765-1803.

A strong outward movement of the Wahhābis, zealous to propagate their doctrines, had now begun; and in no direction was their pressure more severely felt than in the Turkish districts of the Red Sea basin.

War with the  
Sharif of  
Makkah,  
1792-1802.

In 1792 or 1793 hostilities broke out between the Wahhābi Amir and Ghālib, Sharif of Makkah, whose religious and political views were naturally irreconcilable with theirs; and the war continued for several years in the form of desultory raids and counter-raids by the tribes

\* Corancez (*Histoire des Wahabis*) is more explicit. He says that the assassin, who used a dagger, was a Kurdish dervish and had taken service with 'Abdul 'Aziz on purpose to kill him, three of his own sons having been slain by Wahhābis at the sack of Karbala in 1801.

dependent upon either. At one time Ghālib had the advantage, and during a whole year he held possession of the desert village of Sha'arah in Najd; but again he narrowly escaped being surrounded by the Wahhābis and escaped, with a few followers only, to Bishah. In 1799 Sa'ūd, the son of the Wahhābi Amir, came to Makkah on pilgrimage with a large number of armed followers, and in the next year he repeated the visit: in the light of later events both of these journeys should perhaps be regarded as military reconnaissances. In 1801 the tribes in the vicinity of Taif fell under the influence of the Wahhābis and were placed by the Amir in charge of a Bedouin Shaikh 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah, who was a brother-in-law of the Sharif Ghālib but had been for several years at enmity with him.

In 1802 Taif itself, the "Garden of Makkah," situated only a couple of days' journey to the east of the Holy City, was taken by 'Othmān; the inhabitants, including even children, were mercilessly put to the sword; and, before the end of the year, the harbour of Qunfidah also, on the Red Sea coast, was lost by the Sharif to the Wahhābis.

Capture of  
Taif and  
Qunfidah  
by the  
Wahhābis,  
1802-03.

In April or May 1803, after a defence of two or three months' duration, Makkah succumbed to a loose investment by the Wahhābi forces which had reduced the inhabitants to great straits for food and drinkable water, and Sa'ūd took possession of the city. During their stay in Makkah, which was not long, the Wahhābis behaved with considerable moderation; but tombs forming objects of pilgrimage were razed to the ground; a Wahhābi reformation of manners and morals was instituted; and, before the departure of the army, a Wahhābi governor was installed in the person of 'Abdul Ma'iu, a brother of the Sharif Ghālib. Ghālib himself, when he found the surrender of Makkah to be inevitable, had slipped away to Jiddah on the sea, and thither the Wahhābis followed him, but they were unable to storm the fortifications and after eleven days gave up the attempt. The bulk of the Harb tribe, however, who had hitherto opposed them, now made submission, and Yanbō' on the coast submitted; but Madinah, though beleaguered, still held out, and dysentery had begun in the invaders' camp.

Capture of  
Makkah by  
the Wahhābis,  
1803.

In July 1803, the bulk of the Wahhābi forces having then returned to Najd, Ghālib came back from Jiddah, obtained the surrender of two small Wahhābi garrisons that had been left behind in Makkah, and resumed the government of the town; but a little later he submitted to the Wahhābi ruler and was granted favourable terms.

Peace and  
restoration of  
the Sharif of  
Makkah,  
1803.

He was confirmed in possession of his revenues and political influence, and he was exempted, along with the whole population of Makkah, from paying tribute to the Amīr. On his part he agreed to take no customs duty at Jiddah from true Wāhhābis.

### Operations of the Wāhhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1765-1803.

Seriously occupied as the attention of the Wāhhābis must have been in the littoral districts of the Red Sea, their energy and resources were at this time such as to permit of a simultaneous and hardly inferior display of activity along the whole Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, where their cause made considerable progress.

Wāhhābi attacks on Kuwait, 1793-95. During the period from 1793 to 1795, while the British Factory from Basrah was temporarily established at Kuwait, frequent demonstrations and one more or less serious attack were made upon the town by the Wāhhābis, but here they gained no success: some details of these hostilities are given in the history of the Kuwait principality. In regard to the nature of the relations subsisting between the British representatives at Kuwait and the Wāhhābi Amīr there is some doubt; for on the one hand it is stated that presents were regularly sent to the Amīr, who in return \* protected the British desert mail to Europe, and on the other it is alleged that the Factory once helped the people of Kuwait to repel a Wāhhābi attack, after which 'Abdul 'Azīz showed unmistakable signs of resentment. In 1798-99, and again in 1802, Turkish expeditions against the Wāhhābis marched, as will be shown further on, through Kuwait territory.

Wāhhābi conquest of Hasa, 1795. The province of Hasa, reduced for the first time in 1792, was finally conquered by the Wāhhābis in 1795, when it was placed under Wāhhābi governors and religious instructors. Hasa thus came to form a base in Eastern Arabia for the wider extension of Wāhhābi influence; and a few years after, as we shall see in a later paragraph, it became the first battleground of the Wāhhābi and the Turk.

Wāhhābi intervention in Bahrain, 1802-03. Established in Hasa, the Wāhhābis soon began to exert an influence on Bahrain affairs; and it was largely through their aid that as related in the history of Bahrain, the 'Atbi rulers of the principality were able

\* According to Cornceez (page 50) the Amīr undertook to protect the British mail only so long as he should be at peace with the Pāshā of Baghādī, but once put a man to death for tampering with it.

to prevent Saiyid Sultān of Masqat from obtaining a permanent footing in the islands. In 1803 Salmān-bīn-Ahmad, Shaikh of Bahrain, appears to have visited the Wāhhābi Amīr with a sum which he offered as tribute, but the payment was excused.

It was also from Hasa that a Wāhhābi force commanded by Hariq, a Nubian slave, proceeded to the Baraimi Oasis, which they seized and occupied with a view to future action against Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate: the particulars of their operations on this side are given in the histories of the regions mentioned. By the middle of 1802 Wāhhābi influence extended along the whole coast from the neighbourhood of Kuwait to Dibah; and in 1803, in consequence of help lent by Saiyid Sultān of Masqat to their enemy the Sharif of Makkah, the Wāhhābis declared war against 'Omān and, by compelling the 'Utāb of Kuwait and Bahram and the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah to take the sea against him, reduced the Saiyid to serious straits; but peace was made on condition that tribute of \$12,000 a year should be paid by the ruler of Masqat to the Wāhhābi Amīr and that a Wāhhābi political representative should be received by him at his capital. This peace was almost immediately violated by the Wāhhābis, whose object seemed to be the complete subjection of 'Omān by an invasion; but news of the assassination of the Amīr 'Abdul 'Azīz, received at the end of the year, obliged them to suspend their proceedings for a time. Meanwhile Saiyid Badar, who ultimately succeeded Saiyid Sultān at Masqat, had left 'Omān and joined himself to the Wāhhābis.

Wāhhābi occupation of Baraimi and relations with 'Omān 1800-03.

### Aggressions of the Wāhhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1765-1803.

So early as 1784 the proceedings of the Wāhhābis had begun to cause alarm to the Turkish rulers of 'Irāq, and during the next ten years the danger from them steadily increased; their attacks, being made suddenly at unexpected points, were often successful; and "the ease with which the Wāhhābis assembled a force, and the rapidity with which that force marched, when assembled, astonished and confounded the slowly moving Ottoman." The open country and the villages and smaller towns on the western borders of 'Irāq became a prey to Wāhhābi depredations, especially towards the lower end of the province near Basrah; and in some cases, in default of that protection

Wāhhābi raids on the borders of 'Irāq, 1784-98.

which the Pāshaliq of Baghdād was unable to afford, the inhabitants paid blackmail to the Wāhhābis. The power of the Bani Khalid tribe, who might otherwise have served as a partial bulwark against these assaults, was broken by the Wāhhābis in their conquest of Hasa between the years 1792 and 1795; and from that time onward the necessity of steps by the Porte, if they cared at all for the security of their own dominions, was evident. The intrigues of the Sharif of Makkah and the complaints of Persian and other pilgrims, who now underwent considerable extortion on the journey across Arabia, also operated to incite the Turks to action.

First Turkish expedition against the Wāhhābis, 1798-99.

For two or three years the Porte were unable to induce their representative at Baghdād, albeit he was none other than the once able and energetic Sulaimān Pāsha, to undertake an expedition against the Wāhhābis; but at length in 1798, when even the town Hillah had begun to suffer from Wāhhābi annoyance, he allowed his objections, which were probably of a personal and pecuniary nature, to be overcome. The Pāsha raised and equipped a force of about 5,000 Turkish troops, with an imposing but not very effective train of artillery, to which was added later a contingent of twice the strength drawn from the Shammar, Dhafir and Muntafik tribes; and the regular part of this force, which in September 1798 was encamped on the right bank of the Tigris at Baghdād, appears to have reached Basrah by the beginning of December. The whole expedition was under the command of 'Ali Pasha, the Kehiyah or steward of Sulaimān Pāsha, a Georgian slave, but married to his master's daughter; this individual has been described by one who knew him\* as "ignorant, bigoted, irascible, obstinate, ill-mannered and brutal;" and his lack of military knowledge and his absurd and haughty treatment of the chiefs of the tribal contingent, on whom he had largely to rely, caused the failure of the expedition to be predicted by many before it had even started. The objective of the force was the Wāhhābi capital of Dara'iyah, and it was determined to proceed thither by the circuitous but otherwise eligible route of Hasa, that Oasis being reduced on the way.

From Basrah 'Ali Pasha marched by land to the Hasa Oasis, where he secured all the Wāhhābi posts except the Kūt of Hofuf and Qasr Sāhūd at Mubarrāz; but, these having held out for more than two months against his languid attacks and unskilful bombardments, he desisted from the siege and, on the advice of his Arab associates,

\* Sir H. J. Brydges; but Mr. Manesty considered him "a brave and enterprising young man."

among whom Muhammad Baig, the most important, was suspected of correspondence with the Wāhhābis, marched again for Basrah. His way was barred at Thāj in Wādi-al-Miyāh by Sa'ūd, son of the Wāhhābi Amīr, and the armies remained halted opposite to each other for three days, during which neither ventured to attack the other in force. A truce for six years between the Wāhhābis and the Pāshaliq was then arranged, in May 1799; and, to obtain ratification of the same, a Wāhhābi envoy returned with the Kehiyah to Baghdād. Meanwhile Sa'ūd visited Hasa; rewarded the garrisons of Kūt-al-Hofuf and Qasr Sāhūd; and punished those who had submitted to the Turks in the usual Wāhhābi manner, by wholesale confiscation of their property. Matters between the Pāsha and the Amīr were eventually adjusted at Baghdād, but not without some extraordinary displays of arrogance on the part of the Wāhhābi delegate.\*

The chief result of this ill-managed expedition was to inspire the Wāhhābis with contempt for the Turkish troops, and in these circumstances it is no matter for surprise that the truce was, after the first, but indifferently observed by the Wāhhābis; nor were they entirely without excuse, for presently a Persian pilgrim caravan, escorted by a Wāhhābi guard, was attacked and plundered between Hillah and Najaf by local Arabs whom it was the duty of the Turks to restrain. Roving bands of plunderers now appeared again in the vicinity of Basrah; and at length, in 1801 a crowning humiliation at the hands of the Wāhhābis overtook Sulaimān Pāsha, which shortened his days, "spread a gloom over the Muhammadan world, and elated to a high degree the character and confidence of the sectaries."

On the morning of the 18th of Zul Hījeh, corresponding apparently to Wednesday the 20th of April 1801, a Wāhhābi host suddenly appeared before Karbala, which at the time was partially deserted in consequence of a pilgrimage to Najaf,—a circumstance that doubtless had not escaped the observation of the enemy. The strength of the invaders on this occasion has been estimated by more than one authority at not less than 6,000 camels, mostly carrying two men. After halting and pitching a small camp in the gardens on the west side of the town, and after detaching two bodies which took up positions to the north and south, the Wāhhābis proceeded to attack a gate opposite the Khaimahgāh

Sack of Karbala by the Wāhhābis, 20th April 1801.

\* A ludicrous scene which occurred at the Wāhhābi envoy's first reception by the Pāsha is well described by Sir H. J. Brydges, who was an eye-witness: see his *Wahabiy*, pages 23-27

from a caravansarai by which it was adjoined; and before long their guns\* effected a breach in the town wall. The Naqib, Saiyid Murtaza, and the civil governor, Mulla 'Umr, then fled by another gate, and a general *saute qui peut* of the inhabitants ensued, while the Wahhābis made straight for the shrine of the Imām Husain, the adoration offered at which was particularly obnoxious to their principles. In the course of the day the Wahhābis wrecked and plundered the tomb to the best of their ability, destroying about half of the gilded copper dome; and they also thoroughly scoured the streets, except in the quarter of the tomb of 'Abbās, pillaging the houses and slaying every male inhabitant whom they met. In the late afternoon they withdrew again from the town and disappeared into the desert, taking with them, it is said, about 200 camel loads of the sacred treasure and of other spoil, besides many prisoners. The whole tragedy was the work of only eight hours.

The number of the inhabitants of Karbala massacred on this fearful day was at first supposed to be about 3,000, but subsequent enquiry showed that it was even greater and exceeded 5,000, of whom some 500 fell within the precincts of the Imām Husain's tomb. The Wahhābis, it has been stated, lost not a single man. Much distress existed during the whole year following among the survivors of the massacre, but some relief was administered by Mr. Harford Jones (afterwards Sir H. J. Brydges), Resident at Baghdad, on account of the Hon'ble East India Company; and a fund subscribed by Persians for the ransom of prisoners was also managed entirely by the British Resident, through whose efforts over 200 captives were released and sent, at their own desire, to Persia.

After their retirement from Karbala the Wahhābis attacked Najaf, but were repulsed, and raided settlements upon the Shatt-al-'Arab near Basrah, from which, however, they were driven out by the people of Zubair.

The position of Sulaimān Pasha after this affair was critical; for, though the Porte had not themselves the means of removing him from his government, it was not impossible that the Shāh of Persia, whose subjects were the principal sufferers, might take effectual action against him and demand compensation for all losses sustained, including the damage done to the great Shi'ah shrine. To guard against a disaster at Najaf similar to that which had befallen Karbala, the treasures of the

\* So one account clearly implies, but the Wahhābis did not take artillery with them.

shrine of 'Ali were removed temporarily, it is said, to the tomb of Imām Mūsa at Kādhimain near Baghdād; and, to placate the indignant sovereigns of Turkey and Persia, Sulaimān Pasha once more set on foot an expedition, largely tribal in its composition, against Dara'iya. This force was commanded by Thuwaini, chief Shaikh of the Muntafik, and included contingents from the Dhafir, Shammar and Ka'ab tribes, as well as from the Muntafik; but, like the expedition under 'Ali Pasha, it ended in disaster. During a halt at the wells of Subaihiyah, 30 miles south of Kuwait, the commander Thuwaini was murdered by a slave; Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi, approached; and the whole force dispersed in confusion. The non-Bedouin portion, unable to find their way in the desert and dying of thirst, mostly surrendered to the Wahhābis, and those who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the more fanatical tribes of Southern Najd, such as the Qahtān and the 'Ataibah, were put to death in cold blood. Broken down by these accumulated misfortunes, Sulaimān Pasha expired on the 7th of August 1802.

The general supineness of the Turks in face of the serious provocations which they received from the Wahhābis is only intelligible in connection with their situation in Europe, which from 1768 to 1803 was continuously grave, at first by reason of foreign wars and later from internal causes.\*

\* In 1768 the Sultan Mustafa III unadvisedly declared war by land and sea against Catharine of Russia; the Russians occupied the Crimea; and further losses to Turkey were only averted by an armistice, during which the partition of Poland took place. In 1773 war broke out afresh and continued till the peace of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774, by which the Crimea was made independent of Turkey, while Azoff, Kertch and Kinburn became Russian possessions. In 1783 Catharine definitely annexed the Crimea to Russia; and in 1788 Austria and Russia made a joint attack on Turkey with the object of spoliation. In 1791 the Russian armies crossed the Danube; and in 1792 the treaty of Jassy transferred Tiflis and the country between the Crimea and the Dniester from Turkey to Russia. After the accession of Paul, Russia and Turkey stood for a short time on the same side, as members of the second coalition against Napoleon who had invaded the Turkish Province of Egypt in 1798; but mutinous Janissaries, insubordinate provincial governors, and disaffected Christian subjects soon brought the Turkish Empire to the verge of dissolution. In 1804 Servia revolted, at first against the tyranny of the Janissaries, but ultimately against Turkish rule; in 1805 Turkey, now allied with France, was again attacked, but languidly, by Russia, and later a British naval force operated against Constantinople; in 1807 the Janissaries deposed the Sultan Salim III. Under Mahmūd II, who reigned from 1808 to 1839, this ebb of the Turkish fortunes was partially stemmed, (See footnote on page 1100).

Second expedition of the Turks against the Wahhābis, probably in 1802.



## SA'UD-BIN-'ABDUL 'AZIZ.

1803-14.

Sa'ūd, whose succession to the Amirship on the death of his father seems to have been unopposed, perhaps because he had been nominated by 'Abdul 'Aziz in his lifetime, was a good specimen of the Wahhābi chief, and the administration in his day was typical of Wahhābi methods; a glance at his personality and system of government will therefore not be out of place. \*

Personality  
of Sa'ūd.

Sa'ūd was handsome, even among his own family; he wore a beard of more than usual length, and so heavy was the growth of hair on his upper lip that it earned for him the sobriquet of Abu Shuwārib or "the Mustachioed"; his voice was sonorous, sweet, and persuasive. His knowledge of Muhammadan law was intimate; in power to apply it to actual cases he was not surpassed by any of the professional students of his own country; and his justice was as much applauded as his severity was feared. The strength of Sa'ūd's domestic affections, his sincerity of mind, his fidelity to his friends and the reliability of his word were unquestioned; but he was intolerant, especially of deceit, and somewhat choleric in disposition. In dress he was simple, in manner unassuming; as a ruler he was accessible in public audience; he avoided all ceremonial and instead maintained the dignity of his position by a princely hospitality. In personal and family expenditure Sa'ūd was frugal; by some he was accused of avarice, especially after the plunder of Karbala and the towns of Hijāz had whetted—as was supposed—his desire for wealth; and the rigour of his fines and confiscations has been attributed to interested motives as well as to zeal for the law. His only extravagance was in horseflesh, and he owned the finest mares in Arabia; three or four hundred he kept at Dara'iyah and others in Hasa, where lucerne was abundant. He was also well provided with the best riding camels. Sa'ūd is said to have fought by his father's side in battle at the early age of twelve years, and in his youth he bore a not undistinguished part in the exploits of the Wahhābi armies, many of which he commanded; but after his accession he avoided exposing himself in the field, and doubts of his

\* The principal authority here is of course Burekhardt, in the existence of whose masterly and convincing *Materials for a History of the Wahabys* students interested in the subject are indeed fortunate.

personal courage came to be entertained. For several years after his father's assassination he wore a secret coat of mail; during his visits to Makkah he caused himself to be surrounded by extraordinary precautions; at Dara'iyah he seldom left his house except on Fridays; and throughout his reign a private interview with him was difficult to obtain. He showed some distrust of his brothers, and he allowed no power to his sons except the eldest, 'Abdullah; but he made much use of his sons in his military enterprises.

The position of Sa'ūd was never that of an absolute or arbitrary monarch; it was rather that of a great Arab Shaikh, ruling by influence, whose subordinate allies and subjects possessed a large degree of local freedom, and even rights, that he could not with safety invade. The authority of the Amir was superior to all others but, only because he was recognised as the visible embodiment of the Wahhābi principle; and the people, for this reason, submitted voluntarily to his guidance. The Amir was careful to maintain, so far as possible, the hereditary power of families devoted to the Wahhābi cause, but of those which were not loyal he destroyed the influence by removing their chiefs to Dara'iyah and substituting strangers in their place at home. In most cases new appointments to positions of authority were made by local election, the result of which the Amir merely confirmed. The Wahhābi dominions were divided into districts of which the principal, in the time of Sa'ūd, were 'Aridh-cum-Hasa, Qasim, Jabal Shammar, the Haramain (*i.e.*, Makkah and Madiinah), Hijāz (in the Bedouin acceptance of the hilly country to the south of Ta'if), and Yaman: Balrain, Qatar and 'Omān hardly, perhaps, formed regular districts. The executive government in each division, except in 'Aridh-cum-Hasa which contained the capital and was kept by Sa'ūd in his own hands, was carried on by officials, generally no doubt—as in the case of the Sharif Ghālib of Makkah—influential hereditary chiefs; and the principal duties of these executive governors were, besides political vigilance in their charges, to attend to the collection of the revenue and to furnish such military contingents as the central government might require. In matters of law and justice, however, the authorities were not the executive governors but Qādhis, carefully selected and sent down to the divisions from Dara'iyah; and from these, as from the governors, an appeal seems to have lain in all cases to the Amir. In time of peace the Amir relied largely on the advice of the family of the founder of Wahhabism, known as the "Aulād-ash-Shaikh", who seem to have formed in fact a sort of standing but informal council of state.

General ad-  
ministration  
of the Wah-  
hābi Amir.

Civilising  
tendency at  
home of the  
Wahhābi  
government.

The tendency of the Wahhābi government in Najd, in comparison at least with the system or no-system which had preceded it, was essentially civilising. Among the principal objects kept in view were the establishment of law and order, the suppression of local wars and private feuds, and the substitution for the latter of state-inflicted punishments and state-awarded compensation; and considerable severity was used in the prosecution of these aims with the result that Arab license, though far from being abolished, was tempered and held in check. Local responsibility for the prevention of crime, especially robbery, was very strictly enforced; and punishment was even inflicted on bystanders who failed to interfere in personal affrays. By discouraging facility of divorce the Wahhābi Amir sought to raise the level of morality among his subjects. A great part of the new system was repulsive to the Bedouins, who had been accustomed to live by plunder; and the innovation of disregarding, in the case of criminals, the ancient principles of tribal protection or sanctuary must at first have been regarded with consternation.\* The security established by the Wahhābi ruler was, however, appreciated by the non-nomadic population, though these too had their grievances; and, on the whole, public opinion appears to have supported the Amir in most of his reforms. Punishments were severe, but generally took the form of fines beneficial to the treasury; the death penalty however, though rare, was not unknown, and was inflicted in cases of homicide committed with a dangerous weapon. For men of position the gravest penalty was shaving of the beard, and enormous fines were sometimes paid in order to escape this last extremity of degradation.

Religious  
aspects of  
the adminis-  
tration.

The administration was characterised by less of religious austerity than might have been expected from the principles of those by whom it was conducted. After the first few years it was not attempted, even in Najd, to prevent the smoking of tobacco in private; and after 1810, an effort that had been made to avoid communication with heretics having been abandoned as impracticable, commercial intercourse with 'Irāq and Syria was gradually resumed. The punctual and regular observance of the fixed prayers was however enforced, when necessary, by beating with sticks. The commercial policy of Sa'ūd was liberal; and, though usury was forbidden, he did not interfere with speculators who bought cheap and held up their stocks, even in times of scarcity, for a rise in prices.

\* For the rules of tribal protection, see Pelly's *Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, Appendix XIII.

Financial  
system of  
the Wah-  
habis.

The financial arrangements of the Wahhābi government were simple and effective. The state domains were the principal source of revenue; they consisted chiefly of the confiscated lands of rebels and other offenders, leased in many instances to the original owners on a rent of one-half or one-third of the produce; and they were very extensive, embracing in Qasim, for instance, almost all the cultivated ground of the district. Another principal item of revenue was Zakāt or tribute, literally "alms," taken from many classes and professions in accordance with the precepts of the Qurān; under this head unirrigated cultivation was assessed at one-tenth and irrigated at one-twentieth of the actual produce, and merchants were taxed at the rate of 2½ per cent. upon their capital, the amount of which they were required to declare on oath. One-fifth of the booty taken from "heretics" was appropriated to public purposes, the remainder being divided among the troops by whom it was captured; and in the early days of the Wahhābi power, when wars were being waged simultaneously in Hijāz and Yaman, in 'Irāq, and on the Persian Gulf littoral, this must have been a productive source of income. Ordinary miscellaneous fines also brought something into the treasury, and from the Bedouins were taken in kind, viz., in horses, camels, and sheep.

The whole of this revenue, with the exception of the Bedouin Zakāt, which was paid to the Wahhābi Amir direct and retained by him for his personal expenditure, was collected with elaborate precautions against fraud and extortion and deposited in the Bait-al-Māl or treasury which existed in each administrative district; and of the amounts received at each place one-fourth was forwarded to the great public treasury at Dara'iyah, while the rest was expended locally for the public benefit. The aggregate value of the contributions received at the head treasury from local treasuries did not ordinarily exceed \$1,000,000 per annum; but in one particular year, under the rule of Sa'ūd, it was said to have reached \$2,000,000. From the central treasury compensation was paid to Wahhabis who had suffered at the hands of the enemy and assistance was given to those who had lost cattle by accident or disease; but in Sa'ūd's time the outgoings were small in proportion to the income, and there must have been a great accumulation of treasure at Dara'iyah. From the Bedouin Zakāt, collected in spring at prescribed watering places and delivered over to the Amir for private disbursement, were met the cost of his magnificent hospitality and that of the maintenance of his bodyguard: the dependents and guests whom he fed were estimated at 400 to 500 persons daily, and the expenditure on the bodyguard

was probably not less than £10,000 a year. It was a favourable point in the Wahhābi fiscal system that irregular extortions and forced gifts were not permitted; and Sa'ūd, at the worst, was only suspected of occasionally taking steps to bring about the forfeiture by legal means of a mare which he particularly coveted. The Wahhābi ruler had no currency of his own and dollars were the principal medium of exchange in Najd, but Turkish coin was rejected and treated as abominable.

Military  
system of the  
Wahhābis.

Warfare was conducted by the Wahhābis on Bedouin principles. Apart from the Amir's mercenary bodyguard or Manjiyah of about 300 men, and from the retinues of his sons, there was no standing force; but every man between the ages of 15 and 60 was a soldier and was liable to render military service against those who had not accepted the reformed faith, whenever he might be called upon to do so. At times only a proportion, at times the whole, of the military strength of a particular district was called out; and very heavy fines were levied on those who, after being summoned, neglected to appear. This compulsory service in the field was probably the most unpopular feature of Wahhābi rule, at least with the settled population; and it fell so severely upon the owners of mares that many sold their animals, and the number of horses available in Najd became by degrees considerably reduced. The matchlock men of the towns and villages were a *corps d'élite* and took a leading part in the sack of Karbala. Substitutes might be hired by those called out for service except when the levy was universal. The Wahhābi soldier proceeding to the front was required to provide, in addition to his arms and a horse or camel, his rations for the campaign; these were fixed at 100 lbs. of flour, 50 or 60 lbs. of dates, 20 lbs. of butter, a sack of wheat or barley for his animal, and a skin for water. The Wahhābi military system was a good one for raids and incursions, but it supplied no men for the permanent occupation of foreign conquests; and, in fact, no regular Wahhābi garrison was ever maintained abroad for any length of time except at Madinah. The Wahhābis certainly excelled in those destructive raids on which they relied for breaking the spirit of their adversaries, and these they carried out with extraordinary secrecy and despatch, the leader generally assembling his men at an unlikely rallying place and moving off at first in a false direction. In a great invasion of the Syrian Haurān, in 1810, the Wahhābi forces marched for 35 days before reaching their objective and looted a large number of villages before the Pasha of Damascus, who had only two days' notice of their approach, could make any defensive preparations. The courage of the Wahhābi in war was stimulated by a belief that his soul, if he died fighting, went straight to Paradise; and he was chiefly terrible

to his foes on account of his consistent refusal to grant quarter to any who opposed him in arms. In the hostilities in Hijaz during the latter part of Sa'ūd's rule not a single instance, it is said, occurred of a Turkish soldier's life being spared by a Wahhābi. On the other hand "Amān" or quarter, either partial and extending in that ease to little but life, or complete and extending to both life and property, was invariably granted to such as made submission; and, when granted, it was most honourably observed. The honour of women was in all circumstances strictly respected.

We have dwelt at some length upon these particulars because they make the course of Wahhābi history more intelligible; and it is probable that, even at the present day, some such system as that which prevailed in the time of Sa'ūd constitutes the Wahhābi ideal of good government.

#### Internal history of Najd, 1803-1814.

The great activity of the Wahhābis under Sa'ūd beyond their own borders tended to obscure such events as occurred in Najd, and hostility and the absence of communication between the people of Najd and their neighbours made the veil over Central Arabian affairs almost impenetrable. An internal rebellion, of which the exact time and circumstances are not known, is said to have taken place in the district of Hariq, but it was apparently suppressed. In 1808 there was scarcity in the interior, where drought had then prevailed for two or three years. By 1809, at latest, the northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Amir had been added to the Wahhābi dominions for in that year the Pasha of Damascus made an effort, which ended in nothing, to organise an expedition against the place. Sa'ūd died of fever at Dara'iyah in the spring of 1814; the exact date is given as the 10th or 17th of April, and his age at his death is stated to have been 68 years.\*

#### Proceedings of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia, 1803-1814.

The conquest of the Turkish districts of the Red Sea littoral was completed by the Wahhābis under Sa'ūd-bin-'Abdul 'Aziz. Madinah succumbed to a blockade in the spring of 1804 and was treated with some

Madinah  
taken by the  
Wahhābis,  
1804.

\* Burckhardt says 45 or 50 years, but this seems almost inconsistent with his statement that a child of one of Sa'ūd's younger sons was presented to the Amir at Makkah on one of his visits there.

severity on account of the favourable disposition of the inhabitants towards the Turks; thus, while private property was respected, the town was not exempted, like Makkah, from payment of tribute to the Amīr. The Turkish representative was expelled from the place; a Shaikh of the Harb tribe was installed as governor; the treasures of the tomb of Muhammad—or such as had not been divided among themselves by the people of Madinah before the surrender—were appropriated by the Wahhābis; and an attempt was made to destroy the dome of the building itself.\* The desecration of the tomb of the prophet was a shortsighted and impolitic act; it filled the whole Muhammadan world with horror, and it finally alienated all Sunnis from the Wahhābi cause in no less a degree than the desecration of the Karbala shrine had already alienated all Shi'ahs.

In the same year Abu Nuqtah, the principal Shaikh of 'Asir, overran the coast of Yaman from Qunfidah to Bait-al-Faqih, in the name of the Wahhābis, plundering the ports of Lahiyah and Hodaidah; and during the next three or four years he frequently repeated his incursions into the same tract. No attempt, however, was made to capture San'ah,—chiefly, it was believed, because the Wahhābi Amīr was anxious to defer the taking of that place until he could himself be present and secure a main share in the plunder.

Under Wahhābi rule tranquillity prevailed in the conquered districts of the Red Sea coast, and, as communication with Najd was free and intercourse with Egypt unimpeded, provisions were abundant and prices low; but general trade, in consequence of the check to pilgrimages and to the resulting influx of foreign merchants, was stagnant. The local influence of Ghālib, Sharif of Makkah, which was an obstacle to the free exercise of authority by the Wahhābis, had begun to decline; but everywhere it was considerable, and at Jiddah as yet almost unimpaired; and the adroitness of the Sharif was such that the Amīr could find no pretext for taking measures against him. By persuading Sa'ūd to forbid public prayers being made in the mosques on Fridays for the Sultān of Turkey Ghālib succeeded in bringing about a yet more irreconcilable difference than already existed between the Porte and the Wahhābis.

The Wahhābis had always regarded with disfavour the great organised annual pilgrimages to Makkah and Madinah which were made under Turkish official arrangements from Damascus and Cairo and also, by

\* According to Colonel Ross the spoliation of the tomb and the attempted destruction of the dome did not take place until the year 1810, when the Amīr visited Madinah in person.

large concourses of people, from Yaman and Persia. They were themselves exact in performance of the pilgrimage to Makkah, which was frequently made by Sa'ūd himself, and they had apparently no conscientious scruples even against pilgrimages to Madinah; but the irreverent and licentious conduct of many of the pilgrims was repugnant to their feelings, and they had doubtless strong objections to the intervention of the "heretical" Turkish Government. In 1802 the Hajj from Damascus had difficulty in carrying out the pilgrimage to Makkah, and in 1803\* it was obliged to turn back before even reaching Madinah; the Egyptian and Persian Hajjs also came to an end in 1802 or 1803; and in the latter year the Cairo Mahmal, sent by sea from Egypt, was not suffered to proceed beyond Jiddah where it was landed. In 1810, however, an organised Hajj from Morocco and Northern Africa was permitted by Sa'ūd to visit Makkah in consideration of the religious character and propriety of the Maghrabiyyin. The performance of the pilgrimage by individuals who professed acceptance of Wahhābi tenets and comported themselves with decency was never, apparently, either prevented or hindered by the Wahhābi authorities in Hijāz.

In 1804 Muhammad 'Alī† was appointed Pasha of Egypt, chiefly in order that he might recover Hijāz for the Sultān of Turkey. In the same year 400 or 500 troops under Sharif Pasha had been sent to Jiddah, of which place their commandant was appointed governor by the Porte; but Sharif Pasha died at Jiddah, and the position remained

Preparations by the Viceroy of Egypt for the recovery of the Holy Cities, 1804-10.

\* From Corancez' *Histoire des Wahabis*, 1806 (not 1803), would seem to be the year in which the caravan was repulsed.

† Muhammad 'Alī Pasha was an Albanian soldier of fortune and a self-made man.

Ibrāhīm Pasha, who is generally regarded as Muhammad 'Alī's eldest son, but according to some historians was only a step-son, entered soon after the conclusion of his campaign in Najd on a military career in Europe; and in 1848 he was regent of Egypt for only two months, predeceasing his father for whom he acted. 'Abbās II, the present Khedive of Egypt, is Ibrāhīm's great-grandson in the male line.

Tūsūn, who was Muhammad 'Alī's third (or second) son, died of plague at Rosetta in 1816, less than a year after his return from Najd. 'Abbās I, who ruled Egypt from 1848 to 1854, was his son; but in the character of that miserable voluptuary and bigoted Muslim we fail to trace a single lineament of the soldierly Tūsūn.

From the appointment of Muhammad 'Alī until 1841 Egypt was practically independent of the Porte and was actually stronger, both on land and sea, than the rest of the empire to which it nominally belonged. It is therefore necessary to emphasize the fact that the Central Arabian campaigns and occupations of 1815-18 and 1835-41 were Egyptian, not Turkish. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the so-called Egyptian forces included a large proportion of Albanians, Libyan Bedouins, etc., and doubtless, a number of genuine Turks.

General position on the Western Coast of Arabia, 1804-08.

Treatment of the Hajj by the Wahhābis, 1802-10.

unaltered. Suez fell into Muhammad 'Ali's hands in 1805 and Qusair in 1808, and, had he declared those ports closed to trade with Hijāz, it is possible that the inhabitants of that province would have been obliged, through failure of the food supplies for which they are dependent on Egypt, themselves to undertake the expulsion of the Wahhābis; but, either from respect for the Holy Cities and their inhabitants, or from unwillingness to injure the export trade of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali shrunk from this obvious expedient and deferred the recovery of Hijāz until he was in a position to attempt it by force of arms. The Pasha's preparations were not commenced in earnest until the end of 1809; nor was he entirely at leisure from internal preoccupations until he had disposed of the Mamlūk rebellion, which continued into 1811. Once begun, however, his measures were thorough and systematic; and, before commencing the campaign he was careful to provide a sufficient fleet of transports at Suez and to establish and garrison a chain of posts reaching down the eastern shore of the Red Sea as far as Wajj. As soon as the Sharif Ghālib of Makkah became aware of Muhammad 'Ali's intentions he opened a correspondence with the Pasha.

Occupation of  
Yanbō' by  
the Egyptians  
and  
their repulse  
from Madi-  
nah, 1811-12.

Command of the expedition was entrusted to Tūsūn Bey, son of Muhammad 'Ali, a youth who was only eighteen years of age but had distinguished himself by his courage in the Mamlūk wars. The infantry, consisting of 1,500 to 2,000 Albanians, arrived by sea near Yanbō' in October 1811; and that place, which was held by a nominally Wahhābi garrison of 100 men on the part of the Sharif Ghālib, surrendered after a feeble resistance of two days to the Egyptian commanders. A fortnight later Tūsūn Bey himself arrived by land with the cavalry, who numbered about 800 and consisted partly of Turkish horsemen and partly of mounted Bedouins: he had experienced no opposition by the way. In January 1812, the Sharif Ghālib as yet declining on various pretexts to assist either side, the Egyptians advanced from Yanbō' through the hills towards Madinah; but in a gorge near the village of Jadaid they were taken unawares by a huge force of Wahhābis, just arrived from Najd, of whose presence they were altogether ignorant and by whom the mountains on either side were occupied in great strength. The result was a complete disaster for the invading force, who lost four guns, about 1,200 men, 200 horses, the whole of their baggage, and nearly all their camel transport; but pursuit by the Wahhābis was checked by the courage of Tūsūn Bey himself and of his Agha,\* Thomas Keith, *alias* Ibrāhim,

\* Thomas Keith was a native of Edinburgh; he was originally an armourer in the 72nd Highlanders; but, having been taken prisoner in Egypt, he became a Muhammadan and rose, after extraordinary adventures, to be the chief of Tūsūn's Mamlūks.

who between them succeeded in rallying a few of the Egyptian cavalry. The Sharif Ghālib, on learning what had befallen the Egyptians, proceeded in person to join the Wahhābis; but the latter, soon after the action at Jadaid, returned to the interior, leaving the Harb tribe to watch Yanbō'.

In October 1812, having received large reinforcements from Egypt, having conciliated part of the Harb tribe, and having been approached by the Sharif Ghālib, who again offered, as he had done before, to hand over Makkah and Jiddah to the Egyptians as soon as they should have taken Madinah, Tūsūn Bey advanced once more against Madinah. This time there was no resistance by the way; but the inner or walled town of Madinah, from which the Wahhābis had expelled the inhabitants in order that they might occupy it themselves, held out for fourteen or fifteen days. At length, a breach having been opened in the wall by means of a mine as the Egyptian artillery was too light for the purpose, the troops entered headed by Thomas Keith, killed about 1,000 of the astonished Wahhābis, and plundered the town. About 1,500 of the Wahhābis gained the citadel, in which they stood a siege of three weeks; but at the end of that time their provisions gave out and they surrendered on favourable terms, which the Egyptians immediately violated by killing as many of them as they could,—an act of perfidy that caused a strong revulsion of feeling among the Bedouins in favour of the Wahhābis. The skulls of the dead Wahhābis were collected by the Egyptians and built into a tower upon the Yanbō' road, of which a portion still remained in 1815 and was seen by the traveller Burekhardt.

Madinah  
taken by the  
Egyptians,  
1812.

On the fall of Madinah a force of 1,500 men under Mustafa Bey, a brother-in-law of Muhammad 'Ali, marched from Yanbō' in the direction of Makkah; the Sharif Ghālib favoured their advance; and the local Wahhābi leader, Ghālib's brother-in-law 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah, was too weak to oppose it. In January 1813 the Egyptians entered Makkah, Jiddah being at the same time occupied by a detachment; and a fortnight later Taif also, in the hills some 60 or 70 miles to the eastward of Makkah, was taken by Mustafa Bey, assisted by the Sharif Ghālib, after a slight skirmish with 'Othmān. From Taif, Mustafa Bey pushed on towards Turabah, to the east of Taif; but he was defeated in the hills and returned, having lost 400 or 500 men. Tūsūn Bey, now created Pasha of Jiddah, arrived at Makkah as a pilgrim in the course of the winter; and later, in September 1813, 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah was taken prisoner near Taif and was sent to Constantinople, where he was beheaded.

Makkah,  
Jiddah and  
Taif occupied  
by the Egyptians,  
1813.

Arrival of  
Muhammad  
'Ali in Hijāz  
and deporta-  
tion of the  
Sharif Ghā-  
lib, 1813

On the 28th of August 1813, Muhammad 'Ali, who had received strict orders from Constantinople to proceed in person to Hijāz and feared that he might lose the Pashāliq of Egypt if he did not obey, arrived at Jiddah; he brought with him a reinforcement of 2,000 infantry; and in the meantime 2,000 cavalry and 8,000 transport camels had been despatched by the land route from Egypt. The Pāsha at once turned his attention to the problem of provisioning his forces, which had become one of great urgency, for the Turkish garrisons of Makkah and Taif depended on the port of Jiddah for their supplies and transport was so scarce that it was hardly possible to forward them as fast as they were required. Sea transport, too, was inadequate; and to supplement this deficiency Muhammad 'Ali took up the whole of the shipping of Jiddah and Yanbō' and arranged to hire 20 vessels for one year from Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat. The Pāsha quickly conceived a distrust of Ghālib, partly on account of the failure of the latter to provide camels when called upon to do so, and partly because it was obvious that the Arabs regarded the Sharif as their protector equally against the Wahhābis and the Egyptians. Muhammad 'Ali's suspicions led before long to the arrest of Ghālib by artifice, followed by his deportation to Turkey, where he died of plague at Salonika in 1816; but the local effect of this stroke of policy was unfortunate and caused the flight of many influential Arabs to the Wahhābi camp. Among these was Rājah, a relation of Ghālib, whom the Wahhābi Amir appointed his representative in Hijāz in place of 'Othman.

Unsuccessful  
expedition of  
Tūsūn Pāsha  
against Turā-  
bah, 1813.

Such being the position of affairs, Muhammad 'Ali, at the end of October or beginning of November 1813, determined on an expedition against Turabah, where Rājah had now fixed his headquarters and where many others of the adherents of Ghālib had assembled. The Pāsha had succeeded in collecting a small quantity of supplies at Taif, and he therefore ordered his son Tūsūn Pāsha to advance from that place with 2,000 men and provisions for 30 days. The force was delayed on the way by troublesome hill operations against the 'Ataibah, and their provisions were almost exhausted before they came in sight of Turabah, where lived the Buqūm tribe, presided over by an old woman named Ghāliyah, whom the Turks regarded as a sorceress. After one unsuccessful attack on Turabah a retirement was commenced, and the Egyptians, closely pressed by the enemy during a four days' retreat to Taif, lost 700 men by the way; on this occasion, as in the disaster at Jadaid, the force was only saved from utter destruction through the exertions of Tūsūn Pāsha, the commander, seconded by his faithful Scottish Āgha. As Taif was the only point from which operations

could at this time be carried on, it became a matter of the first necessity to re-provision that post; but in doing so great difficulty was experienced, for of the 8,000 camels sent from Egypt only 500 survived their arrival in Hijāz by as much as three months, and from the whole surrounding country not more than 500 local camels could be got together at one time. The route between Jiddah and Taif, moreover, was very unsafe, being exposed to Wahhābi raids and surprises; and about one-third of the load of each convoy was consumed by the escorts and drivers on the march. During the winter of 1813-14 the Egyptian troops remained perfectly inactive.

An organised pilgrim caravan from Egypt apparently reached Makkah at the end of 1812; but it was not until November 1813 that a Syrian Hajj, the first to pass since 1802, was conducted in safety to the sacred city by Sulaimān Pasha. On his way the Pāsha had been obliged to yield to the insolent demand of the Bedouins that he should pay up their allowances for the ten years during which the Hajj had been intermitted. Many pilgrims from Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe also made their way to Hijāz *via* Suez and Jiddah; and the townspeople of Makkah were cheered by prospects of returning prosperity.

Reopening of  
the Hajj.  
1812-13.

#### Proceedings of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1803-14.

The details of Wahhābi action in Eastern Arabia during the reign of Sa'ūd will be found in the separate histories of the Arab principalities upon the coast of the Persian Gulf, chiefly in those of Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate; and here it will be enough to take a general view of the Wahhābi proceedings in that quarter.

In 1808 the 'Utūb of Kuwait, whose attitude towards the Wahhābi Amir had generally been one of defiance, withheld or refused to pay tribute; and a strong Wahhābi force was despatched against the town, but was repulsed with loss. This check to an enemy from whom he had much to fear was very welcome to the Pāsha of Baghdād, who did not fail to show his pleasure by sending a robe of honour and other gifts to the Shaikh of Kuwait. In the following year the Wahhābi Amir, desirous of wiping out the defeat, ordered the 'Utūb of Bahrain, the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Saiyid of Masqat to undertake an

Action of the  
Wahhābis at  
Kuwait.

expedition by sea against Kuwait and Basrah; but the Qawāsim alone expressed their willingness to obey, and even they in the end took no action.

Action of the  
Wahhābis in  
Bahrain,  
Qatar and  
Hasa.

Sa'ūd endeavoured, at the beginning of his reign, to consolidate the power obtained in his father's time over Bahrain and Qatar; and, so long as he remained free from embarrassments in other quarters, his efforts were not unsuccessful. In 1805, a dynastic quarrel being then in progress in 'Omān, he was able to despatch an 'Atbi fleet from Bahrain to watch the course of events at Masqat in the Wahhābi interest. In 1809 he won over to his side the dangerous pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, with whose assistance his power was quickly established in Qatar; and in 1810 he was able to appoint a Wahhābi governor over Qatar, Bahrain and Hasa with headquarters in Bahrain. In 1811, in consequence of the dangers threatening from the direction of Egypt and Hijāz, he was obliged to relax his hold on the newly acquired eastern districts; Zubārah in Qatar was successfully attacked by the ruler of Masqat; and the Wahhābi garrisons were either expelled or withdrawn from that place and from Bahrain, and were withdrawn from Qatif and Hofūf in Hasa. By 1814 the influence of the Wahhābis in Bahrain affairs had ceased; but in Hasa, where there was no strong local power to contest the field, it remained paramount.

Action of the  
Wahhābis in  
Trucial  
'Omān.

The establishment of a Wahhābi post in the Baraimi Oasis in 1800 did not long remain without effect on the affairs of the district known at the present day as Trucial 'Omān. and in 1804-05 there was a marked increase of lawlessness on the part of the piratical Qawāsim; but whether this was due to the direct incitement of the Wahhābis, or was an indirect result of their interference in local politics, must be considered a doubtful point. At the end of 1808 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, the chief of the Qawāsim, was deposed by the Wahhābis from his general authority over the tribe; and in 1809 Husain-bin-'Alī, Shaikh of Rams, who had recently visited Dara'iyah, was appointed governor, on behalf of the Wahhābis, over the whole Pirate Coast. In 1808-09 a serious renewal of piracy took place and symptoms of fanaticism were perceptible, but conclusive proofs of Wahhābi instigation were still wanting; it was stated, however, that Husain-bin-'Alī had undertaken the usual obligation of a Wahhābi governor to forward to Dara'iyah one-fifth of the spoils taken in war from "heretics" by those over whom he was placed. In 1809 the Wahhābis consolidated their hold upon the 'Omān promontory by occupying with Wahhābi garrisons the forts of Fujairah, Bitlnah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah, and in the same year they succeeded in decoying Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar

to Dara'iyah, where he was detained under surveillance; but the Shaikh before long escaped from their custody and made his way through Yaman to the port of Mokha, whence he returned by sea to Masqat. At the end of the year, when the piratical port of Rās-al-Khaimah was attacked by a British armament, it was stated that Mutlaq, the Wahhābi leader at Baraimi, had moved to the assistance of the Qawāsim; but, if he did, he arrived too late. In 1812 piracy again revived upon the coast subject to the Qawāsim; but the connection of the Wahhābis with the outbreak, if they had any, was not clear.

We have already adverted to the interference of the Wahhābis in a dynastic quarrel at Masqat in the year 1805. The result of the struggle there was favourable to the Wahhābi protégé Saiyid Badar, who obtained the chief power and ruled Masqat from 1805 to 1807; but in the latter year he was assassinated by his cousin Saiyid Sa'id, Wahhābi influence at Masqat received a severe check, and a garrison which the Wahhābis had placed at Barkah fled from their post. The new sovereign, Saiyid Sa'id, professed a favourable disposition towards Ibn-Sa'id, who continued to be represented at Masqat by a political agent and some religious emissaries; but the Wahhābis were perfectly well aware of the Saiyid's secret hostility to their influence; and in 1809, after Sa'id had evaded compliance with an order to proceed in the Wahhābi interest against Kuwait, the Wahhābi general Mutlaq-al-Mutairi was sent to Baraimi with orders to organise and conduct a campaign against him. It was at this point that the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah took place, designed partly for the chastisement of the Qasimi pirates and partly for the relief of the ruler of Masqat from the Wahhābi danger; it ended early, in 1810, with the recovery of the Saiyid's town of Shinās from the grasp of the Wahhābis, by whom it had been seized; but the effect of the operations was temporary and in the end probably unfavourable to the interests of Masqat. In 1811 Mutlaq, nothing daunted, proceeded with his task of subjugating 'Omān; after an unsuccessful blockade of Barkah and Matrah, he made himself master of Hisn Samāil in the heart of the Saiyid's dominions; and, having placed a garrison in that fort, he withdrew again to Baraimi. In 1812 the Saiyid's subjects, aided by a Persian contingent, retook Hisn Samāil; but this success was followed by a severe engagement in the neighbourhood of Izki, in which the 'Omānis and their allies were completely worsted. In the same year, or perhaps in 1813, the Wahhābis took a fearful revenge on Saiyid Sa'id; their forces, accompanied by Turki and Faisal, two sons of the Wahhābi Amīr, devastated the districts of Masqat and Eastern Hajar; and they

Action of the  
Wahhābis in  
the 'Omān  
Sultanate.



encamped for a time in Ja'alān, which they made a base for their destructive raids, and where they succeeded in permanently converting the Bani Bū 'Alī and the Bani Rāsib, two important local tribes, to Wahhābism. They then returned, apparently without loss, to their principal post in the Barāimi Oasis.

Later in 1813, Saiyid Sa'id having opened a correspondence with 'ūsūn Pāsha and undertaken to restore the displaced Shaikh of the Qawāsīm, the Wahhābi general Mutlaq invaded Bātināh in irresistible force and extorted from the ruler of Masqat a payment of \$40,000. Mutlaq then proceeded to Najd; but, his successor Ibn-'Azdakāh having been murdered, he quickly returned to 'Omān—only however to meet his death, in November 1813, at the hands of the Hajriyin. His place at Barāimi was taken by one Ibn-Mazrū'.

#### First contact between British and Wahhābi policy.

The events described above, in Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate, brought the Wahhābis for the first time into contact with the British power, and that in a not altogether friendly manner; for the Wahhābis were suspected of instigating the piracies of the Qawāsīm, and they certainly aimed at destroying the independence of the Saiyid of Masqat, which the British Government desired to maintain.

At the same time every precaution was taken by the British authorities to avoid the appearance of a conflict with Ibn-Sa'ūd. In 1805, when British action was first taken, in concert with Saiyid Badar, against the Qāsimi buccaneers, Captain Seton, the agent employed, was strictly enjoined by the Bombay Government to refrain from proceedings which might be displeasing to the Wahhābi Amir; and, in the treaty which he arranged with the Qawāsīm in 1806, the supposed connection of the Wahhābis with that tribe was studiously ignored.

In 1809, on the occasion of the expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, the same indirect policy was observed, and the commander of the British force was instructed to avoid a direct collision with the representatives of Ibn-Sa'ūd; but the peculiar circumstances of the imbroglio at Shinās led to an involuntary contravention of these orders, and some Wahhābi blood was apparently shed by the British arms in the capture

of that stronghold.\* Rahmah-bin-Jābir, however, the pirate of Qatar, escaped punishment by the expedition, partly at least on account of his connection with the Wahhābis. At the conclusion of the campaign a letter was apparently addressed by the British authorities to Ibn-Sa'ūd, requiring him to restrain those under his influence from committing piracy; and an answer was received from the Amir, in which, while he affected not to be impressed by the British operations on the coast, he stated that he had no quarrel with Christians and would prevent aggressions upon the British flag.

The increasing difficulties of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia led, however, before the death of Sa'ūd, to another and more friendly exchange of communications with the British Government. In 1811 or 1812, possibly as a countermove to the journey of Saiyid Sālim from Masqat to Shiraz for the purpose of obtaining help from Persia, the Wahhābi Amir sent an envoy named Ibrāhīm-bin-'Abdul Karīm to the Governor of Fārs, by whom he was well received; and this envoy, after discharging his duty at Shirāz, waited on the British Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, at Būshehr, where he expressed, on behalf of his master Ibn-Sa'ūd, a desire that amicable relations should be established between the British and the Wahhābi Governments and that the ports of either should be thrown open to the commerce of the other. These overtures were submitted in due course to the Government of India, who decided, apparently in 1814, that it would be inexpedient to enter into a treaty or to form intimate relations with the Wahhābi Amir; but they considered that friendly intercourse should be maintained with him, and that every effort made to confirm him in his favourable disposition.

Overtures of the Wahhābi Amir to the British Government, 1811-12.

#### Attacks by the Wahhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1803-14.

Under the Amir Sa'ūd raids upon the borders of Turkish 'Irāq continued; but the people of that province were now thoroughly upon their guard, and no considerable successes were any longer achieved by the Wahhābis. The Wahhābis made, however, almost annual incursions, and they sometimes even crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia.

At the end of 1803, apparently by way of revenge for the assassination of the late Amir 'Abdul 'Aziz, which the Pāsha of Baghdād was

Harmless Wahhābide-monstrations, 1803.

\*From Burckhardt (II. 208) it would seem that a cousin of the Amir Sa'ūd was among those killed.

British settlement with the Qawāsīm, 1806.

British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah and Shinās, 1809.

suspected of having instigated, a force of Wāḥḥābis plundered the environs of Najaf; but when the Pāsha, who had now taken into his counsels a chief named Fāris of the northern Shammar, advanced against them, they retired without fighting.

Unsuccessful  
Wāḥḥābi  
attack on  
Zubair and  
Basrah, 1804.

In 1804 Wāḥḥābi troops overran the neighbourhood of Zubair and Basrah, but, though they captured a Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe and by his means brought pressure to bear on his brother, who was governor of Zubair, they were unable to make any impression upon either place. A tower, however, covering the water supply of Zubair, was destroyed by an accidental explosion in which the whole garrison perished, after having successfully resisted the attempts of the Wāḥḥābis during several days.

Turkish ex-  
pedition from  
Hillah  
against the  
Wāḥḥābis,  
1804-05.

In November 1804 'Alī Pāsha, the Wālī of Baghdād, determined to try conclusions with the Wāḥḥābis and moved out to Hillah with an expeditionary force; he was accompanied by 'Abdullah Pāsha, by whom the last attempt had been made in 1803 to conduct the Syrian Hajj from Damascus to Mādīnah, and also by his own Arab adviser Fāris. The troops remained inactive at Hillah until early in 1805, when a column of 400 picked men was detached, apparently to seek a combat with the enemy in the desert; but their operations seem to have begun and ended with a visit to 'Ain Sa'id in the modern Qadha of Samāwah, of which place the inhabitants had hitherto professed Wāḥḥābism but now readily submitted to the power of the Turks. A few days after their departure Sa'ūd arrived on the spot and reproached those who had made submission to the infidel, but the people were apparently disinclined to change sides again and even resented his threats, and a number of the inhabitants of the district migrated towards Baghdād in order to be out of the way of his vengeance.

Unsuccessful  
Wāḥḥābi  
attacks on  
Najaf, Samā-  
wah and  
Zubair, 1806.

In April 1806, after making a raid on the Dhafir and 'Anizah Bedouins, 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd, doubtless in reprisal for the action of the Pāsha of Baghdād in the previous year, attacked Najaf and Samāwah, but without success; and in the following month he sustained a further reverse at Zubair. At Najaf the Wāḥḥābis, whose presence in the neighbourhood was not suspected, succeeded in gaining the walls by night; but the inhabitants of the town rushed to arms and drove them out again with heavy loss. Samāwah was found prepared; and 'Abdullah, after some attempts on the place which were characterised chiefly by indecision, was fain to retire with a still greater number of casualties than he had sustained at Najaf. He next appeared before Zubair and Basrah, and, though the surrounding country was at this time flooded

up to the very walls, some consternation at first prevailed in Basrah. The Wāḥḥābis, however, were encumbered with wounded and otherwise in distress; and their foraging parties were quickly driven out of the surrounding villages by Muntafik and Ka'ab tribesmen, who inflicted on them further losses.

In 1807 a fresh attack of the Wāḥḥābis on 'Irāq was apprehended, and the Pāsha of Baghdād moved out to Hillah to ward off any attempt that might be made on Karbala or Najaf. In June of 1807, with the reluctant consent of the Pāsha of Baghdād, the British Resident at Basrah began to construct for himself a fortified residence at Gardilān on the eastern side of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Basrah.\*

Apprehen-  
sion of a  
Wāḥḥābi  
attack,  
1807.

In 1808 a force of Wāḥḥābis appeared in the vicinity of Karbala, and a large army under their banner was reported to be marching on Baghdād itself, where great anxiety for a time prevailed. The bazaars were closed, and even Turkish merchants were ordered to arm themselves and reinforce the garrison; but the expected host did not arrive, and it was afterwards stated that their departure had been prevented by internal disturbances in Najd. The raiders near Karbala, however, established themselves in the Shifathah Oasis to the west of that town, blockaded Karbala, invested Hindiyah (corresponding to the modern Tawairij), and showed themselves at 'Ain Sa'id near Samāwah; but Sulaimān Pāsha, hastening from Baghdād with a force, drove them from all these places, and, after executing the principal man of Shifathah on account of his refusal to abjure Wāḥḥābism, returned in triumph to Baghdād, where he arrived on the 15th of August.

The Wāḥḥā-  
bis driven  
from Shifā-  
thah and  
Hindiyah,  
1808.

About 1810 a plundering expedition was carried out by 'Abdullah, son of Sa'ūd, who penetrated to within a short distance of Baghdād.

Wāḥḥābi  
raid, 1810.

In 1812 Wāḥḥābi influence was still sufficiently powerful on the borders of 'Irāq to make it possible for Sa'ūd's tax-gatherers to assemble the surrounding Bedouins and collect Zakāt from them at Hindiyah near Karbala.

Wāḥḥābi in-  
fluence near  
Karbala,  
1812.

### Proceedings of the Wāḥḥābis in the direction of Syria, 1803-14.

Flying raids were executed by the Wāḥḥābis during this period on the confines of Syria; they began, apparently, with an incursion by Hark,† a black slave of Sa'ūd, between the years 1806 and 1808.

Commence-  
ment of  
Wāḥḥābi  
raids on  
Syria, about  
1806.

\* This seems to depend on the statement of Corancez (page 111), who gives, however, a precise date.

† Hark may possibly be identical with the Harīq who in 1800 founded the Wāḥḥābi post at Baraimi in 'Omān.

Great raid in Haurān, 1810, and establishment of Wāhhābi influence, 1810-12.

In 1810 the Wāhhābis struck terror into the heart of Syria by a sudden foray into the Haurān district, where, in the space of three days, they sacked no less than 35 villages; and the provincial capital of Damascus would probably have fallen, had they cared to attack it. The northern Anizah in 1810 still refused to pay Sa'ūd tribute, but he refrained from a breach with their chiefs, and by 1812 his influence over the tribe seems to have become established, for in that year the Jalās or Qalās section yielded him Zakāt at a watering place only twelve hours distant from Aleppo.

#### 'ABDULLAH-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1814-18.

Succession of 'Abdullah.

The successor of Sa'ūd was 'Abdullah, his eldest son by his first wife, whom, according to one account, he had caused to be recognized as his heir so early as 1805. The last words of Sa'ūd are said to have been an injunction, addressed to 'Abdullah, never to engage the Egyptians in the open plain,—a counsel which the Wāhhābis would have done well to observe. The succession of 'Abdullah was disputed by an uncle, brother of Sa'ūd, who also was named 'Abdullah; but, though this individual had a strong following among the 'Ulama of Dara'iyah, he was not able for long to maintain the contest.

Character and capacity of 'Abdullah.\*

As a child 'Abdullah was precocious and at five years of age could gallop his mare; later he became popular among the Bedouins on account of his liberality and the frankness of his manners. His wife was taken from a family in the district of Hasa. Before his accession he was regarded as a paragon of all the virtues; but his career as a ruler, while it justified his early reputation for courage and skill in war, brought to light a serious lack of statesmanship. Inability to maintain combined action among the tribes subject to his authority was perhaps the chief cause of his failure; and it was observed that, after the death of Sa'ūd, the Wāhhābis of the south had to carry on their struggle against the Egyptians almost without help from those of the north.

\* A portrait of 'Abdullah will be found in Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahabys* (frontispiece).

#### Proceedings of the Egyptians in Hijāz and Yaman, 1814-15.

For more than a year after Muhammad 'Ali's arrival in Hijāz his affairs, chiefly on account of the fewness of his troops and the scarcity of transport and supplies, made little progress. As a first step towards the conquest of Yaman an expedition was sent against Qunfidah, which was taken in March 1814 before the death of the Amīr Sa'ūd; but in May the Egyptians were again driven out of the place with the loss of the whole of their artillery, 400 horses, and a considerable number of camels. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1814, Muhammad 'Ali established himself at Taif; and, in the course of the summer, Hasan Pasha, a distinguished leader who arrived in June with 1,500 of the best infantry in Egypt, was sent to occupy Kulākh, a place some 30 miles to the east of Taif on the way to Turabah.

Expedition to Qunfidah, March-May 1814.

The condition of the army of occupation, of which the strength did not exceed 5,000—a number sufficient to protect the Holy Cities from attack, but not to overthrow the Wāhhābis—was at this time far from satisfactory. The troops were dispirited by the length of their sojourn in an unhealthy country, where the cost of living exceeded their scanty and irregular pay, and they were demoralised by the successes of the enemy and by his invariable refusal of quarter. According to the traveller Burekhardt, who himself saw them at this time, "discontent, and a kind of panic, were universal among the soldiers."

Condition of the troops.

Muhammad 'Ali, aware that to fail in Hijāz meant his removal from the Pashaliq of Egypt and the ruin of his career, clung to his task with great tenacity and adopted a new and more conciliatory policy both with the settled population and with the Bedouins of Hijāz; but he and his officers continued profoundly ignorant of the circumstances and mutual relations of the various Arabs with whom they had to deal. In August 1814 some of the adjoining tribes began to be attracted to the Pasha's side by his liberality and friendly demeanour; and in the next month the Sharif Rājah himself came in, and was placed by Muhammad 'Ali in command of a Bedouin contingent that had now been raised.

Relations with the Bedouins.

Difficulties of commissariat, however, continued unabated. Up to this time about 30,000 camels belonging to the army had died in Hijāz, and even in Egypt camels had become scarce, while such as remained there

Transport and supplies.

were required for forwarding supplies to the coast by the Qanah-Qusair and Cairo-Suez lines. The Harb, from whom local camels were obtained, refused to let their animals go beyond Taïf; and even at Taïf there was often not more than ten days' supplies for the garrison. Scarcity prevailed at Kulākh also, and at advanced posts which had been thrown out in the direction of Zahrān.

Defeat of the Egyptians in Zahrān, September 1814.

The fortune of the field also continued adverse to the Egyptians. In September their best troops, under one of their best commanders, were surprised and defeated in Zahrān by Bakhrūj, a chief of the southern Wahhābis; they lost in this action about 80 cavalry and 800 infantry, and were obliged to fall back upon Taïf; but they brought with them about 60 heads of Wahhābis. Meanwhile the Wahhābis and the tribes favourable to the Egyptians continued to raid each other mutually, the advantage generally resting with the former.

Egyptian reinforcements and additions to transport.

Soon after this disaster, however, the aspect of affairs began to improve for the Egyptians. Eight hundred Bedouin horsemen, drawn from the tribes of the Libyan desert, arrived in Hijāz, where half were posted to Madinah and half to Taïf; and they at once proceeded to make forays on the Wahhābis in the Bedouin manner. In November the Hajj arrived; the caravan from Syria brought with it 4,000 camels for the troops, of which 1,000 were stopped at Madinah; while from Egypt there came along with the Mahmal, accompanied on this occasion by soldiers and officials only, 2,500 additional camels and a reinforcement of 1,000 Turkish horsemen. Twelve thousand camels belonging to the Syrian Hajj were temporarily requisitioned to carry stores from Jiddah to Makkah.

Great defeat of the Wahhābis at Bisal, 13th January 1815.

At length a forward movement began. On the 15th of December 1814 the bulk of the infantry, then at Makkah, left for Kulākh; and on Saturday, the 7th of January, after a short delay caused by a Wahhābi excursion towards Qunfidah, Muhammad 'Ali followed with about 1,200 cavalry and other troops. He had not gone far when he received news of the occupation by a Wahhābi army of Bisal, a place between Taïf and Kulākh, where on Thursday, the 12th of January, assisted by a Bedouin levy under the Sharif Rājah and by a part of the 'Ataibah, he brought them to action. The result of the first day's fighting was indecisive; but on the second day the Egyptians, having succeeded by means of a pretended flight in drawing the Wahhābis from the hillsides on which they were stationed into the open plain, achieved a success of which the completeness left nothing to be desired.

The defeated force, of whom not less than 5,000 men are said to have fallen, partly in narrow valleys among which they became entangled in their flight, consisted chiefly of southern Wahhābis from Yaman; but a northern contingent under Faisal, a brother of the Wahhābi Amīr, were present, and the survivors among these carried back news of the disaster to Najd.

The battle of Bisal was the turning point in the contest between the Egyptians and the Wahhābis, and the scene of operations was soon after this transferred to the north; but the conquest of the south was first completed by the capture of Turabah and by a march of the victorious troops to Ranyah and Bishah, whence they returned to the coast near Qunfidah. This southern expedition, though successful from the military point of view, occasioned a great expenditure of life and resources; of 4,000 troops who started on it only 1,500 returned, completely exhausted; and of 10,000 camels, half of which had been captured from the enemy at Bisal, only 300 lived to reach Makkah. A letter demanding his submission was addressed to Ibn-Sa'ūd by Muhammad 'Ali.

Successful expedition of the Egyptians in the south.

### First invasion of Qasim by the Egyptians and resulting treaty, 1815.

We now return to the north, where the fate of the Wahhābi power was eventually decided. In June 1814 the Harb tribe, in consequence of the murder of one of their Shaikhs by the Egyptian governor of Madinah, had closed the communications between that place and the coast, and in August Tūsūn Pāsha was despatched by his father to arrange matters. This he succeeded in doing, after some difficulty at Jadaid and not without great concessions made to the Arabs; and in October 1814 he reached Madinah with about 500 cavalry and 300 infantry, the former of whom he immediately sent to Hanakiyah to watch the Wahhābis of Najd and to make raids into their territory. In the course of the autumn of 1814, and especially on the occasion of the Hajj, Tūsūn Pāsha received, as we have already seen, considerable reinforcements; and in the early spring of 1815, when the news of the Wahhābi disaster at Bisal began to produce its effect in Najd, he was ready to take advantage of proposals that were now made to him by many of the leaders in Central Arabia, particularly by the chief men of Qasim. In January 1815 the Wahhābi

Tūsūn Pāsha sent to Madinah, 1814.

Amir was in Qasim, prepared to oppose the movements of Tūsūn; but on learning of the disaster at Bisal he returned to Dara'iyah, dreading, it would appear, an advance against his capital by the Egyptian forces in the south.

Advance of  
Tūsūn Pasha  
into Qasim,  
March-May,  
1815.

About the end of March 1815, Tūsūn Pasha left for Qasim, whither he had already despatched about 400 cavalry; he took with him 200 or 300 cavalry, 400 infantry and about 400 transport camels; and a few hundred Bedouins of the Harb and Mutair also followed his standard. On the way he halted for a month at Hanakiyah, and while there he received orders from Muhammad 'Ali to return to Madinah; but Tūsūn, who was now his father's equal in rank, declined to obey the command. Muhammad 'Ali, it should be observed, was now at Madinah, where he had arrived unexpectedly on the 14th of April, after his son's departure; but his time there was fully occupied in dealing with local troubles. Early in May Tūsūn Pasha arrived in Qasim, and he was joined at Rass by his political friends among the Qusmān and by the cavalry whom he had despatched in advance; but Hijailān, the principal man in Qasim, who was warmly attached to the cause of Ibn Sa'ūd, would have no dealings with him and instead collected a hostile force at Buraidah.

Precarious  
position of  
the Egypt-  
ians in  
Qasim, May-  
June 1815.

On the arrival of the Amīr 'Abdullah at Shinānah, with a considerable force, both Bedouin and non-Bedouin, Tūsūn Pasha found himself in a serious position; for the Wahhābis were able to prevent his drawing supplies from any but a few of the nearer villages, and in the meantime a detachment of 250 horsemen, sent as a reinforcement from Madinah, had been surrounded and cut up by Wahhābis on the road. This ill-fated party was commanded by Ibrāhīm Āgha or Thomas Keith, whom Tūsūn Pasha had left in charge of Madinah as governor, and who sustained his reputation for courage to the last by killing four of the enemy with his own hand before he fell. Meanwhile Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, who showed no interest in his son's operations but rather appeared jealous of his achievements, hurriedly left Yanbō' on the 20th of May and returned to Egypt: in extenuation of his conduct it is alleged that his health had suffered by his residence in Arabia, and that he feared an attack by the Turkish fleet upon his port of Alexandria.

Treaty and  
return of  
Tūsūn Pasha  
to Madinah,  
June 1815.

The weakness of the Egyptians was not, it would seem, fully apparent to the Wahhābis, or the Amīr, believing that the resources of Egypt must in the end prevail over his own more slender means, thought it prudent to retire from the contest; whatever the reason, 'Abdullah readily responded to the suggestions for a settlement which now proceeded from Tūsūn. A treaty was arranged by which the Amīr abandoned his claim

to the Holy Cities, reserving a right to visit them freely on pilgrimage, and by which he recognised the Sultān of Turkey as his overlord; the Pasha on his part promised to withdraw from Qasim; and Hanakiyah was made the boundary between the spheres of Egyptian and Wahhābi political influence.\* Tūsūn regained Madinah about the end of June 1815; his halt in Qasim had lasted exactly four weeks.

In August two Wahhābi envoys arrived in Cairo to obtain ratification of the treaty, but they were eventually dismissed with an ambiguous answer in which Muhammad 'Ali seemed to offer peace upon condition that the Wahhābis should cede to him the province of Hasa upon the Persian Gulf littoral. Tūsūn Pasha himself returned to Cairo on the 7th of November 1815 and met with a cold reception from his father.

Non-ratifica-  
tion of the  
treaty.

### Second invasion of Qasim by the Egyptians, 1817-1818.

Matters remained in *status quo* for some months after this, chiefly in consequence of a conviction on the part of Muhammad 'Ali that a descent upon Egypt was meditated by Great Britain; but, as this fear passed away, he began preparations for continuing the war in Arabia. Disturbances had broken out in southern Hijāz, and the Egyptian garrisons had been obliged to retire from Bishah, Ranyah and Turabah. In August 1816 Ibrāhīm Pasha, the eldest son (or possibly a step-son) of Muhammad 'Ali, left Cairo, having been provided with a force of 2,000 infantry and 1,500 Libyan Bedouin horsemen and ordered, it was believed, to advance from Madinah through Qasim to Dara'iyah.

Preparations  
for the expe-  
dition, 1816.

A considerable time elapsed, however, before Ibrāhīm Pasha could give effect to his instructions; and it was not, apparently, until some time in 1817 that he reached Hanakiyah, from which place, as a centre, he commenced a series of raids upon the surrounding tribes. The Harb and the 'Atailah were among the Bedouins who suffered from these, and their fate induced many to declare for the Egyptians. The next enterprise of the Pasha was an expedition into the Jabal Shammar region, in which the friendly Arabs were driven into action against the enemy by a body

Operations of  
the Egypt-  
ians from  
Hanakiyah.

\* According to another account 'Abdullah also agreed to give hostages; to hand over Dara'iyah to any governor whom the Sultān might appoint; to restore the treasure plundered from Muhammad's tomb; and even to repair in person to Constantinople if required to do so.

Egyptian  
victory at  
Jabal Mawiyah,  
1817.

of Egyptian cavalry behind them and suffered heavy loss, the Egyptians themselves escaping with less than 20 casualties.

At the request of the friendly Arabs, whom the Bedouins of the Wahhâbis had now begun to annoy, a force with two guns was sent by the Egyptian commander to Jabal Mawiyah, on the road from Hanakiyah to Rass, and was there attacked by the enemy under the Amir 'Abdullah; the result of this engagement was very unfavourable to the Wahhâbis, whose bleaching skeletons still strewed the plain when it was traversed by Captain Sadleir in September 1819; and the Amir himself fled through Rass to 'Anaizah in Qasim. Ibrâhim Pasha, who was in the rear and did not arrive until the fighting was over, followed the barbarous example of the Wahhâbis upon this occasion by putting all his prisoners to death. Having collected his entire force at Mawiyah, to the \*number of 1,200 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, he advanced against Rass and was openly joined by the Shaikh of the Mutair tribe, who had a feud against the Wahhâbi Amir; on the way, apparently, he made an excursion against the 'Anaizah tribe.

Unsuccessful  
siege of Rass  
by the Egyptians,  
1817.

Arrived before Rass, Ibrâhim prepared to carry that place at once; but the walls resisted the fire of his artillery for three days; and, when a breach had been opened, his troops were repulsed with heavy loss in attempting to storm it. The siege was then continued without success for three and a half months, and was ultimately abandoned. The Egyptians lost some 900 men killed and 1,000 wounded in these operations, and they expended 400 camel loads of small arms ammunition and 30,000 artillery rounds, but the casualties among the besieged only amounted to 50 killed and 70 wounded. A sort of agreement was apparently formed with the inhabitants of Rass, under which the fate of their town should be decided by that of 'Anaizah, the capital of Qasim.

Capture of  
Khabrah and  
'Anaizah by  
the Egyptians,  
1817.

The Pasha consoled himself for his failure at Rass by taking Khabrah, which only stood one day's siege. He next advanced against 'Anaizah, while the Amir 'Abdullah retreated upon Buraidah; 'Anaizah fell after a six days' bombardment; and the Amir then retired southwards to Shaqrah, where he remained during the next two months. Ibrâhim Pasha occupied Buraidah on its evacuation by 'Abdullah, and the whole of Qasim submitted to the Egyptians.†

Shaqrah  
taken, 22nd  
January  
1818.

On the 13th of January 1818, Ibrâhim Pasha arrived near Shaqrah, the principal place in Washam, and reconnoitred the environs with 800

\* Captain Sadleir makes the strength of the Egyptians at this time very much less.

† Sadleir gives a somewhat different version of this part of the campaign.

cavalry; and on the next day, after an arduous march across loose sand, he established himself on the southern and eastern sides of the town, which he at once proceeded to attack with a force raised by reinforcements to a strength of 4,500 regulars. On the 16th of January the suburbs were occupied after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, the Egyptians losing about 150 men and the Wahhâbis leaving 68 men dead upon the ground. A number of prisoners taken by the Egyptians were at once decapitated. Ibrâhim Pasha then had recourse to siege operations, and Shaqrah surrendered on the 22nd of January, when the garrison were permitted to lay down their arms and disperse. During the second stage of the operations the Egyptians had 130 casualties, while among the Wahhâbis 170 men were killed and 240 persons wounded.

After a short halt at Shaqrah, due to heavy rains, the Egyptian commander, leaving the sick and wounded behind, resumed his march on Dara'iyah. On the way he passed Dhurumah, where, some unorganised opposition having been offered to the troops, he caused a large number of the inhabitants to be massacred. The Wahhâbi governor, who had shut himself up in the fort, was given a safe conduct to Dara'iyah on condition of leaving behind all his property, which comprised a number of valuable horses, and of not again bearing arms against the Egyptians.

Massacre at  
Dhurumah.

On the 22nd of March 1818, after being again delayed by bad weather, Ibrâhim not without difficulty crossed the hills between Dhurumah and Wâdi Hamifah. His force now amounted to 5,500 men, horse and foot, and his artillery consisted of twelve pieces, of which two were mortars and two howitzers.\* A camp was formed at 'Ayainah and a reconnaissance was carried up to the walls of Dara'iyah. On the 6th of April Ibrâhim took up a position before the Wahhâbi capital, to defend which the inhabitants, sallying out, threw up advanced entrenchments. On the 14th the Egyptians opened fire from two batteries upon an advanced work and captured it with a loss to the Wahhâbis of two guns and some prisoners: the latter the Egyptians at once put to death. An eminence on which two guns were mounted, and which was held with much obstinacy by the Wahhâbis, was taken a little later; and this mishap compelled the defenders of Dara'iyah to abandon their advanced positions, in which Faisal, the Amir's brother, had hitherto commanded.

Arrival and  
preliminary  
operations at  
Dara'iyah,  
March 1818.

At this juncture the arrival of reinforcements and stores from Egypt on the one side, and of provisions from 'Irâq on the other, encouraged the Egyptian general, to whom the evil results of delay were becoming

Dangerous  
situation of  
the Egyptian  
force, May-  
June 1818.

\* According to Captain Sadleir there were 1,950 cavalry and 5,600 infantry; but the sources of his information are not known.

apparent, to assault a work defending the Ghasibah\* quarter; but his troops, after a breach had been opened by artillery fire, refused to advance to the storm. The failure of this operation greatly compromised the prestige of the besiegers, and the Wahhābis entered on a series of daily attacks upon the Egyptian camp, causing them heavy losses. By the end of May the Egyptians were in serious straits. The Wahhābis kept them perpetually in play; the number of ineffectives in their camp was steadily increasing; they could not properly invest Dara'iyah; and supplies from Hasa were constantly entering the town without their being able to prevent it. On the 21st of June, after a sharp action in which the Egyptians lost 160 men including many officers of rank, a gust of wind suddenly carried fire into the Egyptian magazines; a terrific explosion took place; and the besieging army were left in the presence of an overwhelming enemy, hundreds of miles from support, with no ammunition but what remained in the soldiers' pouches and in the batteries. The next day the Wahhābis, aware of the disaster that had overtaken the Egyptians, attacked them in force with 1,500 men; but † Ibrāhīm Pasha, whose courage was unshaken, was able to infuse his own spirit into the troops, and the assault was at length repulsed, with great loss to the Arabs, by a heavy fire of grape from the artillery. The Wahhābis then lost heart and resumed the defensive.

Improved position and increased efforts of the Egyptians.

After an interval of more than three weeks, stores began to arrive from 'Anaizah and other advanced bases, and the Egyptians again obtained the superiority. On the 16th of August, however, during the absence of Ibrāhīm Pasha on a punitive expedition against some outlying villages, the Wahhābis attacked the Egyptian camp and were not beaten off without great difficulty. At length, stimulated to greater exertions by the news that Muhammad 'Ali had despatched Khalīl Pasha with a large force to assist or supersede him, Ibrāhīm began to press his attacks. Faisal, the Amīr's brother, who played an important part in the defence, was struck down by a musket shot. A work containing three guns and artillery ammunition was taken by the Egyptians, who thus arrived in the immediate neighbourhood of the Ghasibah quarter and were able to lay siege to a fort commanded by Sa'ad, a son of the Amīr; and after two days this fort capitulated, being without provisions, and Sa'ad became a prisoner, but was well treated. The quarters of Ghasibah and Sāhil ‡

\* Ghasibah is still the name of one of the quarters on the left or northern bank of Wadi Hanifah.

† Ibrāhīm was at this time only 26 years of age. There is a certain analogy between the position of the Egyptians before Dara'iyah and that of the British force upon the Ridge during the earlier stages of the siege of Delhi (1857).

‡ The quarter of Dara'iyah now adjoining Ghasibah on the left bank of Wadi Hanifah is called Saraiyah.

were bombarded and surrendered. The ex-governor of Dhramah, who had given his parole not to fight against the Egyptians, was taken in arms and executed. The defenders of the Tarfiyah quarter laid down their arms; and only\* Tarāif, in which the Amīr 'Abdullah himself was shut up, continued to resist.

At length on the 9th of September 1818, at the earnest request of his advisers, the Amīr hoisted a white flag, and negotiations began. An interview took place on the same day between 'Abdullah and Ibrahim, in which the Arab, though unable to disguise his emotion, bore himself with dignity and fortitude; while the Turk, on his part, showed every respect and consideration for his fallen foe and even released his son Sa'ad.† Ibrāhīm Pasha offered peace on condition that 'Abdullah should at once proceed to Egypt and allowed him 24 hours for consideration of the offer; it was greatly feared that 'Abdullah, during this interval, might commit suicide or even escape to the desert; but at last, on the understanding that Ibrāhīm should intercede for his life, that the town of Dara'iyah should be spared, and that no punishment should be inflicted on those who had fought against the Egyptians, the Amīr agreed to what was required of him and began to prepare for his journey.

Surrender of the Amīr 'Abdullah, 9th September 1818.

The remainder of 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ud's story is quickly told. Accompanied by his treasurer, his secretary and his most trusty slaves, he travelled down to the coast under a guard of 400 men; and in November he reached Cairo and had a reassuring interview with Muhammad 'Ali, to whom he exhibited a few of the treasures taken from Muhammad's tomb, brought with him by way of restitution; but his treatment at Constantinople belied the favourable expectations that he had been led to form. After being paraded as a public spectacle through the streets of the capital, he suffered death by decapitation in the square of St. Sophia, along with some of his companions in misfortune.

## INTERREGNUM.

1818-19.

### First occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1818.

The power of Wahhābi Najd as an organised state was for the time completely broken, and the Egyptians assumed the direct administration

Deportation of 'Abdullah's brother.

\* Tarāif, on the southern or right bank of Wadi Hanifah, again exists at the present day under the same name.

† Captain Sadleir's account again differs from that of Mengin.



of the country. Four brothers of the deposed Amir 'Ahdnillah were deported to Egypt and kept under surveillance at Cairo, one of these being Khālid; but the escape of another brother, probably Mashāri, caused much anxiety to the invaders.

Destruction  
of Dara'iyah,  
etc.

Dara'iyah was first pillaged, Ibrāhīm Pāsha reserving for himself the houses of the Āl Sa'ūd, in which it is believed but little of value was found, while the common soldiers seized what they could lay their hands upon, and torture was applied to persons who were suspected of concealing their property. The complete destruction of the town and its date gardens had been ordered from Constantinople and was eventually carried out, but not until many of the inhabitants had been deluded into paying large sums for personal exemption from the sentence; when all that could be got in this manner had been extracted, the houses were demolished, every fragment of building timber was burned, and the palms were cut down to the last tree. The homeless inhabitants were mostly removed by the Egyptian commander to Hasa or themselves took refuge at Manfūhah, where they camped in the date groves.

The fortifications of every town and village in Najd were then razed to the ground; and the thoroughness with which this operation was carried out is attested, in the case of Manfūhah, Riyādh, Tharmidah, Shaqrah and 'Anaizah, by the British traveller Captain Sadleir, who passed over the ground in 1819. Houses and date plantations were generally spared, except at particular places such as Dara'iyah and 'Anaizah.

Occupation of  
Kharj and  
Hasa.

An Egyptian post having been established at Sulaimiyah in Kharj, Ibrāhīm Pāsha passed onwards to the province of Hasa, which at this time he seems to have intended should be the headquarters of his conquests. Arrived in Hasa, he was joined by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the famous 'Athi pirate of Qatar, who, after assisting the Pāsha to take the town of Qatif by bombardment, was permitted in return to establish himself at Dammām on the Hasa coast. Ibrāhīm at first entertained designs of further aggression in the direction of 'Omān, but these the natural difficulties of his position soon compelled him to abandon.

Punishment  
of Bedouin  
tribes.

Punitive expeditions were undertaken in all directions against the Bedouin tribes that had helped the Wahhābis; and vengeance fell in particular upon some of the Sabai', who were found at the wells of Rumāh in 'Urmah.

General rela-  
tions of  
Turks and  
Arabs.

Everywhere, during the occupation, the Egyptian army appear to have lived on the worst possible terms with the people of the country, whose resources they consumed; and their own condition was evidently one bordering on misery. After a two years' sojourn in Najd some of the

principal Egyptian officials there were still as ignorant of the geography of the country as if they had never left Cairo.

### Partial withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, 1819.

Gradually it became apparent that a complete occupation of Najd could not be maintained by the Egyptian forces, whose communications between post and post were maintained with difficulty on account of the hostility and increasing audacity of the Bedouin tribes, especially the 'Ajman and the Sa'adah.\*

About June 1819 it was resolved to make over to tribal representatives the whole of the country to the east and south of Qasim, and the process of evacuation was witnessed by Captain Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment, who accompanied the rearguard of the retiring forces, and whose mission to Ibrāhīm Pāsha on behalf of the Government of India is described in the history of Trucial 'Omān. The Kāshif of Hasa, to whose column, consisting of about 250 troops with 600 transport camels, Captain Sadleir attached himself, had prepared for his departure by extorting about 1,000,000 piastres from the inhabitants of Hasa; and, when he left, he installed the Shaikhs of the Bani Khalid as the representatives of the Turkish Government in Hasa. These Shaikhs were the hereditary foes of the Wahhābis, by whom their power had been previously overthrown, and it seems to have been hoped that they would continue to remit the annual tribute of Hasa to 'Anaizah in Qasim, where it was intended to maintain an Egyptian garrison.

Evacuation  
of Hasa, July  
1819.

The usual line followed by the Turks between Hasa and Qasim lay by Sulaimiyah in Kharj, and the Kāshif gave out that he intended to move by this route; but on the second day's march, fearing lest he should be attacked by the Sa'adah, who had recently been giving trouble near Sulaimiyah, he altered his course and made for the wells of Rumāh in 'Urmah, where, according to his arrangements, the Sulaimiyah detachment, consisting of 50 to 100 cavalry, ought to have joined him. They did not appear however,† being then shut up in their post by Bedouins; and the Kāshif was obliged to proceed to Manfūhah, where he arrived on the 3rd of August via Banbān, and to despatch half of his own escort to extricate them.

March from  
Hasa to Man-  
fūhah, July-  
August 1819.

\* The Sa'adah, though separately mentioned by the historian in this connection, were probably the sub-section so named of the 'Ajman.

† The reason of this is instructive. Ibrāhīm Pāsha, in ordering the withdrawal of the Sulaimiyah detachment, directed the officer in command first to destroy four obnoxious Shaikhs of Dilam, who had hitherto been treated as friends of the Egyptians; being unable to effect this by force, the official invited the Shaikhs to an entertainment, at which he caused them to be murdered; he was then himself immediately besieged.

March from  
Manfūhah to  
Rass, August  
1819.

On the 13th of August the Sulaimiyah garrison reached Manfūhah in safety, and the march to Qasim was begun; the whole surrounding country was now up in arms; and the Kāshif was unable to give effect to a design that he had formed of butchering the principal Wāhhābis of Manfūhah before he left. The ruins of \* Dara'iyah, untenanted by any living creature, were passed on the same day; and the force camped for the night at 'Ayainah. On the next day the Haisiyah pass in Jabal Tuwaiq was surmounted, which still bore the tracks of Ibrāhīm Pāsha's † guns; that officer had apparently marched from the neighbourhood of Dara'iyah not far in advance of the Kāshif. The retiring troops passed Barrah, which was found deserted, on the 15th of August; on the 16th they arrived Tharmidah, and on the 17th at Shaqrah. At Shaqrah the Turks were in time to pursue and overtake a body of the 'Ataibah, who had just raided the flocks and herds of the town; 20 of the enemy they despatched on the plain, and five they brought in as prisoners and beheaded. The camel transport, supplied by the Bani Khālid, should have been relieved at this place by animals belonging to the Mutair; but some hitch occurred, and eventually the Egyptians confiscated all the camels and dismissed the Bani Khālid without pay or compensation. During the whole march the Turks had not permitted the Arabs to take their camels to any distance from the camp for grazing, fearing lest they should desert. Mudhrib was reached on the 23rd of August, 'Anaizah on the 24th, and Rass on the 26th. Ibrāhīm Pāsha had taken his departure from Rass for Madīnah on the 24th; but an extraordinary mixed camp of Turks, Albanians, Libyan Bedouins and Bedouins of Najd still remained, to which Captain Sadleir added his quota of Persians, Indians, Portuguese and Armenians.

March from  
Rass to  
Hanakiyah,  
August-September 1819.

The Egyptian authority at Rass having refused to facilitate his return to India by way of Basrah, Captain Sadleir was obliged to continue on his way towards the Red Sea in the company of the retiring troops. On the 31st of August he arrived in the Wādi-al-Miyāh; on the 2nd of September he passed the former battlefield of Jabal Mawiyah; and on the 4th of September he reached the Egyptian post of Hanakiyah, after an exhausting continuous march of 29½ hours without water.‡

The subsequent proceedings of Captain Sadleir in Hijāz are related in the history of Trucial 'Omān; and here it only remains to add that

\* Captain Sadleir has left an interesting description of Dara'iyah as he saw it.

† In his operations the Pāsha's guns were generally dragged by camels.

‡ The features of this long and arduous retirement, in its mingled panic and brutality, are admirably brought out by Captain Sadleir in the graphic pages of his *Journal*.

Departure  
of Ibrāhīm  
Pāsha for  
Egypt, November 1819.

Ibrāhīm Pāsha lingered at the coast until the 17th of November, when he finally sailed from Jiddah for Qusair.

## MASHĀRI-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1819-23.

Soon after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Egyptian forces from Najd, Mashāri, a brother of the late Amīr, perhaps the same who had escaped from custody before the evacuation, gathered a party and assumed authority in Najd, apparently in defiance of the Egyptians. The Egyptian occupation, however, was still to some extent maintained. In 1822 a reinforcement of 700 cavalry was sent to 'Anaizah in Qasim; orders were issued by Muhammad 'Alī that a fort should be built at Dara'iyah for the reception of an Egyptian garrison; and a little later 100 Egyptian cavalry stationed at Riyādh, which had now apparently supplanted Dara'iyah as the capital of Southern Najd, were surprised and cut up by Bedouins in the neighbourhood. The manner in which Mashāri's rule ended is uncertain; possibly, as one authority seems to indicate, he was overthrown by the Bani Khālid governors of Hasa, or, as stated by another, he fell into the hands of the Egyptians and was put to death.

## TURKI-BIN-'ABDULLAH.

1824-34.

### General and internal history, 1824-34.

Mashāri was succeeded by a relative named Turki, belonging to an elder branch of the Āl Sa'ūd family; the father of Turki was one 'Abdullah, a son of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the first Wāhhābi Amīr. Turki seems to have come into power by expelling an Egyptian detachment from Riyādh, and to have obtained immediate recognition among his fellow-countrymen as head of the Wāhhābi cause. After his first success, which occurred at the end of 1823 or beginning of 1824, Turki appears to have undertaken offensive operations further to the westward; and, from

Expulsion of  
the Egyptians,  
1824.

the fact that after this time no Egyptian posts are mentioned as existing in Qasim, it may perhaps be inferred that the Egyptians were altogether ejected from Najd. Amicable relations must however soon have been established, for Turki throughout his reign paid a small annual tribute to the ruler of Egypt; but in other respects his position was that of an independent sovereign.

Internal  
policy of  
Turki.

The internal administration of Turki, when his power became established, was in accordance with the best Wahhābi traditions; but, at the same time, it was more liberal and enlightened than that of his predecessors. Like the first Amirs he restrained tribal disorder and punished robbery with a strong hand, but unlike them he encouraged the passage through his dominions of Sunni and Shi'ah pilgrims to the Holy Cities and even guaranteed their safety. Under Turki the religious prejudices of the Wahhābi sect, except that against the smoking of tobacco in public, were not obtruded upon those who did not share them.

Rebellion of  
Mashāri and  
assassination  
of Turki,  
1834.

In 1831 a nephew of Turki named Mashāri, having obtained the support of the Qahtān and other tribes, rebelled against his uncle; but, though his opposition to some extent unsettled the country, he was unable to effect anything against the Amir by fair and open means. In 1834, however, he succeeded in compassing the death of Turki by assassination.

#### Proceedings of the Amir Turki in Eastern Arabia, 1824-34.

Under Turki the Wahhābis regained for a time their former position of influence in Eastern Arabia, and by 1833 the whole coast of the Gulfs of 'Omān and Persia as far north as Qatif owned their sovereignty, or at least their suzerainty, and paid tribute.

Wahhābi re-  
conquest of  
Hasa, 1824-  
1834.

One of the first objects that Turki set himself to accomplish after his accession was the recovery of the province of Hasa, which had been retained by the Bani Khālid Shaikhs since their installation by the Egyptians in 1819. From 1824 to 1830 the contest remained undecided, but in the latter year, as related in the history of Hasa, the Bani Khālid finally succumbed to the forces of the Amir; in the conclusive battle, fought at Wabrah, the Wahhābis were led by Turki and his son Faisal in person. In 1831, encouraged by the rebellion of Mashāri, the Bani Khālid ventured to attack Hofuf and Qatif; but they were repulsed.

Strong in possession of Hasa, the Amir in 1830 demanded tribute of the Shaikh of Bahrain; and in 1831 the Shaikh, fearing a combination between the Saiyid of Masqat and the Wahhābis, of which there were symptoms, admitted the obligation to pay. The settlement, however, was far from being of a cordial or permanent character on either side; the Wahhābis on their part endeavoured to establish Bashir, a son of the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, at Dammām as a check upon the 'Utūb of Bahrain; and the Shaikh of those islands, as soon as he dared, which was not until 1833 after the departure of Bashir, repudiated his agreement and incited the Bani Khālid to annoy the Wahhābis in Hasa. There is some reason to think that the assassination of the Amir Turki by Mashāri in 1834 was instigated by the Bahrain Shaikh, to whom it was at least highly agreeable, and by whom, before that event, war had been declared and the ports of Qatif and 'Oqair blockaded from the sea.

Wahhābi re-  
lations with  
Bahrain,  
1824-1834.

No sooner was Turki firmly seated on the throne of Najd than the more restless among the chiefs of what is now Trucial 'Omān began to cultivate his good graces, especially the Shaikhs of Shārah and 'Ajmān. In 1825 the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārah secretly professed great fear of the Wahhābis and solicited a promise of British assistance in case a refusal by him to comply with the desires of the Amir should bring him into trouble; no assurance, however, was given; but the Shaikh was strongly advised by the British authorities to refrain from joining in any movement against the Saiyid of Masqat.

Wahhābi in-  
fluence in  
Trucial  
'Omān,  
1824-1834.

The appearance of the Wahhābis on the coast of Hasa in 1830 gave rise to a fresh commotion in Trucial 'Omān, and their probable advent was anticipated with delight by the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, who hoped with their help to throw off the suzerainty of the Qāsimi Shaikh, while by the latter it was naturally regarded with apprehension. The Shaikh of Shārah once more sought British support, of which no hope was held out to him; and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, perhaps remembering the days when Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams had lorded it over the country in the name of the Wahhābi Amir, begged Turki for a commission as Wahhābi agent. This last request was prudently refused by the Amir, on the ground that he could recognise no chiefs in 'Omān except the Shaikh of Shārah and the Saiyid of Masqat only; but later he made the Shaikh of 'Ajmān the medium of a friendly communication from himself to the British Government.

Relations between the Wahhābi Amir and the Saiyid of Masqat were, owing to the great distance intervening between their frontiers, but

Wahhābi re-  
lations with

the 'Omān  
Sultanate,  
1824-1834.

slowly resumed. The initiative seems to have been taken by the Saiyid, who in 1831 despatched an embassy with presents to Riyādh to request the assistance of the Amīr in reducing Bahrain,—a proceeding that Turki turned to his own advantage in order to extort submission and tribute from the Shaikh of Bahrain. In 1833 the direct pressure of the Wāhhābis was felt once more in the 'Omān Sultanate, and in that year the ruler of Masqat was obliged to come to an understanding with the Wāhhābi general, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the principal terms of the settlement being that the Saiyid should pay \$5,000 a year as Zakāt or tribute to the Amīr, and that either party should assist the other in suppressing rebellions among his subjects. The latter clause of the agreement was deemed imprudent by the British authorities; but the Saiyid assured them that he would be guided, in his observance of it, entirely by their wishes.

#### Relations of the Amīr Turki with the British Government, 1824-1834.

The relations of Turki, during his reign, with the British authorities in India were restricted to one simple incident. About the middle of 1831 a message for the Governor of Bombay was received from the Amīr through the Shaikh of 'Ajmān; it expressed his desire "to have the treaty renewed which was made between you, the British, and Imām Sa'ūd."\* On receipt of this communication, search was made in the archives of the Bombay Government for a treaty with the Wāhhābis; but none could be found; and eventually an answer in general but friendly terms was transmitted to the Amīr through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.†

#### FAISAL-BIN-TURKI (FIRST REIGN).

1834-1838.

#### General history and relations with the Egyptians, 1834-1838.

Accession of  
Faisal, 1834.

At the time of Turki's assassination, his son Faisal was engaged in defending the province of Hasa against the aggressions of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but he immediately left for Riyādh, where he besieged Mashārī,

\* See also pages 1122 and 1125 *post*.

† It is characteristic of the ignorance of Central Arabian affairs which prevailed at this time that in the Bombay Government's letter Sa'ūd, who had died only 17 years before and who belonged to the same generation as Turki himself, was described as "your great ancestor."

the murderer and usurper, in the fort. Before long, aided by treachery on the part of some of the garrison, Faisal succeeded in entering the fort by night; and Mashārī with 20 of his associates was put to the sword. One of the assistants of Faisal in this enterprise, and the actual slayer, it was said, of Mashārī, was 'Abdullah-bin-'Alī, Ibn-Rashid, whom the Amīr soon after appointed Mahfūdī or warden on his behalf of Jabal Shammar, and who thus became the founder of the present ruling family of Northern Najd. Faisal at once obtained general recognition as Amīr of the Wāhhābis; his age at the time was about 40 years.

Muhammad 'Alī of Egypt was not satisfied with the nominal suzerainty to which the progress of events had reduced his authority in Najd, and shortly after the accession of Faisal he took measures to re-assert his power. The first step was the appointment of a Bahrain merchant as customs farmer of the Wāhhābi port of Qatif in Hasa, by order of Ahmad Pāsha, governor of Hijāz; but this device, perhaps merely experimental, was frustrated by the firm action of Faisal, whose troops, as related in the history of Hasa, obliged the Egyptian nominee to take a hasty departure from Qatif. In 1836, a large Egyptian force having in the meanwhile been concentrated at Madinah, Muhammad 'Alī insisted that Faisal should join with his officers in a campaign against 'Asir; but the Amīr excused himself on the plea of sickness and deputed a brother instead to present some horses and his excuses. It was believed, moreover, that Faisal had secretly sent help to the opponents of the Egyptians in the south. Muhammad 'Alī accordingly determined to replace Faisal by a more subservient Amīr, and for this purpose he released Khālid, a brother of the late Amīr 'Abdullah, from surveillance at Cairo, and sent Ismā'il Bey with an Egyptian force to assist the pretender in making good his claims, which had, it would appear, some supporters among the people of Najd. Alarmed by these preparations Faisal sent messengers and submissive letters to the Pāsha of Egypt; but it was too late. In 1837, supported by an Egyptian force of 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry and 500 infantry with 12 guns and 4 mortars, Khālid occupied Qasīm and defeated Faisal in the neighbourhood of Riyādh; and the Amīr, when he fell back upon his capital, found that the fort had been occupied in his absence by some of his rival's adherents. The military command in Najd was then assumed by Khurshid Pāsha, who had arrived with reinforcements for the Egyptians.

The Amīr Faisal, having retreated to the district of Kharj, established himself in Dilam, where he was shortly beleaguered by three separate forces, one under Khurshid Pāsha, another under the pretender Khālid,

Re-establish-  
ment by the  
Egyptians  
of their con-  
trol in Najd,  
1835-38.

Surrender  
and deporta-  
tion of  
Faisal, 1838.

and a third under a hostile Arab Shaikh. Seeing that resistance would be vain, he shortly surrendered; and he was deported to Egypt in December 1838.

#### Position of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1834-38.

Relations of the Wahhābis with Bahrain, 1834-38.

In the confusion following the murder of the Amīr Turki in 1834, the Shaikh of Bahrain found opportunity to annex the island of Tārūt, which belonged to the Wahhābis. In 1835 an attempt to recover the island was made by the force which Faisal despatched to eject the Egyptian customs farmer from Qatif; but the endeavour failed, and the Shaikh of Bahrain resumed the maritime blockade of Qatif, which he had meanwhile suspended. In 1836 efforts were made by the Wahhābi agent in Bahrain, under instructions from his master, to induce the Saiyid of Masqat and some of the tribes of the Arabian coast to attack Bahrain by sea in the interest of the Wahhābis; but the ruler of 'Omān replied that he could not join in such an enterprise without the knowledge and consent of the British Government, and this project, too, came to nothing. Very soon afterwards a reconciliation took place between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, who were now both in danger, the former from the designs of the Egyptians and the latter from those of the Persian Government; and the result was a treaty by which the Shaikh pledged himself to pay a tribute of \$2,000 a year to the Amīr, while Faisal on his part undertook to protect Bahrain from external aggression, and not to demand help from the Shaikh of Bahrain in case he should himself proceed against the Saiyid of 'Omān. In 1838, after putting to death three chiefs of the 'Amāir Bani Khālid, supporters of the Egyptians who were now rapidly advancing towards Hasa, the Wahhābi Governor of that province, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, took refuge with the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Relations of the Wahhābis with the 'Omān Sultanate, 1834-38.

An attempt by the Wahhābis in 1836 to draw the Saiyid of Masqat into operations against Bahrain upon their own side has already been noticed above. In the same year, the town of Sohār in Bātinah having fallen into the hands of Hamūd, a rebel belonging to his own family, the Saiyid obtained help from Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wahhābi representative in 'Omān, who, it was arranged, should operate against the place by land

while the Saiyid attacked it by sea; but sudden distrust of his ally's intentions caused the Saiyid to dissolve the combination thus formed before any attempt had been made on Sohār.

#### INTERREGNUM.

1838-40.

#### Second occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1838-40.

After the deportation of the Amīr Faisal, the Egyptian commander, whose forces, regular and irregular, now amounted to about 3,000 men, established his headquarters at Sulaimiyah in the district of Kharj and despatched 300 irregulars to Hasa, where he caused the ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair to be garrisoned. The position of Khālid, who from the first had been merely a puppet in the hands of the Egyptians, was now anomalous and uncertain; for, though the Egyptians in their dealings with neighbouring states pretended only to enforce the rights of the Wahhābi Amīr and at one time held a ceremony for the installation of Khālid and invested him with a robe of honour, Khurshid Pāsha appears, nevertheless, to have kept the entire management of affairs in his own hands and to have proclaimed the absolute sovereignty of his master, Muhammad 'Alī, over the whole of Najd.

Direct administration assumed by the Egyptians.

The designs of the Egyptian Government had this time a much wider scope than in 1818-19; and their object seems to have been now nothing less than the reduction of the whole of Eastern as well as Central Arabia, and the appropriation of the Turkish province of 'Irāq. An assurance which Muhammad 'Alī had given in 1838 to the British political representative at Cairo, that he did not mean to extend his authority in the direction of the Persian Gulf, was presently violated by the proceedings of his officers; and these consequently aroused British opposition, and were in the end, as we shall see below, completely frustrated. The growth of Muhammad 'Alī's power in Europe was regarded by the British Government

Policy of the Egyptians and its conflict with British interests.

with \*disfavour; and in the Persian Gulf it was felt that a serious decrease of British influence must result if the Egyptians should obtain a permanent foothold in Eastern Arabia. In February 1839 the British Political Resident at Būshehr was expressly instructed to use his influence to check the encroachments of the Egyptians.

### Egyptian intrigues in Eastern Arabia and relations with the British Government, 1838-40.

We may now pass on to consider some aggressions on the states of the Persian Gulf, which the Egyptians, from the base that they had acquired in Hasa, now attempted to commit.

\* It is necessary here to revert to the European situation, and to continue the footnote at page 1061.

The accession of Mahmūd II to the throne of Turkey, though his reforms made possible the survival of the Ottoman empire to the present day, did not at once check the course of disaster. In 1812 Russia took Bessarabia, the province between the Dniester and the Danube; and in 1820, while the Porte was engaged in crushing the rebellious Pasha of Janina, Greece rose in insurrection. The Sultan then turned for aid to his vassal Muhammad 'Ali, who had consolidated his power in Egypt during the troublous period following the expulsion of the French, and who now possessed a better fleet than his master, besides an army trained and organised in the European style. Ibrahim Pasha, whom his father placed in command of the Egyptian forces, soon reduced Crete and Greece, as he had done Qasim and Najd. Crete was taken in 1824; Samos fell, and the Morea was invaded; Missolonghi was captured in 1826, and the Abropolis of Athens in 1827. But at this point Ibrahim's victorious career was interrupted by the battle of Navarino, in which his whole navy was destroyed by the combined fleets of Britain, France and Russia; and in the following year, after a war between Russia and Turkey ended by the Treaty of Adrianople, Greece obtained her freedom.

In 1831 Muhammad 'Ali, whose heart was set on the aggrandisement of Egypt, threw an army into Syria under Ibrahim. War between Egypt and Turkey followed, and in 1832 Ibrahim inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turks at Konia in Asia Minor: the cession of Syria to Egypt and closer relations between Turkey and Russia, initiated by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, were the result. In 1839, in spite of improvements effected by Moltke and other Prussian officers, the Turkish Army was again shattered by Ibrahim at Nisib, and the Turkish admiral with his whole fleet deserted to Muhammad 'Ali; but this was more than Europe, except France who favoured Muhammad 'Ali, could tolerate. Acre was accordingly captured by the British, Austrian and Turkish fleets, and Ibrahim was obliged to withdraw from Syria. As the result of this intervention, in which Britain played the leading part, Syria was restored to Turkey, the Egyptian army was cut down to 18,000 men, and the Egyptian fleet was condemned to rot in the harbour of Alexandria; but Muhammad 'Ali, on making formal submission to the Sultan, was recognised as hereditary Governor of Egypt.

From the foregoing it will be evident that the Egyptian advance into Central Arabia in 1837, was part of a large forward policy, and that the withdrawal in 1840 was due to a collapse of the same.

Early in 1839 Khurshid Pasha disclosed his intentions in regard to Bahrain by demanding of the Shaikh of the islands the tribute formerly paid to the Amir Faisal, the rendition of Tārūt Island and Dammām, and the surrender of 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, the refugee Wahhabi governor of Hasa. The Shaikh would at first have thrown himself upon the protection of Britain; but the Government of India, not fully informed of the attitude of the Home Government towards Muhammad 'Ali, could not at once give the assurances that he desired; and the Shaikh then sought to stave off the Pasha's demands by describing himself as a vassal of Persia. In April 1839 the Indian Government, on their own responsibility, authorised Admiral Sir F. Maitland, who was cruising in the Persian Gulf with a British squadron, to discourage the Egyptian commander from aggression upon Bahrain and even to afford the Shaikh as much support as could be given him without provoking a direct collision with the Egyptians; the object of these instructions was to gain time, while maintaining the *status quo*. Two or three weeks later stronger orders were issued, empowering the Admiral in certain circumstances, after a warning delivered to the Egyptian commander, to undertake the defence of Bahrain against Khurshid Pasha; and at the Admiral's visit to Bahrain, which possibly took place before receipt of the revised instructions, the Shaikh formally promised not to place himself in subordination to any foreign power without first consulting the British Resident. In the meantime Khurshid Pasha had written to the Resident with the obvious intention of discovering how the British authorities intended to act in the event of his attacking Bahrain, but the only answer that he received was a request that he would not move without notice to the Resident sufficient to allow of provision being made for the safety of British subjects in Bahrain; and subsequently the Resident was instructed by Government to remonstrate with the Pasha on the subject of his designs against Bahrain, which order, no doubt, was duly executed. Notwithstanding the measures thus taken to strengthen him, the Shaikh, apparently in July 1839, entered into a secret agreement with the Egyptians by which he bound himself to pay them \$2,000 a year as tribute, on condition that there should be no interference in the administration of Bahrain and that no Egyptian representative should be stationed in the principality; his chief motives for his action, which was highly displeasing to the British authorities, appear to have been the desire to escape from an anxious position and a doubt as to the ability of the British Government to protect him on land against Egyptians. A protest against

Relations of  
the Egyptians  
with  
Bahrain,  
1838-40.

the agreement was addressed by the Resident both to the Shaikh of Bahrain and to the Egyptian commander, but the case had no further developments; and in the following year, on the departure of the Egyptians from Hasa, the agreement ceased to be of any practical importance. These matters are treated of at greater length in the history of Bahrain.

Relations of  
the Egyptians  
with  
Trucial  
'Omān,  
1838-40.

In Trucial 'Omān, likewise, the British authorities were obliged to take precautions against encroachment by the Egyptians. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, whom the Amīr Faisal before the end of his reign had removed from Baraimi, joined Khurshīd Pasha in Najd at an early stage in the occupation, and was commissioned by him to proceed to Trucial 'Omān and obtain the submission of the principal Shaikhs to the titular Amīr Khālid. Sa'ad arrived at Shārajah in March 1839 and was received with distinction by the Qāsimi Shaikh, who provided him with a residence. With him came a detachment of Wahhābi soldiers, whom he wished to place in Baraimi; but the Na'im, who held the Baraimi fort at this time and enjoyed the support of Saiyid Hamūd of Sohār, would not agree to admit them; and Sa'ad, though he induced the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to support his demand, was not in a position to coerce the fort-holders. Meanwhile a British political officer had visited the coast with Admiral Sir F. Maitland, and the Shaikhs of the Trucial ports had promised not to help, but on the contrary to resist, the Egyptian agent in his intrigues; nevertheless, after the departure of the fleet, the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Abu Dhabi began to compete with each other for the agent's favour. In Trucial 'Omān, as in Bahrain, an impression seems to have prevailed that the Egyptians were invincible on *terra firma*. In July 1839 the British Resident visited the coast and obtained from each ruling chief a written engagement to support British and oppose Egyptian policy; he took steps, through the Shaikh of Shārajah, to bring about the expulsion of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq from the country; and he encouraged the Na'im of Baraimi to stand firm, at the same time causing the Egyptian agent to be informed that the Na'im had been taken under British protection. Completely foiled in his purpose by these measures, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq embarked at Shārajah for 'Oqair, where, after carrying off 400 sheep with other property from the island of Qais, he arrived in due course; but he had apparently forfeited the confidence of his Egyptian employers, for soon after his return, he was placed under surveillance and removed to Riyādh. In connection with these events the chief man of Qatif received warning that an expedition by sea from Hasa against any part of the 'Omān coast would be opposed by the British naval force in the Gulf; and in January 1840 the Resident paid a second visit to the coast of Trucial 'Omān, where at 'Ajmān he arranged a defensive alliance against all enemies

between the Na'im and Dhawāir of the Baraimi Oasis. A British officer also visited Baraimi. Most of these proceedings are more fully described in the history of Trucial 'Omān.

The Egyptians continued the bullying policy of their predecessors the Wahhābis, towards the Saiyid of Masqat; and they even used some of the same agents for the purpose, especially Sa'ad-Bine-Mutlaq and a certain Bin-Battāl. The Saiyid was at first inclined to attach himself to the Egyptians, through whom he hoped to obtain possession of Bahrain; but later he adopted the views of the Government of India and conducted his correspondence with the Egyptians according to the advice of the British political authorities. The reconciliation between the Saiyid and his kinsman Hamūd, effected by British intervention in 1839, had reference to the Egyptian danger; and the ruler of 'Omān, in the treaty which resulted bound himself to assist Hamūd, who was a staunch opponent of Muhammad 'Alī, against all his enemies.

Relations of  
the Egyptians  
with  
the Sultan-  
ate of  
'Omān.

Kuwait was among the more distant places to which the Egyptians, on their arrival on the shores of the Persian Gulf, despatched emissaries; and the duties of the individual whom they posted to Kuwait were probably political and not unconnected with a scheme for the conquest of 'Irāq, though his ostensible employment was merely that of a purveyor to the Egyptian forces. The Shaikh of Kuwait gave this Egyptian officer the highest seat in all assemblies; and his presence seems to have been the cause of an otherwise inexplicable discourtesy offered by the Shaikh in 1839 to the British Assistant Resident,—an incident of which the details will be found in the history of Kuwait.

Relations of  
the Egyptians  
with  
Kuwait.

### Evacuation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1840.

The uncompromising opposition of the British Government to the more ambitious and distant designs of the Egyptians was seconded by the difficulties in which the latter soon found themselves involved with the inhabitants of the countries actually in their occupation; and early in 1840 a retrograde movement of their forces commenced. The Egyptian governor of Hasa was shot and killed by Arabs in the vicinity of Hofūf, and it was found necessary to recall a small force which he had despatched against the Na'im of Qatar. The attitude of the 'Ajmān tribe, whose principal Shaikh had been imprisoned by the Egyptians but contrived to escape from their custody, was bitterly hostile. Communications became unsafe, and even at Tharmidah, to which place the Pasha had now removed his headquarters, supplies could not be brought in



except under heavy escorts. To add to the serious local difficulties of the Pasha he was now in disgrace with Mhhammad 'Ali, whose jealousy had been excited by his exploits, and very little assistance had reached him by sea, only one vessel with stores arriving at Qatif in November 1839, in place of four vessels of war which he had expected at an earlier date. In May 1840, when a blockade of the Egyptian ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair by British war-vessels was imminent, news was received of the actual withdrawal of the greater part of the Egyptian forces from Najd. Their departure had been heralded by a tour which Khālid, accompanied by a body of Egyptian cavalry, had undertaken in the districts of the interior in order to receive the allegiance of the local Shaikhs, whom he was in future to govern unaided. In Hasa the order to retire was celebrated, as it had been once before in 1819, by an abnormal display of rapacity on the part of the retiring officials; and Barghash, a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid, was at the same time put to death in retaliation for the murder of Muhammad Effendi. It was intended that Najd should for the future be controlled, through Khālid, from Madinah; and, to enable the Egyptian nominee to maintain his position, a force of 800 Egyptian troops, of whom about two-thirds were infantry, were left at his disposal.

#### KHĀLID-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1840-42.

#### General and internal history, 1840-42.

Weakness  
of Khālid's  
position.

The reign of Khālid, who as the creature of the Egyptians was generally disliked, and who appears to have possessed no capacity for government, was short and troubled. His prestige was impaired from the first by rumours that the ex-Amir, Faisal-bin-'Abdullah, had escaped or had been liberated in Egypt, and by the check which his Egyptian patrons were known to have sustained in Syria at the hands of European powers. Claims also were advanced by the Porte to suzerainty over Najd; and Khālid, acting perhaps under the advice of Khurshid Pasha, made the professions of loyalty that were required of him and sent presents

to the Sultān of Turkey,—acts of submission which the Egyptians probably intended should be disavowed at the first convenient opportunity,—and was appointed in return Turkish Wālī of Central Arabia. The Egyptian troops by whom Khālid's power was supported received no pay and became discontented; moreover they were regarded with intense jealousy by the Arabs of the country, who considered that a Wahhābi Amīr should rely on the swords of his fellow-countrymen alone.

In October 1841, notwithstanding these difficulties, the Amīr Khālid descended to Hasa and appeared to be contemplating an expedition against 'Omān; his proceedings drew remonstrances from the British authorities and occasioned the despatch of a British officer to Hofūf, as will be related further on.

The Amīr's ideas of foreign conquest, however, if he entertained such, were speedily dispelled by an insurrection at home, headed by his distant relative 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaīyān, whose cause was supported by Turki-al-Hizāni, one of the leading Shaikhs of the Kharj district in Najd. This rival, finding himself suspected by Khālid, at first fled to Kuwait; but in September 1841 he returned to Central Arabia, took possession apparently of Dhurumah, Hāir and Manfūhah in 'Āridh, and provided himself with the sinews of war by confiscating the estates of two wealthy inhabitants of those places, who were opposed to him and whom he executed. The Sahīl and other tribes attached themselves to his cause; and he was able to secure the neutrality, if not the support, of the important tribes of the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah and Sabai'; but the 'Anizah, Mutair and Bani Hājir still followed the Amīr Khālid. In December 1841 'Abdullah found himself in a position to threaten Riyādh, but was repulsed in a skirmish; he had, however, an influential body of supporters in the town itself, who, on the very day of his defeat, admitted him by the southern gate after dusk and proclaimed him Amīr of Najd. The leaders of Khālid's army fell into his hands, and he put three of them to death; but he spared the life of a resolute individual named 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisāu, probably the same who had governed Hasa under the ex-Amīr Faisal. The Amīr Khālid escaped to Hasa and undertook, as he had done once before, to dismiss the Egyptian troops whose presence was offensive to his leading supporters; but again he failed to observe his promise, and the people of Hofūf then tendered their allegiance to 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaīyān. Khālid found himself obliged to flee to Qatif, where he was rejoined by his troops; but here too the popular feeling was strongly adverse to him; his partisans deserted him; and, after dismissing his mercenaries, he took refuge at Dammām with Mubārak, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Visit of the  
Amīr to  
Hasa, 1841.

Rebellion of  
'Abdullah-  
bin-Thanaī-  
yān, Sep-  
tember 1841-  
April 1842.

From Dammām Khālid visited Khor Hāsān in Qatar, where the Shaikh of Bahrain in April 1842 gave him an honorific reception; but attempts made in his interest upon Hofūf and 'Oqair ended in failure. He finally retired to Kuwait, with the intention of renewing the struggle from the side of Qasīm, where he possessed some interest.

#### Relations of the Amīr Khālid with Arab states, 1840-42.

Relations  
with Trucial  
'Omān, 1840.  
42.

The dealings of the Amīr Khālid with other states in Arabia were slight, and were practically confined to Trucial 'Omān. Some of the chiefs of that region undoubtedly opened a correspondence with him, particularly the Shaikh of Shārjah, a letter from whom, relating to designs on Baraimi, was intercepted by the Na'im of that oasis in 1841. In October of the same year Khālid appeared to be organising an expedition against Baraimi; but, if this was the case, he was prevented from undertaking it by the rebellion, already in progress, which ended in his expulsion from his dominions.

#### Relations of the Amīr Khālid with Great Britain, 1840-42.

Corre-  
spondence.

Early in his reign Khālid addressed a letter to the British Residency Agent in Bahrain, expressing a strong desire that "the amicable and cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his late father, Sa'ūd, and the British Government" should be renewed, and indicating that he would have taken earlier steps to this end had he not been prevented by Muhammad 'Ali.

Lieutenant  
Jopp's  
mission,  
November  
1841.

In regard to Trucial 'Omān, however, as we have already mentioned, Khālid's attitude was ambiguous; and the British Political Resident, taking advantage of the instructions of Government to keep a watch upon the Amīr's movements and warn him, if need be, that an attempt on his part to invade 'Omān would be resisted by the British Government, deputed an officer, Lieutenant Jopp, to interview the Amīr at Hofūf and explain the position to him. The Government of India, who did not intend that the proceedings of the Amīr should be scrutinised with the same strictness as those of the Egyptians, were inclined, when they became aware of this mission, to

doubt its expediency; but a satisfactory assurance was elicited from the Amīr, that he entertained no designs upon 'Omān; and incidentally some new and interesting geographical information was recorded by Lieutenant Jopp on his journey from 'Oqair to Hofūf and from Hofūf to Qatif in November 1841.\*

#### 'ABDULLAH-BIN-THANAIYĀN.

1842-43.

#### Internal affairs, 1842-43.

The rule of the successful rebel, 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, was brief and troubled. In Hasa the severity of his taxation soon estranged the inhabitants, who had in the beginning generally supported his cause; and a number of the Bedonin tribes on that side continued to be hostile to his authority. The ex-Amīr Khālid at first threatened an attack from Qasīm; and in March 1843 the ex-Amīr Faisal, who had in fact regained his freedom, appeared in that district and at once became an even more formidable danger. In June 1843 Faisal marched southwards unopposed and besieged 'Abdullah in the citadel of Riyādh, to which he had retired with a few followers, and 'Abdullah was quickly obliged to surrender at discretion. Faisal had at first offered to associate the ex-Amīr Khālid with himself in his operations; but that helpless individual, who had now withdrawn to Madinah, refused to join him and so vanished from the page of history. Valuable assistance was given to Faisal in his operations by 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, his loyal Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar.

#### Relations with Bahrain, 1842-43.

In 1842, a breach having occurred between the joint Shaikhs of Bahrain, the younger, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, was expelled from the

\* *Bombay Selections XXIV*, pages 111-115. Lieutenant Jopp was apparently the first European to travel between 'Oqair and Hofūf by any, and between Hofūf and Qatif by the ordinary route.

islands by the elder and made his way to Riyādh, where he succeeded in enlisting the sympathy of the Wahhābi Amīr. 'Abdullah, the elder Shaikh, then blockaded the Wahhābi coast, temporarily seized 'Oqair, and gave asylum to discontented emigrants from Saihāt in the Qatif Oasis. In April 1843 'Abdullah was in his turn driven out of Bahrain by Muhammad and established himself at Dammām on the coast of Hasa. The Wahhābi Amīr was not in a position to interfere actively in these affairs.

#### Designs on Trucial 'Omān, 1842-43.

However weak an Amīr of the Wahhābis might be, it was considered necessary to his honour at this period that he should assert his claims to sovereignty over distant 'Omān; and this obligation 'Abdullah fulfilled by informing the Shaikhs of the Trucial coast that he intended to depute Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq to represent him at Baraimi. The Shaikhs of Baraimi, who were also addressed, openly alleged a connection with the British Government, which, they may have hoped, would deter the Amīr from meddling with their oasis; but they were divided among themselves, and the secret correspondence of some among them with the Wahhābis had, it was believed, a different tenor.

#### Relations with the British Government, 1842-43.

The letters of 'Abdullah to the Trucial Shaikhs, except one addressed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi who refused to exhibit it, were procured by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf and became the occasion of a remonstrance by that officer against the Amīr's proceedings: the ground taken by the Resident was that Wahhābi influence had in the past conducted to piracy in Trucial 'Omān and necessitated punitive action by the British Government. 'Abdullah, in reply, professed a desire to co-operate with the British Government in the suppression of piracy and stated that he had enjoined the inhabitants of 'Omān to refrain from maritime offences; but it was observed that in his letter he claimed the people of 'Omān as his subjects.

#### FAISAL-BIN-TURK1 (SECOND REIGN).

1843-65.

#### General and internal history, 1843-65.

The manner of Faisal's second accession has already been related, and the remainder of his reign was, at home, practically devoid of incident. Character and life of Faisal.

Faisal was distinguished by his dignity and self-possession and was respected for the justice of his decisions, but he was greatly feared, especially by the Bedouins, on account of his merciless severity. Like Sa'ūd, the most distinguished of his predecessors, he was regarded by his subjects with mingled feelings, in which dislike and admiration blended. In his later years Faisal became blind and infirm; but, until a few months before his death, his faculties were unimpaired, and he continued personally to carry on the government. In June 1865 the Amīr was attacked by paralysis, and on the 2nd of December following he died at Riyādh; the immediate cause of his death is said to have been cholera.

In his dominions Faisal seems to have maintained perfect order, and from the very first year of his reign he showed great energy in protecting the yearly pilgrimages to the Holy Cities against marauding Bedouins. In the jail at Riyādh there were always many political prisoners of rank and influence. Grave offences were generally expiated by capital punishment and lighter ones by exile to Qatif, a sentence which was regarded by the people of the Central Arabian plateau as tantamount to a lingering death by fever. In 1848, or within the next few years, the Amīr recovered most of the Qasim district which had seceded to Jabal Shammar; but he could not take the town of 'Anaizah. In 1853 and 1862 he made fresh efforts to reduce 'Anaizah; but they were unsuccessful.

In Hasa, where Wahhabism was un congenial to the character of the people, the Amīr's rule was maintained chiefly by fear; and in that province, where disaffection consequently abounded, the temper of the Wahhābi officials was most suspicious and their methods were most inquisitorial. In 1851 Faisal visited the Hasa Oasis and the deserts to the

Administra-  
tion of Najd,  
1843-65.

Government  
of Hasa,  
1843-65.

south of it in person, chastising the Bedouin tribes who harassed the trade and pilgrim routes; and his name is remembered at the present day as that of the only Amir who ever pursued the Āl Morrah tribe in their own country with any measure of success. It is stated, however, that the condition of the Wāhhābi troops, when they finally brought the Āl Morrah to bay in the Jāfūrah desert, was such that the Amir had to be satisfied with a merely nominal settlement.

Resources.

The total annual revenue of the Wāhhābi dominions, including Hasa, was computed item by item in 1865 at over \$800,000 of which about six-sevenths were derived from the settled population.

#### Relations of the Wāhhābi Government with adjacent states in Arabia, etc., 1843-65.

With peace and order prevailing at home and a revenue sufficient for the needs of Government, it was natural that the energies of the Wāhhābi Amir should take an outward direction, and that the proceedings of the Wāhhābis abroad should become more aggressive than they had been for a considerable time past.

Relations  
with Turkey  
and Egypt,  
1843-65.

Some uncertainty overshadows the relations subsisting, during the earlier part of Faisal's reign, between his government and the governments of Turkey and Egypt. In 1851 the Amir was understood to pay tribute to the Porte; but accredited envoys of the Pasha of Egypt were present in his camp, and the Wāhhābi agent at Kuwait professedly supported Egyptian interests. In 1855, in correspondence with the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Amir asserted himself to be "a dependent of the exalted Turkish Government" and stated that his differences with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt had been due to the conflict in policy between that Pasha and the Porte. About 1860, in the course of discussions relating to Bahrain, the Amir Faisal again wrote, somewhat ambiguously, that "in accordance with treaties between the Wāhhābi Amir and the Sultān 'Abdul Majid, there are matters which everyone is precluded from meddling with, unless on special grounds." These periodical declarations show that the Amir was not averse, when it suited his interest, to admit dependence on the Porte; and the Turks, on their part, clearly asserted their suzerainty over the Wāhhābis. An illustration of the Turkish claims was afforded by a protest, lodged by the Pasha of Baghdad in 1862, against the bombardment of Dammām in Hasa by

British war-vessels in the previous year; for the place in question was described as lying within the territory of "Faisal Bey, the Qāim-Maqām of Najd" and as forming "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultān." At the close of Faisal's reign, the tribute rendered by him to the Porte was merely nominal and seems to have been paid through the Sharif of Makkah.

So long as 'Abdullah, the first Mahfūdh, continued to rule Jabal Shammar, the loyalty of that province to the Wāhhābi Amir remained unquestioned; and Faisal, on his return from Egypt, seems to have been assisted by his old dependent to recover his position in Najd. Talāl, the son of 'Abdullah, married a daughter of Faisal and continued, until his death in 1867, to pay a yearly visit to Riyādh, where he was accustomed to deliver his tribute of horses in person. About 1848, however, Qasim, which had hitherto been directly dependent upon the Wāhhābi Amir, appears to have obtained the protection of the Shammar chief as a sort of an intermediate overlord.

Relations  
with Jabal  
Shammar,  
1843-65.

About 1851, as we have seen, the Amir Faisal maintained an agent at Kuwait; and it was ascertained that in 1863 his relations with that place were friendly, although no tribute was paid him by the Shaikh.

Relations  
with Kuwait,  
1843-65.

When Faisal came to the throne of Najd, a contest between 'Abdullah and Muhammad, the two rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, was in progress. The Amir availed himself of their mutual opposition to assert his own authority; and, but for the opposition of the British Government, who had determined to confine Wāhhābi influence to the mainland, it is not improbable that he would have succeeded in reducing the Bahrain Shaikh to a position of strict dependence on himself.

Relations  
with Bahrain,  
1843-65.

The Amir at first sided with the younger claimant, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, who had lately been driven out by 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad; and, when the latter was in his turn displaced, it was principally by a Wāhhābi force that, early in 1844, he was deprived of the fort of Dammām, his last remaining possession, of which the Wāhhābi Amir considered himself to be the rightful owner.

1843-44.

For some time after this the Wāhhābis, having achieved their principal object in the recovery of Dammām, remained quiescent; but in 1845, on Muhammad-bin-Khalifah becoming intractable and refusing to pay an annual tribute with arrears to which he had agreed on the fall of Dammām, 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wāhhābi governor of Qatif, began to arrange an attack on Bahrain, and Muhammad, anticipating his designs, placed the Wāhhābi coast under blockade. An invasion of Bahrain from Hasa by a stratagem was then planned by the ex-Shaikh

1845-47.

'Abdullah and the Wahhābi governor of Qatif; but it miscarried, when on the point of execution, through the scheme of action becoming known in Bahrain. In 1846 two collisions between Wahhābi and Bahrain forces occurred on the mainland and each side was able to boast of one victory. At length, in August 1847, the Shaikh of Bahrain having been weakened by the desertion of some of the Bani Khalid from his side, terms were arranged whereby the Wahhābi Amīr undertook to withdraw his active support from the ex-Shaikh, and the Shaikh in return engaged to pay \$4,000 a year to the Wahhābis as Zakāt.

1850-51.

In 1850 relations between Shaikh Muhammad and the Amīr Faisal again became strained, in consequence of the punishment by the Wahhābi ruler of one of his own envoys to whom the Shaikh had given a flattering welcome, and of a cold reception which Muhammad had subsequently accorded to a son of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wahhābi agent in 'Omān. In 1851 the Amīr arrived in person in the neighbourhood of Qatar, seduced the inhabitants of the principal places in that promontory from their allegiance to Bahrain, and demanded an extravagant increase in the Bahrain tribute, of which payment had probably been withheld altogether. Muhammad thereupon blockaded the Hasa coast; but the preparations of the Wahhābis, who were now joined by the sons of the late ex-Shaikh, had assumed formidable proportions; and it is probable that the Shaikh was only saved from destruction by the appearance of a British squadron which the Resident sent for the protection of the islands. In July 1851 peace was again arranged by the efforts of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but secretly tension continued; and the Wahhābi Amīr established the sons of the late ex-Shaikh of Bahrain at Dammām.

1855-56

After these events, particularly in 1855-56, some correspondence in regard to Bahrain took place between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Būshehr Political Residency; the Amīr claimed the right to chastise at pleasure his dependent, the Shaikh of Bahrain; and the warning returned by the British representative under the authority of the Government of India, that no interference with Bahrain would be permitted, caused him intense irritation and dissatisfaction.

1859.

In 1859 the Amīr, who alleged, and perhaps not without truth, that the Shaikh of Bahrain was inciting the tribes of Hasa to hostile action against his subjects, having disregarded the warnings of the Resident and the presence of a British corvette off his coast, caused preparations to be made by his governor of Qatif, assisted by a son of the late ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, for a serious invasion of the islands. A British squadron was then despatched to threaten Dammām; and, in the result,

the enterprise collapsed, and the Wahhābi official even apologised to the British commander for his proceedings. This successful act of intervention greatly increased the bitterness of Faisal against the British Government and their representatives.

In 1861 the Shaikh of Bahrain assumed the offensive against the 1861. Wahhābi Amīr without first consulting the British Resident. He blockaded the Wahhābi ports and sent six war vessels to cruise against Dammām; and only by most stringent measures, amounting to compulsion, could he be induced by his British advisers to discontinue his unwarrantable action. It was now clear, however, that tranquillity in Bahrain waters could only be restored by the removal of the sons of the late ex-Shaikh from Dammām; and this was accordingly effected, by British naval action, in November 1861. The dislodgment of these disturbers of the peace from their stronghold was reported to have been not altogether displeasing to the local Wahhābi officials in Qatif, who could not themselves have done what was required without committing a breach of Arab hospitality.

Incidentally we may remark that, but for the vigilance with which the independence of Bahrain was watched over by the British Government during this period, the principality might have become attached to Hasa and afterwards have passed with that province into the possession of the Turks.

In Trucial 'Omān, during the whole of this period, the Wahhābis were extremely active. In July 1843 letters and messengers from the Amīr reached the principal Shaikhs of that region, informing them that at the end of the hot weather the Wahhābi agent Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq would arrive with troops to subdue the country; and all the chiefs, except those of Dibai and the Baraimi Oasis, appear to have professed in reply their satisfaction at the prospect.

Relations  
with Trucial  
'Omān, 1843-  
65.

Early in 1845 Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq appeared in Baraimi with a small 1845. force. He was, apparently, by no means confident of success; but the surrounding tribes at first displayed considerable enthusiasm for the Wahhābi cause, and he was encouraged to form designs of occupying Dhank and Dhaid, and even Zora upon the coast. His arrogance and extortions, however, quickly alienated and disgusted most of his supporters; and his direct communications with Najd were then cut, his messengers beaten and insulted, and complaints against him made to the Wahhābi Amīr. At one time it appeared probable that Sa'ad would be visited with his master's displeasure; but, by one means or another, he succeeded in justifying his conduct and in retaining his post. A remittance of

treasure which he made by sea to Hasa no doubt contributed to restore him to favour.

1848. In May 1848 the Baraimi forts were captured by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, assisted by the ruler of the Sohār principality and by the Na'im and Dhiawāhir tribes; and Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, who had been absent when the attack began, took refuge with the Shaikh of Shārjah. Tribal jealousy then came into play, and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān as a whole turned against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but the latter defied the combination against him and continued to hold Baraimi until February 1849, when he voluntarily restored it to the Wāhhābis at the intercession of an envoy sent by the Sharif of Makkah.

1850-51. In March 1850 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, after communication with the regent of the 'Omān Sultanate, again attacked the Wāhhābis in Baraimi, but this time he failed to make any impression; and an assault on the place, made in the following November by a combination of the Bani Yās, Qawāsīm and Na'im, was equally unsuccessful. In 1851 the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah formed an alliance against the Wāhhābis; but nothing came of it.

1852-53. At the end of 1852 'Abdullah, the son of the Wāhhābi Amīr, arrived in Baraimi; but his proceedings there, as will be seen in the next section, had reference chiefly to the 'Omān Sultanate. The chiefs of Trucial 'Omān, however, except the Shaikh of Dibai, who avoided waiting on him in person, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who did his best to dissuade him from aggression to the eastwards, visited Baraimi and fawned upon him in a servile manner.

1854-55. A certain Ahmad-as-Sadairi was appointed about this time to the Wāhhābi agency in Baraimi, in succession to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq. In 1854 this individual appeared to be exerting himself to restrain the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān from mutual aggressions and to curb the license of the Bedouins; but in 1855 his activities took a mischievous turn, and it was found that he was scheming to obtain possession of the seaboard village of Hamriyah. In 1865 the Wāhhābis were represented at Baraimi by Turki-bin-Ahmad, probably a son of Ahmad-as-Sadairi, but his attention was directed chiefly to the affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate.

In 1855, in a correspondence with the British Resident at Būshehr, the Amīr Faisal described his mission in Trucial 'Omān as that of a benefactor by whom the savage tribes of the interior were restrained from preying upon and slaughtering the helpless populations of the coast.

The Wāhhābi post in Baraimi was used as a base for extremely aggressive action against the Sultanate of 'Omān in 1845, in 1853, and again in 1865.

On his arrival in Trucial 'Omān in 1845, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq demanded tribute, at the rate of \$5,000 and \$20,000 a year respectively, from the rulers of Sohār and Masqat, and, to enforce compliance, he ravaged the Bātinah district and took Majis, butchering the garrison; \$5,000 was then paid him on account of Sohār and it was agreed that the question of the Masqat payment should be referred to Saiyid Sa'id, who was absent in East Africa. The Wāhhābi soon violated the truce that had been arranged; but the action of the British authorities in support of the regent of Masqat, Saiyid Thuwaini, obliged him in the end to be content with a total annual tribute of \$5,000. A douceur of \$2,000 was paid by Saiyid Thuwaini to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq in consideration of the settlement, and Majis was restored to the former owner.

In 1853, during his sojourn in Baraimi, 'Abdullah, the heir-apparent to the Wāhhābi Amirship, insisted that the Saiyid of Masqat should cede to him the town and district of Sohār and pay a greatly enhanced tribute for the remainder of his dominions; from the exorbitance of these demands it was believed that the Wāhhābis merely sought a pretext for declaring war. Encouraged by British support, Saiyid Thuwaini prepared to defend Sohār; the Wāhhābis abandoned their intention of invading Bātinah; and the ultimate result was an agreement under which the Saiyid was to retain Sohār and pay an increased tribute of \$12,000 a year for the whole 'Omān Sultanate. It was further arranged that the Wāhhābi agent and the ruler of Masqat should mutually assist one another against all enemies, and in pursuance of this undertaking Saiyid Thuwaini, in the following year, was actually helped by the Wāhhābis to coerce some refractory tribes in Bātinah. The Wāhhābi agent, after these transactions, paid a visit on his own account, probably in the capacity of tax-collector, to the district of 'Omān Proper in the interior.

In 1864 the Wāhhābis brought indirect pressure to bear on the Sultan of 'Omān—now Saiyid Thuwaini, who had succeeded his father Saiyid Sa'id—by supporting a rebel, Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq, against his authority; but the Sultan immediately sought the aid of the British Government, and the Political Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Pelly, was directed to report on the situation. In March 1865 Colonel Pelly paid a personal visit, which will be described later on, to the Wāhhābi Amir in his capital of Riyādh; and there he ascertained that

Relations  
with the  
'Omān Sul-  
tunate, 1848-  
65.  
1845.

1853.

1864-65.

the intimidation of the Sultān had been ordered by the Amīr himself, who regarded Saiyid Thuwaini with the utmost contempt and wished to enhance his annual tribute from \$12,000 to \$40,000. In April 1865, on his return to the Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly proceeded to Masqat, where he learned that Saiyid 'Azzān had now definitively placed himself under the protection of the Wāhhābis, and that the latter were demanding an increased tribute and were threatening an invasion of 'Omān. In these circumstances Colonel Pelly, whose name the Sultān had already in 1864 without proper authority proposed to the Amīr as that of a mediator, wrote to his late host Faisal tendering his good offices for a settlement; but no notice was taken by the Wāhhābi of this communication. In August 1865 Masqat was visited by the usual Wāhhābi deputation, who demanded on this occasion four times the customary annual tribute; but, under British advice, the Sultān paid only the established amount, and stated that, with reference to the balance, he awaited the result of Colonel Pelly's offer of mediation. In the same month the Wāhhābi agent at Baraimi, in response to an invitation by the disaffected Jannabah inhabitants of Sūr, sent a Wāhhābi contingent to that place; a fort occupied by a garrison on behalf of the Sultān was taken after two days' resistance, Sūr was plundered, and one British Indian subject was killed and another wounded. Saiyid Thuwaini then weakly submitted and paid two sums, aggregating \$16,000, to the Wāhhābis as the price of peace; but the British Government, as we shall see later, did not allow matters to remain in this position.

#### Relations between the Wāhhābi Amīr and the British Government, 1843-65.

British policy of non-intervention on the Arabian coast, 1843.

We have still to analyse the policy of the British Government in face of these systematic aggressions by the Wāhhābis along an extensive line of coast: it may be described as one of *laissez faire* in Trucial 'Omān, of modified resistance in the 'Omān Sultanate, and of uncompromising opposition in Bahrain. During the occupation of Najd by the Egyptians, in 1838-40, the British political representatives in the Persian Gulf had been authorised to resist their encroachments at every point; and when the Wāhhābi Amīr, having succeeded the Egyptians in Hasa, showed himself inclined to pursue the same aggressive policy, they proposed to counteract it by similar means. The Government of India, however, considering the danger from the ambitions of a Faisal to be much less

dangerous than those of a Muhammad 'Ali, decided to await developments and to maintain a policy of reserve and—so far as possible—of non-intervention; and they accordingly disapproved of a suggestion made by the Government of Bombay in 1844, that a fixed principle of action should be laid down and that an effort should even be made to bring the Wāhhābi Amīr within the circle of chiefs who were bound to the British Government by engagements relating to the maritime peace. In accordance with their views the Shaikhs of Baraimi, whom the attitude of Government with reference to the Egyptians had encouraged to hope for British support against the Wāhhābis, were informed that the British Government would not interfere on their behalf, having withdrawn from all connection with the internal affairs of Arabia; and, to a letter received from the Wāhhābi Amīr, in which he expressed a desire "for the renewal of the amicable relations which existed between his father Turki and the British Government", a favourable reply was sent, assuring him that the British Government had no object in view except the preservation of the peace at sea, regarding which he had in his own communication declared himself to be solicitous. It was thought that, if a friendly intercourse between the British authorities and the Amīr could be established and maintained, the effect upon the Arab tribes along the coast would be highly beneficial.

Soon, however, it became apparent that the Amīr entertained ambitions which were not compatible with the integrity of the Bahrain Shaikhdom or the 'Omān Sultanate; and the Government of India, by a fear that changes too rapid and too extensive might otherwise result, were led to modify their policy of abstention.

In 1845, in connection with Wāhhābi menaces against Masqat, the Political Resident, while he was cautioned to avoid threats which could not be carried out except by despatching troops from India, was authorised to express the views of Government and to make a naval demonstration. He accordingly wrote both to the Wāhhābi Amīr and to the Wāhhābi agent in Baraimi, at the same time assembling a strong squadron upon the Bātinah coast; and the result, as we have seen above, was satisfactory, inasmuch as a becoming reply was received from the Wāhhābis, Majis was evacuated by their troops, and the demand for tribute was reduced to moderate dimensions.

In 1851, when the Bahrain islands were threatened with invasion by the Amīr who was himself present on the mainland adjoining, the danger was averted by the despatch to the scene, apparently by the Resident on his own responsibility, of the whole British naval force in the

British policy of non-intervention modified, from 1845, except in Trucial 'Omān.

British support of the Saiyid of Masqat, 1845.

British protection of Bahrain, 1851.



Gulf; and it was noticed that after this incident Faisal's attitude to the British Government became, for a time at least, more conciliatory. It had been necessary before this, in 1846, to address a stern warning to the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif, who had permitted himself to use threats of encouraging piracy.

British support of the Saiyid of Masqat, 1853.

Again in 1853, when 'Omān was menaced with invasion by the son of the Wahhābi Amir, the Resident, by summoning the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān from Baraimi to the coast, where he was waiting to conclude with them the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, by remonstrating with 'Abdullah on his detention of the Shaikhs at Baraimi, by sending a vessel of war to cruise along the coast, and by promising to assist the Sultān of 'Omān, if need be, in the defence of his capital, averted the cession of Sohār to the Wahhābis and enabled the Sultān to obtain peace on terms, far less disadvantageous as to tribute, than might otherwise have been extorted from him.

British protection of Bahrain, etc. 1859-61.

In 1859 Bahrain was again saved by British naval interposition from a Wahhābi descent which might have had serious and permanent consequences. This action and a demand that the sons of the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain should be removed from Dammām elicited bitter reproaches and a denunciation of British policy from the Wahhābi ruler.

Reparation for the Sūr outrage, 1865.

For the outrage committed at Sūr in 1865 the British Government undertook to obtain from the offenders the reparation due, which the Sultān of 'Omān was himself too weak to claim with any hope of success.

British policy of non-intervention maintained in Trucial 'Omān.

It was only in Trucial 'Omān that the representatives of the British Government continued to repeat—particularly in 1855, when the Na'im suggested that help should be given them to expel the Wahhābis from Baraimi—that they could not interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia; and even there they assisted the cause of tribal independence by ignoring, in all their political dealings, the very existence of the Wahhābi agent.

Attitude of the Wahhābi Amir towards piracy.

It is due to the Amir Faisal to mention that he never, so far as was ascertained, attempted to reply to the opposition of the British authorities by instigating piracy at sea; on the contrary, in 1855, he referred appreciatively to the "understanding between us and the British Government, of a hundred years' duration, for the security of traders and travellers passing on the seas."

Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, February-March 1865.

Mention has already been made of the remarkable journey to Riyādh undertaken by Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident at Bāshahr, in 1865; his principal object was to remove the animosity against Britain which anti-slavery proceedings at sea and frustration of Wahhābi policy upon the Arabian coast were believed to have excited in the Amir, and

which, by 1863, had brought about a total cessation of intercourse. Colonel Pelly was also anxious to prove that Central Arabia was not inaccessible to a British officer travelling on duty, and he hoped to cast much light upon the geography and natural history of the country.

The starting point of the journey was Kuwait, where Colonel Pelly arrived in January 1865 and remained for some weeks, awaiting the permission of the Amir to proceed; this came at last, but in a laconic form, and no guide was sent. Colonel Pelly was accompanied by Dr. W. H. Colvill, the Residency Surgeon, whom he placed in medical charge of his camp and charged with geological and botanical research, and by Lieutenant E. Dawes, I. N., of the Residency steamer, "Berenice," whose duty it was to take observations for latitude and longitude; and the interpreter was G. Lucas, a native Christian of Mūsā, who passed himself off as a Muhammadan under the name of 'Abdullah. The Resident's entire caravan consisted of about 30 camels; and his party including two Indian sowars, servants, and camelmen, numbered about 33 persons. Only one small tent was taken. The travellers took their departure from Kuwait on the 17th of February, the Residency steamer proceeding to await their return at 'Oqair, and marched by Wafrah, Wabrah and Rumhiyah to Sidūs in 'Aridh; here they turned and took their way down Wādī Hanifah to Riyādh, where they arrived upon the 5th of March, in uniform.

On the 6th Colonel Pelly, accompanied by his whole staff, paid a visit of ceremony to the Amir Faisal in the fort in the middle of the town; and the next morning a private interview took place, at which the Resident was attended by his interpreter only. The Amir was now old and altogether blind, but he appeared to be held by his subjects in the greatest awe; his immediate dependents, it was observed, generally mentioned him by the religious title of Imām. On both occasions the Resident's conversation with the Amir was general; and, though political topics were introduced, Colonel Pelly was careful to avoid discussion of particular questions such as that of the Masqat tribute, in regard to which he did not feel himself to be sufficiently well informed; but, incidentally, the Amir claimed sovereignty over all Eastern Arabia from Kuwait to Rās-al-Hadd and beyond. Faisal's manner was dignified, but friendly and at times even cordial; he appeared on the whole to be pleased by the Resident's visit; and it was arranged that Colonel Pelly, on his way from Riyādh to the coast, should visit Sa'ih in Kharj for the purpose of seeing the Amir's stud of horses. At this point, however,\* hostile influences began to work

\* A useless guide, Shaikh 'Ali of the Sabai, whom Colonel Pelly had employed, gave a mendacious account at Riyādh of the proceedings of the party by the way.

in the Amīr's unscrupulous and fanatical entourage; the manner of his confidential secretary Mahbūb, a "frivolous and vindictive mongrel," suddenly became insolent; Lieutenant Dawes' sketches were burnt, as a precaution; and on the 8th an attempt was made to detain the British party at Riyādh by withholding their camels. No arrangement for a final interview with the Amīr could be made, and, in the afternoon Colonel Pelly thought it necessary to proceed without an appointment to the fort, where, however, he had a farewell meeting with the Amīr, no less friendly than the interviews that had preceded it. The Amīr, on this occasion, requested that he might be informed of cases of piracy or wrecking upon the Hāsa coast, with a view to the severe punishment of the offenders; he asked that his maritime interests upon the coast of Persia might be protected by the Resident; he assured Colonel Pelly of his own sincere friendship; and, finally, he expressed a wish that correspondence should be maintained between them. About 9 P.M. on the 8th of March Colonel Pelly's caravan cleared the town of Riyādh, and the next day the march to the coast was begun in earnest; on the 17th of March the travellers passed Hofūf, and on the 18th they embarked on the Residency steamer at 'Oqair.

From this adventurous journey, as we shall shortly see, little or no political benefit resulted, probably in consequence of the helpless state into which the Amīr sank only three months later; but the observations of Lieutenant Dawes supplied invaluable data, to which no addition has since been made, for a correct map of the most important district of Southern Najd. Lieutenant Dawes had a sunstroke on the way to Riyādh and suffered much from fever during the return journey.

#### Relations of the Wāhhābi Amīr with France, 1843-65.

Mr. Palgrave's mission, 1862.

Colonel Pelly was preceded at Riyādh by the traveller Mr. W. G. Palgrave, who passed through the Wāhhābi capital in 1862 on his way across Arabia. Mr. Palgrave's mission, though he was a British subject, was not undertaken on behalf of the British Government; and it has been conjectured that he represented Napoleon III, who took a strong interest in Syria and Egypt, and who may at this time have turned his attention to Najd in connection with the Suez Canal, already projected.

Correspondence with the French.

In his talks with Colonel Pelly at Riyādh the Amīr Faisal admitted having twice received general offers of assistance from the French; and on the latter of these occasions, which synchronised somewhat closely with

Mr. Palgrave's visit, the Amīr was—by his own account—invited to send his reply to the French Consul at Damascus, whom he accordingly thanked and informed that he did not at the time stand in need of help.

#### 'ABDULLAH-BIN-FAISAL (FIRST REIGN), 1865-71.

##### Internal position at 'Abdullah's accession, 1865.

Faisal was succeeded at his death by his eldest son 'Abdullah, who had acquired considerable reputation as a military leader, and had been employed in 1852-53 as his father's representative at Baraimi to arrange with the Saiyid of Masqat for an increase of tribute. 'Abdullah was present in Riyādh during Colonel Pelly's visit in March 1865; but he mortified his curiosity and avoided an interview, fearing lest the Resident, through personal acquaintance with his defects, should obtain some advantage over him in his future career. One immediate result of 'Abdullah's succession was the downfall of the confidential secretary Mahbūb. The position of the new Amīr was weakened from the first by the rivalry and personal enmity of his next brother Sa'ūd, who at the time of Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, was regarded as of a milder character than 'Abdullah, but eventually, by his frankness, liberality and daring, supplanted 'Abdullah in the affection of the Bedouins. 'Abdullah and his brother Muhammad were the sons of Āl Sa'ūd mothers and were consequently bigoted Wāhhābis, whereas his half-brothers Sa'ūd and 'Abdur Rahmān were of Bedouin descent on the female side and had more generous dispositions. Sa'ūd, whose home was in Khirj, at once rebelled against 'Abdullah with the support of the Dawāsir; but at first he was defeated.

#### Rupture between the British Government and the Wāhhābi Amīr, 1865-66.

An unpleasant legacy remaining from Faisal to his son was the settlement of the Sūr case, in which British Indian subjects and others

Resolution of the Government of India

to assist the Sultan of 'Oman.

had suffered at the hands of tribesmen instigated by the Wahhābi agent at Baraimi. Before the death of Faisal it had been resolved by the Government of India to encourage the Sultān of 'Omān to more active resistance of the Wahhābis; it was ordered that material assistance in the shape of munitions of war, and, if absolutely necessary, of money also, should be afforded him; and naval action in his favour was authorised on condition that operations on land were not to be undertaken.

Letter from the Amīr and intention of the Government of India not to demand compensation for British sufferers at Sūr from the Wahhābis.

Apparently in November 1865, Colonel Pelly being then on his way to Bombay after leave in Europe, a letter, which purported to come from the Amīr Faisal and to be an answer to representations made regarding the behaviour of the Wahhābis at Sūr, reached the British authorities at Būshehr. In this communication it was stated that the Amīr had ordered the release of British subjects taken prisoners at Sūr and the restoration of their property; and, while the question of compensation was ignored, reference was made to an agreement between the British and the Wahhābi Governments "originally effected in the time of the late Sa'ūd, and again ratified in the time of the present ruler." On consideration of the letter, and after various enquiries, the Government of India decided that the Amīr should be invited to send a copy of the alleged treaty; that the Amīr should be given to understand that the Sultān of 'Omān was a friend and ally of the British Government who, while they hoped for a happy settlement of the Sultān's differences with the Amīr, could not regard encroachment on the Sultān's territory without grave concern; and that the Amīr should not be pressed to pay compensation for the recent injuries to British subjects at Sūr.

Ultimatum sent by the Resident to the Wahhābi Amīr, January 1866.

Meanwhile, however, decisive action, leading to an open breach with the Wahhābis, was taken by the local British authorities in pursuance of the instructions which they had received to help the Sultān of 'Omān. The chiefs of Trucial 'Omān were informed that they were at liberty to aid the Sultān against the Wahhābis; arrangements were made for the despatch of a Masqat fleet under Saiyid Turki, the Sultān's brother, to blockade the Wahhābi ports of Qatif and 'Oqair; and, the attitude of the Shaikh of Bahrain appearing suspicious, one of his war-vessels, the "Dinār", was seized by the British authorities, partly to prevent his helping the Wahhābis but partly also to compel satisfaction of claims which there were against him. On the 22nd December 1865 H.M.S. "Highflyer", Captain Pasley, left Bombay carrying two 18-pounder guns with ammunition for the Sultān of 'Omān, which she disembarked at Sohār, and early in January 1866 a consultation

was held at that place between Colonel Pelly and the naval commander. At this juncture an attack was made by a Wahhābi force on Saham in Bātinah, and the British Indian traders residing there were driven into the sea, one of them being drowned. The result of Colonel Pelly and Captain Pasley's deliberations was a demand made by letter on the Wahhābi Amīr for a written apology in regard to the Sūr affair, for a written assurance that in future such outrages would be prevented, and for payment of compensation, to the extent of \$27,000, on account of property lost or destroyed; and it was added that, if in seventeen days from the delivery of the letter to the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif the required satisfaction had not been afforded, the Wahhābi forts on the seaboard would be destroyed, and the craft in their harbours confiscated. Colonel Pelly was prevented, by the necessity of sustaining with his presence the courage of the Sultān of 'Omān, who was to make an attack on the Wahhābi post at Baraimi, from himself accompanying Captain Pasley; but he sent instead the Residency Agent at Shārhjah, who was landed in Bahrain on the 13th of January 1866 as bearer of the letter for the Wahhābi Amīr. The "Highflyer" left Bahrain on the same day for Abu Dhabi and thence cruised along the Trucial Coast, destroying on the way a Qāsimi tower which had been erected, in the Wahhābi interest, on the insulated tract of Zora. On the 23rd of January Colonel Pelly and Captain Pasley met again in Elphinstone Inlet, where a British telegraph station then existed and a rendezvous had been arranged.

The "Highflyer" left again on the 28th of January for Qatif, where she arrived on the 30th, and where Captain Pasley learned from the Residency Agent that no reply had as yet arrived from the Amīr, and that the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif was asking for a respite of twelve days to allow of his communicating with Riyādh. Captain Pasley waited until the 2nd of February and then, the period of grace having expired, proceeded to carry out the threats conveyed in the ultimatum by sending armed boats to Qatif under Lieutenant Fellowes; these demolished the island fort of Ahul Līf and destroyed a single Wahhābi vessel which was found in the harbour and was not worth removing. On the 3rd of February a party under Lieutenant Long was despatched against the Dammām fort, which, according to the information of the Residency Agent, was held by a garrison of only twelve men; but the boats, on account of the shallowness of the water, could not approach within 200 yards of the beach. The party waded ashore and the outworks of the fort were taken, but the garrison was much larger than had been represented, and the assault was eventually repulsed with a loss of three men killed and two officers and

British naval operations on the Hasa coast and repulse from Dammām, February 1866.

three men wounded. On the 4th of February, at high water, Lieutenant Long renewed the attempt on Dammām and plied the fort with shot, shell and rockets; but the range was excessive and no breach could be effected. On the 9th of February the "Highflyer" rejoined Colonel Pelly at Masqat, and operations were carried out on the 11th and 12th, with eminent success, against the Jannabah tribe of Sūr. The orders of the Government of India not to demand compensation from the Wāhhābi Amīr were at length received by Colonel Pelly, and the "Highflyer" left the Gulf for Bombay.

Colonel Pelly next proceeded to Elphinstone Inlet and was there awaiting news of the capture of Baraimi by the Sultān of 'Omān, when, on the 20th or 21st of February, he suddenly received intelligence of the violent death of 'Aiyid Thuwaini with attendant circumstances by which the 'Omāni operations against Baraimi were at once brought to a standstill. Almost simultaneously two letters from the Wāhhābi Amīr reached the Resident. In one of these, dated the 28th of January, 'Abdullah accepted the proposal made to his father some months earlier that Colonel Pelly should mediate in the dispute between the Amīr and the Sultān of 'Omān; and in the other, which was a reply to the British ultimatum, 'Abdullah stated that he desired a consultation and would send an agent. He added that the Jannabah were guilty of the outrage at Sūr, but that it was incumbent on himself, the Amīr, to recover compensation from them.

Soon afterwards a Wāhhābi envoy named Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah-bin-Manāh arrived at Būshehr with definite proposals of peace; and Colonel Pelly, on his return to that place on the 21st of April, gave him an interview. A written declaration was taken from the envoy, in which, on behalf of the Amīr 'Abdullah, he expressed a desire for peace, assured the Resident that British subjects would be protected in the Wāhhābi dominions, and promised that, beyond collecting the tribute established by ancient custom, the Wāhhābis would not in future interfere with Arab principalities in alliance with the British Government, in particular the Sultanate of 'Omān. These terms having been duly submitted to the Government of India, the Resident under their orders informed 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, in a letter which he handed to the envoy, that the British Government did not wish to intervene or to become the guarantor of any agreement which might be formed between the Amīr and the Sultān, but that they had authorised the Resident to use his good offices in arranging the details of a settlement. It transpired, in the discussions held at Būshehr, that the "treaty" with the British Government mentioned by the Wāhhābi ruler at an early stage of the

Reply of the  
Wāhhābi  
Amīr to the  
British ulti-  
matum, etc.,  
February  
1866.

Peace  
arranged by  
a Wāhhābi  
envoy to  
Būshehr,  
21st April  
1866.

proceedings did not in fact exist, and that the Amīr referred only to the friendly letters from the British Government which had from time to time been received and were regarded by the Wāhhābi Government in the light of agreements. It also appeared that the Amīr 'Abdullah had many enemies, and that his position in his own country was precarious. The Government of India regarded the outcome of the operations of February 1866 as on the whole satisfactory; but they considered that the procedure followed, both at Dammām and at Sūr, had been unnecessarily hasty.

### Relations of the Wāhhābi Amīr with the Turks, 1866.

About the same time that 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal sent an envoy to Būshehr, he despatched an agent named 'Abdul 'Azīz-as-Suwaylīm to the 'Turkish Wālī of Baghdād, apparently to complain of the British attack upon the Wāhhābi seaboard and to solicit the intervention of the Porte to prevent its repetition. Namīq Pasha was at first inclined to request, through the British Resident at Baghdād or directly by telegram from himself to the Viceroy of India, that further action might be deferred until the question could be discussed between the British and the Turkish Governments; but later on some difficulty, not wholly explained, arose between the Wālī and the envoy; and the latter, on the 3rd of May, left Baghdād in disgrace.

One reason for the breakdown of these negotiations may have been a raid, which was led by the Amīr 'Abdullah in person, apparently during the month of April, upon Arab tribes on the borders of Turkish 'Irāq. The Amīr, it seems, had made an expedition by way of Jabal Shammar against the Dhafir and part of the 'Anizah tribe; and, in pursuing the Dhafir towards the Euphrates, he came in conflict also with the Muntafik. Some severe fighting ensued, of which the final result was not clearly ascertained, and the Amīr, after halting with his force for a time in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, returned to Riyādh. The Turks were at first informed that their subjects had been defeated in the encounter, and, while this opinion prevailed, the Wālī of Baghdād directed his subordinate at Basrah to write to the Amīr "deprecating hostilities between tribes subject to the same authority and recommending the mutual restoration of plunder as the basis of accommodation"; but later the same official accepted for himself 10 Arab horses and 10 camels which the chief of the Muntafik professed to have captured from the Wāhhābis.

Wāhhābi  
mission to  
Baghdād  
April 1866

Wāhhābi raid  
on the Tur-  
kish border,  
April 1866.

### Relations of the Wahhābis with Kuwait, 1865-71.

The use of Kuwait territory by the Wahhābi Amīr as a line of retirement after his raid on the frontier of Turkish 'Irāq in 1866 has already been noticed; and in the same year 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal apparently offered to join the Shaikh of Kuwait in an attack on Zubair in case the Turkish Wali of 'Irāq should decide against the Shaikh in a dispute about property, then pending, between the Shaikh and some residents of Turkish territory.

### Relations of the Wahhābis with Bahrain and Qatar, 1865-71.

Tribute paid by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Wahhābis, 1866.

An enquiry, held by Colonel Pelly under the orders of Government after the crisis of 1865-66, showed that the Shaikh of Bahrain was now entirely independent of the Wahhābi Amīr in so far as his insular possessions were concerned, but that he paid an annual tribute of \$4,000 to secure his dependencies in the Qatar promontory from attack by tribes under Wahhābi influence. At some time between 1852 and 1866 the Wahhābi Amīr had a representative of his own at Dohah in Qatar; but it is probable that this representative was merely the local headman of the place.

Invasion of Bahrain from Wahhābi territory, 1869.

The invasion of the Bahrain Islands in 1869, in which the ruling Shaikh, 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, lost his life, was carried out from the Wahhābi coast; but there was no clear evidence of complicity on the part of the Wahhābis, and, the Amīr having written to disavow all connection with the affair, the Government of India merely ordered that he should be requested, without threats, to prevent similar occurrences in future.

### Relations of the Wahhābis with 'Omān and Trucial 'Omān, 1865-71.

Destruction by a British force of a tower at Zora,

The destruction by a British war-vessel of a tower erected in Zora by the Shaikh of Shārah, who at this time was hand in glove with the Wahhābis, has been mentioned above in connection with the operations of

1866; and by this measure the peace of the Trucial Coast, which the tower had endangered, was re-established.

On the 7th of April 1869 the Sadairi representative of the Wahhābi Amīr in Baraimi, having proceeded to Shārah and involved himself there in the internal intrigues and dissensions of the ruling Qāsimi family, was shot dead in a broil which arose in the town, and a number of his followers perished with him.

This event was shortly followed by the disappearance of the Wahhābis from Baraimi, which they had occupied, almost continuously, for nearly 70 years. Probably before the death of the Wahhābi agent at Shārah a peremptory demand for payment of tribute had been addressed to Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais, who had recently usurped the Sultanate of 'Omān, and a raid had been made by the Wahhābis on Sohār; consequently, when the Na'im of Baraimi, after the mishap to the agent, invited Saiyid 'Azzān to join them in expelling the Wahhābis from the Oasis, he complied—being a man of bold and decided character—without hesitation. On or about the 18th of June the Wahhābi garrison of Baraimi surrendered, after a trifling resistance, to 'Azzān's force of about 1,500 men; and the Saiyid, after installing a garrison and forming an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, returned in triumph to Masqat.

'Abdullah-bin-Faisal was not inclined to submit tamely to the loss of Baraimi and, with it, of his whole position in Trucial 'Omān and 'Omān; but various circumstances incapacitated him for effective action for its recovery. Early in 1870 'Abdullah came down to Hasa, where he proceeded to collect a force; it was believed that large numbers of boats were being collected by his order along the coasts of Hasa and Qatar for an expedition to Trucial 'Omān and thence against Baraimi; and subsequently the Amīr himself was reported to have reached 'Oqair. He was reminded, however, of his promise, given in 1866, not to commit aggressions upon Arab states having friendly relations with the British Government, and the overthrow by a British naval force of some usurping chiefs who had seized Bahrain served as a timely illustration of the dangers of a conflict with Britain, besides which he was aware that the invasion of Bahrain, committed as it had been from the coast of Hasa, might be laid to his charge by the British Government. A combination formed by the Shaikh of 'Abu Dhabi, the Amīr's rebellious brother Sa'ūd, and Saiyid 'Azzān of Masqat greatly increased the difficulty of his task in 'Omān; and the dryness of the season had made water scarce upon the routes by land from Hasa to Baraimi. In April 1866, dispirited by these obstacles, 'Abdullah seems to have

January 1866.

Death by violence of the Wahhābi agent in Baraimi, 7th April 1869.

Capture of Baraimi from the Wahhābis by the Sultan of 'Omān, 18th June 1869.

Abortive preparations by the Wahhābi Amīr for the recovery of Baraimi, 1869-70.

returned to his capital, where the intrigues of his own relations had become a source of danger. The loss of Baraimi illustrated the truth, exemplified on a larger scale by the Egyptian occupations of Najd in 1818-19, and 1838-40, and by the Turkish occupation of Qasim in 1905-07, that political paramountcy depends even in Arabia on the possession of sufficient material force at the place to be dominated, and that in the absence of such force it cannot long continue.

### Rebellion of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal, 1870-71.

Successes of  
Sa'ūd.

After visiting the Sultanate of 'Omān, Sa'ūd, the younger half-brother of the Amīr 'Abdullah, broke into open rebellion and began to seek for allies in every direction. The Shaikh of Bahrain was successfully dissuaded by the British Political Resident from lending countenance to Sa'ūd; but in the Hasa province a majority of the Bedouins quickly joined his flag. The oases of Hasa and Qatif declared for Sa'ūd; the Amīr was worsted in a severe encounter at the wells of Jūdah in Taff; and Sa'ūd captured 'Abdullah's full brother Muhammad, whom he confined in the fort at Dammām.

Flight of  
'Abdullah.

At this point the first reign of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal may be considered to end; for he fled to Jabal Shammar, of which state the Amīr was nearly related to him by marriage, and through the Shaikh of Kuwait he made overtures for the support of the Turks, promising to render them tribute. The payment of tribute by the Amīr to the Porte had, it would appear, become irregular or been altogether discontinued since the time of the Amīr Faisal.

### SA'ŪD-BIN-FAISAL,

1871-75.

### Conquest of Hasa by the Turks, 1871.

The invitation of 'Abdullah was accepted with alacrity by the Turks, who immediately recognised him as their Qāim-Maqām of Najd; and

with the assistance of the Shaikh of Kuwait, as related elsewhere, a Turkish force was despatched to occupy Hasa and advance into Central Arabia.

The details of the campaign and of the subsequent proceedings of the Turks are given at length in the history of Hasa. Their disembarkation took place at Rās Tanūrah on the 26th of May 1871, and Qatif town fell upon the 3rd, and Dammām upon the 5th of June; at the latter place 'Abdul 'Azīz, a son of the Amīr Sa'ūd, escaped capture by the Turks but left behind him in his flight the prisoner Muhammad-bin-Faisal, whom the Turks set at liberty; and it was proclaimed at Qatif by Nāfiz Pasha, the commander of the Turkish forces, that the object of the expedition was to restore the authority of the "Qāim-Maqām" 'Abdullah in Najd, and that Sa'ūd and his adherents would be pardoned if they submitted. In July the Hasa Oasis was occupied by the Turkish troops without opposition, but the impossibility of their advancing across the deserts to Riyādh was now apparent, and Hofūf became the permanent headquarters of the army of occupation.

The Turkish  
operations in  
Hasa, 1871.

After invoking the help of the Turks 'Abdullah must have returned to Najd, for, when the Turkish troops were overrunning Hasa, the Amīr Sa'ūd was reported to be besieging 'Abdullah in a fort in the Kharj district. 'Abdullah, to whose cause the Qahtān tribe still adhered, was at length obliged to fly from Kharj; and, when he again encountered Sa'ūd to the west of Riyādh, it was with unfavourable results. The Amīr then obtained possession of the capital, and 'Abdullah, excusing himself by the insecurity of the routes in the interior for not having made an earlier appearance, joined Nāfiz Pasha in Hasa; but he soon discovered that the object of the Turks was something quite different from his own restoration to power. In October, after being placed under surveillance and pressed to resign, 'Abdullah fled from the Ottoman camp with his son Turki, and retired to Najd, whither his brother Muhammad had preceded him. The Amīr Sa'ūd, who probably hoped to supersede 'Abdullah as the Turkish nominee, carefully abstained from hostilities against the troops in Hasa.

Movements  
of the Wah-  
habī leaders,  
1871.

Much discontent had been excited at Riyādh by the high-handed proceedings of Sa'ūd's Bedouins, and the Amīr's uncle 'Abdullah-bin-Turki availed himself of the general indignation to seize and hold the capital. Muhammad then wrote to the Turkish commander at Hofūf, received in return some money and supplies, and was honoured by being appointed Mudīr of Riyādh under the Qāim-Maqām 'Abdullah. The Amīr Sa'ūd, incensed by these proceedings, then broke with the Turks and attacked them in Hasa with a force drawn from the 'Ajmān, Al Morrah and

Dawāsir tribes, but unsuccessfully. After his failure he established himself in the neighbourhood of Qatar, where he compelled the coast population to contribute to the support of himself and his following, and from time to time he made raids upon the Turkish lines of communication.

### Complete annexation of Hasa by the Turks, 1871-72.

After the flight of 'Abdullah and the attack on Hasa by Sa'ūd, Mid-hat Pasha, Wali of Baghdād, who visited Hofuf on tour at the end of November 1871, announced that Wahhābi rule in Najd was at an end and that direct administration of the country had been assumed by the Turks; and Nāfiz Pasha was installed as the first Mutasarrif. These steps were professedly taken in consequence of a petition submitted by the people of Hasa, but it appears that the meaning of their representations was misunderstood or, more probably, misrepresented. At this early period, however, it is possible that Turkish rule may have been preferred by the inhabitants, on account of its laxity in some respects, to the domination of the Wahhābis, which had never been popular in Hasa.

The subsequent history of Najd was greatly influenced by the Turkish annexation of Hasa, which brought the shortest of all the routes from the sea to the Wahhābi country under Ottoman control; indeed all practicable lines of access to Central Arabia, except that from Kuwait, ran after this through Turkish territory, and a powerful hold upon Najd was thus obtained by the Porte. It should be observed, however, that the Turkish occupation of Hasa, which can only be supported from the sea, has made the position of Turkey in the Persian Gulf more vulnerable than before *vis-à-vis* of maritime powers.

'Abdullah after this wrote from Riyādh reproaching the Turks with their duplicity, and more than once a nominal reconciliation between him and his brother Sa'ūd was arranged; but the combination was always broken up, as soon as formed, by the treacherous behaviour of 'Abdullah in attacking the tribes most devoted to Sa'ūd, such as the Shammar and the 'Ajman. The Amir Sa'ūd, on his part, wasted the strength which he should have reserved for fighting the Turks in quarrels with various petty tribes in his neighbourhood.

Political results of the annexation of Hasa to Turkey.

Behaviour of the Wahhābi leaders, 1872.

### Subsequent movements of the Wahhābi leaders, and their relations with the Turks, 1872-74.

Early in 1872 the Amir Sa'ūd appeared in the neighbourhood of Kuwait with a force greatly distressed for provisions and threatened to plunder the town unless his necessities were relieved; but the Shaikh, after judiciously enticing his principal supporters away from his camp, attacked him, and he fled accompanied by only 15 followers.

The Turks had now for some time been in negotiation with Sa'ūd, and they had offered to recognise his authority on condition that he should admit his subordination to the Porte, relinquish his authority upon the coast, pay the same tribute as his father Faisal, indemnify the Turks for the cost of their operations in Hasa, and send two of his sons to reside as hostages at Baghdād. After his reverse at Kuwait, finding himself reduced to the utmost straits, the Amir wrote to Hāji Ahmad Khān of Būshehr, lately Deputy-Governor of Bandar 'Abbās and once Wazir of the Sultān of 'Omān, empowering him to treat on his behalf; and, after a visit to Ra'uf Pasha, Wali of Baghdād, the Hāji arrived in Hasa in September 1872. The Amir Sa'ūd, who distrusted the intentions both of his brother 'Abdullah and of the Turks, refused to leave the district of Kharj, where he then was, and a personal meeting became impossible; but there appeared in Hasa, to represent him, his brother 'Abdur Rahmān and a certain Fahad-bin-Suwaitān, whom he had appointed to be his agent in Hasa. 'Abdur Rahmān was conducted by Hāji Ahmad Khān to Baghdād and was there detained as a hostage; nor did Fahad experience better treatment, for in February 1873 he was arrested on a charge of intrigue, thrown into irons, and sent after 'Abdur Rahmān to Baghdād.

The position of Sa'ūd at length showed signs of improvement: the seizure by the Turks of a leading 'Ajman Shaikh brought many recruits to his standard; he defeated 'Abdullah in Kharj and shut him up in Riyādh; and finally he took the capital, while 'Abdullah fled to the neighbourhood of Kuwait, or, according to another account, found an asylum among the western Bedouins of the Jabal Shammar principality.\* 'Abdullah was closely connected with the house of Rashid, having married first Nūrah,† a celebrated daughter of the Shammar Amir 'Abdullah, and, after her

Defeat of the Amir near Kuwait, 1870.

Mission of Hāji Ahmad Khān and treacherous seizure by the Turks of the Amir's brother and agent, 1872-73.

Expulsion of 'Abdullah from Southern Najd, 1873.

\* Possibly this statement refers to his earlier flight to Jabal Shammar about 1870.

† Her brother, the Shammar Amir Muhammad, was accustomed to use Nūrah's name as a sort of oath or asseveration.



death, a sister of Ḥunūd-bin-'Obaid; yet the Amīr Muḥammad would not allow him to approach Ḥail, nor do more than supply him with such horses, camels and sheep as he required for his subsistence.

Negotiations  
of Abdullah  
with the  
Turks.

'Abdullah was at this time advised by his full brother Muḥammad to submit to Sa'ūd, but he declined to entertain the idea; he responded, however, to advances made to him by Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik, on the part of the Turks. He could not be persuaded to visit Baghdād or even Kuwait; but he sent the confidential secretary Maḥbūb, now restored to favour, whom he had at one time placed over the Baraimi Oasis but who had been driven out thence, to convey his proposals: these were to the effect that Qatif and Hasa should be restored to him, in which case he would pay revenue, but that he should not be required to place himself in the power of the Turks.

Unsuccessful  
rebellion,  
headed by  
the Amīr's  
brother 'Ab-  
dur Rahmān  
against the  
Turkish re-  
presentative  
in Hasa,  
1874.

In March 1874, on the advice of Nāsir Pāsha, the Muntafik chief, the Turks withdrew from their military occupation of Hasa, leaving Barrāk-bin-'Arar, a Shaikh of the Bani Khālīd, to represent them as governor with the support of a body of gendarmerie. In August of the same year 'Abdur Rahmān, the brother of Sa'ūd, and soon after him Fahad-bin-Suwaitān were released from their captivity at Baghdād; 'Abdur Rahmān shortly arrived in Bahrain and opened a correspondence with the tribes of the mainland; a few weeks later he landed at 'Oqair and was joined by thousands of the 'Ajmān, Al Morrah and other tribes; a number of the Turkish gendarmerie were slain, and Barrāk was besieged in the fort of Hofūf. Dissensions, however, broke out among the 'Ajmān supporters of 'Abdur Rahmān; and, on the approach of Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik, who was responsible for the arrangements with Barrāk, with a Turkish military force, the Wahhābi army dispersed and 'Abdur Rahmān proceeded to join his brother the Amīr at Riyādh. The Turks, after his departure, punished the insurgents of the Hasa Oasis with merciless severity.

Death of  
Sa'ūd, 25th  
January  
1875.

On the 25th of January 1875 the Amīr Sa'ūd died of small-pox.

#### Relations of the Amīr Sa'ūd with the British Government, 1871-75.

General poli-  
cy of the  
British Gov-  
ernment.

Sa'ūd, during his short and troubled reign, corresponded freely with the British Resident at Būshehr; but he did not receive that assistance which it was his object, in so doing, to obtain. The policy of the British

Government with reference to the Turkish occupation of Hasa is fully described in the history of that province; it was, briefly, to reassure the rulers of Arab principalities adjoining Hasa, to prevent them from embroiling themselves with the Turks, and to restrict as much as possible the scope of the Turkish operations.

At the beginning of the war Sa'ūd requested the British authorities either to restrain the Shaikh of Kuwait from aiding the Turks with vessels or to permit him, the Amīr, to take action against the Shaikh at sea; but to this communication no answer was returned. In September 1871 Sa'ūd urged that the proceedings of the Turks against himself belonged to that class of maritime aggressions which the British Government had been accustomed to prevent, and he suggested that Great Britain should arbitrate between him and the Turks. In June 1872 and in March and May 1873 Sa'ūd again invoked the help of the British authorities upon various grounds, especially the old friendship between the Amīr of Najd and the British Government and the traditional policy of that Government itself in preventing maritime descents upon the coasts of the Gulf,—relying upon which, so Sa'ūd stated, he had neglected to defend his province of Hasa. Later the Amīr dropped his argumentative tone and merely asked for British friendship and good wishes. The Resident was instructed, should Sa'ūd revert to the question and demand assistance as a right, to explain to him that, as he was not a party to any maritime treaty with Britain and had received no assurances of protection, he could not claim the benefit of British intervention.

Correspond-  
ence with  
Sa'ūd,  
1871-73.

On the arrest of his agent in Hasa, Fahad-bin-Suwaitān, Sa'ūd complained to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf of the treachery of the Turks and was courteously informed in reply that the British Government could not interfere in the matter; but the case was referred by the Resident at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and it was possibly through the instrumentality of the latter that 'Abdur Rahmān and Fahad were subsequently released.

Release of  
the Amīr's  
brother and  
agent, 1874.

#### 'ABDULLAH-BIN-FAISAL (SECOND REIGN), 1875-87.

##### General history of Najd, 1875-81.

The death of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal left the sovereignty of the shrunken Wahhābi dominions in dispute among his relations. 'Abdur Rahmān-

Dissensions  
among the  
Al Sa'ūd.

January to  
July, 1875.

bin-Faisal was inclined to make terms with his half-brother 'Abdullah, but the Wabhābi priesthood, on account of the latter's connection with the Turks, would have none of him; and a force seems actually to have been despatched against him from Riyādh. About April 1875 Muhammad, the eldest son of the late Amīr Sa'ūd, joined the party of 'Abdur Rahmān in the capital, while 'Abdullah, it would appear, was excluded from the town and obliged to camp outside the walls. In July the British Political Resident at Būshehr and the Residency Agent in Bahrain received letters from 'Abdur Rahmān, in which he announced that he was now ruler of Najd and held the capital, and that 'Abdullah had become a fugitive in the desert; but no reply was sent to his communication.

Reconciliation  
among  
the Al Sa'ūd,  
August 1875.

About August, however, 'Abdullah defeated 'Abdur Rahmān and re-entered Riyādh, where he set himself, at least in appearance, to conciliate all the members of his family. 'Abdur Rahmān became 'Abdullah's Wazīr and confidential adviser; and Muhammad and 'Abdul 'Azīz, the two eldest sons of the late Amīr Sa'ūd, who were as yet young and without influence, made peace with their uncle. This reconciliation among the Al Sa'ūd caused the Mutasarrif of Hasa to withdraw from a correspondence with 'Abdullah on which he had been induced to embark while 'Abdur Rahmān was in the ascendant. The 'Ajmān were the only tribe that did not immediately submit to 'Abdullah's authority.

Rebellion in  
Hasa against  
the Turks,  
1878.

From the end of 1875 to the end of 1878 tranquillity apparently prevailed in Central Arabia; but in the summer of 1878 there was a rising in Hasa against the Turkish administration, headed by Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān, the sons of the late Wabhābi Amīr Sa'ūd. This rebellion failed, as related in the history of Hasa, after some initial successes in the Qatif Oasis; and in December 1878 the defeated Wabhābi leaders arrived in Bahrain with about 60 followers and were received there by the Shaikh, who was prevailed upon, however, by the British authorities to refrain from showing them favours.

Dissensions  
and recon-  
ciliation  
among the  
Al Sa'ūd,  
1879-80.

In 1879 the Amīr 'Abdullah was again at variance with his nephews, the sons of Sa'ūd, whom in the month of April he expelled from Kharj. Muhammad, the eldest of these youths, recovered Kharj in the following September or October; but his success was short-lived, for his uncle, who had just returned from a successful raid against the Mutair, made a sudden expedition to Kharj and took him prisoner. The Amīr did not apparently detain Muhammad for long; and in 1880 it was reported that, while 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal with his brothers Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān lived at Riyādh and held possession of the 'Aridh, Sadair and Washam districts, the children of Sa'ūd ruled, with his consent, over

Kharj, Hautab, Hariq and Aflaj and disposed of the 'Ajmān, Dawāsir and Al Morrah tribes. In this year another attack by the Wabhābis upon the Turks was apprehended, and alarming rumours were circulated, perhaps by friends of the Muntafik tribe, who were then in rebellion in 'Irāq; but nothing occurred to justify the general expectation of trouble.

In 1879 a new claimant of the Wabhābi Amirship appeared in the person of 'Abdullah, a son of the former Amīr 'Abdullah-bin-Thaniyān. This individual, who had resided at Basrah since 1876, now undertook a journey to Constantinople with the object of obtaining for himself a grant of Najd and Hasa from the Porte in consideration of tribute and fealty, or at least of recovering his share of the property of the Al Sa'ūd in Hasa, which the Turkish authorities had confiscated. On his way down the Gulf in October 1879, 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah called upon Colonel Ross, the British Resident at Būshehr, and sought to impress on him the advantages which would result to the Turks from his appointment; and he suggested at the same time that he should be supported in his proposals by the British Ambassador at Constantinople. From Jiddah, where he had an interview with Mr. Zohrab, the British Consul, 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah again wrote to Colonel Ross, pointing out how his scheme might benefit British and Turkish interests and hinting at the advisability of a British money loan to himself. 'Abdullah then visited Cairo, where he saw Mr. Malet, the British Consul, and in July he waited on the British Vice-Consul at Damascus. The British Government, however, decided to have nothing to do with 'Abdullah's application to the Porte; and, after his arrival at Constantinople in August 1880, nothing further was heard of him or of his proceedings.

Journey of  
'Abdullah-  
bin-'Abdul-  
lah to Con-  
stantinople,  
1879-80.

In 1881 the Amīr 'Abdullah was still in possession of Riyādh, where from time to time he was visited in a friendly manner by his nephew Muhammad; and some 'Ajmān chiefs, who were discontented with Turkish rule and refused to reside in Hasa, maintained personal relations with him.

Position in  
1881.

### Early hostilities between the Amīr of Jabal Shammar and the Wabhābis, 1877-84.

Meanwhile trouble, of which the ultimate consequences to the Wabhābi state were not at once foreseen, arose between the ruling

family of the Āl Rashid in the north and the rulers of Riyādh. The first unpleasantness appears to have been occasioned by an expedition which the Amīr of Jabal Shammar undertook in 1877 against the 'Atabah, a tribe devoted to the Wahhābi chief; and soon afterwards the northern Amīr began openly to encroach upon the dominions of his nominal suzerain and seized the Wahhābi districts of Qasīm and Sadair, occupying, it would appear, the towns of Buraidah and Majma'; 'Anaizah in Qasīm, however, apparently held out against him. In February 1880 an understanding was understood to have been reached between Ibn-Rashid and Ibn-Sa'ūd; but, if so, it did not long endure. In 1882 an effort was made by the Wahhābi Amīr to recover Qasīm and Sadair by military operations; but his troops were outnumbered by those of the Shammar Amīr and he fell back upon Riyādh. He next discovered that Ibn-Rashid had been intriguing with his nephews, the sons of Sa'ūd, with a view to their joining the Shammar interest or remaining neutral; whereupon, to give greater cohesion to the Wahhābi cause, 'Ahdullah, in March 1883, resigned the command of his forces in favour of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, retaining for himself only the spiritual title of Imām and his authority as such. Each side made raids upon the dependents of the other, and in 1885 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd obtained a transient success in Qasim against the Shammar Amīr, whom he obliged temporarily to evacuate Buraidah; but, discovering from intercepted letters that his uncle intended him to be defeated and murdered, he relinquished the conduct of the operations and retired to his home in Kharj. After this Ibn-Rashid, who possessed four moveable guns and a large number of Martini rifles, whose military organisation was more efficient than that of the Wahhābis, and who was reported to enjoy the benefit of a friendship with the Shaikh of Kuwait, had generally the advantage in the field.

#### Continued dissensions of the Āl Sa'ūd and deposition of the Amīr 'Abdullah, 1884-87.

The differences between the Wahhābi Amīr and his nephews were apparently irreconcilable, but the meagreness of the information which we possess regarding them precludes conjecture as to their real cause. We know that the sons of Sa'ūd maintained some connection with Bahrain, for Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd arrived there in February 1886 and

remained a month, and his brother 'Abdullah visited the islands in August of the same year, chiefly, it was suspected, for the sake of obtaining presents. Meanwhile the authority of the Amīr 'Abdullah in Najd was, somewhat unaccountably, on the wane; but he remained in possession of the capital until the autumn of 1887, when he was suddenly seized and imprisoned by his nephews. Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd then wrote to the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān announcing his own accession to the Amirate of Najd; but his triumph, as we shall see, was not of long duration.

#### Relations of the Turks with Central Arabia during this period, 1875-87.

From what has gone before it will have been gathered that the relations of the Turks with the Wahhābis during the second reign of 'Ahdullah-bin-Faisal were of the slenderest sort, and that they were not characterised by any remarkable feature except the Hasa revolt of 1878; but Turkish influence, while it remained in abeyance in Southern Najd, was being gradually extended to Jahal Shammar. As explained in the separate history of that principality, there was friction between the Shammar Amīr and the Turks on the Syrian frontier in 1872, and possibly in 1880; but in 1886 the Amīr accorded a friendly reception to a Turkish mission, of which the object was to obtain leave for the erection of an Ottoman mosque and school at Hail, and dismissed them with presents, though without granting their request. It was during the period now under consideration that the Turks first showed jealousy of the influence which they erroneously supposed the British Government to possess in Central Arabia.

#### British relations with Central Arabia during the same period, 1875-87.

In reality the British authorities had, as we have seen, no relations at all with Najd; and even their information regarding the course of events there was extremely defective. The omission of the British Government to reply to a letter from 'Abdur Rahmān in 1875, their

advice to the Shaikh of Bahrain against entangling himself in Wahhābi affairs in 1878, and their indifference to the proposals of 'Abdullah-bin-Thaniyān in 1880 have already been mentioned above.

# INTERREGNUM, 1887-1902.

## Conquest of Southern Najd by the Amir of Jabal Shammar, 1887-92.

Administra-  
tion of  
Southern  
Najd usurped  
by Ibn-  
Rashid,  
1887-88.

On learning of the displacement of the Amīr 'Abdullah by his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar—at this time Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Ibn-Rashid—marched against Riyādh, which capitulated and opened its gates to him after a short defence. At his departure Ibn-Rashid carried the deposed Amīr away with him to Hail, leaving an agent of his own at Riyādh to carry on the administration of the Wahhābi districts with the assistance of Muhammad-bin-Faisal, a brother of the ex-Amīr; and he at once informed the Turks of his success, which he pretended to have achieved in their name. In August 1888, possibly at the suggestion of the ex-Amīr 'Abdullah, the agent of Ibn-Rashid at Riyādh hunted down and killed, in Kharj, Muhammad, Sa'ad and 'Abdullah, the only surviving sons—except 'Abdul 'Aziz who shared his uncle's captivity at Hail—of the former Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal. This massacre, perpetrated with impunity by the Shammar agent with a retinue of only 18 men, was an illustration of the paralysing prestige which the northern Amīr had now acquired in Southern Najd; for Muhammad, "the modern Bayard of Arabia," was much beloved, and months passed before his adherents relinquished the hope that he might be still alive and in hiding.

Partial suc-  
cess of the  
Al Sa'ūd  
against Ibn-  
Rashid,  
1890.

The deposed ex-Amīr 'Abdullah, being no longer considered dangerous, was permitted in the autumn of 1889 to return from Hail to Riyādh, and there he died almost immediately on his arrival; but in the following year 'Abdur Rahmān, his brother and former adviser, took Riyādh and captured Bin-Sabbān, the Shammar agent by whom the sons of Sa'ūd had been put to death. It was believed that 'Abdur Rahmān had acted on the advice of sympathisers in Qasim to frustrate a plan formed by

Ibn-Rashid for the destruction of all the remaining descendants of the Wahhābi Amīr Faisal. A Shammar governor who had been installed in Kharj then capitulated, according to one account, without fighting; and the chiefs of 'Anaizah and Buraidah, and the people of Qasim generally, declared for 'Abdur Rahmān. These proceedings brought the Shammar Amīr in anger from the north, accompanied by the Shammar, the Harb, and other tribes; but his siege and bombardment of Riyādh were ineffectual, sallies were made against his force, his Bedouin supporters began to melt away, and eventually a peace was arranged by which the districts of Kharj, Sadair and Washam were secured to him, but Riyādh and the rest of Southern Najd reverted to the Āl Sa'ūd. At the end of the year the people of Qasim and Southern Najd as a whole, with the Bedouin tribes of the Mutair and 'Ataiyah, had loagned themselves together to overthrow the power of Ibn-Rashid; and bloody feuds had been suspended, and hereditary foes united, by the universal hatred of Shammar tyranny. The confederation against Ibn-Rashid was commanded by Zāmil, Amīr of 'Anaizah, from whose house the declaration of war was despatched.

By February 1891 the opposing forces were in contact in Qasim, the flanks of the allies resting on the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah; and the number of men in the field is said to have been greater than in any other war within living memory in Central Arabia. Hasan-bin-Mahanna, chief of Buraidah, on whose assistance the Shammar Amīr relied, deserted to the side of the confederates as soon as hostilities began. For a month fighting continued without decisive results, and, though vast numbers of camels were employed by day and night in bringing up water and other supplies, the provisions of Ibn-Rashid's force began to fail. Towards the end of March Ibn-Rashid made several desperate attempts to storm the position of the allies; but all of them, notwithstanding that his men were better armed than the enemy, were repulsed with loss. At length he braced himself for a final effort; his troops advanced to the attack driving some thousands of camels in front of them as a screen; and this time, though the loss in camels was very heavy, the Qusmān were driven from their ground. A hundred men are said to have fallen in the battle of Buraidah or \*Mulaidah; the veteran Zāmil and his second son 'Ali were among the slain; two of their relatives were killed in the battle and several others

Battle of  
Buraidah and  
complete vic-  
tory of Ibn-  
Rashid, 1891.

\* In Najd this battle appears to be generally known by the name of Mulaidah, a place which is said to be near Shaihiyah. The account given in the text is taken chiefly from Baron Nolde's *Reise nach Innerasien*.

were deported to Hail; Hasan-bin-Mahanna, Amīr of Buraidah, was captured in the desert and imprisoned at Hail; the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah surrendered; Rass, Shaqrah and even Riyādh sent deputations to the victor to treat for peace; 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd, sought a refuge in Balrain; and the Shammar Amīr placed a governor of his own in charge of Qasim.

Unsuccessful renewal of the struggle by 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn Sa'ūd.

A little later Ibn-Rashid's governor of Kharj, after plundering a pilgrim caravan, was killed in an attack upon the 'Ajman tribe, and 'Abdur Rahmān profited by the opportunity to re-occupy Kharj and Riyādh; but he was soon surprised and totally defeated by the Shammar Amīr, who caused the fortifications of Riyādh to be levelled with the ground by the forced labour of the inhabitants, destroyed half of the date plantations, and laid the castle-palace of the Wahhābi Amīrs in ruins. The war was now over. All Central Arabia owned the sway of Ibn-Rashid, and the Āl Sa'ūd had become a band of homeless wanderers.

Subsequent movements of 'Abdur Rahmān, 1891-92.

'Abdur Rahmān at first joined the Bedouins of Hasa, among whom he sojourned in constant fear of capture by the adherents of the Shammar Amīr; from August to November 1892 he lived in Qatar under the protection of the Shaikh of Dōhah, being joined there by his family from Bahrain; and finally, in November 1892, at the invitation of the Turkish Wālī of Basrah, he settled down in Hasa on a pension of £T33 a month, granted him by the Porte.

#### Relations of the Shammar Amir with the Turks during his tenure of Southern Najd, 1891-1900.

Profession by Ibn-Rashid of allegiance to the Porte, 1888.

In 1888, after his first decided victory over the Āl Sa'ūd, Ibn-Rashid communicated with the Turks, professed himself a dependent of the Porte, and declared that he held his conquests at their disposal. This announcement was received with much satisfaction by the Turkish Government.

Expected expedition against Trucial 'Omān and policy of the Porte in Najd, 1888-89.

In the same year there were persistent rumours that an expedition against Trucial 'Omān was about to be undertaken, in the Turkish interest, by Ibn-Rashid and the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar; the details of this question, in its local aspect, are given in the history of Trucial 'Omān. It may now be doubted whether such a project was ever actually entertained, unless perhaps by the Āl Thāni Shaikh; but

the danger at the time appeared so real that representations were made by the British Government to the Porte, in reply to which the Turkish Government stated that, apart from an occasional exchange of presents, no communication existed between the Sultān and the Shammar Amīr. In 1889 it was ascertained by the British Ambassador at Constantinople that there was in fact a conflict of policy between the two, for, while Ibn-Rashid desired to extend his authority over Hasa and yet to be, except in name, independent of the Turks, the Porte aspired to establish direct control over Central Arabia as well as Hasa.

In 1890, when a temporary settlement had been arranged in Najd between the Āl Sa'ūd and the Āl Rashid, both sides sought the favour of the Turks; the Shammar Amīr accused his adversaries of entertaining designs on Hasa; and the Wahhābi chief, to whom the Turkish authorities at this time appeared inclined to listen, complained of the aggressions of Ibn-Rashid and professed his own desire to submit to the Porte. As already mentioned, the head of the Āl Sa'ūd, after being worsted by Ibn-Rashid, was granted asylum and a pension in Hasa in 1892.

In 1895, as related in the history of Hasa, some friction arose, out of tribal affairs upon the borders of that province, between the Shammar Amīr and the local Turkish authorities; but it had no serious results. In the same year a request for an interview, received from the Āl Thāni Shaikh in Qatar, was declined by Ibn-Rashid for fear of giving offence to the Turks.

Correspondence of both parties in Najd with the Turks, 1890.

Friction between Ibn-Rashid and the Turks, 1895.

#### Renewal by the Āl Sa'ūd of the struggle for possession of Southern Najd, 1900-1902.

In 1900 or three years after the death of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the formidable Amīr of Jabal Shammar by whom Southern Najd had been conquered, 'Abdur Rahmān, the fugitive chief of the Āl Sa'ūd, began to move again; it is possible that he was encouraged by signs of disorganisation which the Shammar state, under 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab, nephew and successor of Muhammad, was now manifesting. About 1897 'Abdur Rahmān, having left his refuge in Hasa, settled at Kuwait and became a recipient of the bounty of Shaikh Mubarak as well as of that of the Turkish Government; and the Shaikh, irritated by support which Ibn-Rashid had extended to certain rebellious nephews of his own, was before long induced to take an even more active interest in the case of his Wahhābi guest.

Residence 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd at Kuwait, 1897-1900.

Commence-  
ment of  
hostilities,  
1900.

In August 1900 'Abdur Rahmān, having received encouragement from well-wishers in Najd, suddenly left Kuwait for the interior, where he gained some successes over the Bedouins of Ibn-Rashid's party; and in September of the same year he invited Shaikh Mubārak to join him with reinforcements. What action was taken in the first instance by the Shaikh of Kuwait is not clear; but during the greater part of October he was absent from his capital, and in November a collision on the borders of Turkish 'Irāq appeared imminent, between Ibn-Rashid on the one side and Sbaikh Mubārak and Sa'dūn Pasha, a Muntafik outlaw, on the other. It was averted, however, by the Turkish authorities at Basrah, as is related at length in the history of Kuwait.

Expedition of  
the Shaikh of  
Kuwait to  
Qasim and  
battle of  
Sarif, 1901.

The Shaikh of Kuwait, notwithstanding the intervention of the Turks, had by no means renounced his intention of lending effectual aid to Ibn-Sa'ūd, and on the 18th of December 1900 he placed himself at the head of a large mixed force of Bedouins and settled Arabs and started for Qasim. His preliminary operations are described in the history of the Kuwait principality. After the Summān and Dabānah deserts had been cleared of the enemy, declarations of loyalty to Ibn-Sa'ūd began to be received from many places in Southern Najd and Qasim; and 'Abdul 'Aziz, the eldest surviving son of 'Abdur Rahmān, was nominated by anticipation, for Riyādh was as yet in possession of the enemy, to the governorship of the Wahhābi capital. On the arrival of Sa'dūn Pasha, which had apparently been awaited in the desert or on the confines of Qasim, the allies resumed their advance; but the Shammar Amīr was now in the neighbourhood, and, when they reached Tarfiyah in Qasim, he took up a position at Sarif a few miles in their rear. On the 17th of March 1901 a decisive battle, known as the battle of Sarif, was fought in the bed of Wādi-ar-Rummah at an equal distance from the two camps; it ended in the complete discomfiture of Shaikh Mubārak and Ibn-Sa'ūd. On the side of Ibn-Rashid, Salim and Mahanna, sons of the Amīr's cousin Hamūd, were slain; but the losses of the allies were considerably the heavier and included at least three near relations of the Shaikh of Kuwait and six members of the ruling Abul Khail family of Buraidah. According to a Shammar version of the affair, the defeated army made no stand at all and suffered heavily in its flight, many of the fugitives were dragged out of hiding places in cultivated fields or in stacks of straw, and of these some were put to death in cold blood by townsmen and slaves under the orders of Ibn-Rashid. Within a fortnight Shaikh Mubārak, Ibn-Sa'ūd and Sa'dūn Pasha had regained Kuwait in safety, while their dispersed troops continued to straggle home.

The failure of this expedition proved a serious matter or some of those who had engaged in it, especially for the Shaikh of Kuwait and for those among the inhabitants of Qasim who had taken his part. On some of the latter Ibn-Rashid took summary vengeance; but the partial success of the hostile combination had greatly alarmed him; and about the end of May, through an agent at Basrah, he made overtures, which met with no encouragement, to obtain the protection of the British Government.

The only outsiders interested in the situation that had arisen were the Turkish Government, who were anxious to acquire influence over the Shaikh of Kuwait; and they immediately deputed the Mushir of their 6th Army Corps from Baghdad to Basrah, where he arrived about the beginning of May and remained for several months. The task of this high officer was to arrange a reconciliation among the principal disputants, and this he proceeded to attempt by opening a correspondence with each; but it is not clear that he met with a favourable response from any one of them except Ibn-Rashid. In August the Turks, who now seemed to be drifting into a pronounced partisanship of Ibn-Rashid, began to concentrate troops upon the Euphrates; and in September 1901, on raids being made by Ibn-Rashid into Kuwait territory, a panic arose in the town and its neighbourhood, and preparations were made by the British naval authorities for assisting the Shaikh in case an emergency should arise. In November and December 1901, Ibn-Rashid being then at Safwān, a place upon the Kuwait border not far from Basrah, strenuous efforts were made by the Turkish authorities at Basrah to induce the Shaikh to submit to the Porte and even to admit a Turkish garrison to his capital; but they were foiled by the decided attitude of the senior British naval officer at Kuwait. A crisis followed which is described in the history of Kuwait; but it passed over harmlessly in consequence, it is probable, of British naval preparations for the defence of Kuwait; and the Shammar Amīr moved off, slowly and reluctantly, to the wells of Lainah on the eastern border of his own dominions.

At this juncture the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd suddenly began to make progress in the south. About the 15th of January 1902 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān made a sudden dash from the side of Hasa, where he had for some time been engaged in collecting adherents, and recovered Riyādh for his father. He entered the town by night, accompanied at first by eight picked men; later he was joined within the walls by the rest of his party, who only numbered 80 all told; and with this force he surprised and slew the Shammar governor and took possession of Riyādh, to the general satisfaction of the inhabitants. Ibn-Rashid's garrisons were then expelled

Consequence  
of the expedi-  
tion, 1901-  
1902.

Recovery of  
Riyādh by  
the Wahhā-  
bis, January  
1902.

from the neighbouring districts of Kharj and Hariq; and it was represented to the Porte by Ibn-Sa'ūd that the country thus recovered would be ruled by him as a loyal subject of the Sultān.

'ABDUR RAHMĀN-BIN-FAISAL,  
since 1902.

With the recovery of Riyādh the interregnum in Southern Najd may be considered to end, and the reign of 'Abdur Rahmān as a Wahhābi Amir to begin.

War between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashīd, 1902-04.

Difficulties  
of Ibn-  
Rashīd,  
1902.

Ibn-Rashīd was now fully aware of the precariousness of his situation. The port of Kuwait being in unfriendly hands, he could no longer obtain in sufficient quantities the arms and ammunition which were essential to the maintenance of his power in Najd; and he was conscious that many even of his hereditary subjects had been alienated by cruelty, rapacity, and general maladministration. Accordingly, at the middle of March 1902, he sent an envoy to the Turkish Wālī of Basrah praying for Turkish aid to subdue the "revolt," with which, as he confessed, he could no longer cope; and in a letter which he sent about the same time to the Grand Wazīr at Constantinople, he attributed to the British Government a design of entering into close relations with Central Arabia through the agency of Ibn-Sa'ūd and the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Progress of  
the Wahhābi  
arms, 1902.

In Najd the tide of war continued to roll steadily northwards. On the 8th of April, near Majma', 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān inflicted a signal defeat on a body of the Qahtān tribe, who were supporters of Ibn-Rashīd; and by this time the 'Atāibah, Dawāsir, Sabai', 'Ajmān, Al Morrah and Mutair tribes in the south and east had declared for Ibn-Sa'ūd, so that there remained to Ibn-Rashīd only the Qahtān, Harb and Dhafir, besides the Shammar to which he himself belonged. Many leading Wahhābis, who had gone into voluntary exile during the Shammar domination of Southern Najd, began to return from Basrah and other

places abroad; the people, even in Qasīm and the districts adjoining it, were as a rule favourable to the cause of the Wahhābi dynasty; and a general impression prevailed that the supremacy of Hail must ere long yield to that of Riyādh. On the 11th of May 1902 the Amir 'Abdur Rahmān left Kuwait for Riyādh, where he was soon established in the seat of his ancestors, having inflicted some loss on the hostile Shammar and Dhafir Bedouins by the way. On the 27th of May his son 'Abdul 'Azīz succeeded in capturing some of the relations of Ibn-Rashīd; and the reconquest of Southern Najd seemed all but complete.

Ibn-Rashīd, however, had resolved on a strong effort for the recovery of the southern districts, deprivation of which seemed to threaten him with the loss of Qasīm also at no distant period. At the end of July 1902 some of his supporters made an incursion into Kuwait territory and reached the wells of Subaihiyah, but were there repulsed. A little later the Shammar Amir himself began to move southwards. Occupying Buraidah in Qasīm and Washaiqir in Washam as he passed, he detached some of his mounted troops to attack Riyādh and pressed on in person in search of 'Abdul 'Azīz, who was then in Kharj; he took Sulaimiyah; and he pitched his camp at Dilam, the capital of Kharj. At Dilam he remained inactive for a few days, during which the bulk of the inhabitants of the Hautah and Hariq districts, as also the Dawāsir tribe, flocked to the standard of 'Abdul 'Azīz at Muhammadi, a place with cultivation some two or three miles to the northward. On the 1st of November 1902, after three days of inconclusive skirmishing, a general engagement took place in which, after five hours' heavy fighting, Ibn-Rashīd was totally defeated, and fled, leaving his camp, many horses and camels, and one of his standards in possession of the enemy. 'Abdul 'Azīz followed up his success by advancing so far in the direction of Qasīm as Shaqrah; while Ibn-Rashīd, after making good his escape, took up his position for a time at Zilfi in the extreme north of Sadair. At the end of December 1902 a raid, headed, it is said, by Ibn-Rashīd in person was made on Kuwait subjects in the neighbourhood of Jahrah and did some damage; but the raiders were ultimately beaten off. Ibn-Rashīd then retired into Qasīm, and a short interval occurred in the active operations, during which 'Abdul 'Azīz paid a visit to Kuwait.

Ibn-Sa'ūd at this point received some encouragement from a European power. At an early stage in the Central Arabian conflict it had become known at Basrah that the agents of the Russian Government were taking an interest in the struggle, and now, on the occasion of 'Abdul 'Azīz's visit to Kuwait, an interview took place between him and

Serious  
defeat of  
Ibn-Rashīd  
in Kharj,  
1902.

Interview  
of the son  
of the Wah-  
hābi Amir  
with a Rus-  
sian official  
at Kuwait,  
1903.



the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr; this official had arrived on board the Russian cruiser "Boyarín," which was visiting the port in company with the French cruiser "Infernet". It was reported from Kuwait that the Russian Consul-General on this occasion offered to help 'Abdul 'Aziz with money and arms, and the statement received some corroboration from an independent source. The interview in question took place at the beginning of March 1903.

Sadair recovered by the Wahhābis, 1903.

Ibn-Rashid, meanwhile, occupied himself in chastising some of the outlying uṣṣad tribes who were favourable to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd, and he endeavoured to enlist upon his own side the services of the Muntafik outlaw Sa'dūn Pasha. On the night of the 3rd of April 1903 he made an attempt to retake Riyādh, where the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān was now firmly established; but he was repulsed with loss. A few days later the Wahhābi 'Abdul 'Aziz, who after his visit to Kuwait had been recruiting followers at Ntā', made a counter-attack upon Ibn-Rashid's Bedouins, inflicting considerable injury. The year 1903 ended with the capture of Zilfi, and the consequent recovery of the district of Sadair, by this active scion of the Āl Sa'ūd.

Ibn-Rashid's petition for assistance granted by the Porte, 1904.

Ibn-Rashid now redoubled his efforts to obtain the active assistance of the Turks; and on the 7th of January 1904 he wired to the Grand Wazir at Constantinople, soliciting the orders of the Porte and representing that Ibn-Sa'ūd was seeking to form relations with the British Government, and that he would probably be furnished by them with guns and ammunition. His petition must have been granted, for in April he was supplied with some specie, rifles and ammunition from Baghdād; and orders were issued for the concentration of a Turkish force at Samāwah on the Euphrates.

Recovery of Washam and Qasim by the Wahhābis, 1904.

In the interim the successes of 'Abdul 'Aziz had grown even more rapid and decisive. On the 7th of February 1904, at Faidhah in Wādī-as-Sirr, he attacked and defeated a force under Husain Jarrād, Ibn-Rashid's governor of Qasim; killing the governor himself, whose standard and seal he despatched to Kuwait in token of victory. A number of other Shammar notables lost their lives in this encounter; and Southern Najd, by the submission of the district of Washam, was at last recovered in its entirety. 'Abdul 'Aziz, Ibn-Sa'ūd, next fell upon Qasim, a district inclined to independence but generally, through force of circumstances, in semi-vassalage either to Hail or to Riyādh. The town of 'Anaizah was entered on the 22nd of March, not without assistance from sympathising citizens; and Mājid, a son of Ibn-Rashid's cousin Hamūd, who was encamped outside the place to defend it, was defeated on the same

day with considerable slaughter, while another son of Hamūd, named 'Obaid, was among those who perished in the battle. This decisive action seems to have brought the whole of Qasim, including the town of Buraidah, under the influence of the Wahhābis with very little delay.

It was probably the events just related that finally determined the Ottoman Government to intervene actively in Central Arabia, where the influence of their protégé Ibn-Rashid appeared to be at an end and his complete subjugation by Ibn-Sa'ūd already appeared as a not remote contingency.

### Turkish military expedition to Qasim, 1904.

The Turkish expedition, when it marched from Samāwah on the Euphrates in the last days of May 1904, consisted of about 2,000 infantry and six light guns, each carried in a litter between two mules, and it was escorted by a large contingent of Shammar and 'Anizah Bedouins; but its proportions were considerably reduced by disease and desertion before it reached the scene of action. It was too late to save Buraidah; but an attack on Hail, which was threatened by the Wahhābis, was probably averted by the timely arrival of the expedition; and war was carried into the enemy's country by an advance southwards into Qasim.

The opening engagement took place at Bukairiyah, on the afternoon of the 15th of July, and appears to have been a confused affair. The first attack on Ibn-Rashid and his Turkish allies was made by an 'Arīdh contingent under the command of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān; but it failed, and the assailants were routed and driven off the field with considerable loss by Ibn-Rashid's mounted troops. Meanwhile, however, the men of Qasim, unaware of the fate of their associates who were separated from them by some low hills, were advancing on the Turkish camp; and in the evening they captured it. The Turkish commander, about a dozen of his officers, and a large number of his men were killed in the fight; all the Turkish guns and a large number of Turkish prisoners fell into the hands of the Qusmān; and Mājid, the eldest son of Ibn-Rashid's cousin Hamūd, was killed in a cavalry *mélée* at the close of the day,—the fourth of his family to fall in a vain endeavour to retrieve the sinking fortunes of Jabal Shammar. After this success the Qusmān withdrew to 'Anaizah. The remains of the Turkish force then resumed possession of their guns, except one which had been removed by the enemy and was

Battle of Bukairiyah, 15th July 1904.

subsequently sent to Riyādh; but of those recovered, three had been rendered useless.

Subsequent operations and retreat of the Turks to Kahāfah, July to October 1904.

In order to secure a better position or, possibly, to maintain an appearance of acting on the offensive, the Turks and their allies about the beginning of August moved some miles to the south-westward and occupied Shinānah, one of the separate villages forming the township of Rass. Here they remained immobile for about six weeks, drawing their supplies from the village of Nabbāniyah a considerable distance to the westward, while the enemy held the country to the east of them and even, it would appear, the remainder of Rass. Finally, about the 27th of September, the Turks and Ibn-Rashid issued from Shinānah and attempted to bombard a fortified enclosure in the vicinity known as Qasr Ibn-'Aqaiyil, a few miles to the west of Rass, which was occupied by Ibn-Sa'ūd's friend, the chief of Buraidah. The enemy, observing this movement made a sally from Rass, upon which the Turkish troops broke and fled, and Ibn-Rashid disappeared. Another gun and much booty were taken by the Wahhābis and Qusmān; but on this occasion there was little loss of life. After this the remnants of the Turkish force, not numbering more than 700 men, took up a position at Kahāfah about midway between Buraidah and Hāil, for Ibn-Rashid had, it is said, refused to allow them, though sent to his assistance, to approach any nearer to his capital. The Turkish expedition had thus ended in complete failure; but the Ottoman authorities, if they knew the facts, were far from admitting them; and banners, supposed to have been captured from Ibn-Sa'ūd, were carried in triumph through the streets of Karbala more than a month after the first Turkish defeat.

Negotiations and amicable settlement between Ibn-Sa'ūd and the Porte, 1904-1905.

Ibn-Sa'ūd seems to have been somewhat alarmed at the completeness of his own success against the Ottoman troops; and, about the end of October 1904, an apologetic letter was received from him by \*Fakhri Pāsha, the acting Wāli of Basrah, an able and enlightened official trained to the military profession. In this letter the Wahhābi Amīr sought to exculpate himself in respect of the attacks on the Turkish forces in Qasim, asked that his submission might be accepted, and begged that payment of the allowance which he had been accustomed to receive from the Turkish Government might be continued. His proposals were referred to Constantinople and apparently met with acceptance; but preparations which had been commenced at Najaf for the despatch of a second Turkish force to Central Arabia were not discontinued. By

\*According to another version it was Fakhri Pasha and not Ibn-Sa'ud who made the first advances.

this time, however, it was generally understood that the objects of the expedition were pacific and not punitive,—a circumstance which may be held to indicate that Ibn-Sa'ūd's promises of good behaviour, although he had not yet appeared in person to confirm them, were regarded by the Porte as satisfactory and sufficiently reliable. Nor was the necessary confirmation long wanting. Hardly had the Turkish field force started from Najaf, when the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān in person, accompanied by Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, arrived from the Kuwait side at the little village of Safwān on the Turkish frontier and was there met by Mukhlis Pāsha, who had recently assumed charge of the Basrah Wilāyat. The first meeting, held at Safwān on the 8th of February, was followed by official telegraphic discussions between Basrah and Constantinople. At the second meeting, which took place on the 13th of February at the wells of Qash'āniyah, Ibn-Sa'ūd appears to have been informed that the Sultān had appointed him Qāim-Maqām or governor of Southern Najd under the Porte, and that Ibn-Rashid would not be allowed to interfere with the affairs of his districts; while Ibn-Sa'ūd, on his part, seems to have agreed to the location of Turkish civil officials and military garrisons in Qasim.

#### Pacific occupation of Qasim by the Turks, 1905.

Meanwhile, at the end of January 1905, the Turkish military expedition organised at Najaf towards the end of 1904 had marched for Qasim; it consisted of about 3,000 men with six guns and it was commanded by Ahmad Faizi Pāsha, Mushir of the 6th or Baghdad Army Corps, "a corrupt old rascal," more than 70 years of age, but by no means deficient in physical energy. The agreement concluded with Ibn-Sa'ūd shortly after its departure rendered the task of the expeditionary force an easy one. A junction was effected with a column of 750 men and a battery of field artillery sent from Madinah, but neither the rendezvous nor the subsequent route of the combined force can be identified with certainty from such reports as are available. No opposition was experienced; for the people of Najd were weary of war, and for the moment they welcomed the prospect of peace even under a Turkish ægis. Buraidah in Qasim was occupied on the 15th of April 1905 and 'Anaizah three days later; a military post of 100 men or less was apparently established at either place; the Ottoman flag was hoisted,

Military entry of the Turks into Qasim, April 1905.

the Hamidiyah march was played, and public prayers were recited in the name of the Sultān of Turkey. It was observed that Ibn-Rashid was not present, even as a spectator, at these ceremonies; and the conclusion was drawn that the inhabitants of Qasim, in submitting to the Porte, had stipulated that the Shammar Amir should be allowed no *locus standi* in their affairs,—a point on which Ibn-Sa'ūd had from the first laid great stress in his negotiations with the Turks.

Civil organization of the country by the Turks.

The country of Najd was next parcelled out into administrative divisions on the usual Turkish system. Buraidah was constituted a Qadha under Salih-bin-Hasan as Qaim-Maqam, and 'Anaizah became a Mudirlik with 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdullah as Mudir; but the relations of these two officials to one another were not, apparently, defined. Whether the new districts were administratively dependent on Basrah or on Madinah remained unknown to the Arabs; but by the Turkish officials they were believed to have been attached to the Basrah Wilayat, and Southern Najd was understood to have become a Qadha under the Wali of Basrah, with Ibn-Sa'ūd for Qaim-Maqam and headquarters at Riyadh. These dispositions, which were the more easy to carry out that they were purely nominal, had no sooner been completed than the veteran Ahmad Faizi Pasha, having received orders to suppress a rebellion in Yaman, threw himself on the back of a camel and hurried off by way of Madinah to the port of Yanbu' on the Red Sea.

#### General history of Central Arabia during the Turkish occupation of Qasim, 1905-06.

Visit of 'Abdul 'Aziz, Ibn-Sa'ūd to Qatar, etc., July to August 1905.

The proceedings of the Turks in Qasim may have momentarily impressed the Wahnabi Amir, for he discontinued his operations against Ibn-Rashid and turned his attention instead to the coast of the Persian Gulf. In July and August 1905 the Amir's son 'Abdul 'Aziz proceeded on a tour to the Jafurah desert and the borders of Qatar, and his unexpected visit was a source of embarrassment to the Turkish authorities in Hasa, who seemed uncertain how to behave but in the end sent a Tabur Aghasi to wait upon him at the wells of Da'ilij in Jafurah. Two caravans having been stopped at this time by robbers on the Hasa-'Oqair route, 'Abdul 'Aziz took advantage of the circumstances to put to death or mutilate a few Bedonins and so to pose as a friend of law and order; and he claimed to have reconciled the 'Ajman, Bani Hajir and

Al Morrah tribes, which were previously at feud. He made several halts at watering places in the neighbourhood of Salwa Bay; and he had a meeting at the 'Araiq camping ground in Qatar with Jasim, the Al Thani Shaikh of Dohah, from whom his father was believed to have obtained valuable assistance in 1904. Eventually 'Abdul 'Aziz, finding the heat excessive, returned home via the wells of Zarnuqah in Kharunah; but, before his departure, he wrote letters to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, announcing his intention of visiting 'Omān in the following spring. These missives, as related in the history of Trucial 'Omān, created some excitement among the chiefs to whom they were addressed, and the British political authorities were obliged to take cognisance of the matter.

The hostilities of the Wahnabi and Shammar Amirs, suspended for a short time out of a transient respect for Turkish authority, were renewed towards the end of the year. Between the two rivals, as subsequently explained by a Turkish Pasha who had dealt with both, there was a decided contrast in character, for, while Ibn-Rashid was the "desert warrior" pure and simple, Ibn-Sa'ūd was more of the "desert diplomatist"; but the deficiencies of the Wahnabi chief were more than made good by the soldierly qualities of his son 'Abdul 'Aziz. Towards the end of 1905 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, assisted by his brother Muhammad, began to raid the Harb tribe and the Bani 'Abdillah branch of the Mutair to the westwards; he had now made Qasim his base, and the headquarters of Ibn-Rashid were at Kahafah on the north-western frontier of the same district. At the end of March 1906 the Wahnabis were encamped at 'Ain Ibn-Fahaid in Qasim, and Ibn-Rashid was at Thamami, a watering place in the Batin, about 70 miles to the north-east of their position. Ibn-Rashid had by this time sought the mediation of Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait, whom he begged to regard him as a son, and that wily politician had already begun to weave a scheme for restoring peace in Najd by the creation of a buffer state to lie between the territory of the two Amirs, to be under the Shaikh's own control, and to consist of the Qasim, Washam and Sadair districts. Meanwhile, however, on the night of the 11th April 1906, the Wahnabis succeeded in surprising Ibn-Rashid, while he was encamped in fancied security at a place known as Ruwaidhah, 20 or 30 miles to the east of Buraidah. A duststorm was raging at the time, and Ibn-Rashid might perhaps have escaped; but he boldly declared his presence and fell, reciting his Rajaz or war-song, under the concentrated fire of his assailants' rifles. A number of the Amir's followers perished with him; and his head, having been cut

Renewal of hostilities between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashid and death of the latter, 1905-06.

off, was fixed on a pole and paraded round the country in triumph; but this last enormity was condemned by all respectable Arab opinion, and some regret for Ibn-Rashid's death was shown even by the Shaikh of Kuwait, to whom his signet ring was immediately sent, in proof of his success, by Ibn-Sa'ūd.

Elation of  
Ibn-Sa'ūd,  
April to  
June, 1906.

The Wahhābi Amir despatched letters or emissaries to announce his victory to the Sultān of Turkey, to the Turkish Walis of Baghdad and Basrah, and to the Arah chiefs of Hasa, Qatar and Bahrain. The deputation sent to Basrah was reported to have been well received by the Governor, and most of the Shaikhs who had been addressed returned their congratulations, accompanied by handsome presents. Ibn-Sa'ūd also proclaimed himself ruler of "Sharq", by which he probably meant all Eastern Arabia. A temporary coldness shortly afterwards sprang up between the Wahhābi Amir and the Shaikh of Kuwait out of disputes relating to the tribute and allegiance of some Bedouin tribes,—perhaps the commonest cause of dissension among potentates in Central Arabia,—and it was reported that Ibn-Sa'ūd, in the first arrogance of his success, had spoken disparagingly of Shaikh Mubarak; but the support of the Shaikh was essential to the Amir's safety, and the estrangement between them was not of long duration.

Deportation  
of the Qāim-  
Maqām of  
Buraidah and  
other aggres-  
sions commit-  
ted by the  
Wahhābis,  
April to June,  
1906.

'Abdul 'Aziz, after the destruction of Ibn-Rashid, proceeded to take full advantage of his success. In April or May, disregarding both the official rank of his victim in the Turkish service and the presence of Turkish troops in Qasim, he seized Salih-bin-Hasan, Qaim-Maqam of Buraidah, by a stratagem and deported him to Riyadh along with his brothers Mahanna and 'Abdul 'Aziz; the reason appeared to be that Salih had taken his own position as an Ottoman Qaim-Maqam too seriously and was working in the interests of the Porte; but the measure, on account of Salih's personal popularity in Qasim, was generally felt to be one of doubtful policy from the standpoint of Wahhābi interests. 'Abdul 'Aziz then carried his raids far to the northward, and, apparently in May, began to harry the Bedouins in the neighbourhood of Hail and to demand arrears of the tribute formerly paid by the Shammar Amir to Riyadh; but the gates of the town were closed against him, and scarcity of forage and supplies soon obliged him to retire. Some members of the Al Sa'ūd family who had been prisoners at Hail were now released, among them a youth named 'Abdul-'Aziz-bin-Muhammad, a grandson of the Wahhābi Amir Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal, who early in July arrived at Kuwait and received medical treatment in the British dispensary there. Several political *detenus* belonging to the ruling families of 'Anaizah and Buraidah were also set at liberty about the same time.

Meanwhile Mat'ab, the son and successor of the deceased Wahhābi Amir, maintained a correspondence with the Shaikh of Kuwait, whom he begged to proceed with the negotiations begun on his father's behalf; and the influence of Shaikh Mubarak apparently continued to be exerted in favour of a settlement. In July peace was arranged in Qasim, and hostilities ceased; but a Wahhābi messenger, sent by Ibn-Sa'ūd to apprise the Shaikh of Kuwait of the circumstance, was murdered on his way in the desert by a Shammar tribesman, either in revenge for the death of the Amir 'Abdul 'Aziz or because the murderer was not aware that peace had been made. It is not clear that the Wahhābi Amir himself ever, during the whole of these proceedings, quitted his capital of Riyadh.

We may now enquire in what light the recent proceedings of Ibn-Sa'ūd, exhibiting as they did complete disregard and even contempt for Ottoman authority in Central Arabia, were regarded by the Turkish Government. A deputation sent by the Wahhābi Amir met, as we have already seen, with a not unfavourable reception at Basrah; but the sympathies of the Porte naturally lay with the family of Rashid, who had for some time professed allegiance to the Sultān of Turkey, and by whose downfall, consequently, Turkish prestige in Najd could not but be lowered. The Wali of Basrah attributed the disastrous end of Ibn-Rashid to the intervention of the Shaikh of Kuwait, in the guise of a peacemaker, between the parties; but the Porte were inclined to suspect that there had been undue interference by the military in the work of the civil officials,—in other words that the commanders of the Turkish army of occupation had been attempting to exercise too much authority over the indigenous chiefs.

Before the end of April a telegram was received at Basrah from the Sultān's Secretary, directing that Mat'ab, the new Amir, should be informed of the regret of the Sultān at the death of 'Abdul 'Aziz, of the intention of the Porte to punish the late Amir's murderers, of Mat'ab's own confirmation as his father's successor, and of the continuance in his favour of his father's salary and allowances. The subsidy of Ibn-Rashid from the Turks at this time was reported to amount to £2200 a month and 200 Taghars of rice per annum, while that received by Ibn-Sa'ūd was £190 a month; the former was disbursed from Baghdad through Karbala, and the latter from Basrah through Kuwait.

At the beginning of July, Sāmi Pasha, who had been appointed military commandant and civil Mutasarrif of Najd about a year previously but had contrived until now to defer his actual departure, left Madinah

Peace declared  
between Ibn-  
Sa'ūd and Ibn-  
Rashid, July  
1906.

Attitude and  
action of the  
Turks with  
reference to  
the successes  
of Ibn-Sa'ūd,  
July to Sept-  
ember 1906.

with an escort of 500 infantry and one gun; and a month later he reached Qasim and made his headquarters at Shaihiyah, about 30 miles to the south-west of Buraidah. He then summoned 'Abdul 'Aziz, the son of Ibn-Sa'ud, to his presence; but the Wahhabi declined to enter his camp; and ultimately a meeting was arranged in the open country between Shaihiyah and Buraidah, at which the chief subjects of discussion were, apparently, the construction of forts at 'Anaizah and Buraidah for the reception of permanent Turkish garrisons and the release by Ibn-Sa'ud of the Qaim-Maqam Salih-bin-Hasan. With regard to the former demand 'Abdul 'Aziz, supported by the people of Qasim, seems to have insisted successfully on the observance by the Turks of a promise, previously given, that not more than 100 men should be placed in either of the towns; and the question of Salih was apparently dropped in consequence of an assertion—which afterwards proved to be false—that he had escaped from custody at Riyadh and been murdered by Al Morrah Bedouins in the desert.

Fariq Sadiq (or Sudqi) Pasha, who had commanded the Turkish forces in Najd before Sami Pasha's arrival, now took his departure for Kuwait, where he arrived safely on the 21st August *via* Zilfi, the Safah wells in Summan, and Subaihiyah. He brought with him an escort of 142 men and had no casualties by the way.

About the end of September the new Mutasarrif sent a party of troops to purchase supplies at 'Anaizah; but the elders of the town refused to assist them on the plea of scarcity; and the Turks, as they were returning by night to their camp, were attacked and lost several of their number.

Meanwhile Talib Pasha, an aide-de-camp of the Sultan of Turkey and probably identical with the ex-Mutasarrif of Hasa of the same name, was travelling from Baghdad to Hail as bearer of a Turkish decoration for the young Amir Mat'ab, and at the end of September it was reported that he had reached his destination. The allowance of the Shammar Amir from the Karhala treasury was at this time irregularly received, apparently because Mat'ab declined to pay certain bribes that were demanded by the Turkish officials.

#### Virtual withdrawal of the Turks from Najd, November 1906.

It was now evident to the Turkish Government that their occupation of Qasim, which was no longer approved by the people, had

Hardships  
endured by

become both unprofitable and dangerous. It was difficult to ensure supplies for the troops, who, according to the statements of deserters, could never obtain any tobacco and were sometimes reduced, for want of food, to eating the pith of date palms. The forces were clothed in rags. The Arabs, it was stated, frequently committed aggressions against the soldiers, while the latter, if they attempted to retaliate, were handed over by their officers to deputations of murmuring Shaikhs, by whom they were put to death. For these reasons the whole army of occupation, themselves largely Arabs, looked on the country as accursed and spoke of it as Bint-Iblis or "Satan's Daughter"; sickness and desertion were rife; and many sold their arms and ammunition to the people of the country, merely in order to provide themselves with the necessaries of life.

In the circumstances described the Turkish Government seem to have \*decided, in the autumn of 1906, to reduce the garrison of Qasim from the strength of 2,500 or 2,000 men, to which it had been raised by the arrival of Sami Pasha's escort from Madinah, to one of 200, and ultimately to one of 100 men only; and in November the withdrawal commenced. The first to move were the units belonging to western Army Corps, which left Qasim about the 3rd of November; and some three weeks later the troops belonging to the Baghdad command started on their march to the coast. These last, numbering about 800 men with two field and four light guns, were supplied with 2,000 camels belonging to private owners at Buraidah, 'Anaizah and Zilfi for transport; they marched in 25 days from Buraidah to Kuwait, which town the Shaikh did not permit them to enter; and they eventually reached Basrah in safety. The evacuation, in consequence of difficulties made by the Qusman about the strength of the posts to be left, was perhaps more complete than had been intended by the Porte; and it is clear that not more than 50 men actually remained in Qasim, while one report placed the number as low as 26.

If the total number of Turkish troops despatched to Qasim from Iraq in 1904 and 1905 be estimated at the lowest possible figure, *viz.*, 4,500, and the number of those who either were left in Qasim or returned to Iraq as soldiers be taken as probably 1,000 altogether,

Almost  
complete  
withdrawal of  
the Turkish  
forces,  
November  
1906.

Military and  
political  
results of the  
occupation  
and with-  
drawal.

\* According to another account the evacuation was carried out by Sami Pasha, who retired on Madinah, upon his own responsibility, the reason being that he could get no help, or even instructions, from Constantinople.

† According to the authority quoted in the last footnote Sami Pasha did not fall back on Madinah until February 1907. The last of the troops withdrawing on that side had sometimes to subsist on locusts.

it will be apparent that the wastage by desertion and death in Najd must have been abnormally heavy. Desertions to Kuwait began in 1905, and it was estimated that, by March 1906, 500 Turkish deserters from Najd had already passed through the town. Of those who died in Qasim by far the greater number, it was stated, succumbed to disease.

The evacuation of Qasim was very injurious to Turkish prestige in Arabia. Disturbances which occurred in Hasa were attributed to the confidence with which the withdrawal had inspired the Arabs, and there was much anxiety in the spring of 1907 lest the troops employed in the construction of the Hijaz Railway should be attacked by Ibn-Sa'ud. It was, however, by no means certain that the Turkish withdrawal from Najd would be permanent, especially as the completion of the Hijaz Railway, then rapidly approaching Madinah, could hardly fail to influence and strengthen the policy of Turkey in Central Arabia.

#### General history of Central Arabia after the Turkish evacuation of Qasim, 1906-07.

Relations of  
Ibn-Sa'ud,  
Ibn-Rashid  
and the  
Shaikh of  
Kuwait,  
1906-07.

After the departure of the Turkish forces an uneasy peace, broken by frequent but apparently incorrect rumours of renewed hostilities between Ibn-Sa'ud and Ibn-Rashid, prevailed in Najd. In January 1907, as related in the history of Northern Najd, Mat'ab, the young Shammār Amīr, was murdered by his relation Sultān-bin-Hamūd, who then usurped his position. The attitude of the new Ibn-Rashid, doubtless because he felt his position to be precarious, was conciliatory towards Ibn-Sa'ud; and the Shaikh of Kuwait, who, like the townsmen of Qasim and even the Turks themselves, did not wish a complete and permanent supremacy to be established in Najd by the ruler of either Riyādh or Hail, seemed inclined to transfer his support from the Wahhābi to the Shammār Amīr, whose cause had become undeniably weak. Shaikh Mubārak had previously alleged the government of Ibn-Sa'ud to be wanting in system and organisation, and he now criticised the character of Ibn-Sa'ud himself as being both "too quick to anger and too easily appeased;" it is possible, however, that this remark was intended to apply not to the actual ruler, 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Faisal, but to his son 'Abdul-'Azīz, who was now frequently spoken of as "Ibn-Sa'ud", perhaps on account of his greater activity and conspicuousness.

In Southern Najd the town of Majma' in Sadair continued to defy, in some sort, the authority of the Wahhābi Amīr, agreeing to pay to him the tribute which it had formerly rendered to the Amīr of Jabal Shammār, but refusing to consent to any enhancement of the same, or to enter into close relations with him. It was at length ascertained beyond doubt that Sālih-bin-Hasau, the deported Amīr of Bnraidah, was alive in confinement at Riyādh; and his brothers Sulaimān and 'Abdur Rahmān were reported to have joined Ibn-Rashid.

Miscellaneous political matters, 1907.

#### Relations of the British Government with Central Arabia, 1900-07.

In consequence of its physical inaccessibility and economic unimportance, Central Arabia has generally lain—as will be apparent from what has preceded—almost beyond the purview of the British and Indian Governments; but, after the revival of the Wahhābi power in Najd in 1900, the situation was modified in this respect by the alliance between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn-Sa'ud and the espousal of the cause of Ibn-Rashid by the Turks.

At the beginning of 1901 the Government of India contemplated the despatch of Muhammadan agents to obtain reliable information regarding the political and religious conditions prevailing in Central Arabia, the obscurity of which was a cause of hesitation in policy; but execution of the scheme was deferred on account of the disturbed condition of the interior at the time.

Deputation of Muhammadan agents to Najd contemplated by the Government of India, 1901.

When Ibn-Sa'ud, in May 1902, started from Kuwait to reoccupy his ancestral capital, he addressed a letter to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in which he begged that he might be regarded "as one having relations with the British Government" and that "the eyes of the benevolent British Government might be fixed on him," and intimated that at Kuwait he had declined overtures from a Russian official because he preferred that his relations should be with Great Britain. The action of the Resident in not replying to this letter was approved by the Government of India, and he was instructed that no encouragement should be given to Ibn-Sa'ud, because the policy of the British Government was to abstain from connection with the affairs of Najd, especially while they remained in an unsettled state.

First overtures of Ibn-Sa'ud to the British Government, 1902.

In 1904, when the Porte were about to despatch a military force to the aid of Ibn-Rashid in Najd, the British Government found that they

Action of the British Government with

reference to the Turkish expedition to Najd and request for their protection by Ibn-Sa'ud, 1904.

could not remain indifferent, for they were deeply interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* at Kuwait, and they feared that it might be imperilled if the help given to Ibn-Rashid should oblige Shaikh Mubarak to take the field once more on behalf of his friend Ibn-Sa'ud. Accordingly, in February 1904, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to claim fulfilment of a pledge given by the Turkish Government in October 1901, that they would restrain the Amīr of Jabal Shammar provided the British Government restrained the Shaikh of Kuwait; and again, on news being received that Turkish troops had been ordered to proceed from Madinah to Qasim, a remonstrance on the subject was addressed to the Porte; but the British Ambassador felt that the aggressiveness of the Wahhābis weakened his arguments, and he doubted whether the reconstitution of the Wahhābi empire in Najd would be in every respect an advantage. The Government of India, however, pointed out that the power of the Wahhābis was now territorial, not fauatical; that British prestige would suffer at Kuwait, if the Shaikh were restrained from assisting his ally; and that the absorption of Najd by the Turks might be a greater evil than a Wahhābi domination and might lead to encroachments on Kuwait from an unexpected direction in which the boundaries of the principality were undefined. Further remonstrances at Constantinople were authorised; but they were ineffectual, and the Turkish expedition marched. The only practical outcome of the discussion between the British and Indian Governments was the appointment, a month or two later, of a British Political Agent at Kuwait.

Ibn-Sa'ud, alarmed at the prospect of Turkish intervention, had in the meantime written to the Resident in the Persian Gulf requesting British protection; but no answer was returned to his letter.

At the beginning of 1904 the Government of India had been led to consider the advisability of despatching a British officer to Riyādh\* for the purpose of studying the situation and possibly of entering into closer relations with Ibn-Sa'ud, and enquiry showed that such a mission could easily be arranged through the Shaikh of Kuwait. His Majesty's Government, however, in the state of affairs then prevailing, regarded the proposal with some apprehension and directed that, without their previous sanction, no steps should be taken to enter into relations with Najd or to send agents there; and eventually the Government of India informed the Home Government that, while recognising that it might shortly become incumbent on them to take a closer interest in the affairs

\* In 1903 it was intimated to the present writer, then on leave in Europe, that he would probably be selected in event of an officer being required to travel in Central Arabia, —a contingency at that time already under consideration.

Contemplated deputation of a British officer to Riyādh, 1904.

of Central Arabia, they did not propose to move immediately in the matter. To this conclusion His Majesty's Government readily assented, but they admitted the desirability of obtaining further information about Najd, and they did not discountenance the idea of the subject being re-opened at some future and more favourable opportunity. Again, at the end of the year, His Majesty's Government expressed a desire that it should be clearly understood that their interest and influence were to be confined strictly to the coast line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing should be said or done to connect them, even indirectly, with warfare in progress in the interior. Their prudent self-restraint the Turkish Government would have done well to imitate.

Hardly had the Turks put into execution their designs upon Qasim, when the proceedings of the Wahhābi Amīr himself in the direction of the Persian Gulf began to occasion anxiety to the British Government. The facts relating to his son 'Abdul 'Aziz's visit to Jāfūrah and Qatar in 1905 and to his correspondence with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān are given in an earlier paragraph of the present chapter and in the history of Trucial 'Omān; and as related in the latter place, Ibn-Sa'ud through the Shaikh of Kuwait subsequently disclaimed all serious designs in the direction of 'Omān, and expressed regret for any accidental remark on his part which might have occasioned disquiet. Before the receipt of these satisfactory assurances, however, the Government of India had advised His Majesty's Government that, in their opinion, it was desirable to ascertain from Ibn-Sa'ud—through the Shaikh of Kuwait, the Sultān of Masqat, or some other intermediary—whether he was prepared to abide by the engagement, given by his predecessor 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal in 1866,\* not to molest British subjects in his own dominions and not to commit aggression on Arab states in alliance with the British Government; and they considered that, in event of the Amīr's reply proving unsatisfactory, he should be informed that the British Government would regard any attempt to interfere in 'Omān as an unfriendly act and would take suitable measures to frustrate it. Ultimately it was decided by His Majesty's Government that the steps proposed by the Government of India need not be taken unless the Wahhābi chief appeared at the coast for the purpose of carrying out the designs with which he was credited, and that, in the case supposed, the necessary warning should be conveyed to him directly.

Throughout the year 1906 persistent efforts to open negotiations for support by the British Government were made by the Wahhābi Amīr, or more probably by his son 'Abdul 'Aziz, through various intermediaries.

Attitude of the British Government towards the designs of Ibn-Sa'ud in the Persian Gulf, 1905-06.

Renewed overtures of Ibn-Sa'ud to the British

\* Vide page 1124 ante.



Government,  
1906.

The subject was first broached to Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, by Musā'ad-bin-Suwailim, an emissary of Ibn-Sa'ūd who arrived from Qatar and suggested that, in case the Amīr should succeed in driving the Turks out of Hasa, a treaty should be arranged between him and the British Government whereby the latter should undertake to protect the Amīr against subsequent attacks by the Turks from the sea, while they in return should be allowed to maintain a political officer in the oasis of Hasa or of Qatif. Captain Prideaux gave no encouragement to these suggestions; and the emissary at once left for Būshehr, where he avoided visiting the British Residency and instead despatched a long telegram from Jāsim, the Āl Thāni Shaikh in Qatar, to the Sultan of Turkey, recommending Ibn-Sa'ūd to the favour of His Ottoman Majesty. The next advance was made by Ibn-Sa'ūd through Shaikh Jāsim, who, at an interview in Qatar between himself and Major Cox, the British Resident, made proposals similar to those brought forward by Musā'ad in Bahrain, and suggested that the Amīr should have a meeting with a British officer at some place upon the Arabian coast. In August 1906 Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait endeavoured to convince the Political Agent there, Captain Knox, of the desirability of Ibn-Sa'ūd being taken under British protection, especially in the interests of British trade. In October an urgent request for a personal interview was received from Shaikh Jāsim by Captain Prideaux in Bahrain; and that officer, being unable to go to Qatar himself, sent his interpreter, Mr. In'am-ul-Haqq. The explanation of the Shaikh's letter was that he had received a further communication from 'Abdul 'Azīz, who feared that his case had not been pressed with sufficient warmth by the Shaikh of Kuwait, and who now sought an interview with Captain Prideaux at a rendezvous in the desert, either in person or through a brother; and it appeared that 'Abdul 'Azīz, being determined to recover Hasa, the most valuable portion financially of the former Wahhābi dominions, was anxious to be assured of British protection by sea in event of his being successful; also that he would in return bind himself by agreements to the British Government, probably resembling those of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, and would agree to the residence of a British political officer at his court. These proposals were at once reported by Captain Prideaux to higher authority. In November the subject was revived by the Shaikh of Kuwait. It will be observed that the advances of Ibn-Sa'ūd in 1906 were made before the withdrawal of the Turks from Qasim, and that they were most urgent after the arrival there of Sāmi Pāsha with his escort from Madinah.

In February 1907 the question of the answer to be returned by the Political Resident to the spokesmen of Ibn-Sa'ūd was formally referred by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government, and the latter, in the month of May following, directed that Major Cox should, if possible, avoid the subject; otherwise he should inform the Amīr's agents that, as Ibn-Sa'ūd's proposals involved considerations which it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to entertain, no reply should be expected.

Orders of His Majesty's Government in regard to the overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd, 1907.

#### ANNEXURE No. 1.—SEPARATE HISTORY OF THE JABAL SHAMMAR PRINCIPALITY OR NORTHERN NAJD.

The external history of Northern Najd is given in full in the preceding chapter; but it appears advisable to add here a supplementary notice, referring chiefly to the internal affairs of the principality.

#### Early history of Jabal Shammar.

Of events in Jabal Shammar before the rise of the present ruling family, the Āl Rashīd, very little is known. The Wahhābis probably overran the country towards the end of the 18th century, at an early stage of their victorious career in Central Arabia; for, by 1809 at latest, their power was so firmly established in the northern oasis of Jauḥ-al-'Amīr, that the Turkish Pāsha of Damascus could not even collect a force for the purpose of dislodging them.

Relations with the Wahhābis, 1809.

In 1817 Ibrahim Pāsha, while on his way to overthrow the Wahhābis at their capital, made an expedition from Hanakiyah against the tribes of Jabal Shammar. It was not, apparently, successful; and it resulted in heavy loss to the Arab tribes who fought upon the Egyptian side.

Relations with the Egyptians, 1817.

The predominant family in Jabal Shammar in those days were the Bait 'Alī, who belonged to the Ja'far subdivision of the 'Abdah division of the Shammar tribe and had their seat at Hāil. About the year 1818, when the power of the Wahhābis was temporarily broken by the Egyptians, a young Shaikh of the Ja'far subdivision, whose family formed part of the Khālil section, challenged the predominance of the Bait 'Alī; this was 'Abdullah-bin-'Alī-bin-Rashīd, the founder of the present dynasty of the Āl Rashīd. 'Abdullah succeeded in gaining to his side a majority of the citizens of Hāil; but the people of the neighbouring town of Qafār, at that time not inferior to Hāil in population and resources, unanimously supported his adversaries.

Rise of the Āl Rashīd.

'Abdullah-bin-'Alī, after a contest, was obliged to fly the country, and took the road by Jauḥ-al-'Amīr to Syria. Beyond Jauḥ his party

Adventures of Abdullah.

bin-'Ali,  
1819-34.

were attacked by hostile 'Anizah, and he himself was severely wounded and left for dead; but a passing merchant took him up and carried him to Damascus, where he recovered. After this 'Abdullah sought service with the Wahhābis, and he apparently took a prominent part in their successful campaign, in 1830, against the Bani Khālid in Hasa. In 1834 he was still in Hasa, assisting Faisal, the son of the Wahhābi Amīr Turki, to repel the aggressions of the Shaikh of Bahrain upon that province; and, when the assassination of the Wahhābi ruler took place at Riyādh in the same year, he was one of those who helped Faisal to recover Riyādh and make good his claims to the Amirate. The usurper Mashāri himself fell, it is said, by the hand of 'Abdullah.

#### 'ABDULLAH-BIN-'ALI,

1835-47.

Abdullah  
bin-'Ali  
appointed  
Mahfūdh of  
Jabal Sham-  
mar by the  
Wahhābi  
Amīr, 1835.

The Wahhābi Amīr Faisal was no sooner established on the throne of his ancestors than he rewarded his late associate, 'Abdullah bin-'Ali, by conferring on him the governorship of Jabal Shammar together with the title of \*Mahfūdh; and he commissioned him to subjugate the southern branches of the great 'Anizah tribe, supplying him at the same time with men and material resources. The first task of 'Abdullah, however, was to overcome the Bait 'Ali; but he soon drove them from Hail to Qafar, and from Qafar they were expelled by 'Abdullah's brother 'Obaid.

Conquest by  
Abdullah of  
Qasim,  
Hayat and  
Jauf-al-  
'Amir.

Finally the Bait 'Ali took refuge in Qasim, of which district the inhabitants were their partisans, and 'Abdullah thereupon sought the further assistance of the Wahhābi Amīr, which he obtained on the condition that any new territory conquered should be added, not to his own governorship, but to the districts directly under Riyādh. With the assistance thus lent he devastated Qasim, taking its villages one by one, and almost exterminated his opponents of the Bait 'Ali; and finally, in accordance with the terms of his contract, he handed over the newly acquired district to the Wahhābi Amīr.† His commission against the 'Anizah 'Abdullah partially executed by depriving them of Hayat, in the west, with its much prized springs of water; and by the instrumentality of his brother 'Obaid, whom he sent to compose dissensions in the distant northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Amir, he succeeded in establishing a sort of suzerainty over that place also.

Internal pol-  
icy of 'Abdul-  
lah.

The domestic policy of 'Abdullah is represented as having been unpopular with the majority of his subjects. He established Wahhābism

\* Or perhaps "Muhāsih" which would appear to be more natural, though not so given in the principal authority. "Mahfūdh", which has been translated "Warden," can only have that meaning if it is a contraction of some longer title.

† Perhaps the foregoing, so far as it relates to aid lent by the Wahhābi Amīr, should be dismissed as unhistorical; it depends chiefly on traditions collected by Palgrave 25 years later, and it is inconsistent with the account given by Wallin, an earlier and more careful enquirer. 'Abdullah's services in Hasa and his share in the removal of Mashāri are, however, confirmed by Wallin.

as the state religion and encouraged Wahhābi propagandists. He showed favour to the Bedouin tribes, and utilised them to break the strength of the towns and villages,—a process which, of necessity, was soon reversed under his sons. Towards the end of his reign he began to build a new quarter in Hail town exclusively for the residence of himself and his relations with their dependents.

To the end of his days 'Abdullah appears to have remained a loyal and contented feudatory of the Wahhābi Amīr Faisal, whom in 1843, after his return from Egypt, he assisted to recover his power in Najd; and no tribute seems to have been required of him by the Amīr except an annual gift of horses.

'Abdullah was probably unfriendly to the Egyptians; and the loss of an Egyptian detachment in the Nafūd Desert, where they perished of thirst,—probably one of the Egyptian garrisons withdrawn from Najd about 1840—was, if local tradition may be trusted, deliberately arranged by the Mahfūdh through his brother 'Obaid. It is believed that George Augustus Wallin, the able Swede who visited Hail in 1845, and again in 1848 a year after 'Abdullah's death, was sent there by Muhammad 'Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to investigate the rising power of Jabal Shammar or, possibly, with some more definite political aim.

Relations of  
'Abdullah  
with the  
Wahhābis.

Relations of  
'Abdullah  
with Egypt.

#### TALĀL-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1847-67.

'Abdullah left three sons, Talāl, Mat'ab and Muhammad, of whom the eldest, Talāl, was about 20 years of age. Talāl's succession was unopposed; he profited throughout his reign by the loyal support of his uncle 'Obaid and of his brother Mat'ab; and under him the boundaries of Jabal Shammar continued to extend. One of his first expeditions was against Khaibar and was conducted by the formidable 'Obaid, with whom Mat'ab was associated in the command to temper his severity; Khaibar fell and was placed under a governor sent from Hail. About 1848 the people of Qasim after secret negotiations, transferred their direct allegiance from Riyādh to Hail, where Qasimi refugees from Wahhābi tyranny had become accustomed to find a refuge; and the Wahhābi Amīr for a time acquiesced, though unwillingly, in the new arrangement. Operations against Taimah, directed by Talāl in person, were successful and enabled him to round off his western frontier. Finally, in 1855, he completed the work begun at Jauf-al-'Amir in his father's reign by proceeding thither in person, subduing the oasis, and placing it under a Shammar governor and three sub-governors of his own nomination.

Expansion of  
Jabal Sham-  
mar under  
Talāl, 1847-  
55.

The internal policy of Talāl was progressive and pacificatory. He relied on the settled population and addressed himself to the task of curbing the Bedouins, whom his father had unduly encouraged. Life and property, both on the roads and in the villages, were secure in his day. His chief pleasure was in the construction of palaces, markets, shops, streets and fortifications; he introduced foreign merchan-  
dants—many of them Shi'ahs, for Talāl was not a strict Wahhābi—from Basrah and Mashhad 'Ali, and even from Madinah and Yaman; and he tried, it is

Domestic  
policy of  
Talāl.

Relations of  
Talāl with  
the Wahhā-  
bis, Turkey,  
Egypt, and  
Persia.

said, but without success, to induce Jews and Christians from the north to settle at Hāil.

Notwithstanding the umbrage given by his protection of the refractory Qusmān and the scandal which his irreligious habits of wearing silk any smoking tobacco occasioned to rigorous Wāhhābis, Talāl, who had married a daughter of his father's friend the Wāhhābi Amīr Faisal, remained to the last on friendly terms with his suzerain at Riyādh; and he continued throughout his life to pay a yearly visit to Riyādh for the purpose of delivering his tribute of horses in person. At the same time, however, he professed allegiance to Turkey, caused the Sultan's name and titles to be proclaimed at Friday prayers in Hāil, and pretended that all his conquests were made in the Ottoman interest and in this attitude, which was partly forced upon him by increasing contact with the Turks on north and west, an interesting premonition of the subsequent fate of his family may be discovered. While he declined to enter into the schemes of 'Abbās I of Egypt, who sought, by means of an alliance with the Bedouins of the north and an understanding with the Wāhhābi government in the south, to render himself independent of the Porte and master of the Arabian peninsula, Talāl maintained friendly relations with that Pasha and even with his successor Sa'īd; but he early discovered the inability of the latter to afford him the slightest protection against either Turkish or Wāhhābi aggression. With Persia Talāl cultivated somewhat intimate relations, chiefly in the hope that one of his favourite projects might be realised, — the diversion, namely, of the Persian Hajj, with its incidental trade and foreign intercourse, from a route through Buraidah in Qasim, which it then followed, to a route through Hāil.

Death of  
Talāl, 1867.

On his return from one of his annual visits to Riyādh, Talāl fell into ill-health, and, dreading the loss of his reason or having actually lost it, he committed suicide by shooting himself. This happened in 1867.

#### MAT'AB-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1867-71.

Death of  
'Obaid, 1869.

Talāl was survived by his uncle 'Obaid and by his brothers Mat'ab and Muhammad, and he left also several sons of his own, of whom the eldest was Bandar, born about 1850. The succession fell to Mat'ab, whose short reign of about four years was remarkable chiefly for its tragic end, and for the death in 1869, at a very advanced age, of the veteran 'Obaid. 'Obaid was a true Wāhhābi; but, notwithstanding this fact and a harsh, overbearing temper, he was extremely popular. His reputation for capacity and personal prowess also stood very high, and, according to one authority, he was the virtual ruler of the country after the death of his brother 'Abdullah. 'Obaid left six sons, well endowed with property in the shape of lands at Hāil, date-palms at Jauf-al-A'mir and a title to half the produce of Hāyat; but the eldest suffered from the family weakness of insanity, and the others except Hamūd, of whom more hereafter, exhibited various abnormalities and defects

Mat'ab was a mild and intelligent man; but his amiable character did not protect him from the ambition of his nephews Bandar and Badar, sons of Talāl, who assassinated him, probably in 1871. It was probably during the reign of Mat'ab that the Wāhhābi Amīr 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, having been expelled from power by his brother Sa'ūd, for the first time found a temporary asylum in Jabal Shammar.

Assassination  
of Mat'ab,  
1871.

#### BANDAR-BIN-TALĀL,

1871-72.

Bandar, after he had thus usurped the Amirship, took the young widow of his murdered uncle to wife; and she bore him a son, 'Asar. To his subjects it seemed that the vengeance of Heaven followed him; for cholera ravaged the country in his day, and power and life were his only for a short twelve months. Muhammad, the only surviving brother of the deceased Mat'ab, took refuge at Riyādh, and for a short while he lived there under the protection of Ibn-Sa'ūd; but ultimately, by Wāhhābi mediation, he was enabled to return to Hāil and to resume his place there as manager of the Baghdad-Makkah pilgrim route under the orders of his nephew the Amīr. The inevitable collision between the two relations was not long delayed. In a quarrel outside the gates of Hāil, which seems to have been unpremeditated on the part of Muhammad, and in the presence of Badar and Hamūd, who had accompanied Bandar to the interview, the uncle stabbed the nephew dead. Badar fled; Hamūd joined Muhammad, with whom there is reason to think he had from the first sympathised; and the people of Hāil remained passive.

#### MUHAMMAD-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1872-97.

#### General history of Jabal Shammar under Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, 1872-97.

In this manner the power passed to Muhammad, the third and last remaining son of 'Abdullah, the first Mahfūd; for fate had willed that until the elder generation of the family was exhausted the sway should not fall permanently to any younger member. The first act of Muhammad was one of sanguinary precaution. Except 'Asar, the infant son of Bandar, and Na'if, a son of Talāl, whose lives were unaccountably spared, all the male descendants of Talāl, including Badar who had been captured, were put to death along with their slave foster-brethren; and others also from whom danger was apprehended by the new sovereign, among them, it is said, four sons of his own sister by one Jabbār, perished at his accession.

Accession of  
Muhammad  
and murder  
of the sons  
Talāl, etc.,  
1872.

Reception of  
the Wahhābi  
ex-Amir,  
1873.

In 1873 the Wahhābi Amir 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, having been expelled by his brother Sa'ūd, again found an asylum in Shammar territory; but Muhammad, though he supplied his wants, would not allow him to approach Hail. 'Abdullah married Nūrah, a favourite sister of Muhammad, and after her death a daughter of 'Obaid, thus connecting himself by a double affinity with the Al Rashid.

#### Conquest of Southern Najd by the Shammar Amir, 1877-91.

The history of the great contest for the supremacy in Najd which now occurred, resulting in the victory of Muhammad, is given at length in the preceding chapter; and here the facts need only be recapitulated in such a manner as to avoid a breach in the continuity of our narrative.

First en-  
crouement  
on the Wah-  
hābi domi-  
nions, 1877-  
84.

In 1877 Ibn-Rashid forayed the 'Ataibah, a tribe regarded as subject to Riyādh. A little later he detached the district of Sadair and a part of Qasim from the Wahhābi dominions; and his possession of these conquests was apparently confirmed by a short-lived peace arranged in 1882. In 1882 the Wahhābis failed in an attempt to retake Sadair; and the recovery of Buraidah by the Wahhābi commander Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd in 1885 was only temporary. From 1884 onwards the Shammar Amir possessed a decided advantage in the field.

Complete  
overthrow of  
the Wahhābi  
power and  
subjugation  
of Qasim,  
1891.

In 1887 Muhammad profited by family broils at Riyādh to seize the Wahhābi capital, which he placed under a Shammar governor, and to carry off to Hail, where he detained him for two years, the Wahhābi Amir 'Abdullah. In 1888 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the most active of the Wahhābi family, was killed in Kharj along with two of his brothers. In 1890 Riyādh was taken by 'Abdur Rahman, a younger brother of the late Wahhābi Amir, and Ibn-Rashid attempted to recover the place by bombardment, but did not succeed. Towards the end of the same year a strong confederation against Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah was formed by the Wahhābis, the people of Qasim, and a number of Bedouin tribes; but in March or April 1891, after successfully resisting him for a time, the league was overthrown by the Shammar Amir at the memorable battle of Buraidah or Mulaidah. 'Anazah, which had hitherto successfully resisted the attempts of Ibn-Rashid to reduce it by siege and bombardment, then fell into the hands of the victor, and Riyādh was to a large extent destroyed; while the power of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah became absolute throughout Central Arabia and so continued until the end of his life.

#### Relations of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah with the Turks, 1872-97.

Attempt of the Turks to In 1872, immediately after Muhammad's accession, his northern town of Jauf-al-'Amir was surprised by a small Turkish force from Ma'au,

composed of Syrian and Moorish irregulars, and submitted without resistance. The Amir hastened to the spot and entered into negotiations with the leader of the Turks, and it was finally arranged that Jauf should continue to be included in the Shammar territories, but that Ibn-Rashid should pay 1,500 Majidis a year as tribute on account of it to the Sultan and that a Turkish Qaim-Maqām and garrison should remain. In 1874 the Moors of the garrison mutinied, not having received their pay, and handed over the place to Ibn-Rashid, who resumed possession in his own name and enrolled most of the Turkish deserters in his bodyguard. Jauf possessed a special interest for Muhammad, who had been wounded in the foot at its capture during the reign of his brother Talal.

In 1880 the Amir Muhammad invaded the Hauran country, penetrating as far as Basrah, only 70 miles from Damasens; the result was a reconciliation with the northern tribes, whom it had been his object to coerce; and the conclusion of peace was celebrated by a great feast.

Towards the end of his reign the relations of the Amir Muhammad with his Turkish neighbours appear to have become more friendly and more direct: this may have been the result of attentions paid by the Turks, who no doubt were anxious to profit by the rapid expansion of Ibn-Rashid's power in Central Arabia. In 1886, the way having been prepared by despatch of presents in the preceding year, an Ottoman mission visited Hail to arrange for the establishment of a Turkish Government mosque and school at Hail and were dismissed with gifts, but without a favourable answer. In 1888, when his successes in Southern Najd began to be considerable, the Shammar Amir was careful to inform the Porte of his victories and to pretend that he was acting in the Turkish interest. In the same year reports were circulated that Ibn-Rashid was about to invade Trucial 'Omān with the countenance of the Turkish Government; but they turned out to be premature if not baseless, and the existence of any such design was denied by the Porte.

As noticed in the history of Hasa, some friction, arising out of tribal questions and raids, occurred in 1894 and 1895 between the Shammar Amir and the Turkish authorities in Hasa.

#### Government, personality and death of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah.

In almost every year of his reign the Amir Muhammad rode against some offending Bedouin tribe; and the 'Anizah, 'Ataibah and Mutair, in turn, felt the weight of his hand. In April 1885, in retaliation for injuries committed upon some of his subjects, Ibn-Rashid actually raided and plundered a camp of the 'Ajman so far distant from his capital and so near to the Persian Gulf as 'Awainah in Wādī-al-Miyāh; but on this occasion the 'Ajman were successful, by a pursuit of his party, in recovering some of their horses that had been carried off. Allusion has just been made above to the Amir's difficulties in 1894 and 1895 with Arab tribes on the borders of Hasa.

establish  
themselves at  
Jauf-al-  
Amir, 1872-  
74.

Raid by the  
Amir on the  
Syrian border,  
1880.

Closer rela-  
tions with  
the Turks  
and occasion-  
al friction on  
the Hasa  
border, 1885-  
97.

Repression of  
the Bedouins  
by the Amir  
Muhammad.

Character and  
appearance of  
the Amir Mu-  
hammad.

The career of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah seems in itself to prove that he was a man of more than average energy and ability; but he owed much to the constancy and force of character of his cousin Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, and the personality of the latter seems to have made a deeper impression on most European visitors to Hail than that of the Amir himself. It was during the reign of Muhammad that Northern Najd was visited by Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt, by the Frenchman Mr. C. Huber, and by Mr. C. M. Doughty, of whom the last was without doubt at once the greatest, the most exact, and the most sympathetic of all Central Arabian explorers.

Muhammad was barely of the middle height, but in build he was strong and thick-set. His head was of the shape known as Spanish.

His personal  
history and  
death in  
1897.

The Amir Muhammad was many times married. Some of his matrimonial alliances were dictated by political considerations, as for instance that which he contracted with the ruling family of Buraidah by marrying a sister of Hasan-bin-Mahanna, but his principal object was undoubtedly to found a family. In this, however, he was disappointed, and he died childless in 1897,—a fate which popular superstition did not fail to connect with his cruel butchery of the sons of Talāl.

'ABDUL 'AZIZ-BIN-MAT'AB,  
1897-1906.

#### Position of 'Abdul 'Aziz at the beginning of his reign.

The favourite of the late Amir among his younger relations had been 'Abdul 'Aziz, the only son of his murdered brother Mat'ab; and 'Abdul 'Aziz it was who now succeeded to the Amirship. Nothing is known regarding the behaviour of Hamūd and his sons on this occasion; and 'Asar, the son of Bandar, was perhaps already dead. The situation of 'Abdul 'Aziz was difficult on account of the extent of the dominions which, relying on the small resources of Jabal Shammar only, he must hold and govern. At the outset he appears to have further weakened his position by oppressing his more distant subjects, of whose loyalty he was doubtful, by ignoring his father's influential cousin Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, and by making an enemy of Mubārak, Shaikh of Kuwait. The quarrel with Kuwait, which arose out of disputes about the allegiance of Bedouin tribes and was greatly embittered by encouragement subsequently given at Hail to some rebellious nephews of the Kuwait Shaikh, was especially detrimental to the interests of 'Abdul 'Aziz; for the remarkable personality and far-reaching influence of Shaikh Mubārak were of great service to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd, and the port of Kuwait was closed to Ibn-Rashid, who thus became dependent on his suspicious neighbours the Turks for his entire supply of arms and warlike stores. The results were the loss, within a few years, of all Southern Najd and Qasim, and the reduction of Ibn-Rashid himself to a state of complete dependence upon the Porte.

#### Gradual subversion of the power of the Shammar Amir by the Wahhābis, 1899-1906.

In 1899, not apparently without incitement on the part of the Turks, Ibn-Rashid assumed a threatening attitude towards the Shaikh of Kuwait; and in the next year open warfare began between the Shammar Amir and 'Abdur Rahmān, the head of the Wahhābi ruling family, who had for some time been harboured, and was now openly assisted, by the Shaikh of Kuwait. The course of the campaign has been fully related in the chapter on the history of Najd, and here it will suffice merely to mention the principal events. In August 1900 the Wahhābi chief left Kuwait for the interior and achieved some preliminary successes; and two or three months later a collision between Ibn-Rashid and the Shaikh of Kuwait on the borders of 'Irāq was with difficulty averted by the Turks, whose assistance the former had invoked. Early in 1901 the Shaikh of Kuwait advanced into Qasim, accompanied by 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd, and the position of Ibn-Rashid appeared somewhat critical; but on the 17th of March, at the battle of Sarif, the Shammar Amir succeeded in inflicting a serious defeat on the invaders, by which their force was entirely broken up; on the side of the Shammar, however, Salim and Mahanna, sons of Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, were killed. In autumn of the same year Ibn-Rashid took the offensive against Kuwait, making his headquarters at Hafar; and in September a panic was caused at Kuwait by the raids of his partisans in the surrounding district. From November 1901 to January 1902 acute anxiety prevailed in consequence of a movement by Ibn-Rashid to Safwān not far from Basrah, where he remained in close correspondence with the Turkish officials, and an attack upon Kuwait was believed to be imminent. Dispositions were made, however, by the British naval authorities to assist the Shaikh in repelling any act of aggression; and in the end the Shammar Amir returned quietly to his country *via* the wells of the Lainya. About the time that Ibn-Rashid withdrew from Safwān, the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd recovered Riyādh and the districts of Kharij and Hariq for his father; and the Shammar Amir then sought aid from the Wali of Basrah and from the Grand Wazir at Constantinople, enforcing his appeal by insinuations that the British Government were assisting his adversary. Qasim generally had now become favourable to the Wahhābi cause; and in November 1902, having attempted an invasion of Southern Najd, Ibn-Rashid sustained a serious reverse in Kharij by which, apparently, the whole of that province except Sadair, Washam and Wādī-as-Sirr was lost to him. At the beginning of 1903 the Shammar Amir still held Zilfi in Sadair; but by the end of the year that town, too, had been regained by the Wahhābis; and in February 1904, on the defeat of a Shammar force in Wādī-as-Sirr, Southern Najd in its entirety reverted to Ibn-Sa'ūd.

The Wahhābis immediately followed up their successes by advancing into Qasim; and on the 22nd of March 1904 a decisive battle was fought under the walls of 'Anaizah in which Majid-bin-Hamūd, the

Invasion of  
Qasim by the  
Shaikh of  
Kuwait and  
reconquest of  
Southern  
Najd by the  
Wahhābis,  
1900-03.

Recovery of  
Qasim by the  
Wahhābis,  
1904.

commander of the northern forces, was defeated with loss, and his brother 'Ohaid killed. By this unsuccessful action the whole of Qasim was lost to Ibn-Rashid.

Defeat of the  
Turks and  
Ibn-Rashid  
in Qasim,  
1904.

The Turks then sent troops from 'Iraq to assist Ibn-Rashid to recover his position in Qasim; but the allied forces were defeated in two disastrous engagements, the first at Bukairiyah on the 15th of July, and the second at Qasr Ibn-'Aqaiyl on the 27th of September. The remains of the Turkish expedition retired upon Kaháfah.

Turkish occu-  
pation of  
Qasim and  
domestic re-  
bellion  
against Ibn-  
Rashid, 1905-  
06.

In April 1905, in consequence of arrangements made by the Porte with Ibn-Sa'ud, a Turkish force, drawn partly from 'Iraq and partly from Hijaz, occupied Qasim without opposition; and the farce was enacted of placing Qasim under nominal Turkish administration. In June 1905, Sultān, son of Hamūd-hin-'Obaid, went into rebellion against his relative, the Shammar Amir, and apparently obtained independent possession of Jauḥ-al-'Amir in the extreme north, not without the countenance of the inhabitants and of the surrounding tribes; he also complained to the Sultān of Turkey against Ibn-Rashid, but without result.

Death of the  
Amir 'Abdul  
'Aziz-bin-  
Mat'ab, 11th  
April 1906.

After a short respite the Wahhābis, emboldened by the obvious powerlessness of the Turkish garrisons in Qasim, prepared to resume their attacks on Ibn-Rashid; and the Shammar Amir hung on the borders of Qasim, probably with the double object of preventing a northward movement against Hail and of inflicting damage upon the enemy, if an opportunity should occur. In December 1905 Ibn-Rashid was at Kaháfah; in March 1906 he was at Thamāmi in Bātin; and on the 11th of April 1906 he was surprised and killed by the Wahhābis at Ruwaidhab, probably not more than 30 miles from the nearest Turkish post. Shortly before his death 'Abdul 'Aziz had invoked the good offices of the Shaikh of Kuwait, whom he had asked to look upon him as a son, and to arrange a peace on his behalf with Ibn-Sa'ud.

### Personality of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab.

Partly in consequence of the enmity between him and the Shaikh of Kuwait, by which authentic information regarding Jabal Shammar affairs was prevented from reaching the British political authorities in the Persian Gulf, considerable doubt prevailed, and still prevails, as to the real character of 'Abdul 'Aziz. The impression at first formed of the Amir by our officials was that he was of a harsh and impetuous disposition, without prudence or judgment, and that his administration, especially in his outlying dependencies, was excessively severe and provocative of disloyalty; but the result of later enquiries was to modify this opinion, and to show that he was in the end the victim rather of ill-fortune than of his own folly. His courage and skill as a military leader, despite his want of success in the field, have never apparently been called in question.

### Relations of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab with British Government, 1897-1906.

In May 1901, after the invasion of Qasim by the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn-Sa'ud, 'Abdul 'Aziz, disappointed at the dilatory and ineffectual action of the Turks on his behalf and strongly impressed with the advantages which the Shaikh of Kuwait had derived from British protection, made overtures on his own account to the British Government. The occasion was a message sent him by the British political authorities, suggesting that he should settle his differences with Shaikh Muḥarak, to which the Amir replied by a letter written in a somewhat haughty strain; but simultaneously he caused his agent at Basrah to inform Mr. Wratislaw, the British Consul there, that the written communication was a mere blind, and that he really desired to cultivate good relations with the British Government. He suggested that the British Government should undertake to supply him, at his own cost, with arms and ammunition, and that they should depose his enemy, the actual Shaikh of Kuwait, in favour of a nephew: the Amir on his part, would undertake not to interfere in Kuwait affairs, and would guarantee the safe construction by British enterprise of railways across Arabia.

Overtures  
from the  
Shammar  
Amir to the  
British Gov-  
ernment,  
1901.

The Government of India, while they considered that the Amir's requests were such as could not be granted, were anxious not to alienate his sympathy. They therefore proposed that a British officer should be sent from the side of 'Aqabah to interview the Amir and to ascertain more particularly his views and the nature of his personality, and they thought it might even be advisable that the British Government should undertake to restrain the Shaikh of Kuwait in future from hostilities against the Amir and to use their good offices to prevent Turkish aggressions on Najd; but His Majesty's Government, fearing that a mission might give rise to complications with Turkey and that anything in the nature of a protectorate might involve obligations which could not be discharged without resort to material force, withheld their approval. Accordingly no action was taken; and a few months later, as we have seen, the Shammar Amir fell more completely than before into the hands of the Turks and even joined with them in threatening an attack on Kuwait, after which no further communications passed between the Amir 'Abdul 'Aziz and the British Government.

Orders of His  
Majesty's  
Government  
on the same  
and result.

### MAT'AB-BIN-'ABDUL 'AZIZ.

1906-07.

'Abdul 'Aziz was succeeded by his eldest son Mat'ab, a youth about 18 years of age, whose straightforwardness and generosity, aided by

Position of  
Mat'ab at his



accession,  
April 1903.

Relations  
with Ibn-  
Sa'ūd and the  
Shaikh of  
Kuwait.

Relations  
with the  
Porte.

Murder of  
Mat'ab-bin-  
Abdul 'Aziz,  
January  
1907.

the remission of a year's taxes and the restoration of various personal allowances that had been reduced or abolished by his father, produced an immediate and favourable impression upon his subjects. The principality of Jahal Shammar was now, however, so impoverished that the young Amīr could no longer find the annual tribute of 80 horses which his predecessors had been accustomed to pay to the Sultān of Turkey.

After the death of 'Abdul 'Aziz the Wahhābis continued to press their advantage against his successor, and in June 1906 the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd appeared at the very gates of Hāil demanding tribute, but he could not take the capital, and he was soon obliged by scarcity of supplies to withdraw from its vicinity. The Shaikh of Kuwait, who had apparently consented to negotiate with the Wahhābi ruler on behalf of the late 'Abdul 'Aziz, agreed at the urgent request of the new Shammar Amīr, of his elderly relation Hamūd and of others of the family, to continue his efforts; and at length in July 1906, after discussions between the principals or their agents in Qasim, a regular peace was arranged, apparently on the basis that each Amīr should keep what he then held.

The Turks showed much sympathy with the Amīr Mat'ab when he came to power, but their own position in Qasim was so weak that they could afford him no real assistance; and the Sultān accordingly confined himself to condoling with the young chief on his father's death, to recognising him as his father's successor, and to promising the punishment of his father's murderers and the continuance to himself of his father's subsidy. In September 1906 Tālib Pāsha, an aide-de-camp of the Sultān, arrived at Hāil with a Turkish decoration for the Amīr; but in November 1906 the Turkish garrison, except a score or two of men, was withdrawn from Qasim, and Turkish influence in Najd virtually ceased to exist.

In the first week of January 1907 a fresh crime was added to the blood-stained annals of the Al Rashid. Sultān-bin-Hamūd, who had withdrawn to Jauf in 1905 and had subsequently returned to Hāil, induced the Amīr Mat'ab to join him on a hunting expedition in the country, in the course of which he treacherously shot him dead with his own hand; and simultaneously Sultān's brothers, Sa'ūd and Faisal and his cousin, Dhari killed Mash'al and Muhammad, the brothers of the Amīr, and Talāl, the son of the Amīr's cousin Nāif. On their return to camp the murderers gave out that Talāl had killed the sons of 'Abdul 'Aziz and that they had taken immediate vengeance on him, but their story obtained no credence. An infant son of Talāl-bin-Nāif was also put to death. By these crimes not a single male descendant of 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, the first Mahfūdh of Jahal Shammar, was left alive except an infant son of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab, whom his mother had apparently taken with her on a pilgrimage to Madinah. The females of 'Abdullah's branch were next expelled, or themselves voluntarily emigrated, to Madinah, whither Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, the senior member of the Al Rashid family also betook himself, arriving there on the 7th of April. Hamūd had lived in retirement at Hāil during the lifetime of 'Abdul 'Aziz, of whose policy he did not approve, and who did not seek his advice; but one of his daughters had married 'Abdul 'Aziz and was the mother of the Amīr Mat'ab and his brothers; and it seemed that the old man's heart was broken by the murder of his grandsons by his sons.

## SULTAN-BIN-HAMŪD, SINCE 1907.

The attitude of Sultān after his accession was subservient towards Ibn-Sa'ūd, with whom he appeared anxious to establish good relations; but the Turkish Government apparently did not recognise Sultān, for the allowances paid by the Porte to his two predecessors were not continued in his favour. Sultān twice made overtures through the Shaikh of Kuwait to the British Government; but they were not acknowledged (1907).

Position of  
Sultān after  
his accession.

## ANNEXURE NO. 2.—SEPARATE HISTORY OF THE QASIM DISTRICT.

### Early History of Qasim.

The detailed narrative of affairs in Central Arabia given in the preceding chapter and Annexure leaves little besides internal affairs to be noticed in the present separate history of Qasim.

Qasim appears to have been among the first acquisitions of the rising Wahhābi power at the end of the 18th century; but no details have been preserved of the manner in which it was occupied or incorporated with the Wahhābi dominions.

### Qasim entered by the Egyptians, 1815, and the Egyptian occupation of Qasim, 1817-24.

The invasion of Qasim by Tūsūn Pāsha in 1815, resulting in a peace between the Egyptians and the Wahhābis, and the occupation of the district by the Egyptians between 1817 and 1824 are fully dealt with elsewhere. From the encouragement given to Tūsūn Pāsha by some of the leading men in Qasim it would seem that in 1815 a considerable proportion of the inhabitants were discontented with Wahhābi rule; but Hijailān, the most influential of the local chiefs, was devoted to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd and would hold no communication with the Egyptians. The principal operations of Ibrahim Pāsha's campaign in Qasim were an unsuccessful siege of Rass, the capture of Khabrah and 'Anaizah, and the occupation of Buraidah without resistance. The bulk of the Egyptian troops seem to have been withdrawn from Qasim about 1819, the year in which Captain Sadleir passed through 'Anaizah and Rass



on a political mission from the Government of India to Ibrāhīm Pāsha; but some apparently remained until 1824, when the Wahhābī Amīr Faisal-bin-Turki, at his accession, drove the last of the Egyptian garrisons from Najd.

#### Wahhābī reconquest of Qasim through the Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar, about 1835.

Nothing is known of the position of Qasim during the years that immediately followed the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops; but it is probable that the district enjoyed practical independence. When 'Abdullah-bin-'Alī, the first of the Āl-Rashīd to rule Jabal Shammar, was placed over that province in 1835 by the Wahhābī Amīr Faisal, his principal opponents, the Bait 'Alī, whose influence had hitherto predominated in the northern principality, were supported by the people of Qasim; and the final result of the struggle was the subjugation of Qasim by 'Abdullah-bin-'Alī, who handed it over to his master, the Wahhābī Amīr. It was perhaps during this period that an ill-conducted expedition started from 'Anaizah to attack the Amīr of Hail and received short shrift at the hand of his brother 'Obaid.

#### Egyptian occupation of Qasim, 1837-1842.

The second occupation of Qasim by the Egyptians is described, like the first, in another place; it began apparently in 1837, when the Egyptians sent troops into Najd to assist Khālid-bin-Sa'ūd, whom they had put forward as a claimant of the Wahhābī Amirship in opposition to Faisal-bin-Turki. It was from Qasim that Khālid, after he in his turn, had been ousted from power by 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaīyān, made an ineffectual effort to recover Southern Najd in 1842; and it was in Qasim that the ex-Amīr Faisal, returning from his captivity in Egypt, commenced his victorious march on Riyādh in 1843. The exact date of the withdrawal of the last Egyptian military post from Qasim cannot be fixed; but it must have been later than the spring of 1842, when a few Egyptian soldiers attached to the Amīr Khālid still remained in Hasa.

#### Period from 1842 to 1862.

During the first few years after the withdrawal of the Egyptians the people of Qasim appear to have co-operated with the Wahhābī authorities for the restoration of order in Najd, and to have furnished military

contingents and paid annual tribute with regularity to the Wahhābī Government.

In 1848, however, true to the instinct which invariably bade them counteract a rising power, the Qusmān, after secret negotiations, transferred their direct allegiance from Riyādh to Hail. The Wahhābī Amīr for a time acquiesced in the change and accepted the explanations of his vassal at Hail; but before long he began to put in force against the people of Qasim the levelling and incorporating policy which they themselves had assisted him to apply to Southern Najd. Buraidah, smaller and less important than 'Anaizah, was the first place singled out for reduction; and, its commerce having been cut off, the town quickly became desirous of peace. Thereupon the Wahhābī Amīr invited some members of the leading family, the Banī 'Alaiyān, to Riyādh to discuss terms; but on their arrival he caused them to be massacred and instantly despatched his son 'Abdullah with an army to Qasim. Paralysed by the suddenness of these occurrences Buraidah submitted; and Mahanna, a rigid Wahhābī and a native of Riyādh, was installed there as governor.

The exact date of these events and of the annexation of 'Anaizah, which in 1852 was governed by Jalui, a brother of the Wahhābī Amīr, cannot be determined; but it was in 1853 that the people of 'Anaizah, finding the Wahhābī yoke intolerable, rose under Yahya, whose son 'Abdullah was Shaikh at the time, and quietly and without bloodshed removed Jalui to Buraidah. The Wahhābī Amīr Faisal at once marched from Riyādh against 'Anaizah and was joined before the walls by his Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar; but their united forces could make no impression on the stubborn town, which was partially self-supporting on account of the fields and date-plantations enclosed within the outer walls. According to one account the Wahhābīs were at last induced to raise the siege by the Sharif of Makkah, who, from the point of view of his own interests, regarded the independence of 'Anaizah as a valuable check upon the Wahhābīs, and whose mediation the Shaikh of 'Anaizah had sought.

For some years after the failure of this expedition, the Wahhābīs occupied themselves with crushing the Harb and 'Ataibah Bedonins, who were partisans of 'Anaizah, and with extending the dependencies of Buraidah, their headquarters in Qasim, in such a way as to isolate and harass 'Anaizah. Mahanna, the Wahhābī governor of Buraidah, was an oppressive and extortionate ruffian who did his best to break the spirit of the Qusmān under his rule by sending them on frequent military expeditions in the interest of the Wahhābīs; in 1856 he fleeced a Persian pilgrim caravan so effectually that for two years the Persian Hajj across Arabia ceased altogether; and it was probably some characteristic act of his which occasioned the flight from Buraidah of a certain 'Abdullah-al-'Aziz, a member of the former ruling family. The fugitive was kindly received by the people of 'Anaizah, but soon afterwards he was murdered by Wahhābīs in the desert.

Open hostilities which were now declared by Ibn-Sa'ūd against 'Anaizah may have been a consequence of this incident, for the people of 'Anaizah considered themselves at feud with the Wahhābī Amīr on account of the murder of their guest; but it has also been stated that the war was provoked by the refusal of the Shaikh of 'Anaizah to

Rebellion of Qasim against the Wahhābīs 1848, and its subjugation.

Successful revolt of 'Anaizah against the Wahhābīs, 1853.

Wahhābī administration in Qasim, 1853-62.

Unsuccessful attempt of the Wahhābīs to reduce 'Anaizah, 1862.

appear in person before the Wahhābi Amir and answer for tribute which was claimed of him. 'Anaizah was at this time ruled by Zāmil, who had seen fighting in his youth as leader of the 'Anaizah contingent in a Wahhābi expedition against 'Omān, and whose name was honourably distinguished in the later history of Qasim; he had succeeded his cousin 'Abdullah, who was Shaikh in 1853, but his father also had once held the Shaikhship. The Wahhābis began their operations against 'Anaizah with a loose blockade organised by Mahanna from the neighbouring town of Buraidah, to which the people of 'Anaizah retorted vigorously by laying waste the lands and gardens of Buraidah. All Qasim secretly sympathised with the 'Anaizans, and even Buraidah itself, between which town and 'Anaizah enmity usually prevailed, was on the verge of rising against the Wahhābis. Ibn-Rashid and the Sharif of Makkah would willingly have intervened, but they dreaded a personal rupture with Ibn-Sa'ūd; and 'Anaizah was left to stand alone.\*

By degrees a large force was collected before 'Anaizah under a near relation of the Wahhābi Amir who brought with him Bedouin contingents from distant Hasa and still more distant 'Omān; Talāl, the Amir of Jabal Shammar, with his uncle 'Obaid joined the Wahhābi camp; and Mahanna, governor of Buraidah, and the Wahhābis of Qasim were already present. A regular siege of 'Anaizah was then undertaken, but the Wahhābi artillery produced no effect on the walls and the operations soon flagged, for the Qasim levy at heart desired their failure and the Bedouins brought from a distance felt no interest in their success. On one occasion a part of the besieging force was routed by a sally of the besieged, a Wahhābi standard was taken, and Zāmil, no less humane than courageous, was already exerting himself to prevent a massacre of the fugitives, when of a sudden a rain-storm broke and the matches of the 'Anaizah musketeers were extinguished: in a moment the mounted Wahhābis had ridden them down and the half-won victory of the defenders of 'Anaizah was converted into the most serious defeat that they suffered during the whole siege. After this only two petty skirmishes took place, and finally the Wahhābis retired leaving 'Anaizah as they found it, a free town.

#### Period from 1862 to 1891.

During the next 30 years Qasim appears to have enjoyed immunity from disturbances, except those of a petty character resulting from raids by Bedouins upon Bedouins, and from punitive expeditions by the settled population against nomad breakers of the peace. In 1878 a notable defeat was inflicted on the Qūhtān near the wells of Dukhnah by the Mutair, with whom they were at feud, assisted by the townsmen of 'Anaizah. By 1880 Buraidah had become a practically independent town

Qasim independent and at rest from war, 1862-80.

\* At this juncture Palgrave, whose special mission from the Emperor of the French to the Wahhābi Amir is noticed in the history of Najd, passed through Qasim on his way from Hail to Riyadh.

and no longer paid any deference to the Wahhābi ruler; but it showed considerable respect for the Amir of Jabal Shammar, whose power was now increasing from day to day. This was the time of the wanderings in Qasim of the enterprising French cartographer Mr. C. Huber and of his greater contemporary, the private English traveller Mr. C. M. Doughty, whose name stands with that of Niebuhr above those of all other workers in the Arabian field.

A little after this Ibn-Rashid possessed himself of Buraidah and its dependencies; but he was at first no more successful than the Wahhābis had been in his efforts to subjugate 'Anaizah. In 1885 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, a Wahhābi commander, defeated the Shammar Amir in Qasim and temporarily recovered Buraidah; this was, for the time the last decided success gained by the Wahhābis in Qasim. In 1890 a combination to resist the progress of Ibn-Rashid was formed, embracing the whole of Qasim and Southern Najd besides the Bedouin tribes of the 'Ataibah and Mutair; but it was disastrously defeated, at the battle of Buraidah or Mulaidah, which was fought in March or April 1891. The veteran Zāmil of 'Anaizah, who seems to have been the leading spirit among the confederates, was himself among the slain; with him fell his second son 'Ali and his relatives Khālid-bin-'Abdullah and 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Ibrāhīm; and a number of the ruling Salaimi family of Buraidah were carried into captivity at Hail.

Qasim conquered by Ibn-Rashid, 1880-91.

#### Qasim a district of Jabal Shammar, 1891-1904.

The Shammar Amir at once placed Qasim under a governor of his own, and for ten years the political position of the district remained unchanged. In 1901 the invasion of Qasim by the Shaikh of Kuwait, acting in the Wahhābi interest, encouraged the Qusmān to hope for release from Shammar tyranny; but their expectations were disappointed by the defeat of the invaders at the battle of Sarif, and many of them suffered severely for having ventured to show premature sympathy with the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd. Among those killed in the battle were Sālih-bin-'Ali, Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Muhammad-bin-Hasan, Sālih-bin-'Abdullah, 'Ali-bin-'Abdullah, and Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhīm, all belonging to the ruling Abul Khail family of Buraidah; and several other members of that family were either deported by Ibn-Rashid to Hail or obliged to seek safety in exile. At length, in March 1904, the whole of Qasim was lost to Ibn-Rashid in consequence of an encounter, near 'Anaizah, between his troops and those of the Wahhābis.

#### Turkish invasion of Qasim, 1904, and Turkish occupation of the district, 1905-06.

The subsequent course of events in Qasim is so fully described in the preceding chapter on the history of Najd that nothing can be added here.

In 1904 the Turks, in alliance with Ibn-Rashid, invaded Qasim; but they suffered two serious defeats at the hands of the Qusmān and Ibn-Sa'ūd and were obliged to retire to the village of Kahāfah in Jabal Shammar. In April 1905, under arrangements made with Ibn-Sa'ūd, they achieved a pacific occupation of Qasim which continued until November 1906; but it was never effective, and they were unable to prevent the Wahhābis from attacking and killing their ally Ibn-Rashid on the borders of the district, or to obtain any satisfaction from Ibn-Sa'ūd for the kidnapping by his son of Salih-bin-Hasan, Amīr of Buraidah, whom they had appointed to be Qāim-Maqām. In 1907 the Turkish troops remaining in Qasim numbered less than 50 men. After the death of Ibn-Rashid a number of political prisoners belonging to the ruling families of 'Anaizah and Buraidah, taken after the battles of Buraidah (1891) and Sarif (1901), were released; and others who had been living abroad began to return home from exile.

## CHAPTER IX.

### HISTORY OF TURKISH 'IRĀQ.

In 1600, the year from which we begin our survey of the modern history of Turkish 'Irāq, Muhammad III was Sultān of Turkey; and war prevailed, as related in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, between him and Shah 'Abbās I, the Safavi monarch of Persia. In 1600 a considerable part of north-western Persia, conquered by the Turks some years previously, was still subject to the Porte and formed a Pashāliq of Tabriz, which was reckoned the third in the Ottoman Empire as being next in dignity after those of Cairo and Baghdad; but in 1603, that is shortly before the death of Muhammad III, Tabriz was recovered by the Persians, and the Turks were partially expelled from Persia.

#### AHMAD I, 1603—17.\*

Muhammad III died on the 22nd of December 1603 and was succeeded in the Sultanate by Ahmad I, the elder of his two surviving sons.

\* The special authorities for the history of Turkish 'Irāq from 1600 to 1773 are an anonymous official *Précis of Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1905; besides which the *Voyage en Arabie*, 1776 of Niebuhr, who travelled in the country in 1765-1766, contains a large amount of relevant information. Facts relating to particular periods will also be found in the following works: *Travels of Pedro Teixeira*, 1902, relating to 1604; *Travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle*, 1665, relating to 1625; *Collections of Travels through Turkey into Persia and the East Indies*, 1684, by J. B. Tavernier, whose journey in Turkish 'Irāq was made in 1652; and a *New Account of the East Indies*, 1739, by Captain A. Hamilton, whose acquaintance with the country seems to have extended from 1688 to 1723. Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, may be consulted for general Turkish affairs during the period, and Sir J. Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, in regard to Turko-Persian relations.